FOURTH SECTION
PARTIAL DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 48684/99
by Anna UTHKE
against Poland
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 28 September 2000 as a Chamber composed of
MrG. Ress, President,
MrA. Pastor Ridruejo,
MrL. Caflisch,
MrJ. Makarczyk,
MrV. Butkevych,
MrJ. Hedigan,
MrsS. Botoucharova, judges,[Note1]
andMrV. Berger, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application introduced on 7 December 1998 and registered on 9 June 1999,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a Polish national, born in 1924 and living in Łowicz, Poland.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant is an owner of an apartment house located in Warsaw, at 73 Różana Street.
In 1992 the applicant lodged with the Warsaw District Court an eviction claim against two of her tenants, who had apparently ceased to have any legal title to the apartment.
In 1993 hearings were held on the following dates: 24 March, 6 and 18 May, 16 and 21 June, 16 July, 12 August, 24 September, 20 October, 17 and 30 November and 21 December.
On 24 March 1994 the Mokotów Housing Administration, in reply to a query submitted by the court, informed it that administrative proceedings had been instituted at the request of tenants T.M. and S.P. who requested to have their tenancy rights, apparently originating from administrative decisions, confirmed.
On unspecified dates defendant T.M. appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court against the administrative decision by which the relevant authorities discontinued proceedings in which she had requested that administrative decision be given awarding her administrative tenancy rights. Likewise, on an unspecified date defendant S.P. filed an appeal with the court against a decision by which his request for confirmation of his tenancy rights had been refused.
On 14 April 1994 the court stayed the proceedings until the end of administrative proceedings instituted by the defendants and later on, by a decision of 14 July 1994, refused to resume the proceedings. On 28 July 1994 the applicant lodged an appeal against this decision. The case-file was forwarded to the Regional Court on 25 August 1995. The appeal was dismissed on 28 December 1994 by the Warsaw Regional Court.
On 1 April 1995 the State-run Office of Adminstration of Privately Owned Houses transferred the management of the house to the applicant.
On 23 August 1995 the Warsaw District Court refused the applicant’s next request to resume the stayed proceedings, as the administrative proceedings concerning the administrative tenancy entitlements of her tenants had not come to end and remained pending before the Supreme Administrative Court.
On 30 August 1995 the applicant complained to the President of the District Court about the excessive length of proceedings.
On 29 January 1996 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed an appeal lodged by T. M. against a decision by which she had been refused to be granted, by way of an administrative decision, the right to a lease of the apartment in issue.
On 29 August 1996 the Warsaw District Court refused to resume the stayed proceedings as the second defendant S. P. had appealed against the first-instance administrative decision given in his case on 10 June 1996. The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision with the Warsaw Regional Court.
By a letter of 19 November 1996 the President of the Regional Court informed the applicant, in reply to her complaint, that the length of the proceedings had been caused by the fact that the administrative proceedings concerning the housing entitlements of S.P. still remained pending.
Apparently on an unspecified later date the proceedings in the case were resumed.
In a letter of 1 July 1997 the President of the Civil Division of the District Court informed the applicant, in reply to her complaint of 4 June 1997, that the proceedings in her case disclosed no excessive length.
A hearing to be held on 3 July 1997 was adjourned as the summons to the defendant’s T.M. had not been duly served on him.
In a letter of 7 July 1997 the President of the District Court informed the applicant that the proceedings would most probably come to end at the hearing scheduled for 16 October 1997, as the taking of evidence had almost been completed.
In 1997 the applicant requested the Ombudsman to intervene in her case. The Ombudsman, by a letter of 12 November 1997, informed her that he lacked competence to intervene in pending civil cases as to the merits. However, as the applicant had complained about the excessive length of the proceedings, the Ombudsman requested the president of the District Court to provide him with information about the proceedings. In reply, the Ombudsman was informed that the proceedings were about to be finished, as the taking of evidence had been completed and only the parties were to be questioned.
On 18 November 1997 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed an appeal lodged by the second defendant S.P. against an administrative decision by which the proceedings instituted at his request for an administrative decision, giving rise to a tenancy contract, had been discontinued. The court considered that these proceedings had to be discontinued as under the Tenancy Act of 1994 the tenancy contracts established by way of administrative decisions had ceased to exist. The court further observed that under applicable legal provisions, any disputes as to the existence and scope of tenancy rights had to be brought before civil courts.
On 23 March 1998 and 7 July 1998 the hearings were adjourned as the court had not received a postal confirmation that the summonses had been served on the defendants.
On 8 July 1998 the applicant complained about the length of proceedings to the Ministry of Justice.
The next hearing was scheduled for 8 October 1998 and before 5 August 1998 the court received the postal confirmation that the summonses had duly been served on the defendants.
In a letter of 5 August 1998 the President of the District Court stated, in reply to the applicant’s complaint about the protracted character of the proceedings, that she could not fully share the applicant’s view.
On 16 October 1998 the applicant complained to the Minister of Internal Affairs about the excessive length of the proceedings. On 20 October 1998 her complaint was transmitted to the Ministry of Justice. On 22 October 1988 a similar complaint, lodged with the Bureau of the Council of Ministers, was transmitted to the same Ministry.
On 7 January 1999 the defendant S.P. lodged with the Warsaw District Court a claim to assert a right of adverse possession of the litigious apartment. Apparently on the same day, he lodged with the same court a request to re-open the proceedings concerning the applicant’s eviction claim, in which the hearings must have previously been closed, arguing that the outcome of the newly instituted proceedings was to be decisive for the eviction proceedings, which had then to be stayed again. On an unspecified later date, the hearings in the eviction case were re-opened.
On 7 April 1999 the Warsaw District Court stayed the eviction proceedings until the end of the proceedings instituted by the defendant S. P. concerning the claim to assert a right of adverse possession, and discontinued the proceedings in respect of T. M. as the applicant had withdrawn her eviction claim.
On 20 May 1999 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against this decision.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains, without invoking any provision of the Convention, about the length of the proceedings.
She further complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that she is to be deprived of her property, as it is the intention of the second defendant S. P.’s to acquire, by way of a judicial decision given in the proceedings which he instituted before the Warsaw District Court, her valid property rights to the apartment in which she lives.
THE LAW
1.The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the length of the proceedings.
The Court considers that it cannot, on the basis of the file, determine the admissibility of this complaint and that it is therefore necessary, in accordance with Rule 54 § 3 (b) of the Rules of the Court, to give notice of this complaint to the respondent Government.
2.The applicant also complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that she is to be deprived of her property by a judicial decision to be given in the proceedings instituted by S.P.
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 reads:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
The Court first recalls that the deprivation of property referred to in the second sentence of the provision relied on by the applicant is primarily concerned with the formal expropriation of assets for public purposes and that a judicial decision as to which of two litigants is the owner of certain property according to the rules of private law can never be seen as constituting an unjustified State interference with the property rights of the losing party, as it is the very function of the courts to determine such disputes (Eur. Comm. HR, no. 10000/82, Dec. 4.7.1983, D.R. 33, p. 257). The same applies to the proceedings in which civil courts rule on the parties’ obligations of a contractual character. Moreover, even assuming that the applicant’s complaint could give rise to any issue under Article 1 of Protocol No.1 to the Convention, the Court observes that the relevant proceedings are pending and that therefore, this complaint is premature.
It follows that this part of the application is inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and that it must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
DECIDES TO ADJOURN the examination of the applicant’s complaint[Note2] that the length of the proceedings in her case exceeded a “reasonable time” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.
Vincent BergerGeorg Ress
RegistrarPresident
[Note1]Judges names are to be followed by a COMMA and a MANUAL LINE BREAK (Shift+Enter). When inserting names via AltS please remove the substitute judge’s name, if necessary, and the extra paragraph return(s). (There is to be no extra space between the judges’ names and that of the Section Registrar.)
[Note2]Summarise the complaints without necessarily citing the invoked Convention Articles.
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