THIRD SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 7786/09
Lyudmila Nikolayevna TRYAPITSYNA
against Russia
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 15 March 2016 as a Committee composed of:
Helena Jäderblom, President,
Dmitry Dedov,
Branko Lubarda, judges,
and Marialena Tsirli, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 13 October 2008,
Having regard to the decision to apply the pilot-judgment procedure taken in the case of Burdov v. Russia (no. 2) (no. 33509/04, ECHR 2009),
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
FACTS
1. The applicant, Ms Lyudmila Nikolayevna Tryapitsyna, is a Russian national who was born in 1956 and lives in Penza (region of Penza). The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights.
A. The circumstances of the case
2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
3. The applicant worked at the Extradepartmental Security Unit of the Leninskiy Department of the Interior of Penza. On 20 October 2006 the applicant was dismissed from the service due to staff reduction.
4. On 6 July 2007 the Justice of the Peace of the Court Circuit No. 4 of the Leninskiy District of Penza ordered the applicant’s former employer to pay the applicant 1,302.83 Russian roubles (RUB) as arrears in payments of the average wages paid to her after the dismissal and RUB 700 as compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The judgment came into force on 27 September 2007.
5. On 11 October 2007 the applicant obtained the writ of execution. On 22 October 2007 she submitted it to the bailiff’s office.
6. On 1 November 2007 the bailiffs returned the writ of execution to the applicant. The ruling to return the writ of execution stated that since the debtor was a budgetary institution of a constituent entity of the Russian Federation, the writ of execution should be submitted to the body holding accounts of the debtor.
7. On 11 December 2007 the applicant challenged the decision of the bailiffs to return the writ of execution in domestic courts.
8. On 15 January 2008 the Leninskiy District Court of Penza dismissed the applicant’s claims. The court confirmed that the bailiffs had lawfully returned the writ. It clarified that, in accordance with Article 239 of the Budget Code, as in force at the material time, the bailiffs were not entitled to recover the debt, since the debtor was a legal entity funded by the federal budget. The court’s judgment further stated that in accordance with Article 242.3 of the Budget Code the writ of execution against the recipients of the funds from the federal budget should be sent to that branch of the Federal Treasury where the debtor had accounts.
9. On 19 February 2008 the decision was upheld on appeal by the Penza Regional Court.
10. On 26 September 2008 the applicant submitted the writ of execution to the Federal Treasury Department of the Penza region.
11. On 1 October and on 3 October 2008 the awards in accordance with the judgment of 6 July 2007 were paid to the applicant.
B. Relevant domestic law
12. Article 239 §§ 2 and 3 of the Budget Code of the Russian Federation, as in force at the material time, provided that the bailiffs’ service were not entitled to execute judicial decisions recovering funds from the budgetary system of the Russian Federation. Execution of such decisions was regulated by Chapter 24.1 of the Budget Code (Articles 242.1-242.5).
13. Article 242.1 § 1 of the Budget Code provided that enforcement of judicial decisions recovering funds from the budgetary system of the Russian Federation was held on the basis of the enforcement documents (writ of execution, court order).
14. Article 242.3 § 1 provided that the creditor or the court acting on his or her behalf should send the necessary enforcement documents to the relevant branch of the Federal Treasury that holds the debtor’s accounts.
COMPLAINTS
15. The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of the Protocol No. 1 to the Convention about the delayed enforcement of the binding and enforceable judgment rendered in her favour. The applicant also made accessory complaints with reference to various Articles of the Convention and its Protocols.
THE LAW
16. The applicant complained that the authorities’ prolonged failure to comply with the binding and enforceable judgment in her favour violated her right to a court under Article 6 of the Convention and the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions under Article 1 Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. As far as relevant, these Articles read as follows:
Article 6 § 1
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law ...”
17. The Government argued that the complaint is inadmissible because the applicant had failed to comply with the minimal cooperation requirement and caused a substantial delay in the enforcement of the judgment.
18. The applicant did not comment on that point, and maintained her complaints.
19. The Court notes that the judgment in the applicant’s favour became final on 27 September 2007 and the relevant sums were transferred to the applicant’s bank account on 1 and 3 October 2008. Thus, it took the authorities one year and one week to enforce the judgment.
20. According to the Court’s consistent position, a delay of more than one year in payment of a monetary judicial award is prima facie incompatible with the Convention. However, this presumption may be rebutted in view of particular circumstances of the case and with due regard to the criteria of “reasonableness” laid down in the Court’s case-law (see, among others, Gerasimov and Others v. Russia, nos. 29920/05, et al., § 169, 1 July 2014; see further Belkin and Others v. Russia (dec.), no. 14330/07, 5 February 2009, in which the enforcement delays of less than one year were found compatible with the Convention requirements).
21. The reasonableness of a delay is to be determined having regard, in particular, to the complexity of the enforcement proceedings, the applicant’s own behaviour and that of the competent authorities, the amount and the nature of the award (see Raylyan v. Russia, no. 22000/03, § 31, 15 February 2007).
22. It has been the Court’s constant approach that a person who has obtained a judgment against the State may not be expected to bring separate enforcement proceedings (see Metaxas v. Greece, no. 8415/02, § 19, 27 May 2004). The burden to ensure compliance with a judgment against the State lies primarily with the State authorities starting from the date on which the judgment becomes binding and enforceable (see Burdov (no. 2), cited above, § 69). For instance, the Court has found on several occasions that, in the absence of clear instructions as to the enforcement procedure to be followed, an applicant cannot be blamed for the delay in submitting the writ of execution to the competent agency. It is incumbent on the State to organise its legal system in such a way that ensures co-ordination between various enforcement agencies and secures honouring of the State’s judgment debts in good time (see Fitisov v. Russia, no. 41842/04, § 28, 8 November 2007, and Reynbakh v. Russia, no. 23405/03, § 23, 29 September 2005).
23. At the same time, the Court has accepted that a successful litigant may be required to undertake certain procedural steps in order to recover the judgment debt (see Shvedov v. Russia, no. 69306/01, § 32, 20 October 2005). The creditor’s uncooperative behaviour may be an obstacle to timely enforcement of a judgment, thus alleviating the authorities’ responsibility for delays (see Belayev v. Russia (dec.), no. 36020/02, 22 March 2011). In several Russian cases, the Court has found that where the Budget Code, in force at the material time, provided for a successful litigant to be able to request the trial court to forward the writ of execution directly to the competent State authority, and where the applicant for any reason obtained himself the writ of execution from the trial court, it was logical to require that he submitted it to the competent authority with a view to enforcement of the judgment (see Li v. Russia, no. 38388/07, § 17, 24 April 2014, and Gadzhikhanov and Saukov v. Russia, nos. 10511/08 and 5866/09, § 26, 31 January 2012).
24. Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the applicant obtained the writ of execution and submitted it to the bailiff’s service. However, the writ of execution was returned to the applicant on 1 November 2007. As she disagreed with the decision to return the writ, the applicant brought court proceedings to clarify the matter. The Court is prepared to accept that at the initial stage of the proceedings the applicant could still have had reasonable doubts as to the procedure to follow in order to have the judgment enforced, and thus could not be blamed for the delay in forwarding the writ to a competent domestic authority.
25. However, the Court considers that, by contrast to the mentioned above cases, the applicant’s possible doubts as to the procedure to follow were dispelled in the domestic proceedings which ended as early as on 19 February 2008 with the final judgment of the Penza Regional Court. The domestic courts at two instances established that the bailiffs had not been entitled by law to recover the debt, confirmed the lawfulness of their decision to return the writ and advised the applicant, in clear and unambiguous terms, that the writ was to be resubmitted to the relevant branch of the Federal Treasury.
26. Nevertheless, for an unspecified reason the applicant submitted the writ of execution to the Federal Treasury the Penza Region only on 26 September 2008. Thus, it took her more than seven months to follow the procedure suggested by the domestic courts. The Court further notes that after the submission of the writ of execution to the Federal Treasury Department of the Penza region in September 2008 the debt was paid to the applicant within approximately one week.
27. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that a delay of seven months is attributable to the applicant. Her failure during the above period to comply with the domestic court’s clarifications and to take reasonable procedural steps was an obstacle to the enforcement of the judgment within reasonable time. Consequently, the authorities cannot be held responsible under the Convention for the delayed enforcement of the judgment of 6 July 2007.
28. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill‑founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
29. Referring to various Articles of the Convention and its Protocols, the applicant complained about the unfairness of more than twenty rounds of domestic proceedings concerning her allegedly unlawful dismissal.
30. However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.
31. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill‑founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 7 April 2016.
Marialena TsirliHelena Jäderblom
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy