Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC]

Legal summary

July 2025

Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC] - 43800/14, 8019/16, 28525/20 et al.

Judgment 9.7.2025 [GC]

Article 1

Jurisdiction of States

Responsibility of States

Respondent State’s jurisdiction over areas in eastern Ukraine under separatist control and areas under control of Russian armed forces after 2022 invasion; for complaints concerning military attacks by separatists or the Russian armed forces on Ukrainian territory; for its authorities’ actions in Russian sovereign territory

Article 33

Inter-State application

Multiple, flagrant and unprecedented Convention violations in Ukraine resulting from the downing of flight MH17 and numerous administrative practices

Article 46

Article 46-2

Execution of judgment

Individual measures

Respondent State, without delay, to release or safely return all persons deprived of their liberty in occupied territory and to cooperate in establishing a mechanism for the identification of all children transferred from Ukraine to Russia and Russian-controlled territory and their reunification with their families or legal guardians

Facts – The case arises from events which began in the spring of 2014 with the occupation and annexation by Russia of Crimea, part of Ukrainian sovereign territory, and the appearance of pro-Russian separatist armed groups in eastern Ukraine who subsequently took control of territory in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and declared independence from Ukraine. The violence rapidly escalated, with separatist armed groups seizing public buildings and towns. The government of Ukraine launched an “Anti-Terrorist Operation” to re-establish control. The separatists held “referendums” in territory under separatist control and subsequently declared the independence of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”) and the “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”). The fighting intensified and on 17 July 2014 flight MH17 was downed in the Donetsk region, causing the deaths of all 298 civilians aboard, including 196 Dutch nationals.

On 24 February 2022 Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian armed forces entered Ukrainian sovereign territory at various border points and launched attacks by land, air and sea. Ukrainian towns and cities in the north, south and east were subjected to heavy airstrikes and artillery fire causing large‑scale death, injury and destruction. Over the subsequent years, control over territory in Ukraine has shifted in the face of Russian advances and Ukrainian counter-offensives. Heavy fighting continues on multiple fronts. Russian aerial strikes continue across Ukraine.

The case encompasses four inter-state applications.

The first three applications (nos. 8019/16, 43800/14 and 28525/20) concern complaints related to the conflict in eastern Ukraine involving the separatists from spring 2014. In its two applications, the Ukrainian Government pleaded an administrative practice by Russia of numerous Convention violations. The application lodged by the Dutch Government concerned alleged violations of Articles 2, 3 and 13 resulting from the downing of flight MH17.

By a decision of 25 January 2023, the Grand Chamber declared the three applications partially admissible.

On 17 February 2023 the Grand Chamber decided to join the fourth application (no. 11055/22) to the pending case. The application concerns the Ukraine Government’s complaints of further administrative practices committed by the Russian Federation following its full-scale invasion beginning on 24 February 2022.

Law –

(1) Preliminary observations and general findings –

(a) Participation of the respondent State – The respondent State had not participated in the proceedings on the merits in respect of the first three applications or in the proceedings on the admissibility and merits of the fourth application. Respecting the adversarial nature of and the need for equality of arms between the parties in the proceedings, the Court continued to engage in correspondence with the respondent Government in the normal manner. A respondent State’s failure or refusal to participate effectively in the proceedings was not in itself a reason for the Court to discontinue the examination of an application. The Court found that there was insufficient cause for the respondent Government’s failure to submit a memorial or to participate in the hearing. It thus decided to proceed with its examination of the case, finding that that was consistent with the proper administration of justice.

(b) Terminology – Whether the conduct of the Russian Federation in Ukraine amounted and amounts to an invasion, to an occupation and to an annexation was a matter of fact to be established on the evidence. The Court was satisfied, bearing in mind the ordinary meaning of the word “invasion”, that the entry of Russian armed forces into Ukrainian territory from 24 February 2022 in the circumstances outlined in its judgment had amounted to an invasion.

Furthermore, to the extent that Ukrainian territory was found to be under the Russian Federation’s effective control for the purposes of that State’s jurisdiction under Article 1, the Court considered it appropriate to refer to such territory as occupied territory.

Applying the definition of “annexation” by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, the Court considered that any Ukrainian sovereign territory under the respondent State’s effective control which the latter had purported formally to integrate into the Russian Federation, and to which it had, accordingly, applied its own laws in the place of the applicable Ukrainian law, might be described as annexed territory. The terms “annexed” and “annexation”, where used by the Court in its judgment, did not imply any recognition of a transfer of sovereignty over the areas in question.

The Court clarified that any description of the conduct of the Russian Federation in Ukraine as an invasion, an occupation and an annexation was not intended to do more than describe the situation as it presented itself as a matter of fact and was without prejudice to any different assessment of the facts made by any other tribunal in separate legal proceedings. It did not reflect any evaluation of, or judgment as to, the legality or otherwise as a matter of international law more generally of the acts in question.

(c) The third-party interveners – Thirty third-party interveners had provided written submissions to the Court, including twenty-six High Contracting Parties which was unprecedented. The intervention by twenty-six High Contracting Parties reflected their perception of the importance of the case to the Convention system as a whole. Their common submissions expressed not only their joint position on the specific legal issues arising in the case but also their shared view of the respondent State’s conduct in the light of the Council of Europe’s underlying aims and objectives.

(d) The present conflict – The Court noted that the admissibility hearing had taken place against the backdrop of increasing tensions in the region and since then the nature of the conflict had substantially changed. As the Court deliberated on the case before it, the hostilities had continued on Ukrainian territory, with new deaths and extensive destruction every month. There had been widespread condemnation of the Russian Federation’s actions from the international community.

The transformation from covert to openly acknowledged operations in Ukraine had brought transparency to the Russian Federation’s objectives in Ukraine which appeared to be no less than the destruction of Ukraine as an independent sovereign State, through the forcible acquisition of Ukrainian territory and the subjugation of any remaining Ukrainian nation to Russian influence and control. The Russian Federation had, moreover, not identified any clear limitations to its territorial ambitions, either in Ukraine or beyond and the potential for further escalation had frequently been invoked by senior Russian political figures.

Although the Court had already examined applications arising out of situations of conflict in Europe, the events in Ukraine were unprecedented in the history of the Council of Europe. The nature and scale of the violence as well as the ominous statements of the Respondent State’s President and other senior Government figures concerning Ukraine’s statehood, its independence and its very right to exist represented a threat to the peaceful co-existence that Europe had long taken for granted. The dangerous rhetoric had also on occasion been extended to encompass other Council of Europe member States, including Poland, Moldova and the Baltic countries. Those actions sought to undermine the very fabric of the democracy on which the Council of Europe and its member States were founded by their destruction of individual freedoms, their suppression of political liberties and their blatant disregard for the rule of law. In none of the conflicts previously before the Court had there been such near universal condemnation of the “flagrant” disregard by the respondent State for the foundations of the international legal order established after the Second World War and such clear measures taken by the Council of Europe to sanction the respondent State’s disrespect for the Council of Europe’s fundamental values: peace, human life, human dignity and the individual rights guaranteed by the Convention.

The Court was not called upon to decide on the legality of Russia’s invasion and occupation of Ukraine in the abstract or the individual criminal responsibility of those implicated in the events, but rather to decide on the conformity of the respondent State’s actions with the fundamental guarantees contained in the Convention and its Protocols.

(e) Temporal jurisdiction – The Court’s temporal jurisdiction did not extend further than 16 September 2022, when the Russian Federation ceased to be a Party to the Convention. The Court could, however, have regard to facts which had occurred following the termination date in so far as it considered appropriate in its assessment of whether there had been a violation of the Convention in respect of acts which occurred prior to 16 September 2022.

(f) Approach to the evidence – The Court applied the approach to the evidence, to the burden and standard of proof and to the drawing of inferences outlined in its admissibility decision with one exception: since the Court was examining the merits of the alleged violations, the applicable standard of proof to be satisfied was that of “beyond reasonable doubt”.

(g) Relationship between the Convention and international humanitarian law – The applicant Governments and third-party interveners had invited the Court to clarify its approach to the interpretation of the Convention’s provisions in situations of armed conflict and the relevance in that respect of IHL provisions, particularly in circumstances like those in the present case where no derogation under Article 15 of the Convention had been lodged.

In that respect the Court confirmed its duty to interpret the Convention in the light of the rules set out in Article 31 § 3 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and so far as possible in harmony with other rules of international law of which it formed part, including IHL. In particular, in the context of international armed conflict the specific IHL provisions did not displace Convention human rights guarantees but were used as an interpretative tool when determining the scope of those guarantees; the safeguards under the Convention continued to apply.

In examining the alleged violations of specific Convention Articles against the backdrop of international armed conflict, the Court observed that it would have regard to the relevant IHL provisions, interpret IHL and where necessary for it to carry out its role, assess the respondent State’s compliance with IHL provisions. In its admissibility decision, the Court had acknowledged that a harmonious interpretation of Convention provisions with relevant IHL provisions might not be possible in the absence of a derogation under Article 15, since the provisions might be in conflict with one another, as regards the Article 2 complaints advanced by the applicant Governments. It would address whether such conflict arose on the facts of the present case in the context of those complaints.

(2) Jurisdiction and attribution –

Article 1 (complaints in respect of which jurisdiction now falls to be determined):

(a) Continuing jurisdiction in the “DPR” and the “LPR” on the basis of effective control – Given the absence of any information to suggest a decrease in the level of control exercised by the respondent State over the “DPR” and the “LPR” since the hearing on admissibility on 26 January 2022, and the formalisation of the control already exercised by it through the purported “accession” of those two territories to the Russian Federation and the retroactive application of Russian criminal law to the territories and assimilation of “DPR” and “LPR” interests to those of the Russian Federation itself, the Court found that those areas continued to be under the respondent State’s effective control throughout the period falling within the Court’s temporal jurisdiction (i.e., until 16 September 2022).

(b) Jurisdiction in respect of the complaints in application no. 11055/22 – The complaints concerning the Russian authorities’ actions on Russian sovereign territory, in respect of filtration processes and the transfer and adoption of children, clearly fell within Russia’s jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1.

In so far as the complaints concerned the respondent State’s actions in areas in the hands of the Russian armed forces after the 2022 invasion, it was clear from the evidence and the speed and scale of the Russian advance, that the respondent State’s military presence in Ukraine was substantial. As a result, Russian armed forces had taken control of areas of Ukraine. The fact that some of the territory in question had been later recovered by Ukraine during successful counter-offensives did not undermine that conclusion. By virtue of the control exercised over the territory concerned by the Russian armed forces, the Court held that Russia exercised effective control over such territory and thus had jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 for any period during which such areas had remained under the control of its armed forces, up until 16 September 2022.

(c) Jurisdiction in respect of military attacks between 2014 and 2022 – In its admissibility decision the Court had joined to the merits the respondent Government’s objection as to whether the applicant Ukrainian Government’s complaints of administrative practices of bombing and shelling in violation of Article 2 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, together with associated Article 14 complaints, fell within the respondent State’s Article 1 jurisdiction. With the joining of application no. 11055/22, the Court also had to examine the military attacks referred to in that application.

The reality of the extensive, strategically planned military attacks perpetrated by Russian forces across Ukrainian sovereign territory between 2014 and 2022, carried out with the deliberate intention and indisputable effect of assuming authority and control, falling short of effective control, over areas, infrastructure and people in Ukraine, was wholly at odds with any notion of chaos. In planning and in executing, directly or via the armed forces of the “DPR” and “LPR”, its military attacks across Ukrainian territory with a view to acquiring and retaining effective control over areas of sovereign Ukrainian territory and thereby removing those areas from the effective control of Ukraine, the Russian Federation had assumed a degree of responsibility over those individuals affected by its attack. In those circumstances, the Russian Federation exercised, through its de jure and de facto armed forces, authority and control over individuals affected by its military attacks up until 16 September 2022. Such individuals therefore fell within its jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1. It followed that the Russian Federation was under an obligation pursuant to that provision to secure to individuals affected by its military attacks the Convention rights and freedoms relevant to their situation.

(d) Attribution – Acts and omissions of the Russian military were acts of Russian State organs and were plainly attributable to the respondent State. In its admissibility decision, the Court had already explained that the acts and omissions of separatists in the areas under the effective control of the Russian Federation had been attributable to that State. It was right to equate the separatists with de facto organs of the Russian Federation, within the meaning of Article 4 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility. Any other solution would allow States to avoid their Convention obligations by choosing to act through entities whose supposed independence was purely fictitious.

Conclusion: jurisdiction established (unanimously); preliminary objection concerning military attacks dismissed (unanimously).

(3) Downing of Flight MH17 –

(a) Article 2 (substantive limb):

The Court agreed that the evidence suggested that the missile had been intentionally fired at flight MH17, most likely in the mistaken belief that it had been a military aircraft but in the full knowledge that the deaths of all those on board would be the inevitable outcome. Based on the evidence gathered by the international joint investigation team (“JIT”), and in the absence of any information from the Russian Federation, the only reasonable conclusion was that the missile had been fired by a member of the Russian military crew of the Buk-TELAR or by a member of the “DPR”. It was not necessary for the Court to determine exactly who had fired the missile since acts of the Russian armed forces and of the armed separatists had been attributable to the Russian Federation.

The Court accepted that a Buk-TELAR acting alone could not distinguish between military and civilian aircraft. Deploying a Buk-TELAR in isolation, without the remaining units of the Buk missile system and in particular without a Buk-TAR, and without other measures capable of accurately identifying military targets, would constitute a violation of IHL.

The Court inferred from the evidence and from the absence of any information from the Russian Federation that no other measures had been taken to ensure the accurate verification of the target of the Buk-TELAR in breach of the IHL principles of distinction and precautions. The attack had accordingly been an indiscriminate attack prohibited under IHL and thus did not constitute a lawful act of war. Accordingly, there was no potential conflict arising from the absence in Article 2 § 2 itself of any accommodation of deaths which were compatible with IHL. Furthermore, the intentional use of force leading to the deprivation of the lives of the civilians on board the flight could not, be justified under any of the grounds listed in Article 2 § 2.

Moreover, the Russian Federation, in addition to its negative obligation, had also violated the positive obligation inherent in Article 2 by failing to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those on board the flight. The Buk-TELAR had been deployed in an area where civilian flights had still been operating. A Buk missile had significant destructive power and the chances that the occupants of an aircraft struck by such a missile would survive an attack had been nil. In those exceptional circumstances, the Russian authorities knew or ought to have known of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the lives of all civilians present in civilian aircraft flying over the area. An obligation to take measures to avoid that risk accordingly arose.

The applicant Dutch Government had pointed to a number of administrative measures which could have significantly reduced or even eliminated the risk posed by the Buk-TELAR to civilians travelling in civilian aircraft over eastern Ukraine. The respondent State, however, had not provided an explanation for why none of these measures had been taken. The measures proposed represented the very minimum steps to be expected of a State deploying such a destructive weapon in those circumstances. The respondent State’s failure to take any steps had been representative of a cavalier attitude to the lives of civilians at risk from its hostile activities in eastern Ukraine.

Conclusion: violation (unanimously).

(b) Article 2 (procedural limb):

The Court held that the respondent State had failed to conduct an effective investigation into the downing of flight MH17. Any inquiries made by its authorities had been piecemeal, focusing on certain aspects of the incident ostensibly with a view to showing the lack of any Russian involvement and deflecting responsibility onto Ukraine. Those inquiries, which had not complied with the requirement of independence, had regularly resulted in the disclosure of information which had later been shown to have been at best inaccurate and at worst a complete fabrication. The next of kin of those killed had not been involved in any inquiries undertaken by the Russian authorities and had not been directly informed of the outcome. The inquiries had not been capable of leading to the establishment of the facts or the identification and punishment of those responsible.

Furthermore, the Russian authorities had failed to cooperate effectively with the JIT investigators and had failed to adequately respond to or execute legal assistance requests. The evidence from the JIT provided clear examples of the respondent State’s obstructive approach to attempts to elucidate the cause and circumstances of the crash. The inaccurate revelations and disclosures of the Russian Ministry of Defence had been directed at contradicting and undermining what the JIT investigation had revealed, deliberately setting false trails and wasting JIT time and resources. The failure to cooperate had had a material impact on the JIT’s ability to conclude its investigation into the involvement of the Russian armed forces and senior Russian politicians in the downing of the flight.

Conclusion: violation (unanimously).

(c) Article 13 in conjunction with Article 2:

The respondent State’s continued blanket denial of involvement in the downing of flight MH17 and refusal to provide information for scrutiny, had made it impossible for the full truth to be established by any independent fact-finding body. Consequently, any suggestion that the elucidation of the facts might be achieved and the liability of Russian State officials established in civil proceedings in Russia could only be described as fanciful. In those circumstances, there was no evidence that the victims’ relatives would have access to effective remedies in the Russian Federation capable of establishing the liability of State officials and awarding compensation.

Conclusion: violation (unanimously).

(d) Article 3 (substantive):

In its admissibility decision, the Court had joined to the merits the question whether the alleged suffering of the relatives of victims of the downing of flight MH17 had attained the minimum level of severity to fall within the scope of Article 3.

The Court had no doubt that the crash victims’ next of kin had experienced, and continued to experience, profound grief and distress on account of the killing of their loved ones and the aftermath of the crash. According to the reports of the psychologists and psychiatrists, the nature of the deaths of the victims had caused the next of kin profound grief of a traumatic nature which had gone beyond that inevitably experienced in the case of the loss of a relative.

Although the next of kin had not witnessed the downing of the aircraft or the crash site directly, they had not been able to avoid seeing the footage of the crash site and the bodies of their relatives shown very widely in the media. They had been forced to witness the gruesome images of the bodies of their relatives being treated with little respect at the crash site.

The respondent Government had not responded positively to the international community’s requests to ensure that the fighting ceased so that adequate measures could be taken to secure the crash site to recover the bodies in a timely and appropriate manner. As a result of the limited access to the crash site, it had taken eight months to complete the recovery of the bodies which throughout that period had remained out in the open. In those circumstances, together with the general lawlessness prevailing in the area of the crash site, the next of kin had experience a strong sense of powerlessness and anxiety. Some next of kin had been required to identify what remained of the bodies of their relatives in circumstances where the condition of the body had rendered the task even more distressing and some had to bury the incomplete bodies of their relatives; in some cases, further body parts had been returned to them after the burial had taken place. In two cases, the bodies had still not been recovered.

The next of kin had participated in the JIT investigation and had reached to the Russian authorities and the Russian President himself in a bid to obtain crucial information concerning the downing of the flight. The respondent State’s failure to carry out an effective investigation and their failure to cooperate with the JIT had significantly aggravated the suffering of the next of kin by prolonging the agonising wait for answers. It had left the relatives in a state of uncertainty as the exact circumstances of the downing of the flight and the responsibility of senior figures in the Russian Government.

For those reasons, the Court concluded that the continuing profound suffering of the next of kin of the victims of the downing of flight MH17 had a character and dimension that attained a level of severity amounting to inhuman treatment under Article 3.

Conclusion: violation (unanimously); preliminary objection dismissed (unanimously).

(4) Admissibility of Application no. 11055/22 – The respondent Government had not taken part in the proceedings on the admissibility and merits of this application and had not made any submissions on its admissibility.

The Court found that the majority of the complaints made in the application did not as such amount to new complaints but were a continuation of the complaints made in previous applications and already declared admissible s. Most of the new complaints of administrative practices were declared admissible:

– Article 3: causing of suffering exceeding the minimum level of severity through unlawful military attacks and abductions and forced disappearances;

– Article 8: forced displacement and transfer of civilians, involuntary displacement of civilians and prevention of their return home, the application of filtration measures, the destruction of homes and personal possessions and the theft and pillage of personal possessions;

– Article 11: unlawful interference with the peaceful right to protest;

– Article 2 of Protocol No. 1: failure to ensure a right of access to educational facilities and indoctrination of students;

– Article 14 in conjunction with the above Articles in respect of the above complaints;

– Article 13 in conjunction with Articles 2, 3, 4 § 2, 5, 8, 9, 10 and 11, Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4.

Conclusion: admissible (unanimously); remainder of new complaints inadmissible (unanimously).

(5) Administrative practices –

(a) Identification of the administrative practices alleged – The Court examined the allegation of unlawful military attacks in the context of the conduct of hostilities, in respect of which the applicant Ukrainian Government had pleaded a number of Convention Articles, as a single thematic complaint. Such attacks had not taken place in occupied territory and it was therefore appropriate to address them separately from allegations concerning the conduct of Russian agents in occupied areas. Similarly, it examined separately the allegation of the abduction and transfer to Russia of Ukrainian children which concerned a particular course of conduct alleged to engage a number of Convention rights and had occurred in both occupied Ukrainian territory and Russian sovereign territory. As to the remaining complaints the Court examined each Convention right one by one.

(b) Approach to the evidence for administrative practices and overall conclusions – The Court acknowledged that, given the overall context and the alleged pattern of violations, direct evidence of the alleged events might be difficult to come by, in view of the repeated restrictions on monitoring in occupied territory, witnesses’ or victims’ fear of retaliation or persecution for speaking out, and the fact that many of them could only share their accounts years later (after their release, in the case of detainees, or after Ukraine had reacquired control over occupied territory, for example). The Court therefore was satisfied that it could draw relevant inferences when assessing the evidence before it.

The Court relied in particular on primary evidence from the monitoring missions of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (the OHCHR) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (the OSCE) and from fact-finding bodies such as the UN Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine and OSCE Moscow mechanism experts.

On the basis of that evidence and the extensive additional evidence before it, the Court concluded beyond reasonable doubt that the reported incidents had been sufficiently numerous and interconnected to amount to a pattern or system of violations constituting repetition of acts.

Moreover, reports commented on the prevailing climate of impunity and general lawlessness in eastern Ukraine from 2014 and the lack of legitimate and effective judicial services. The reports of the UN Commission of Inquiry showed starkly the huge scale of the grave violations of human rights perpetrated by Russia across Ukrainian territory following the 2022 invasion. It was inconceivable that the higher authorities of the Russian Government could have been unaware of such practices over more than eight years. The evidence attested to the erosion of the rule of law in the areas under the control of the Russian forces and the atmosphere of fear and intimidation in the areas under their control or affected by their military attacks. Moreover, many of the measures had been of a regulatory nature. The unprecedented abuses described in the judgment could not have been carried out without the direct authorisation, encouragement and support of the higher authorities. Accordingly, the Court found it proven beyond reasonable doubt that the repetition of acts in violation of the Convention had been officially tolerated by the Russian authorities.

In respect of many of the alleged violations, the Court highlighted the absence of any basis in law for the actions taken. The respondent Government had failed to provide the necessary information to enable the Court to conclude that any legal acts adopted by the “DPR” and the “LPR” might be accepted as “law” for the purposes of its assessment of alleged Convention violations. Moreover, the conditions required for Russian law or measures taken by the occupying authorities to be recognised as providing a valid legal basis, for Convention purposes, for acts undertaken in Ukraine had not been met.

Taken as a whole, the evidence presented a picture of interconnected practices of manifestly unlawful conduct by agents of the respondent State on a massive scale.

The Court also underlined, as regards the qualified rights in the Convention, that there was no evidence of any constraints applied to agents of the Russian Federation in the exercise of the functions carried out by them on behalf of the respondent State. Extensive human rights violations had been committed on a huge scale not only without sanction but frequently as part of a far-reaching administrative system put in place by the respondent State’s authorities without any apparent safeguards whatsoever. It was, therefore, important to record that the evidence overwhelmingly showed conduct by the respondent State’s agents that, as well as being unlawful, had clearly been disproportionate to any aims that might be considered legitimate under the qualified rights in the Convention.

(c) Specific findings of administrative practices –

(i) Articles 2 and 3 (substantive), and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (administrative practice of military attacks against civilians and civilian objects in the period between 11 May 2014 and 16 September 2022); and Article 8 from 24 February 2022):

The evidence showed the use of heavy weaponry since the start of the conflict in 2014 and the frequent use of explosive weapons, cluster munitions, unguided rockets and multiple unguided bombs in populated areas. Military attacks by the separatists across the contact line had continued almost uninterrupted for the following seven and a half years with almost daily exchanges of fire with skirmishes and local escalations on a regular basis and periods of particularly active hostilities, such as the heavy shelling of populated areas. From 24 February 2022 the scale and territorial reach of the military attacks launched by the respondent State had escalated sharply with the almost total devastation of cities like Mariupol and Izium by the Russian armed forces. It was clear from the relevant reports that from that date, the respondent State’s armed forces, including “DPR” and “LPR” separatists, had conducted an intense, sustained and widespread campaign of military attacks. Those attacks had killed and injured thousands of civilians and damaged and destroyed civilian objects, including homes, hospitals, schools, commercial property and essential infrastructure and buildings sheltering civilians and clearly marked as such, on a massive scale. There was ample evidence of the extensive shelling of civilian areas in the absence of any immediately identifiable military targets.

There was no doubt as to the scale of the deaths, injury and damage to property which had been caused over the more than eight years of military attacks under examination. The Court had not been provided with figures for the number of civilians killed and injured as a result of military attacks by the respondent State prior to the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The OHCHR had recorded a total of 3,405 conflict-related civilian deaths and the number of injured civilians had been estimated to exceed 7,000. The OHCHR had a further recorded a further 6,306 civilian deaths and 9,602 wounded between the start of the full-scale invasion and 17 October 2022. The Court emphasised that those figures were based on verified fatalities and casualties. The actual number of civilians killed and injured because of military attacks were likely to be considerably higher.

Accordingly, Article 2 was applicable in respect of the military attacks conducted in breach of IHL by the respondent State between May 2014 and 16 September 2022. That was the case irrespective of whether such attacks had resulted in death or injury: the very nature of the conduct, involving indiscriminate and disproportionate military attacks and also attacks directed at residential areas and civilian infrastructure, had been such as to put civilian lives at risk. Those deadly attacks could not be justified under Article 2 § 2.

The Court also found that the intense and sustained military attacks on Ukrainian sovereign territory by the respondent State between 24 February 2022 and 16 September 2022 and their widespread failure to respect IHL provisions had inevitably created fear and terror among the civilian population in Ukraine. Survivors of attacks had been left physically scarred and psychologically traumatised. Those in besieged cities had been forced to shelter for weeks or months in dire conditions. The level of suffering met the minimum level of severity for the purposes of Article 3 and the military attacks amounted to inhuman treatment of civilians.

The above findings under Articles 2 and 3 also applied to military attacks on cities, notably in Mariupol, Izium and Chernihiv, which had amounted to a siege. However, in addition to violating its negative obligations, the Court found that the respondent State had also violated its positive obligations under those provisions by failing to take the necessary measures to protect civilian lives and well-being when conducting sieges between 24 February 2022 and 16 September 2022. The respondent State had been under an obligation to ensure adequate supplies of water, food and heat for settlements under siege as well as access to medical assistance and humanitarian corridors for the safe evacuation of the civilian population. However, the relevant reports revealed a complete disregard for the lives and well-being of civilians in besieged areas and there was no evidence of any such measures having been taken.

It was also plain from the evidence that the military attacks in breach of IHL had caused enormous damage to private property in Ukraine, including homes and personal possessions, commercial and business property and privately-owned energy, transport and medical facilities. It could not be said that that serious interference with the right to respect for homes and with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions had been in accordance with the law, pursued a public or general interest permitted by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention or had been necessary and proportionate.

Conclusion: violation (unanimously); Articles 2, 3, and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (from 11 May 2014 to 16 September 2022); Article 8 (from 24 February 2022 to 16 September 2022).

(ii) Article 2 (substantive) (administrative practice of extrajudicial killings in occupied territory from 11 May 2014 to 16 September 2022):

There was overwhelming evidence that demonstrated beyond any doubt that from the very outset of the conflict the armed separatists, and later Russian armed forces, had killed civilians who had quite clearly not been participating in the hostilities and Ukrainian soldiers who had indisputably been detained, unarmed and hors de combat. There was evidence of summary executions, deaths due to the use of force not in the immediate vicinity of hostilities, and deaths during detention. There was also a great deal of evidence as to the conduct of the Russian armed forces during their occupation of areas of Ukraine after 24 February 2022, in particular the frequent recourse to lethal violence against civilians and Ukrainian soldiers who had been hors de combat. There was evidence of the large-scale murder of civilians perpetrated in occupied territory in the immediate aftermath of the arrival in those areas of Russian armed forces and the unprovoked shooting of civilians, including children, seeking to flee hostilities in areas under Russian control.

The Court reiterated that the protection of civilians and military personnel hors de combat was a fundamental principle of IHL and found that the use of lethal force had not been justified under IHL. The killings could also not be justified by reference to the exceptions listed in Article 2 § 2.

Conclusion: violation (unanimously).

(iii) Article 3 (substantive) (torture and inhuman and degrading treatment of civilians and prisoners of war in occupied territory from 11 May 2014 to 16 September 2022):

The evidence showed that from the start of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, the armed separatists had used violence against detainees, both civilian and military, in areas under the effective control of the Russian Federation. There had been regular reports of incidents of violence across “DPR” and “LPR” territory in the context of abductions, deprivations of liberty, interrogations and forced entry between 11 May 2014 and 24 February 2022. A network of places existed of deprivation of liberty where people had been tortured and ill-treated and subjected to inhuman conditions of detention. After the 2022 invasion, the evidence showed a significant increase in the scale and in the gravity of acts of ill-treatment. The nature of the violence inflicted had been set out in details in reports before the Court and included beatings, forced nudity and intimate searches conducted during filtration and in detention places; mock executions; cutting off of body parts; electric shocks; use of prolonged stress positions in detention; exposure to extreme temperatures and forcing prisoners of war (“POWs”) to ingest their insignia. The evidence also showed that detainees had been forced to witness the severe beatings or summary executions of others.

There was evidence of a widespread and systemic use of sexual violence by armed separatists and Russian troops, in respect of men and women, old and young, from the outset of the conflict, which had escalated after the 2022 invasion. Rapes had been committed at gunpoint, with extreme brutality and accompanied by acts of torture, such as beatings, strangling or electric shocks. Women and men had often been subjected to sexual violence and rape in detention. There was also extensive evidence of rape outside classical situations of detention. Some victims had been gang-raped, others subjected to sexual slavery over long periods. Family members who had tried to intervene to stop the attacks had been killed.

Civilians and POWs had been subjected to repeated threats of violence, including threats of summary execution. The perpetrators had threatened to harm the victims’ close family members, including threatening to rape their children. Those threats had been made in a context where many of the victims had witnessed sexual violence or summary execution being perpetrated on others, with no regard for the age or vulnerabilities of victims.

In the face of the overwhelming evidence, the Court found it indisputable that there were multiple, repeated instances of the ill-treatment of civilians and POWs. There was a pattern of treatment, encompassing the practices described, that amounted to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering and involving the intentional infliction of severe pain and suffering with the aim, inter alia, of obtaining information, inflicting punishment and intimidating and humiliating victims. The prevalence of sexual violence and rape by Russian soldiers in occupied territory was especially abhorrent. It was persuaded that sexual violence and rape had been deployed in Ukraine following the 2022 invasion as part of a military strategy to dehumanise, humiliate and break the morale of the Ukrainian population, as individuals and as a community, and to assert dominance over Ukrainian sovereign territory. The sexual assaults and rape of civilians in communities across occupied territory in Ukraine, had been carried out within an overall context of lawlessness and with complete impunity, leaving women and men powerless to protect themselves and their families and living in fear. The systematic rape of women as a weapon of war was an act of extreme atrocity that amounted to torture.

Overall, the pattern of ill-treatment of civilians and POWs in occupied areas of Ukraine between 11 May 2014 and 16 September 2022 had amounted to torture and inhuman and degrading treatment.

There was also ample evidence for the same period of civilians and POWs being held in inadequate detention conditions, in blatant contravention of the applicable IHL provisions, which had amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment.

Finally, abductions and disappearances after 24 February 2022 had occurred in a context of mass arbitrary detentions and systematic and horrific abuse, with no possibility for the relatives to seek information or obtain an investigation. The Court found that flagrant, continuous and callous disregard of the obligation to account for the whereabouts and fate of missing relatives had caused suffering which had amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment.

Conclusion: violation (unanimously).

(iv) Article 4 § 2 (administrative practice of forced labour in occupied territory from 11 May 2014 to 16 September 2022):

The evidence of alleged forced labour had arisen almost exclusively in the context of detention by armed separatists or Russian armed forces. Although Article 4 § 3 excluded from the definition of “forced labour” any work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention imposed according to the provisions of Article 5, the Court found that that exception to the Article 4 § 2 prohibition of forced labour was inapplicable in the present case in the light of the widespread context of unlawful arrest and detention in breach of Article 5 in which those instances of alleged forced labour had occurred.

There had been credible reports of the separatists forcing detained Ukrainian soldiers and civilians to work from the early days of the conflict. They had been forced to carry out reconstruction and maintenance duties, to dig trenches, load and unload ammunition and engage in demining work. Tasks closely linked to the hostilities appeared t incompatible with IHL and demining work amounted to dangerous labour which was proscribed by IHL. Detainees had also been coerced or obliged to join the separatist forces and, later, the Russian armed forces to fight at the front lines. Shortly before the start of the 2022 invasion, the “DPR” and the “LPR” authorities had ordered the “general mobilisation” requiring all men between the ages of 18 and 55 to enlist in the separatist armed forces. Forcing civilians in occupied territory or POWs to serve in the forces of a hostile power was strictly prohibited by IHL. There was no evidence that the forced labour had been justified under IHL.

Conclusion: violation (unanimously).

(v) Article 5 (administrative practice of unlawful and arbitrary detention in occupied territory from 11 May 2014 to 16 September 2022):

There was comprehensive and detailed evidence as to the prevalence of abductions, kidnappings, arrests and detention across occupied areas of Ukraine in a general climate of fear and impunity. Journalists, religious leaders, Ukrainian civil servants, activists and those holding pro-Ukrainian unity views had been particularly targeted. The Court noted in particular the practice of administrative or preventive arrest widely employed in the “DPR” and the “LPR”. Those practices had been purportedly authorized for certain periods by legal instruments of the separatist entities but had also occurred in the absence of any purported legal framework. Countless civilians had been detained between 2014 and 2022. Following the 2022 invasion Russian armed forces had unlawfully confined large numbers of civilians in areas under their control. Victims had included local authority personnel, government personnel, veterans of the Ukrainian armed forces, volunteers evacuating civilians and civilians arrested for reasons which had not been apparent and without any review from a judicial or administrative body. Detainees had frequently not been informed of the reasons for their detention. The evidence also revealed that a process of filtration had been implemented across occupied territory to screen individuals seeking to leave besieged cities or other dangerous areas, including areas of military operations, for connections with or allegiance to the Ukrainian administration. That had often resulted in further screening at “filtration camps” and the detention of civilians on a large scale for long periods of time.

The respondent Government had not identified the purported legal grounds for the deprivations of liberty of countless civilians between 2014 and 2022 in occupied areas of Ukraine. They had not provided the Court with any arrest warrants or judicial decisions authorising any of the detentions. In the circumstances of the conflict, the Court was not in a position to identify itself any legal framework enabling deprivation of liberty in occupied areas. In so far as detention was purportedly authorised by regulatory measures adopted by the “DPR” or the “LPR”, or by the application of the Russian federal Law on Martial law in the occupied territories, none of these measures could provide a legal basis for the deprivation of liberty of civilians in Ukraine. There was also no evidence that the conditions permitting internment of civilians under IHL had been satisfied or that any procedural safeguards had been put in place.

The Court was satisfied beyond any doubt whatsoever that the pattern of unlawful and arbitrary detention of civilians had taken place across the occupied territories in Ukraine, without the most basic procedural safeguards.

Conclusion: violation (unanimously).

(vi) Article 8 (administrative practice of unjustified displacement and transfer of civilians in occupied territory and application of filtration measures from 24 February to 16 September 2022):

After the 2022 invasion millions of Ukrainian nationals had left their homes in the occupied territory or had been removed.

Some people had been detained and removed to Russian detention facilities, without any legal framework or official individual decisions authorising and regulating transfers.

Some had been directed to leave or escorted to Russia by armed men allegedly as a result of a purported humanitarian evacuation. The coercion involved in their removal from their homes was sufficient in itself to lead to the conclusion that such removal amounted to an interference for the purposes of Article 8. However, the available reports did not identify legitimate grounds for such “evacuations”. Nor had there been any explanation as to why people could not have been moved to safety within Ukraine. Moreover, it had not been shown that the “evacuation” of civilians from Ukraine to Russia could be justified under IHL/international law.

A large number of civilians had left their homes because of military action, the destruction of their homes and generalised violence and human-rights violations. The absence of direct physical force did not automatically render displacement voluntary. The Court found that the level of coercion caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression and abuse of power by Russian and separatist forces had been such that it had resulted in the forced displacement of civilians in occupied territory. The ongoing environment of coercion and terror in occupied territory had actively prevented, and continued to prevent, people from returning to their homes. The Court was satisfied that the displacement of civilians at liberty in occupied areas of Ukraine had amounted to an interference under Article 8.

The transfer and displacement of civilians in detention and at liberty in occupied territories of Ukraine had not been “in accordance with the law”.

Individuals had also been subjected to “filtration” measures in the form of invasive and abusive security checks, involving body searches and interrogation, detailed checks of mobile phones and personal belongings at “filtration” points or sites. The extensive database generated by the recording of all this information had likely been of assistance to the Russian authorities in the further identification, screening and surveillance of persons who opposed Russian occupation of Ukrainian territory. The sheer number of filtration sites and the equipment used indicated that the measures had been systemically applied. They had not been limited to combatants but had also been applied to civilians, including children. There was no evidence of any clear, detailed rules governing the scope and methods of the measures. Nor were there any minimum safeguards providing sufficient guarantees against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness. For these reasons the filtration measures had also not been “in accordance with the law”.

Conclusion: violation (unanimously).

(vii) Article 9 (administrative practice of intimidation, harassment and persecution of religious groups, aside from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, in occupied territory from 11 May 2014 to 16 September 2022):

Since May 2014 freedom of religion had been significantly curtailed in the occupied territories and this had continued after the 2022 invasion. Reported acts included, inter alia, the harassment and prosecution of religious figures of other religions or Christian churches as well as civilians engaging in worship in the context of those religions and churches, in breach of the requirements of international humanitarian law; attacks on the Prayer Marathon for peace and Ukrainian Unity in Donetsk; seizure of places of worship by separatists; ill-treatment, abduction and, in some cases the killing of religions leaders by separatists in eastern Ukraine; banning of religious material deemed to be “extremist” by separatist administrations and institutions, with Members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses particularly targeted; introduction of formal requirements for the mandatory registration and operation of religious groups which were applied restrictively to refuse registration to a number of religious organisations on undisclosed grounds; banning religious organisations as “extremist” organisations and seizing, destroying and banning, their religious material and publications; seizing of immovable property; prosecution of religious leaders and parishioners for organising or attending illegal gatherings. Extremism “laws” and other provisions purporting to ban “sects” had been applied in newly occupied territories to justify the confiscation of religious material and prevent religious worship by those outside the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate community. Furthermore, in 2022 the Russian occupation administration had “nationalised” property from religious communities and repurposed it for their own ends.

Unlawful deprivation of liberty, ill-treatment and torture and extrajudicial killing of civilians on account of their belonging to or practising their religion, plainly could not be justified under Article 9 § 2.

Purported legal acts of the “DPR” and the “LPR” and the Russian occupation administrations could not provide a legal basis for the other measures taken. There had been no legal basis for the seizure and confiscation of religious property or for the mandatory registration of religious communities in IHL. For these reasons the measures were not “prescribed by law”. In addition, it was unlikely that the measures taken in pursuance to purported legal acts proscribing extremism would satisfy the “quality of law” requirement inherent in “lawfulness” on account of the absence of safeguards to protect against an excessively broad interpretation of the concept of “extremism” by the “DPR”, “LPR” and other occupation authorities. It was also questionable whether a law purporting to limit to the followers of registered religious organisations only the right to manifest one’s religion would satisfy the “lawfulness” requirement in light of the fundamental inconsistency of such a law with the requirements of Article 9.

Conclusion: violation (unanimously).

(viii) Article 10 (administrative practice of interfering with the freedom to impart and received information and ideas in occupied territory from 11 May 2014 to 16 September 2022):

It plainly emerged from the evidence that Russian authorities and armed forces of the separatist administration had specifically targeted independent journalists from both international and Ukrainian media from the outset of the conflict in eastern Ukraine. They had instructed the media how to report on current events, under threat of harm, and prevented them from recording in conflict zones. Journalists who had criticised the separatists or who had not presented a sufficiently positive account of them were intimidated and detained. Media outlets, including individual bloggers, seeking to work in the “DPR” or the “LPR” were obliged to “register” or seek “accreditation”, which was refused for reasons which were not clear. Many journalists had been “convicted” of espionage, terrorism-related offences or extremism and sentenced to lengthy prison terms. Ukrainian and foreign broadcasters and websites had been blocked, and new “laws” had been applied prohibiting and penalising the dissemination of information in support of Ukraine. In territories under Russian effective control, Ukrainian media had been replaced by Russian media and the local residents had only had access to the latter. The evidence before the Court left no doubt as to the overall effect of those practices on the freedom of expression of the press and the local population’s access to information and, in particular, the chilling effect of the detention and ill-treatment of journalists.

The unlawful deprivation of liberty, ill-treatment and extrajudicial killing of civilians, including journalists, on account of the expression of information and ideas, clearly could not be justified under Article 10 § 2.

Purported legal acts of the “DPR” and the “LPR” and the Russian occupation administrations could not provide a legal basis for the other measures taken and no legal basis could be identified under IHL. The Court therefore concluded that the measures were not “prescribed by law”. Moreover, it was unlikely that the measures that had been taken in occupied areas of Ukraine pursuant to “legal acts” concerning extremism would satisfy the “quality of law” requirement inherent in “lawfulness” on account of the absence of safeguards to protect against an excessively broad interpretation of the concept of “extremism” by the “DPR”, “LPR” and other occupation authorities. Moreover, there was no evidence of any safeguards capable of protecting individuals from the apparently excessive and arbitrary effects of the measures used to block access to websites and broadcasters. Finally, the Court noted that, in its judgment in Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], it had found a similar practice of suppressing non-Russian media in Crimea to be “not only unlawful, but also, in any event, not necessary in a democratic society”. The Court saw no reason for arriving at a different conclusion in the present case.

Conclusion: violation (unanimously).

(ix) Article 11 (administrative practice of forcible dispersal by the Russian military of peaceful protests in occupied territory in March and April 2022):

There was evidence before the Court of ten specific instances of forcible dispersal of peaceful protests in occupied territories in in March and April 2022, the majority of which had been reported by independent sources and corroborated by other material. The force used had included the use of firearms, rubber batons, stun and smoke grenades and tear gas, and had resulted in deaths and injuries. In view of the short time concerned, the Court was satisfied that the instances had been sufficiently numerous to amount to a pattern or system. Although under IHL the respondent State, as occupying Power in the towns and cities identified, had been entitled to take measures to maintain law and order and that, in that respect, a general legal basis for such measures might in principle be found in IHL, it had not been shown that any such legal basis had been reflected in the domestic legal order through relevant legal instruments and appropriate guidance governing the use of force by State agents in the case of peaceful protests and containing the necessary safeguards to protect against abuse. Any law permitting the use of deadly force against peaceful protesters appeared so fundamentally inconsistent with the requirements of Article 11 that it was unlikely to satisfy the “quality of law” requirement inherent in the notion of “lawfulness”. The Court was accordingly not persuaded that the actions taken by the respondent State to disperse the peaceful protests described above had been “prescribed by law”.

Conclusion: violation (unanimously).

(x) Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 8 (administrative practice of destruction, looting and expropriation of the property of civilians and private enterprises from 11 May 2014 to 16 September 2022 and of the destruction and looting of homes and personal possessions from 24 February 2022 in occupied territory):

Certain complaints of the applicant Ukrainian Government referred to energy infrastructure (including gas and oil infrastructure and nuclear facilities), transport infrastructure, medical facilities and civic and cultural property. At least some of that property was held by State authorities or State-owned monopoly enterprises. The Court was not called upon to examine any complaints in so far as they would refer to the interference with property held by entities which did not qualify as a “non governmental organisations”. The incidents concerning the destruction of property involving these companies was not taken into account in the Court’s overall assessment of the existence of a pattern of “identical and repetitive” acts which might amount to an administrative practice contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

The evidence showed that since May 2014 private property had been systemically stolen, looted, misappropriated, nationalised, damaged and destroyed by Russian and Russian-controlled officials and armed forces in the “DPR”, the “LPR” and in Ukrainian territory under the control of Russian forces after the 2022 invasion. The incidents of destruction of property described in the evidence had not taken place in circumstances of active hostilities but depicted the intentional vandalism or destruction of civilian cars and other private property. After February 2022, it had become commonplace for the Russian armed forces to pillage on a widescale, which was prohibited under all circumstances under IHL.

The “DPR" and “LPR” authorities had passed a number of formal decisions on the appointment of loyal administrators to manage private property, representing a de facto en masse seizure of private property without any compensation. A similar process of nationalisation of over 400 private companies had been documented in 2022 in Zaporizhzhia. Parallel property registration systems had been established by 2016 in the “DPR” and the “LPR”. Failure to “legalise” property under the new rules had resulted in property being declared “abandoned” and later nationalised. Failure to register vehicles under the new rules had resulted in fines and forfeiture of the vehicle until the fine had been paid.

It was clear beyond doubt that during the period under consideration there existed a systemic campaign by the separatists and by the Russian armed forces of large-scale expropriation, nationalisation and destruction of and significant damage to the property of civilians and private enterprises in the occupied territory.

There was no evidence of a legal basis for the measures or that the requirements under IHL permitting the appropriation of property under certain conditions had been met. There was also no evidence that any compensation had been made or was envisaged or that any procedure for recording legitimate confiscations of property and enabling subsequent payment of compensation had been put in place. On the contrary, it appeared that private property had been seized and confiscated for opportunistic reasons of plundering available economic resources, sometimes under the political cover of protection against “anti-Russian activity”. Lastly, no evidence had been adduced that the destruction of private property had been absolutely necessary for military operations. Those interferences with property rights could therefore not be seen as having been carried out in “conditions provided for by law”.

Conclusion: violation (unanimously).

(xi) Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (administrative practice in occupied territory of suppression of the Ukrainian language from 11 May 2014 to 16 September 2022 and of indoctrination in education from 24 February to 16 September 2022):

The evidence showed that official measures to suppress education in the only official language of Ukraine, namely the Ukrainian language, had been implemented by the “DPR” and the “LPR” as early as 2014 and subsequently in the Ukrainian territories occupied after the 2022 invasion. The impugned measures had replaced all education in the Ukrainian language with education in the Russian language, with the former being taught, at best, only as a foreign or a minority language. Education in the only official language of Ukraine in the “DPR”, the “LPR” had been stopped in 2014 by the implementation of Russian as the language of education, by the imposition of a Russian curriculum and textbooks, and by the re-accreditation of schools and training of teaching personnel according to Russian educational standards. The measures had been extended to other occupied areas in 2022 and had been associated with a form of indoctrination to the official Russian narrative, which denied Ukraine’s existence as an independent state to legitimise its invasion of Ukraine.

In the context of the new curriculum and its imposed narrative, pupils had received instruction about the history of their country solely from the standpoint of the occupation authorities’ interpretation. This had meant that many children in occupied areas were liable to face a conflict of allegiances between what they had been taught in schools and the convictions and interpretation of information handed down by their parents and the previously established education and values system. There was no doubt that the views of parents in occupied territory on the history and status of Ukraine had attained the level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance required for them to be considered “convictions” within the meaning of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.

Furthermore, teaching staff, children and their parents had been exposed to harassment and threats relating to the use of the Ukrainian language in the context of education and the attendance of children at schools run in conformity with the Russian system.

IHL provisions, read together with the general obligation for the occupying Power to maintain the laws in force in the occupied territory and not modify or suspend or replace them with its own legislation “unless absolutely prevented” did not authorise the occupying Power to change the educational system in occupied territory.

Similar policies of suppressing the Ukrainian language in schools and of persecuting Ukrainian-speaking children at school, implemented by the Russian Federation in Crimea, had also been found by the Court in its judgment in Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC] to amount to an administrative practice in breach of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.

The Court considered that the failure of the “DPR”, the “LPR” and the occupation administrations of other territories under Russian control to make continuing provision for teaching in the Ukrainian language in the “DPR” and the “LPR” after 2014 and in the other Ukrainian territories under Russian control after February 2022 had amounted to a denial of the substance of the right under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.

Moreover, from February 2022, the arrangement for advancing the Russian narrative in schools in occupied territory had sought to enforce the Russification of the Ukrainian population living there, in accordance with the overall political objectives of separating those areas from Ukraine and ultimately denying its existence as a sovereign State. Parents of children in these areas had been faced with sending their children to be educated in circumstances where their education had been, in important respects, to be conducted in a manner wholly inconsistent with their political and philosophical beliefs or risking severe sanction or no education at all. Given the fundamental importance of education for each child’s personal development and future success, it had been impermissible to interrupt those children’s schooling in the only official language of the territory and force them and their parents to make such difficult choices with the sole purpose of entrenching the separatist and revisionist ideology. Such teaching had pursued the aim of indoctrination which did not respect the convictions of their parents, an aim prohibited by Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.

Conclusion: violation (unanimously).

(xii) Articles 3, 5 and 8 (administrative practice of transfer to Russia, and in many cases, the adoption there of Ukrainian children in occupied territory from June 2014 to 16 September 2022):

In its admissibility decision the Court had declared admissible the complaint concerning an administrative practice in respect of the alleged abduction and transfer to Russia of three groups of children (85 residents of children’s homes) in eastern Ukraine in the summer of 2014. In the absence of further evidence by the respondent Government to support their allegations to the contrary, the Court, drawing inferences from the available material, found that the involuntary nature of the border crossings had been established reasonable doubt.

There was also overwhelming evidence of a systematic practice from shortly before the 2022 invasion of transferring Ukrainian children in occupied areas to Russia, without parental or legal consent, and facilitating their adoption there. The Ukrainian Government had recorded that, by the end of September 2022, 7,890 children had been removed from Ukraine. Transfers had started shortly as purported evacuation measures, before the invasion and, in the following months, countless children from institutions and attending holiday camps had been transferred to Russia and had been unable subsequently to return to their homes in Ukraine. In May 2022 legislative amendments had been passed in Russia to make it easier for Ukrainian children to acquire Russian citizenship and be adopted by Russian families. The evidence showed that they had been listed for adoption or foster care in Russia. The Court concluded that those measures had been indicative of a systematic programme of long-term, indeed permanent, removal of those children from their legal guardians in Ukraine.

Between 2014 and 2022, the evidence showed the movement of a large number of children back and forth across the border between occupied Ukraine and the Russian Federation. The transfers had clearly been organised by Russia and had involved significant logistical arrangements. However, Russia had not provided any information concerning the number of children transferred in groups across the border during the above period; the identities, nationalities and backgrounds of the children; or the purpose of the transfers. There was also no information regarding the legal arrangements for children resident in care homes in eastern Ukraine or otherwise separated from those holding parental responsibility for them.

Given the overwhelming evidence of systemic transfers and of facilitating the adoption of Ukrainian children shortly before the 2022 invasion, the movement of children across the border between 2014 and 2022 gave rise to a real concern that the practice of transferring children to Russia established in the summer of 2014 continued throughout the intervening years. The reference in statements made in 2022 by the Russian officials to experience with caring for children from Donbas “since 2014” further corroborated the allegation that relocations from the “DPR” and the “LPR” had taken place in 2014 and in subsequent years.

In those circumstances, the Court did not consider that the overall examination of the complaint about the existence of an administrative practice of the transfer of children between 2014 and 2022 was to be confined only to the three groups of children transferred in the summer of 2014 and the numerous children transferred in 2022. A continuous sequence of acts in a pattern between 2014 and 2022 aimed at removing Ukrainian children from occupied territories in Ukraine and integrating them potentially indefinitely in families or institutions in Russia had therefore been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt. The temporal breaks between such sequences of acts and the development of additional elements, such as the provisions facilitating changes of nationality and adoption in the Russian Federation, did not affect the continuity of the overarching pattern and the intention behind it.

The Court was satisfied that the children’s removal from their homes, their separation from their parents and caregivers, their transfer to Russia and the absence of any steps by the Russian authorities to secure their reunification, while active arrangements were being made for their temporary or permanent placement in foster families or adoption, had amounted to interferences with the children’s right to respect for their private and family lives. No legal basis could be identified for the children’s transfer, nor did they appear to qualify as lawful evacuations under IHL.

The Court had not been informed of any measures undertaken by the respondent Government to secure the return to Ukraine and the family reunification of children purportedly evacuated, and no such measures were described in the various reports before it. On the contrary, numerous credible reports identified cases where Ukrainian children had been themselves left to try and contact their parents, often with the manifest non-cooperation of the persons in whose custody they had been. The policy that had been put in place for the mass acquisition of Russian nationality by children in occupied areas after the 2022 invasion, in breach of IHL, had been nothing less than the automatic imposition of Russian nationality. The Court had already found in its judgment in Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC] a similar policy in Crimea implemented in respect of adults to have breached Article 8. The change in nationality had facilitated the adoption of the children in Russia. In view of the secrecy of adoption proceedings, once adopted a child was virtually impossible to trace. Given the evidence of changes to nationality and adoption in the Russian Federation, the children’s transfer to Russia could not be seen as a temporary measure.

The Court therefore found that the transfer to Russia of Ukrainian children and, in many cases, their subsequent adoption in Russia had not been “in accordance with the law” within the meaning of Article 8 § 2.

Furthermore, the children’s treatment had attained the threshold of severity required to engage Article 3: there had been an official policy of removing children from their legal caregivers in occupied territory and placing them in the care of a hostile occupying State potentially indefinitely and in defiance of international law; the impugned acts had occurred against the backdrop of military operations which on their own had a long-lasting and traumatising impact; the children’s separation from their families and caregivers in the context had had a traumatising effect on the children concerned, in particular considering the uncertainty and the fear of being permanently and forcibly separated from their families. There had also been credible reports of ill-treatment to which some of these children had been subjected after relocation. Those considerations, combined with the children’s inherent vulnerability resulting from their age and in certain cases their disabilities or special health needs and institutionalisation or the absence of parental care, had been sufficiently serious to fall within the scope of application of Article 3.

As regards Article 5 the incidents described had concerned not only acts of removing children from their habitual residence but also acts of holding them in Russia or Russian-controlled territories either by facilitating their placement in foster-care or their adoption or by placing an excessive burden on children and their caregivers to enable their reunion. While, according to reports provided by credible sources, a total of over 300 children had been returned to Ukraine after their removal, many more children had remained unidentified and stranded in Russia, sometimes thousands of kilometres away from Ukraine and from their families or caregivers. The exceptional circumstances of the present case – the coercive element of the children’s removal from and stay outside Ukraine, the lack of opportunity to contact their family members, the excessive difficulties faced by caregivers seeking to reunite with the children, the holding of a number of children in various facilities and institutions throughout Russia or Russian-controlled territories and the evident impossibility for them to leave those facilities alone and travel back to Ukraine – led the Court to conclude that the children had been “deprived of their liberty and security” within the meaning of Article 5. There had been no legal ground for such deprivation of liberty.

Conclusion: violation (unanimously).

(xiii) Article 14 in conjunction with Articles 2, 3, 4 § 2, 5, 8, 9, 10 and 11, and Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No. 1:

Referring to its findings of administrative practices in violation of the Convention in Ukraine between 11 May 2014 and 16 September 2022, the Court noted that aside from the acts of violence directed against civilians in Ukraine, and often targeted more particularly at those expressing political views in support of Ukrainian unity, there was also extensive evidence of regulatory measures applied in occupied areas intended to undermine Ukrainian ethnicity and history, including through the blocking of Ukrainian broadcasting, the forced transfer of Ukrainian children to Russia, the suppression of the Ukrainian language in schools and the indoctrination of Ukrainian schoolchildren.

It thus found that the respondent State had failed to secure, in occupied areas, the rights and freedoms set out in those provisions, during the above period, without discrimination on the grounds of political opinion and national origin.

Conclusion: violation (unanimously).

(xiv) Article 13 in conjunction with Articles 2, 3, 4 § 2, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14 and Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No. 1:

It was inherent in an administrative practice that any remedies would clearly be ineffective at putting an end to it. In view of the reasons for its conclusion that the official tolerance element had been established, the Court also found that there had been an administrative practice in breach of Article 13 taken in conjunction with the above provisions between 11 May 2014 and 16 September 2022.

Conclusion: violation (unanimously).

(6) Article 38: The respondent Government’s lack of cooperation had unnecessarily rendered more difficult the Court’s task to determine whether violations of fundamental human rights protected by the Convention had occurred; the Court had had to identify and consider the application of relevant IHL provisions ex proprio motu and spent considerable time and resources in ensuring that the respondent State had not suffered prejudice in the application of the Convention to the facts of the present case.

The respondent Government’s failure to provide information requested by the Court, its lack of constructive engagement with the examination of the case at the separate admissibility stage of the proceedings and its failure to participate in the examination of the outstanding admissibility issues and the merits of the present case, had been in breach with its obligations under Article 38.

Conclusion: violation (unanimously).

(7) Article 46: The Court indicated individual measures to be taken. In particular, the respondent State, had to without delay:

– release or safely return all persons who were deprived of liberty on Ukrainian territory under occupation by the Russian and Russian-controlled forces in breach of Article 5 before 16 September 2022 and who were still in the custody of the Russian authorities; and

– cooperate in the establishment of an international and independent mechanism to secure, as soon as possible and with due consideration of the children’s best interests, the identification of all children transferred from Ukraine to Russia and Russian-controlled territory before 16 September 2022, the restoration of contact and the safe reunification of those children with their surviving family members or legal guardians.

(8) Article 41: The Court adjourned the question of the application of Article 41.

In respect of applications nos. 8019/16, 43800/14 and 11055/22 it noted that any future award made in respect of the applicant Ukrainian Government would have due regard to the establishment of the Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine by the Council of Europe, in May 2023, and the ongoing discussions concerning a future compensation mechanism.

As regards application no. 28525/20, in May 2025 the International Civil Aviation Organisation had found the respondent State to have failed in its international law obligations in respect of the downing of flight MH17. It was now considering what form of reparations were in order and thus, any further developments in that respect would be taken into account when making an award for just satisfaction in respect of the Dutch Government. It would also be important to have regard to the processing of the individual applications lodged before this Court by relatives of those who had lost their lives. For those reasons, the Court found it appropriate to disjoin application no. 28525/20 from the remainder of the case to permit the examination of the just satisfaction claims made therein separately.

(See Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], 25781/94, 10 May 2001; Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) (dec.) [GC], 20958/14 and 38334/18, 16 December 2020, Legal Summary; Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], 38263/08, 21 January 2021, Legal Summary; Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.) [GC], 8019/16 et al, 30 November 2022, Legal Summary; Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], 20958/14 and 38334/18, 25 June 2024, Legal Summary)

© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.

To access legal summaries in English or French click here.
For non-official translations into other languages click here.