FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 13419/04
by Ivan Krastev TSVETKOV
against Bulgaria
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 10 May 2011 as a Chamber composed of:
Nicolas Bratza, President,
Sverre Erik Jebens,
Päivi Hirvelä,
Ledi Bianku,
Zdravka Kalaydjieva,
Nebojša Vučinić,
Vincent A. de Gaetano, judges,
and Lawrence Early, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 1 April 2004,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Ivan Krastev Tsvetkov, is a Bulgarian national who was born in 1939 and lives in Sofia. The Bulgarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs R. Nikolova, of the Ministry of Justice.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
On 15 November 1997 the applicant entered into a preliminary contract under which a Mr K.N. undertook to sell to the applicant a plot of land. Shortly afterwards, K.N. died.
On 17 November 1998 the applicant brought an action against K.N.’s heirs before the Sofia District Court, requesting the court to declare the contract final.
In these proceedings the applicant argued that K.N. could have sold the land as he had obtained it through adverse possession. The defendants contested the claim, stating that the land had belonged to their father, a son of K.N., who had died before K.N. and who had purchased the plot in 1969.
The court held a number of hearings in which the applicant participated without counsel.
By a judgment of 19 May 2000 the District Court dismissed the action, finding that the preliminary contract had been null and void ab initio as it had not determined with sufficient precision the boundaries of the disputed plot of land.
On an unspecified date the applicant filed an appeal with the Sofia Regional Court.
The court held several hearings. At the hearing of 7 February 2002 the applicant failed to appear. According to the record from the hearing, the court accepted a request, filed by the applicant’s representative, for additional evidence to be obtained.
By a judgment of 9 July 2002 the Regional Court upheld the lower court’s judgment.
On 5 December 2002 the applicant filed a cassation appeal, presenting once again his arguments, namely that the preliminary contract had been valid as the plot had been identifiable and that K.N. had acquired it through adverse possession. The defendants made submissions in reply, which were accessible to the applicant.
The hearing before the Supreme Court of Cassation was listed for 18 February 2004.
On 16 February 2004 the applicant requested the adjournment of the hearing on the ground of ongoing health problems. In support he presented a medical certificate.
At the hearing on 18 February 2004 the defendants objected to the applicant’s request for adjournment. They stated that the applicant had counsel who could represent him. Following deliberations, the court found that the applicant:
“... had had counsel in the proceedings before the second-instance court as evident from the legal representation contract [between him and] P.V. [The latter] was authorised to represent the [applicant] at all levels of the court proceedings ...”
The court therefore found that the conditions for adjournment set out in Article 107 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure had not been met and proceeded with the hearing.
At the hearing the defendants requested that the cassation appeal be dismissed on the grounds already set out in their written submissions in reply to the cassation appeal.
By a judgment of 27 February 2004 the Supreme Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal. The court examined the arguments of the parties and agreed with the applicant that the preliminary contract had been valid. It found, however, that K.N. had never obtained title to the plot.
The applicant has submitted a declaration by P.V. to the effect that he never acted as counsel for the applicant in the proceedings at issue.
B. Relevant domestic law
At the material time the relevant court was under a duty to adjourn a hearing in the event that a party and his representative were not able to attend due to an impediment which the party could not have removed (Article 107 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1952). This provision was reproduced verbatim in the new Code of Civil Procedure 2007 (Article 142 § 2).
At the material time the cassation appeal was to be submitted to the relevant Court of Appeal which was under a duty to send a copy to the other party. The other party was then entitled to submit, within fourteen days, submissions in reply to the cassation appeal. On expiration of this period, the Court of Appeal was duty-bound to send both the cassation appeal and the reply to the Supreme Court of Cassation, which would then examine the case in an open hearing (Article 218в § 1 in relation to Articles 218г and 218e of the Code of Civil Procedure 1952).
The Code of Civil Procedure 2007 introduced new requirements and procedure for the admissibility of cassation appeals.
COMPLAINT
The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the domestic courts had violated his right to a fair hearing. He complained, in particular, that the Supreme Court of Cassation had examined the case concerning his civil rights in his absence and in disregard of the evidence about his inability to attend.
THE LAW
The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 that the civil proceedings brought by him had been unfair. Article 6 § 1, in so far as relevant, provides that:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal...”
The Government argued, in particular, that the applicant had been able to set out his arguments in the text of his cassation appeal and the defendants had not raised any additional arguments during the hearing before the Supreme Court of Cassation.
The applicant did not submit observations in reply.
The Court observes at the outset that it is unclear whether the applicant had authorised counsel at some point of the proceedings. However, the Court need not investigate this issue or the question whether the Supreme Court of Cassation erred in fact or law when it decided to proceed in the applicant’s absence as the complaint is in any event manifestly ill-founded for the reasons stated below.
The Court reiterates that while Article 6 § 1 of the Convention does not compel the Contracting States to set up courts of appeal or of cassation, where such courts do exist the proceedings before them must comply with the guarantees of Article 6 (see, among many other authorities, Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], no. 55707/00, § 97, ECHR 2009‑...). When deciding whether that provision has been complied with, “appearances” are relevant, as is the seriousness of what was at stake for the applicant (see, for example, A.B. v. Slovakia, no. 41784/98, § 55, 4 March 2003). The principle of equality of arms, one of the features of the wider concept of a fair trial, dictates that each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case under conditions that do not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent (see, among many other authorities, Kress v. France [GC], no. 39594/98, § 72, ECHR 2001‑VI).
Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the applicant could not take part in person in the public hearing before the Supreme Court of Cassation. The salient issue is whether the court’s decision to proceed in his absence placed the applicant in a substantially disadvantageous position vis‑à-vis his opponent and deprived him of a reasonable opportunity to present his case.
First, the Court notes that the applicant participated actively in the proceedings at two levels of jurisdiction and was able to lodge a cassation appeal, in which he presented his arguments. Furthermore, these arguments were scrutinised by the Supreme Court of Cassation in its judgment of 27 February 2004.
Secondly, the applicant had the opportunity to acquaint himself with the defendants’ response to the cassation appeal before the hearing took place. While it is true that the applicant was not able to participate in the hearing in person, he could have made written submissions to the court in reply to the defendants’ position or appoint counsel to attend in his stead. Furthermore, the defendants did not raise any additional arguments during the hearing.
Lastly, the applicant has not maintained before the Court that he intended to raise a particular fact or argument before the Supreme Court of Cassation and that he was prevented from so doing as a result of that court’s decision to proceed in his absence.
The above is sufficient to conclude that the applicant was not placed in a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis the defendants and was not deprived of his right to a fair hearing.
The Court finds, therefore, that the complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Lawrence EarlyNicolas Bratza
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy