Legal summary
August 2025
Vervele v. Greece - 34012/20
Judgment 26.8.2025 [Section III]
Article 6
Article 6-1
Reasonable time
Excessive length of civil proceedings in respect of applicant’s compensation claim regarding employment dispute: violation
Article 13
Effective remedy
Lack of effective remedy in respect of excessive length of civil proceedings: violation
Facts – On 22 June 2001, the applicant brought an action against her employer in respect of unpaid salary supplements and allowances. The proceedings were adjourned until the delivery of a final judgment in respect of a different earlier action by the applicant against the same employer. On 20 April 2015, the first-instance court in part upheld the latter action. Upon appeal that judgment was quashed and the action upheld in part. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law which was dismissed by the Court of Cassation. That judgment was finalised on 10 March 2020, and on 9 April 2020 an official copy of it became available to the applicant.
February 2014 saw the entry into force of Law no. 4239/2014 which had been introduced with a view to allowing compensation to be obtained for unjustified delays in proceedings before civil and criminal courts and the Court of Auditors.
Law – Article 13 in conjunction with Article 6 § 1:
The applicant’s complaint relating to the length of the proceedings which had lasted for almost nineteen years over three levels of jurisdiction was “arguable” for the purposes of Article 13, and she had been entitled to a remedy whereby she could have obtained appropriate relief before the domestic courts for the alleged breach of her right to a hearing within a reasonable time under Article 6 § 1.
(1) The “fragmentation” of the proceedings by level of jurisdiction – Under Article 3 § 1 of Law no. 4239/2014 claims for just satisfaction had to be lodged separately at each level of jurisdiction within six months from the delivery of the “final decision” taken by the court in those proceedings. The Court had previously held that the compensatory remedy introduced by Law no. 4239/2014 offered the requisite effectiveness for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 and Article 13. Subsequently it had further confirmed that a remedy for raising a complaint about the length of proceedings was “effective” only if it was capable of covering all stages of the proceedings complained of – and thus capable of taking into account their overall length.
Re-examining the effectiveness of the remedy, the Court found its construction prevented the domestic courts from applying standards that were in conformity with the principle embodied in its case-law. Claimants were required to address each court separately – even though proceedings might be continuing at the appeal and cassation level, with no possibility for either court to undertake a review regarding their overall length. This ran counter to the Court’s consistent approach that although proceedings might be pending at each stage for a period that could not be considered excessive as such, the overall duration might nonetheless be excessive. An excessive burden was also put on claimants to lodge multiple claims for just satisfaction and to initiate parallel judicial proceedings even when the final determination of their case had not yet taken place or a decision delivered. It also increased the strain on the already overburdened courts. Additionally, other claimants’ arguments that the excessive length of proceedings at previous instances should be considered had been explicitly dismissed – which was indicative of the remedy’s limitations.
(2) Criteria for assessing what constitutes “reasonable” time in decisions dismissing claims for just satisfaction – Examining domestic decisions between 2015 and 2024 where compensation claims for excessive length of civil proceedings had been examined on the merits, the Court observed there had been instances where the domestic courts had found no deficiency in the conduct of the authorities, despite delays of more than three years for which the litigant could not have been held responsible, while additionally, following an adjournment requested by the latter, the court had set a date for a hearing more than three years after that adjournment. Even considering the principle that the procedural initiative lies with the parties, their attitude did not relieve the judges of their duty to ensure the expeditiousness required by Article 6 § 1. The courts had had to explore any possible ways of making delays due to adjournments shorter by examining whether the circumstances and the reasons for the adjournments would have allowed for an earlier date.
There had also been several cases where the domestic courts had found that setting a date for a hearing had depended on the internal organisation of the court, that no damage had been caused to the claimant owing to the length of the proceedings and that a hearing at an earlier date could have been requested, even in cases where the proceedings in question had been found to be long. The Court had already held that requesting an earlier date could not be considered to constitute an effective remedy allowing the acceleration of proceedings in order to prevent their length from becoming incompatible with the Convention. In the very few cases where claimants had made such a request, it had not always been granted. Any failure by a claimant to use that means to speed up proceedings did not relieve the State of its obligation to organise its judicial system to guarantee the right to obtain a decision within a reasonable time. The relevant periods of delay on the part of the authorities could not therefore be attributed to the claimants in such cases. Furthermore, in other cases the domestic courts had followed an excessively restrictive approach to the criterion of what was at stake for the claimant. Lastly, in certain instances, the domestic courts had considered as a starting point the hearing of the cases and not the date on which the litigants had requested the court to set a hearing date.
Regarding the date until when the length of proceedings had been calculated, there had been instances where the period that had elapsed between the delivery of the judgment on the merits and the date on which the claimant had been able to receive an official copy of it had not been taken into account on the grounds that the domestic judgment had rejected the appeal on points of law and that consequently no issues concerning the question of enforcement had arisen. In view of the importance of having sufficient knowledge of the final domestic judgment and its full content and reasoning and the rights that were linked to that, it was not consistent with the requirement that proceedings be of reasonable length that the proceedings might be considered as completed before the person concerned could obtain an official copy of the reasoned decision after its finalisation – even in cases where no issues of enforcement arose.
Accordingly, the interpretation of the criteria applied when determining what constituted “reasonable” time, the conduct of the applicant or of the authorities, what had been at stake for the claimant, the starting point and the point until when the length of proceedings had been calculated had not been in line with the standards as set out in the Court’s case-law.
(3) Compensation awarded and costs incurred in lodging a claim – In more than four fifths of the cases submitted by the Government, the courts had made lower compensation awards than the Court would have awarded in those circumstances. Regarding the costs of lodging a claim, the minimum fixed expenses set out in Annex I to the Code of Lawyers, in addition to a court fee, had been aimed at discouraging the use of manifestly ill-founded or inadmissible remedies and had not been in themselves unreasonable.
Under Article 5 § 3 of Law no. 4239/2014, if a claim for just satisfaction was allowed, the expenses incurred by a claimant in lodging their claim and for legal representation were refunded by the State up to a certain amount; if a claim was dismissed, the claimant might be required to pay costs. The law did not provide for the case where a claim was upheld in part. However, in all the decisions where claims had been upheld, claims had been upheld only in part. In slightly more than half of those decisions the courts had ordered that each party pay their own expenses and in the rest, expenses had been partially refunded to the claimant. The court fee had been either withheld or reimbursed in part or entirely. All claimants had been consequently required to pay costs.
In nineteen of the thirty-six decisions awarding compensation, the net amounts that the claimants received had been significantly or manifestly unreasonably lower than what the Court would have awarded in those circumstances. Therefore, it was very probable that any awarded compensation could be significantly reduced or even absorbed by the obligation to pay costs. Additionally, there was no clarity as to whether claimants would be reimbursed the costs if their complaint was considered justified and allowed in part.At the very least, the costs incurred often had a significant impact on the compensation awarded. The Court could also not accept that legal aid could cover costs as that possibility was granted only under certain financial criteria to financially disadvantaged citizens. Claimants would also have to request legal aid at each instance, while should a claimant be unsuccessful, legal aid would not cover the costs incurred by the opposite party unless the court ordered differently.
(4) Impartiality – Article 4 of Law no. 4239/2014 laid down a specific procedure for designating the judicial body at each level of jurisdiction responsible for examining a claim for compensation. The procedure in which claims for compensation had to be examined by a court at the same level of jurisdiction as that which adjudicated on the merits and the mode of apportionment of jurisdiction did not in themselves raise any partiality issue.
(5) Conclusion – The Court had no reason to doubt that claims for just satisfaction were examined in practice with the necessary expeditiousness. However, the fragmentation of proceedings was contrary to its case-law and did not allow an examination of the overall length of proceedings and a consideration of its gravity, which progressively increases over time. In a significant number of instances where the domestic courts had dismissed claims for just satisfaction their interpretation of the criteria for the assessment of the length of proceedings did not correspond to the Court’s case-law. When an award had been made, the sums did not constitute adequate redress, in particular when the costs incurred in lodging claims for damages were taken into account. In conclusion, the remedy at issue did not afford appropriate redress and could not be considered as effective, as a result in part of the legal framework and in part due to its application by domestic courts. The Government had, therefore, not shown that any form of effective relief had been available and that the applicant would not be unduly hampered in lodging a claim for just satisfaction. The Court, therefore, having joined the issue to the merits, dismissed the Government’s objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
Conclusion: violation (unanimously).
Article 6 § 1:
The subject matter of the litigation at issue could not be considered particularly complex and the applicant could not be considered as having contributed to the length of proceedings by bringing consecutive similar actions corresponding to different periods of employment. The applicant had been in general active in respect of the proceedings, had undertaken a number of procedural actions aimed at having hearings scheduled and had showed the “normal diligence” required in civil proceedings. The case had lasted eighteen years, nine months and eighteen days over three instances – even discounting a delay of eleven months that could not be attributed to the Government. There had been long periods of inactivity and several periods of delay on the part of the judicial authorities which, taken together, indicated that the proceedings had not proceeded with the necessary expedition. The Court, assessing the case-circumstances and having regard to the overall duration of the proceedings, found this lapse of time to have been excessive. The difficulties which the civil courts might be admitted to have encountered could not be considered to have been temporary and nothing suggested that the situation had been exceptional.
Conclusion: violation (unanimously).
Article 41: EUR 11,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
(See Techniki Olympiaki A.E. v. Greece (dec.), 40547/10, 1 October 2013, Legal Summary; Xynos v. Greece, 30226/09, 9 October 2014, Legal Summary; Rutkowski and Others v. Poland, 72287/10, 7 July 2015, Legal Summary)
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This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
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