Information Note on the Court’s case-law 216
March 2018
Uzan v. Turkey - 30569/09
Judgment 20.3.2018 [Section II]
Article 10
Article 10-1
Freedom of expression
Criminal conviction for publicly insulting the Prime Minister during a speech: violation
Facts – In September 2008 the applicant was sentenced by a criminal court to eight months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine of about EUR 400 for publicly insulting the Prime Minister and attacking the latter’s honour and reputation; the court held that he had exceeded the limits of acceptable criticism in statements made during a speech in 2003 and in his repeated use of the terms “treacherous” “looter”, “insolent”, “godless one”.
However, the criminal court decided to defer delivery of this judgment, subject to the condition that the applicant submit to judicial supervision for a period of five years, one year of which was to be supervised by a counsellor who would ensure, firstly, that the applicant attended a three-month course on self-control and, secondly, that he read five books on personal development.
Nonetheless, as these obligations had not been fulfilled, the above-mentioned deferment was lifted and in February 2010 the applicant was sentenced to imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine; the duration and amount of these penalties were reduced by half for the execution phase. In December 2010 the Court of Cassation upheld that judgment.
Law – Article 10: The criminal-law measures taken against the applicant amounted to an interference with the rights guaranteed by Article 10, were in accordance with the law and pursued the legitimate aim of protection of the reputation or rights of others.
Although the applicant had attempted to downplay the seriousness of his remarks by explaining to the domestic courts the terms used in the speech, some of them, such as “treacherous”, “looter”, insolent” and “godless one”, remained open to criticism. As the applicant was the leader of an opposition party and the majority shareholder in two companies targeted by governmental measures, his statements, assessed in their entirety, could be considered as having been made in the context of a political speech on issues arising from the government’s actions. Notwithstanding their negative and hostile connotation, in this context such exchanges between politicians could not be considered as lacking in moderation.
The domestic courts had made no distinction between “facts” and “value judgments”, but had merely assessed whether or not the applicant’s remarks had been insulting and whether the terms used were capable of denigrating the Prime Minister’s personality and reputation. They had not ruled on either the context in which the impugned remarks were made, or on the merits of the criticism expressed by the applicant.
The Prime Minister had inevitably laid himself open to close scrutiny of his every word and deed, and also to criticism; he was required to display a particularly high degree of tolerance in this context, including with regard to the form taken by such criticism, especially since, in the present case, the impugned remarks had been made as part of a political speech.
Lastly, the Court attached considerable weight to the fact that, although in the first phase of the proceedings the criminal court had decided to defer delivery of the judgment convicting the applicant, provided that he submit to judicial supervision for five years and comply with the obligations imposed, this had nonetheless been a criminal-law penalty. In any event, the applicant had stood to benefit from deferment of the judgment only if, for five years from the date of that measure being granted, he did not commit any other intentional offence; otherwise, the applicant had been liable, at the very least, to be tried and sentenced to imprisonment and a fine.
Regard being had to the circumstances of the case and, in particular, the failure to examine the proportionality of the penalty, which was of a criminal-law nature, it had not been shown that the impugned measure was proportionate to the aim sought and that it was necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the reputation or rights of others.
Conclusion: violation (unanimously).
The Court also concluded, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 on account of the length of the proceedings before the domestic courts.
Article 41: no claim made in respect of damage.
(See also Oberschlick v. Austria (no. 2), 20834/92, 1 July 1997; Jerusalem v. Austria, 26958/95, 27 February 2001, Information Note 27; and the Factsheet on Protection of reputation)
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This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
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