THIRD SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 51420/17
Dragan VESIĆ
against Serbia
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 19 May 2026 as a Committee composed of:
Darian Pavli, President,
Úna Ní Raifeartaigh,
Mateja Đurović, judges,
and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 51420/17) against the Republic of Serbia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 4 July 2017 by a Serbian national, Mr Dragan Vesić (“the applicant”), who was born in 1976 and lives in Kragujevac, and was represented by Mr M. Karaklajić, a lawyer practising in Kragujevac;
the decision to give notice of the application to the Serbian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms Z. Jadrijević Mladar;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The application concerns allegedly divergent domestic case-law in respect of claims for the payment of salary accrued during annual leave to the employees of the Ministry of the Interior (“the Ministry”).
The applicant’s situation2. The applicant lodged a civil claim against the Ministry, seeking compensation for the difference between the salary he had received during his annual leave and the salary which he normally earned, which included a 10% bonus for time spent at work, as provided for in Article 9 of the Regulation on the Salaries of Employees of the Ministry of the Interior (“the Regulation on Salaries”), as in force at the material time. On 7 March 2014 the Kragujevac Court of First Instance upheld his claim, finding that the salary paid during his annual leave had not included the bonus. The court relied on Article 169 of the Police Act, which was then in force, which provided that the rights of employees of the Ministry were governed by the regulations on employment relations in State bodies unless otherwise provided for by that Act or by regulations adopted on the basis of that Act, and on Article 32 § 1 of the Salaries of Civil Servants and Employees Act (“the Salaries Act”), which entitled a civil servant on annual leave to a salary equal to the same amount as that which he or she would have been paid if he or she had been working. The court concluded that Article 9 of the Regulation on Salaries should not have been relied on to reduce the applicant’s salary paid during periods when he had been on leave. As a lower-ranking regulation granting fewer rights than the Salaries Act, it could not have overridden the latter.
3. The Ministry lodged an appeal against that decision. On 16 December 2014 the Kragujevac Court of Appeal held that Article 32 § 1 of the Salaries Act was not applicable to the applicant’s situation, as the issue of salary payments to employees of the Ministry was governed by the Regulation on Salaries, adopted on the basis of the Police Act. It therefore reversed the first‑instance judgment and dismissed the applicant’s compensation claim.
4. On 20 February 2015 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. On 24 November 2016 the Constitutional Court rejected the appeal, noting that the applicant’s appeal on points of law had in the meantime been dismissed by a decision of the Supreme Court which had been served on him on 9 October 2015. The Constitutional Court further observed that an appeal on points of law had been available to the applicant as of right, and emphasised that appellants were required to exhaust that remedy before lodging a constitutional appeal in such circumstances. It therefore concluded that the applicant’s appeal had been premature when submitted and that it had not been extended to cover the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision.
5. Relying on Article 6 of the Convention, the applicant complained that different courts of appeal had ruled in favour of his colleagues, who had lodged identical claims and had been in the same situation as he had been, and that the Constitutional Court’s case-law on the matter had been inconsistent. He also raised a complaint under Article 13 of the Convention.
Other relevant information6. Between August 2010 and August 2014 the courts of appeal in Novi Sad and Kragujevac ruled in favour of 12 of the applicant’s colleagues who had lodged claims identical to his. Their claims were upheld on the same basis as the applicant’s claim at first-instance, that is, the application of Article 32 § 1 of the Salaries Act (see paragraph 2 above).
7. In addition to the applicant’s case, the courts of appeal in Belgrade and Kragujevac dismissed as unfounded the claims lodged by eight of his colleagues between March 2013 and June 2015. Those courts based their decisions on the same grounds as those referred to by the Kragujevac Court of Appeal in the applicant’s case (see paragraph 3 above).
8. In one decision adopted in October 2015 and four decisions adopted between March and June 2017, the Constitutional Court found a violation of appellants’ right to equal protection of rights under Article 36 § 1 of the Constitution on account of inconsistencies in the case‑law of the courts of appeal in situations comparable to the applicant’s. It held that the existence of two final divergent judgments from 2010 and 2013, in which other claimants’ actions had been upheld, was sufficient to disclose a breach of the principle of legal certainty, given that the appellants’ identical claims had been dismissed on the same grounds as those referred to in the applicant’s case.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention9. The Court does not find it necessary to examine the Government’s objection that the applicant could not claim to be a victim of the alleged violation, as the application is in any event inadmissible for the reasons set out below. Furthermore, it is noted that the applicant’s constitutional appeal was rejected as premature (see paragraph 4 above). This raises the question of whether he exhausted that remedy in accordance with the domestic rules of procedure. When notice of the application was given to the Government, they did not raise an objection as to non-exhaustion in respect of the above‑mentioned fact. This being so, the Court cannot examine this question of its own motion (see, mutatis mutandis, M.C. v. Türkiye, no. 31592/18, § 44, 4 June 2024, and the authorities cited therein).
10. The relevant principles regarding alleged violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of divergent domestic case-law are summarised in Nejdet Şahin and Perihan Şahin v. Turkey ([GC], no. 13279/05, §§ 49-58, 20 October 2011), Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania ([GC], no. 76943/11, § 116, 29 November 2016) and Šabanović and Others v. Serbia (nos. 39819/16 and 4 others, §§ 87-88, 7 October 2025).
Inconsistent case-law of the courts of appeal11. It is clear from the domestic proceedings (see paragraph 6 above) that the domestic courts initially upheld claims for compensation similar to the applicants’ one. The first judgment to that effect was delivered in August 2010. From March 2013 onwards, however, the domestic courts also began to dismiss such claims (see paragraph 7 above). The conflicting decisions were delivered until August 2014, after which, according to the material in the case file, the courts consistently dismissed the claims.
12. Both the Civil Procedure Act 2004, as in force at the material time and which was applicable in the present case, and the Civil Procedure Act 2011 provided for the possibility of lodging an “extraordinary” appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court. Such an appeal could be allowed in order to, inter alia, secure consistency in the case-law of the lower courts.
13. According to the material in the case file, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in at least two cases involving compensation claims identical to the applicant’s, with a view to harmonising the case‑law of the lower courts. In the ensuing proceedings, it reversed the previous decisions and dismissed the claims, holding that Article 32 § 1 of the Salaries Act was not applicable to that type of case and that the claims were to be dismissed on the basis of the Police Act and Article 9 of the Regulation on Salaries. Those decisions were adopted on 29 October 2014 and 10 December 2015.
14. The Court observes that the case‑law of the Serbian courts of appeal displayed divergences concerning the application of Article 32 § 1 of the Salaries Act. It notes, on the basis of the material before it, that the domestic courts, while initially upholding claims comparable to the applicant’s, reversed their approach several months prior to the Kragujevac Court of Appeal’s dismissal of his claim (see paragraph 6 above). Accordingly, such divergences existed during the relevant period. They were “profound”, as they had originated in several courts of appeal, and “long‑standing”, given that they had persisted for a period of 17 months. The period under consideration is between March 2013, when the domestic courts of appeal started dismissing comparable claims, and August 2014, when such claims ceased to be upheld.
15. However, the existence of conflicting court decisions cannot, in itself, be considered in breach of the Convention, as the possibility of conflicting court decisions is an inherent trait of any judicial system which is based on a network of trial and appeal courts with authority in a certain area (see Stanković and Trajković v. Serbia, nos. 37194/08 and 37260/08, § 41, 22 December 2015, and Šabanović and Others, cited above, § 102). It thus remains to be established whether domestic law provided for a mechanism to overcome those inconsistencies, whether that mechanism was applied and to what effect.
16. The Court has previously acknowledged the role of the Supreme Court in addressing divergences in the case‑law of the Serbian courts (see Šabanović and Others, cited above, §§ 105-06, and the authorities cited therein). In the present case, the Supreme Court, acting within its jurisdiction to eliminate inconsistencies in the case‑law through the “extraordinary” appeal on points of law, succeeded in resolving the divergences at issue. There is no indication that, after August 2014, the domestic courts continued to adopt decisions upholding claims comparable to the applicant’s. The case‑law was harmonised within a reasonably short period of time (see Šabanović and Others, cited above, §§ 111-12). Moreover, the Supreme Court had endorsed this line of reasoning in a comparable case before the applicant’s own case was decided with final effect, and his case was adjudicated in accordance with that approach (ibid., § 113).
17. The Court also finds that the contested decisions of the Kragujevac Court of First Instance and the Kragujevac Court of Appeal (see paragraphs 2 and 3 above) were well-reasoned and cannot be considered arbitrary. Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that the proceedings leading to those decisions were otherwise unfair.
18. Lastly, the Court notes that in several cases involving situations comparable to the applicant’s, the Constitutional Court found a violation of the appellants’ rights on account of inconsistencies in the case‑law of the courts of appeal (see paragraph 8 above). In this connection, the Court emphasises that the Convention establishes minimum standards of protection, and a domestic interpretation that affords broader protection of the principle of legal certainty under Article 6 § 1 is not precluded. However, such domestic findings are not binding on the Court, whose task is to assess, in each individual case, whether the requirements of the Convention have been met.
19. Accordingly, this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
Allegedly inconsistent case-law of the Constitutional Court20. The applicant further alleged that, in other comparable cases, the Constitutional Court had not declared constitutional appeals inadmissible as premature (see paragraph 8 above), as it had in his case. However, the decisions relied upon by the applicant did not concern identical factual circumstances regarding the exhaustion of remedies prior to lodging a constitutional appeal (see Nejdet Şahin and Perihan Şahin, cited above, § 61). Those decisions therefore cannot be regarded as comparable.
21. Accordingly, this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
Alleged violation of Article 13 of the Convention22. Relying on Article 13 of the Convention, the applicant complained of the same issues as those complained of under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
23. Accordingly, this complaint is also manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 11 June 2026.
Olga Chernishova Darian Pavli
Deputy Registrar President