AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 21343/93
by Mirja UUHINIEMI and 14 others
against Finland
The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on
10 October 1994, the following members being present:
MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President
S. TRECHSEL
A. WEITZEL
F. ERMACORA
E. BUSUTTIL
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
J.-C. SOYER
H.G. SCHERMERS
H. DANELIUS
Mrs. G.H. THUNE
MM. F. MARTINEZ
C.L. ROZAKIS
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. L. LOUCAIDES
J.-C. GEUS
M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
G.B. REFFI
M.A. NOWICKI
I. CABRAL BARRETO
B. CONFORTI
N. BRATZA
I. BÉKÉS
J. MUCHA
E. KONSTANTINOV
D. SVÁBY
G. RESS
Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 9 December 1992
by Mirja UUHINIEMI and 14 others against Finland and registered on
5 February 1993 under file No. 21343/93;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicants, all Finnish citizens, are set out in the Annex.
Before the Commission they are represented by Ms. Elina Lampi-
Fagerholm, a lawyer of the National Association of the Fishing Industry
("Kalatalouden keskusliitto").
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be
summarised as follows.
Particular circumstances of the case
At an unofficial meeting on 30 May 1990 the Council of State
(valtioneuvosto, statsrådet) adopted the principles to be applied in
the further preparation of a shore conservation programme. A draft
version had been adopted by an ad hoc working group at the Ministry for
the Environment (ympäristöministeriö, miljöministeriet) appointed in
1988. The draft was based on information obtained through nature
inventories and the opinion submitted by an ad hoc Committee in 1985.
On 6 June 1990 the Ministry for the Environment published a draft
shore conservation programme and invited the municipalities concerned
to submit comments on it before 31 August 1990. It also requested the
municipalities to notify the property owners concerned of their right
to submit individual comments before the same date. 4.692 property
owners submitted such comments.
On 20 December 1990 the Council of State adopted "in principle"
(periaatepäätös, principbeslut) the shore conservation programme,
stating, inter alia:
"... [T]he programme includes 138 shore areas of
international or national value. The areas with sea nature
are 29 and cover about 1.500 kilometres of shore [about 4
per cent of the total seashore]. The areas with lakeside
nature are 109 and cover a total shore line of 7.300
kilometres [about 5 per cent of the total lakeside shore].
The areas included in the programme are nearly the same as
those indicated in the reference material of [the 1985
Committee]. ...
The ... programme will be implemented primarily through
voluntary conservation in accordance with the [1923] Nature
Conservation Act [luonnonsuojelulaki 71/23, lag 71/23 om
naturskydd; hereinafter "the 1923 Act"]. Measures will only
be taken on the property owner's initiative or in case of
construction or other activities damaging the conservation
values ...
The intention is to conserve the privately owned areas
primarily by establishing nature conservation areas in a
manner agreed to by the property owner and on [his] request
so that [he] receives full compensation for the
conservation in accordance with the principle of full
compensation. Alternatively, the area can be acquired by
the State, in which case full compensation will be paid for
it. ...
Measures for the conservation of an area or its acquisition
by the State in accordance with [the 1923 Act] will be
taken [either] on the property owner's initiative [or] if
a request for a permit for construction in such an area has
been lodged, if the forestry in the area deviates from the
... recommendations issued by the Central Forestry Boards
(keskusmetsälautakunnat, centralskogsnämnderna) with regard
to shore areas or if other measures damaging the
conservable values (luonnonarvot, naturvärdena) are being
taken.
...
... [R]estrictions on forestry [exceeding those indicated
in the above-mentioned recommendations] can be [applied]
only in areas with endangered and extremely rare animal and
plant species. ..."
In its judgment of 22 June 1992 following the applicants' appeal
the Supreme Administrative Court (korkein hallinto-oikeus, högsta
förvaltningsdomstolen) considered that the decision of the Council of
State of 20 December 1990 was appealable, stating, inter alia:
"... The decision contains, inter alia, internal
administrative orders addressed to the State authorities
... in general. ... In this respect the decision must
partly be considered ... as an official order against which
no appeal lies, ... and partly as a decision of a
preparatory character ... against which no appeal lies
either ... .
...
... The decision of principle contains the position of the
Council of State that [certain] areas are conservable.
Given that the decision also focuses on individualised
areas and thus also on their owners as well as on holders
of a right of usufruct, it is not in this respect only an
internal administrative measure nor such a statute or order
as would be addressed to a group of individuals in general.
The actual importance of the decision is increased by the
fact that it has been made by the Council of State sitting
in plenary session, which is also competent to determine
the conditions for expropriating real property and separate
rights pursuant to section 5, subsection 1 of the [1977]
Redemption Act [laki 603/77 kiinteän omaisuuden ja
erityisten oikeuksien lunastuksesta, lag 603/77 om inlösen
av fast egendom och särskilda rättigheter; hereinafter "the
1977 Act"]. At issue is, however, not the confirmation of
a plan referred to in subsection 2 which would entail a
right to proceed to the expropriation of a property without
a permit [to that end].
...
... Although the programme does not in itself prevent the
granting of a building permit, an activity prohibition
issued by a County Administrative Board (lääninhallitus,
länsstyrelse) prevents the implementation of a construction
project for which a permit has already been granted. ...
Whilst the adoption of the programme has not [as such]
entailed the entry into force of a prohibition on building
or construction, it has resulted in a de facto
expropriation threat which forces the property owner not to
make use of his property in a manner contrary to the
programme. At the same time it gives the County
Administrative Board the right to issue an activity
prohibition pursuant to section 18 of [the 1923 Act] in
order to secure the aim of the redemption.
Having regard to the above-mentioned repercussions on the
use of the areas, ... the decision has such a legal effect
as to be appealable ... by a party who considers that his
right has been violated."
The Supreme Administrative Court went on to hold that the
applicants had locus standi to lodge an appeal on account of the
location of their particular properties.
The Supreme Administrative Court further found that the Council
of State had been competent to adopt the conservation programme, having
regard to, inter alia, the general competence afforded to it by section
41 of the 1919 Constitution Act (Suomen Hallitusmuoto 94/19, Regerings-
form för Finland 94/19; hereinafter "the Constitution Act").
In regard to the general lawfulness of the decision of the
Council of State the Supreme Administrative Court stated, in general,
inter alia:
"... The programme is not such a national plan of higher
rank or other plan as would have a binding impact on
regional, general or other planning. The programme can
guide the planning as a document of reference on the basis
of which [the authorities] attempt, in pursuance of ... the
[1958] Building Act [rakennuslaki 370/58, byggnadslag
370/58; hereinafter "the 1958 Act"], to harmonise regional
and general planning with national planning within the
framework of State supervision. For these reasons ... the
decision of the Council of State is not unlawful as being
incompatible with the planning system set out in [the 1958
Act].
The effects ... on construction and forestry are not of
such immediate nature that they would follow in a legally
binding manner directly from the decision of the Council of
State. The immediate legal effects are caused only by
[subsequent] planning and building prohibitions for
planning purposes, by decisions made in accordance with
[the 1923 Act] on request by an individual property owner
or, if the property owner acts in a manner contrary to the
aims of the programme, by prohibitions and redemption
decisions issued in accordance with [the 1923 Act]. In all
these stages of the implementation of the programme the
parties are to be heard in accordance with legal
provisions, the decisions are to be made in a procedure ...
prescribed by law and the decisions are appealable. When
compulsory measures are resorted to pursuant to [the 1923
Act] the property owners and others who suffer damages
shall be entitled to full compensation for their losses.
Those seeking voluntary conservation may on request be
granted compensation for the restriction of their right of
usufruct to the land remaining in their possession. In
property exchanges and sales the compensation is based on
agreements. Building and activity prohibitions can only be
issued on the conditions prescribed in [the 1958 Act] and
they can only be limited in time. If an area ... is
reserved in a regional or general plan as a conservation
area and a building permit cannot therefore be issued, the
property owner is entitled to compensation for the refusal
of such a permit.
Having regard to the aim of the programme to protect
nationally valuable ... areas by resorting, in order to
further the aims of the conservation, to measures provided
for by current legislation which in an individual case
would also be at the authorities' disposal, ... the
programme does not impose such unreasonable limitations on
the property owners and holders of a right of usufruct as
to render the decision to adopt the programme unlawful in
general.
The decision may, however, be unreasonable or otherwise
unlawful with regard to an owner of an individual area or
a holder of a right of usufruct to such an area, if the
programme would contain, for instance, shore areas which
due to their ... character do not fulfil the conditions for
a conservable ... area or which are too large, having
regard to, in particular, the aim of the programme, namely
the conservation of nature on the shore. Although the
decision-making concerning these questions will take place
only during the implementation of the programme, it is not
justified to retain an area which ... clearly cannot be
conserved in the [programme] with its de facto restrictions
on the use [of the area]."
As to the lawfulness of the decision of the Council of State in
regard to the property Iso-Tilus 12:59 owned by applicants nos. 14 and
15 the Supreme Administrative Court carried out a detailed examination
of the conservable values on the property, but found that sufficient
reasons had been shown for reserving it as a conservable area.
In conclusion, the Supreme Administrative Court found that the
decision of the Council of State did not violate the applicants' rights
and rejected their appeals.
On 20 October 1990 the Parliamentary Ombudsman (eduskunnan
oikeusasiamies, riksdagens justitieombudsman) rendered his decision in
response to a complaint lodged by applicant no. 14. The Ombudsman
considered, inter alia,
- that the threat of expropriation following from the
adoption of a nature conservation programme as well as
possible building and activity prohibitions are likely to
result in the absence of other buyers than the State, this
negatively affecting the property owner's position in the
negotiations concerning the price of his property;
- that provided the property owner does not, by
endangering the conservation values, force the State to
take measures, the de facto expropriation threat will
remain in force indefinitely;
- that the decision of principle to adopt the shore
conservation programme contains the position of the Council
of State in regard to, inter alia, the areas which, if
necessary, can be acquired by the State;
- that the decision does not entail any right to
expropriate a property without a permit to that end issued
in pursuance of the 1977 Act;
- that the programme has not entailed the transfer of any
property or rights; but
- that it has resulted in a de facto expropriation threat
forcing the property owners and others concerned to abstain
from using their properties in a manner contrary to the
programme, thus creating de facto restrictions on their
right to use their properties;
- that domestic law contains no provisions on national
conservation programmes;
- that it could therefore be questioned whether in the
light of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention it
is sufficient that the decisions of principle concerning
nature conservation programmes have been made on the basis
of the general competence of the Council of State as
prescribed in section 41 of the Constitution Act;
- that the decision of the Council of State to adopt the
shore conservation programme cannot be considered as being
clearly contrary to section 6 of the Constitution Act or
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention; but
- that, considering the de facto effects of the decision,
the shore conservation programme should justifiably have
been prescribed by law.
Relevant domestic law
1. The competence of the Council of State to adopt a conservation
programme
The Council of State shall ensure that the decisions of the
President of the Republic are being implemented, decide matters which
it has been empowered by law to decide as well as such government and
administrative matters which have neither been reserved in the
Constitution Act or in any other law or decree for decision by the
President nor delegated for decision by a minister in his capacity of
Head of a Ministry or to an authority of a lower rank (section 41,
subsection 1 of the Constitution Act).
2. The conditions for the establishment of conservation areas
Section 1 of the 1923 Act (as amended by Act no. 399/41) concerns
State-owned real property. Such property may be reserved as a general
conservation area for the purpose of protecting it from interferences
by man (subsection 1). A specific conservation area may also be
established in order to protect a place of great natural beauty or with
otherwise remarkable nature or in order to protect a particular animal
or plant species (subsection 2). A conservation order made in
accordance with the above-mentioned provisions shall not limit a right
of a private party which was acquired prior to the conservation
(section 8).
Section 9 of the 1923 Act (as amended by Act no. 672/91) concerns
private properties. On request by the property owner the County
Administrative Board may declare a property of significant importance
from the point of view of nature conservation as a specific
conservation area pursuant to section 1, subsection 2 (subsection 1).
3. Expropriation
Under the Constitution Act the right of Finnish citizens to their
possessions shall be secured by law (section 6, subsection 1).
Expropriation of property in the public interest against full
compensation shall be governed by law (subsection 3).
The State may expropriate real property in accordance with the
1977 Act for the purpose of creating a conservation area (section 18,
subsection 1 of the 1923 Act, as amended by Act no. 672/91).
A property may be expropriated if there is a general need
therefor. Expropriation shall, however, not be resorted to, if its aim
may also be achieved in another manner or if the inconvenience caused
to a private interest is more significant than the benefit to the
general interest (section 4, subsection 1 of the 1977 Act).
Expropriation permits are granted by the Council of State or, in
certain cases, by the competent County Administrative Board or another
administrative authority (section 5, subsection 1 of the 1977 Act). A
permit is not needed if another decision already entails a right to
proceed to expropriation (subsection 2, as amended by Act no. 1110/82).
A property owner is entitled to full compensation for the
economic losses caused by the expropriation. The sum shall be fixed on
the basis of the market price of the property (sections 29 and 30 of
the 1977 Act).
4. Restrictions on the use of real property
The County Administrative Board may, provisionally and for a
maximum period of two years, prohibit an area from being used in a
manner which could jeopardise the aim of an expropriation in accordance
with the 1923 and 1977 Acts. The prohibition is immediately enforceable
irrespective of appeal proceedings, unless the appeal body decides
otherwise. If no expropriation takes place a compensation shall be
fixed by the Board for any damage or inconvenience caused by the
prohibition (section 18, subsection 2 of the 1923 Act, as amended by
Act no. 672/91).
If an expropriation permit has been granted the property at issue
shall not be used in a manner which could jeopardise the aim of the
expropriation. This prohibition is in force until the expropriation
proceedings have terminated or until the moment when the expropriation
matter is struck off. In the last-mentioned case compensation for
losses or inconvenience caused by the prohibition shall be paid by the
State (section 18, subsection 3 of the 1923 Act, as amended by Act
no. 672/91). Under the 1959 Building Decree (rakennusasetus 266/59,
byggnads-förordning 266/59; hereinafter "the 1959 Decree") the
competent County Administrative Board shall be heard by the local
Building Board in respect of a request for a building permit pertaining
to a property located, inter alia, within an area included in a
conservation programme adopted by the Council of State. The County
Administrative Board's opinion shall be given within six months
(section 52, subsection 3, as amended by Decree no. 480/90 which
entered into force on 1 June 1990). Section 124, subsection 3 of the
1959 Decree (as amended by Decree no. 480/90) provides for similar
conditions in respect of a request for a building permit pertaining to
a property covered by a building plan (rakennuskaava, byggnadsplan).
Finally, section 137 (as amended by Decree no. 480/90) provides for a
similar procedure with regard to a request for a building permit within
an area not covered by a town plan (asemakaava, stadsplan), building
plan or shore plan (rantakaava, strandplan).
The Ministry for the Environment may, if it deems it necessary,
order a municipality to adopt or amend a certain plan within a fixed
period of time. The order entails a building prohibition and an
activity prohibition applicable to the area indicated in the order. If
necessary, the Ministry may proceed to having the municipality comply
with the order under threat of an administrative fine (uhkasakko, vite)
(section 143, subsection 1 of the 1958 Act, as amended by Act
no. 626/69, and subsection 7, as amended by Act no. 556/81).
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicants complain that they have no access to a court in
order to challenge, within a reasonable time, the alleged interference
with their property rights, nor do they have any other effective remedy
at their disposal. They submit that their appeal to the Supreme
Administrative Court was not examined on its merits insofar as it
related to the alleged unlawfulness of the conservation programme and
its related repercussions. They invoke Article 6 para. 1 of the
Convention.
2. The applicants further complain that their right peacefully to
enjoy their possessions has been violated in several respects as a
result of the adoption of the shore conservation programme. The
programme has allegedly no basis in domestic law, since its adoption
was not an executive measure falling within the general competence of
the Council of State. In any case, the Council of State had not been
specifically empowered by Parliament (eduskunta, riksdagen) to adopt
the programme. The programme is also claimed to be incompatible with
the planning monopoly afforded to the municipalities by law, since it
is alleged that subsequent planning would only amount to an enforcement
of the programme.
Moreover, already the publication of the draft shore conservation
programme had the immediate effect of restricting the applicants' use
of their properties for an indefinite period of time, thus causing them
financial losses, but without their receiving any compensation. The
restrictions were partly based on the allegedly unlawful amendments to
the 1959 Decree which entered into force on 1 June 1990. In particular,
the value of the applicants' properties as securities has decreased and
the properties are now impossible to sell except to the State which may
therefore "dictate" the conditions. In the above circumstances the
ownership of the applicants' properties has become so precarious that
the properties have been de facto expropriated by the State. The
applicants invoke Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
3. The applicants furthermore complain that the expropriation threat
imposed on them amounts to an unlawful criminalisation of the use of
their properties. They point out that already the lodging of a request
for a building permit could entail the expropriation of their
properties. In this respect they invoke Article 7 of the Convention.
4. The applicants finally complain that they had no effective remedy
against the alleged violations of their Convention rights. They invoke
Article 13 of the Convention.
THE LAW
1. The applicants complain that they have no access to a court in
order to challenge, within a reasonable time, the interference with
their property rights, nor do they have any other effective remedy at
their disposal. They submit that their appeal to the Supreme
Administrative Court was not examined on its merits insofar as it
related to the alleged unlawfulness of the conservation programme and
its related repercussions. They invoke Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of
the Convention.
Insofar as it is relevant to the present case Article 6 para. 1
(Art. 6-1) reads as follows:
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations
..., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial
tribunal established by law. ..."
The Commission must first ascertain whether Article 6 para. 1
(Art. 6-1) is applicable in the instant case and, notably, whether
there was a dispute over a "civil right" which can be said, at least
on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law. The dispute
must be genuine and serious and its outcome must be directly decisive
for the right in question (e.g. Eur. Court H.R., Oerlemans judgment of
27 November 1991, Series A no. 219, pp. 20-21, paras. 45-49).
In the present case the Commission considers that there existed
a dispute concerning the lawfulness of the shore conservation programme
and the allegedly related restrictions on the applicants' use of their
properties, the right of property clearly being a "civil right" within
the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) (e.g. Eur. Court H.R.,
Zander judgment of 25 November 1993, Series A no. 279-B, p. 40,
para. 27; cf. e.g. O. v. Austria, Comm. Report 14.5.93, para. 34,
pending before the European Court of Human Rights and to be published
in Series A).
The Commission finds that the conservation programme did not in
itself entail any de jure activity prohibition served on individualised
property owners and restricting the applicants' right to use their
properties without seeking prior authorisation (cf., a contrario, the
above-mentioned Oerlemans judgment, p. 10, para. 16; Eur. Court H.R.,
de Geouffre de la Pradelle judgment of 16 December 1992, Series A
no. 253-B, pp. 42-43, para. 33; Eur. Court H.R., Allan Jacobsson
judgment of 23 October 1989, Series A no. 163, pp. 19-20, paras.
68-71). Nor did the programme entail a refusal to authorise certain use
of the properties (cf., a contrario, Eur. Court H.R., Skärby judgment
of 8 June 1990, Series A no. 180-B, pp. 36-37, para. 28) or a
revocation of any permit already permitting certain use of the
properties (cf., a contrario, Fredin v. Sweden (no. 1), Comm. Report
6.11.89, paras. 90-91, Eur. Court H.R., Series A no. 192, p. 34, and
the above-mentioned de Geouffre de la Pradelle judgment, p. 43,
para. 34). Finally, the programme neither constituted the issuing of
an expropriation permit nor did it amount to an amendment of a plan
capable of otherwise extinguishing any of the applicants' property
rights (cf., a contrario, Eur. Court H.R., Sporrong and Lönnroth
judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52, pp. 29-30, para. 80,
and Eur. Court H.R., Mats Jacobsson judgment of 28 June 1990, Series A
no. 180-A, pp. 13-14, para. 33). It has not been shown that the use of
any of the applicants' properties has been restricted solely on the
basis of the conservation programme.
The Commission therefore concludes that in the particular
circumstances of the present case the dispute at issue was not directly
decisive for the applicants' "civil rights". Accordingly, Article 6
para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention is not applicable. This position
is not affected by the forestry recommendations appended to the
programme which, as their substance shows, are also of a non-binding
character.
It follows that this complaint must be rejected as being
incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention within the meaning
of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).
2. The applicants further complain that the shore conservation
programme allegedly affecting their properties had no basis in domestic
law. It is further claimed that the programme has restricted the
applicants' use of their properties for an indefinite period of time,
but without their receiving any compensation for the financial losses
allegedly suffered by them. The applicants therefore assert that their
properties have been de facto expropriated by the State. They invoke
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention which reads as
follows:
"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful
enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject
to the conditions provided for by law and by the general
principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it
deems necessary to control the use of property in
accordance with the general interest or to secure the
payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."
The Commission recalls that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
(P1-1) comprises three distinct rules. The first rule, set out in the
first sentence of the first paragraph, is of a general nature and
enunciates the principle of peaceful enjoyment of property. The second
rule, contained in the second sentence of the same paragraph, covers
deprivation of possessions and makes it subject to certain conditions.
The third rule, stated in the second paragraph, recognises that
Contracting States are entitled, amongst other things, to control the
use of property in accordance with the general interest. The three
rules are not "distinct" in the sense of being unconnected: the second
and third rules are concerned with particular instances of interference
with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property and should therefore
be construed in the light of the general principle enunciated in the
first rule (e.g., the above-mentioned Allan Jacobsson judgment, p. 16,
para. 53).
The Commission finds that the shore conservation programme did
not entail such serious consequences to the applicants' properties as
to amount to a de facto expropriation (cf., a contrario, Eur. Court
H.R., Papamichalopoulos judgment of 24 June 1993, Series A no. 260-B,
p. 70, paras. 45-46). The applicants have thus not been "deprived" of
their properties within the meaning of the second sentence of the first
paragraph of Article 1 (Art. 1-1).
Referring to its above conclusion with regard to the complaint
under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention, the Commission
furthermore finds that the situation complained of does not constitute
a control of the use of the applicants' properties to be examined under
the second paragraph of Article 1 (Art. 1-2).
The Commission does not consider it necessary to determine
whether the situation complained of amounts to an interference with the
right guaranteed in the first sentence of the first paragraph of
Article 1 (Art. 1-1), as, even if it did, a fair balance has been
struck between the various public and private interests involved (cf.,
a contrario, the above-mentioned Sporrong and Lönnroth judgment, p. 24
et seq., para. 61 et seq.).
The Commission accepts that the aim of the shore conservation
programme was to protect valuable shore areas. This aim must be
considered as reflecting the demands of the general interest of the
community, the protection of the environment constituting an
increasingly important consideration in today's society (Eur. Court
H.R., Fredin judgment (no. 1) of 18 February 1991, Series A no. 192,
p. 16, para. 48). The decision to adopt the programme was, moreover,
made by the Council of State on the basis of its general competence
according to the Constitution Act. The Commission cannot find that
domestic law has thereby been breached.
In so far as the applicants' properties may have been adversely
affected as a result of their inclusion in the shore conservation
programme, the Commission notes that the applicants have not submitted
any evidence showing that the value of their properties has been so
substantially diminished on account of the outline objective as to
result in an unfair balancing of interests (cf., mutatis mutandis,
No. 9310/81, Dec. 16.7.86, D.R. 47 pp. 5-15, at p. 14). With reference
to the ever increasing importance attached to nature conservation the
Commission considers that some repercussions on landowners' property
rights cannot in themselves prevent the publication of a conservation
intention such as the conservation programme at issue in the present
case.
The Commission further observes that the inclusion of the
applicants' properties in the shore conservation programme resulted in
an obligation pursuant to sections 52, 124 and 137 of the 1959 Decree
on the part of the relevant municipal Building Boards to hear the
County Administrative Board in regard to proposed construction within
the area. It has not been shown, however, that this obligation has
caused any substantial adverse effects on any of the applicants'
properties.
The Commission concludes therefore that no such adverse effects
which could render the balancing of interests unfair have been shown
to exist as a result of the shore conservation programme. Accordingly,
there is no appearance of an improper balance between the protection
of the applicants' property rights and the demands of the general
interest and, consequently, no appearance of a violation of the
applicants' right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions.
It follows that this complaint must be rejected as being
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2
(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
3. The applicants furthermore complain that the expropriation threat
imposed on their properties amounts to an unlawful criminalisation of
their use of those properties. They invoke Article 7 (Art. 7) of the
Convention which reads as follows:
"1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on
account of any act or omission which did not constitute a
criminal offence under national or international law at the
time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be
imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the
criminal offence was committed.
2. This Article shall not prejudice the trial and
punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at
the time when it was committed, was criminal according to
the general principles of law recognised by civilised
nations."
The Commission considers that any use of the applicants'
properties contrary to the shore conservation programme cannot as such
be considered a "criminal offence" within the meaning of Article 7
(Art. 7). Accordingly, Article 7 (Art. 7) is not applicable.
It follows that this complaint must also be rejected as being
incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention within the meaning
of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).
4. The applicants finally complain that they had no effective remedy
against the alleged violations of their Convention rights. They invoke
Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention which reads as follows:
"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the
violation has been committed by persons acting in an
official capacity."
In view of its conclusions under nos. 1 and 3 above in regard to
the complaints under Articles 6 and 7 (Art. 6, 7) of the Convention the
Commission considers that the related aspect of the complaint under
Article 13 (Art. 13) must also be considered incompatible ratione
materiae with the provisions of the Convention.
In view of its conclusions under no. 2 above in regard to the
complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) the Commission
considers that the applicants have no "arguable claim" of a breach of
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) which would warrant a remedy under
Article 13 (Art. 13) (see Eur. Court H.R., Powell and Rayner judgment
of 21 February 1990, Series A no. 172, p. 20, para. 46).
It follows that the complaint under Article 13 (Art. 13) must be
rejected under Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention, partly
as being incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the
Convention and partly as being manifestly ill-founded.
For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission
(H.C. KRÜGER) (C.A. NØRGAARD)
ANNEX
The applicants are:
1. Ms. Mirja Uuuhiniemi, a housewife born in 1920 and resident at
Kuhmoinen;
2. Mr. Kauko Konivuori, a farmer born in 1917 and resident at
Kuhmoinen;
3. Mr. Matti Helenius, a farmer born in 1947 and resident at
Puukkoinen;
4. Mr. Urho Lampinen, a farmer born in 1949 and resident at
Puukkoinen;
5. Ms. Maili Antila, a physician born in 1920 and resident in Turku;
6. Ms. Kaija-Leena Kosonen, a teacher in a day nursery for children,
born in 1926 and resident in Pori;
7. Mr. Allan Flinck, a farmer born in 1928 and resident at
Puukkoinen;
8. Mr. Ari Uuhiniemi, a farmer born in 1952 and resident at
Puukkoinen;
9. The estate of Mr. Olavi Savijärvi represented by Ms. Helvi
Savijärvi, a housewife born in 1923 and resident at Kuhmoinen;
10. Mr. Vesa Savijärvi, a farmer born in 1953 and resident at
Puukkoinen;
11. Mr. Veikko Koskinen, a farmer born in 1934 and resident at
Puukkoinen;
12. Mr. Risto Rannisto, a lumberjack born in 1944 and resident at
Länkipojha;
13. Ms. Rauha Janhonen, a housewife born in 1916 and resident at
Länkipohja;
14. Ms. Riitta Tilus, a city clerk born in 1949 and resident at
Himanka; and
15. Mr. Seppo Tilus, a farmer born in 1948 and resident at Himanka.
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy