SECOND SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 40554/04
Robert VEVECKA
against Albania
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 26 May 2020 as a Chamber composed of:
Jon Fridrik Kjølbro, President,
Marko Bošnjak,
Valeriu Griţco,
Egidijus Kūris,
Ivana Jelić,
Darian Pavli,
Peeter Roosma, judges,
and Stanely Naismith, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 9 November 2004;
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant;
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
A. Background to the case
1. In the 1990s and 2000s, owing to large internal migration of the population, a great number of unauthorised buildings were constructed in the country, creating informal settlements. It was not uncommon that residents of existing blocks of flats erected unauthorised extensions or additions to buildings, for residential purposes, made structural alterations to dwellings or carried out any work without obtaining the required permission.
2. Faced with the high number of such informal settlements as well as unauthorised extensions and additions to existing buildings, two Legalisation Acts, with a view to regularising unauthorised constructions, were enacted in 2004 (see paragraphs 32 and 33 below).
B. The circumstances of the case
3. The applicant, Mr Robert Vevecka, is an Albanian and Austrian national who was born in 1950 and lives in Vienna. Following the communication of the application to the respondent Government, the applicant informed the Court that he had acquired citizenship of Austria.
4. On 5 December 1996 the applicant purchased a one-bedroom flat on the fourth floor of a five-storey building in Tirana.
5. It would appear that, while the applicant was living in Vienna, on an unspecified date the residents of the applicant’s block of flats started building a side extension which adjoined the northern wall of the building.
6. In January 1999, on a visit to Tirana, the applicant noticed that the building of the extension was being carried out and reported the interference with his property to the Construction Police (Policia Ndërtimore).
7. On 20 January 1999 the Construction Police, noting the existence of an allegedly unlawful construction, ordered the suspension of the building work pending the examination of the administrative contravention (see paragraph 31 below). The record stated that “at the time of inspection of the unlawful building, the brickwork of the fourth floor and the installation of the frame for the construction column [wa]s under way (në momentin e ushtrimit të kontrollit, objekti i kundraligjshëm është në fazën e muraturës se katit IV dhe vendosjses së armatures së kollonës së ndërtimit)”.
8. On 27 January 1999 the applicant, given that the building work had continued in spite of the suspension order, lodged a civil action with the Tirana District Court (“the District Court”) against the building company and K.G., who was the alleged owner of the extension’s fourth-floor flat. In his civil action, the applicant chiefly relied on Articles 302 and 303 of the Civil Code (“the CC”) (see paragraphs 22 and 23 below) and requested (i) the cessation of interference with his property rights, (ii) the suspension of the unauthorised building work, (iii) the demolition of the unauthorised extension, and (iv) that he should be recognised as the lawful owner of the extension’s fourth-floor flat which abutted his own flat. The applicant claimed that the extension had infringed his property rights, since it had diminished the value of his flat by obstructing the light, view and airing and by occupying his part of the plot which lay under the main building. It had also enabled burglars to break into the flat.
9. On 18 February 2000 the District Court ordered an expert report in order to obtain information on, amongst other things, the lawfulness of the extension, the state of the building work and any damage caused to the applicant’s flat.
10. On 9 March 2000, as supplemented on 30 March 2000, the expert’s report stated that two unauthorised extensions had been erected, one adjoining the northern side and the other adjoining the eastern side of the building containing the applicant’s flat. As regards the side extension in dispute, the report stated that it had been built by the residents of the block of flats in which the applicant’s flat was situated, without obtaining any prior permission. The side extension had its own entrance and staircase and did not have structural openings to any of the flats located in the applicant’s block of flats. The report further stated that there had been interference with the use of the northern wall of the applicant’s flat, which was a non-opening load-bearing wall (mur mbajtes kallkan) and served as a party wall (mur veshës) to the flat allegedly belonging to K.G., and with the use of the plot of land lying under the flat. The building work, which had consisted of plastering walls and installing flooring, windows and doors, had been completed in the extension’s fourth-floor two-bedroom flat. No damage had been observed to the northern wall of the applicant’s flat as a result of the building work.
11. On 12 May 2000 the District Court, noting that the applicant had been living in Austria since 1994, found in his favour. Having regard to the applicant’s wish to withdraw both the action against the building company and the claim to be recognised as the lawful owner of the extension’s fourth-floor two-bedroom flat, the court decided to discontinue those parts of the proceedings. Relying on the expert’s report, the court found that K.G., who had admitted to the unauthorised construction of the extension, had bought the two-bedroom flat in bad faith from unlawful owners who had never had an ownership title thereto and had never been residents of the applicant’s block of flats. It further held that the extension had been erected in the absence of valid permission and other technical documentation. The court finally ordered K.G. to demolish the unauthorised extension’s fourth-floor two-bedroom flat, which had infringed on the applicant’s property rights by making use of his flat’s northern wall.
12. On 19 December 2000, following K.G.’s appeal against the District Court’s decision, the Tirana Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) quashed it and remitted the case to the District Court for a fresh examination by another bench. It held that the District Court had failed to assess various aspects of the case, such as the date on which the building work had started, in particular whether the building work had commenced prior or subsequent to the applicant’s acquisition of ownership, and whether the former owners of the applicant’s flat had consented to the construction of the extension. By ordering K.G. to demolish the extension’s fourth-floor flat, the District Court had also failed to give reasons about the consequences that such demolition would have for the alleged owners of the flat to be constructed on the extension’s fifth floor. K.G. could not be held solely responsible for the unauthorised construction of the five-storey extension. Even though the expert report had stated that the applicant’s flat had not been damaged as a result of the building work, it had not clearly demonstrated the existence of interference with the applicant’s property rights.
13. Following the applicant’s cassation appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision, on 7 November 2001 the Supreme Court rejected it de plano, finding that its grounds fell outside the scope of the limited grounds of appeal within the meaning of Article 472 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“the CCP”) (see paragraphs 28 and 29 below).
Rehearing proceedings
14. Following the remittal of the case, the District Court ordered a fresh expert report, which was carried out on 15 September 2002. The expert report stated that a semi-detached, five-storey side extension had been erected and completed by 2002, adjoining the northern non-opening load-bearing wall of the applicant’s building. Each floor of the extension housed a two-bedroom flat, all of which were occupied. The report could not determine the precise nature of the building work carried out by the building company which had laid the foundations. It noted, however, that in March 1995 the building company had given receipts (mandate arkëtimi) to residents of the applicant’s building, and that, on the basis of a (sales) contract dated 4 September 1996, S.S. had sold the extension’s fourth-floor flat to D.D., who had subsequently sold it to K.G. The report did not point to any external damage, such as damp, on the walls of the applicant’s flat or to obstruction of the light; it noted that plaster had fallen off the applicant’s balcony walls. The expert had not inspected the interior of the applicant’s flat, which remained locked.
15. On 10 November 2002 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s action. Making an assessment of the evidence in the case file, the court found that the carrying out of the building work had been without permission, as evidenced by the Construction Police’s suspension order. Referring to the building company’s receipts, it found that the building work had commenced before March 1995 and the extension’s frame (karabina) had been erected by September 1996, which was prior to the applicant’s acquisition of the flat on 2 December 1996. In the court’s view, the applicant was prevented from seeking the suspension of the building work and the demolition of the extension in so far as those claims had been lodged on 27 January 1999, which was beyond the one-year statutory time-limit provided for in Article 303 of the CC. The applicant had not substantiated the fact that he had been living abroad from the time he became the flat’s owner until 1999, when he brought his civil action. Nor had he made an application to lodge the civil action out of time. The District Court also held that, by the time the applicant had lodged the civil action in 1999, the bulk of the building work had been completed, and K.G. was occupying the extension’s fourth-floor flat.
16. The District Court considered that the applicant’s claim for cessation of interference with his property rights, under Article 302 of the CC, was ill-founded. In reaching this conclusion, the court referred to the expert’s report (see paragraph 14 above), which had found that the side extension adjoined the non-opening load-bearing wall of the applicant’s building and that it had not obstructed the lighting and airing of, or access to, the applicant’s flat. Furthermore, the expert’s report had stated that no signs of damp were visible on the party wall and that no damage could occur to the applicant’s flat as a result of the extension’s construction. Lastly, the District Court dismissed the applicant’s claim to be recognised as the owner of the extension’s fourth-floor flat as unsubstantiated and being devoid of a legal basis.
17. The applicant appealed, arguing that the District Court had legitimised an unlawful construction, which had been erected in the absence of statutory permission and in breach of urban planning regulations. He maintained that the District Court had made an erroneous assessment of the evidence. For example, he had been a tenant prior to becoming the owner of the flat in 1996 and the extension had interfered with his right to the protection of property. The carrying out of the building work had commenced in 1999, as evidenced by the Construction Police suspension order, and he was within the statutory time-limit prescribed by Article 303 of the CC to lodge the civil action. The court had, however, ignored the suspension order which stated that the brickwork for the fourth floor was continuing. In his further submissions, the applicant, without elaborating further, stated that the Court of Appeal should have referred to a Supreme Court Joint Benches decision no. 901 of 14 July 2000 (see paragraph 27 below).
18. On 15 May 2003 the Court of Appeal endorsed the District Court’s findings, upheld its decision and dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The court, having assessed the evidence in the case file, reconfirmed that: the applicant had acquired his flat on 5 December 1996, the building work for the extension had commenced before 15 March 1995, the building work had been completed and the flats in the extension were all occupied. It rejected the applicant’s claim under Article 302 of the CC as ill-founded, since the applicant had failed to demonstrate that the extension infringed his property rights. The expert’s report had stated that the applicant’s flat had not sustained any damage or otherwise been affected as a result of the construction of the extension. The court further rejected the applicant’s claim under Article 303 of the CC as having been submitted beyond the one-year time-limit prescribed by that provision.
19. On 18 June 2004, following the applicant’s cassation appeal which contained the same grounds he had raised before the lower courts, the Supreme Court rejected the appeal de plano, finding that its grounds fell outside the scope of Article 472 of the CCP.
20. On 18 February 2005, following the applicant’s constitutional complaint, the Constitutional Court, sitting as a bench of three judges, declared the applicant’s appeal inadmissible de plano, stating that the complaint did not raise issues concerning the applicant’s right to a fair hearing.
C. Relevant domestic law and practice
1. The Constitution
21. The relevant parts of the Constitution, at the material time, read as follows:
Article 42 § 2
“In the protection of his constitutional and legal rights, freedoms and interests, or in defending a criminal charge, everyone has the right to a fair and public hearing, within a reasonable time, by an independent and impartial court established by law.”
Article 131
“The Constitutional Court shall decide on: ... (f) final complaints by individuals alleging a violation of their constitutional rights to a fair hearing, after all legal remedies for the protection of those rights have been exhausted.”
2. Civil Code (“CC”)
22. Article 302 of the CC provides that “the owner [of a property] has the right to request from anyone who interferes with his property, without divesting the owner of the possessions, to put an end to the interference, not to repeat it in the future, and, when appropriate, provide compensation for damage caused”.
23. Article 303 of the CC stipulates that “the owner...[of a property] who may reasonably fear damage caused by new work started by a third party on his or her property or the property of others, is entitled to initiate civil proceedings on condition that the work has not been completed or provided that one year has not elapsed since the beginning of the new work”. The court may decide, as appropriate, to halt the construction, demolish it and order compensation or dismiss the civil action.
24. Articles 608 and 609 of the CC make provision for a tort action by an owner seeking compensation for the damage to his property.
(a) Supreme Court’s case-law on the interpretation of Article 303
25. In its decision no. 41 of 25 January 2000 the Supreme Court held that the following four cumulative conditions should be met in order to examine a civil action under Article 303 of the CC: (i) the claimant should be the owner or possessor of a property; (ii) the existence of new work should be present; (iii) the new work should not have finished and a year should not have elapsed from its start; (iv) the existence of reasonable grounds that the new work would damage the claimant’s property (see also subsequent decision no. 341 of 27 March 2007 which follows the same reasoning).
26. In its decisions no. 1102 of 25 October 2001 and no. 647 of 9 April 2003 the Supreme Court dismissed the claimants’ appeal under, inter alia, Article 303 of the CC, in that it was time-barred. The claimant’s civil claim had been lodged beyond the one-year time-limit (see also subsequent decisions no. 126 of 14 February 2006 and no. 769 of 5 June 2007 which follow the same approach).
(b) Other relevant case-law of the Supreme Court
27. The Supreme Court Joint Benches decision no. 901 of 14 July 2000, as referred to by the applicant in his appeal (see paragraph 17 above), stated that the court examining a civil action should take a position in respect of all claims. Only the claimant could determine the defendant(s), and, as a rule, the court could not determine the parties to the proceedings. A defendant could decide to submit a rejoinder (prapësime) or a counterclaim (kundër padi) in response to the civil action (padi).
3. Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”)
28. Article 472 of the CCP, at the material time, stated that “the Court of Appeal and the District Court’s decisions may be appealed to the Supreme Court if: (a) the law has not been respected or has not been correctly applied; (b) there have been serious breaches of procedural rules; (c) decisive evidence requested by the parties during the trial has not been admitted; (ç) the reasoning of the decision is clearly illogical; or (d) the provisions on jurisdiction and authority have been breached.”
29. Article 480 of the CCP, at the material time, provided that “the Supreme Court shall dismiss an appeal if it does not comply with the requirements laid down in Article 472 of the CCP. The Supreme Court shall decide in private on the admissibility of appeals.”
4. The Urban Planning Act 1998 (law no. 8405 of 17 September 1998, as amended)
30. The Urban Planning Act 1998 defined the general rules governing the urban planning and architecture of constructions in Albania. The Act instituted a two-tier procedure for obtaining the required permission. An application for planning permission (kërkesa për shesh ndërtimi) was initially to be submitted for examination and approval by the competent municipal authority, and a building permit (leje ndërtimi) was required to be obtained prior to the commencement and carrying out of any building work.
5. The Construction Police Act 1998 (law no. 8408 of 25 September 1998)
31. According to the Construction Police Act 1998, the Construction Police were responsible for supervising compliance with urban planning legislation, imposing fines in the event of breach of the urban planning legislation and deciding on the suspension of the building work and ordering the demolition of unlawful constructions.
6. The Legalisation Acts 2004
32. The Legalisation of Additions to Buildings Act (law no. 9209 of 23 March 2004) entered into force on 25 May 2004 and the Legalisation of Illegal Settlements Act (law no. 9304 of 28 October 2004) entered into force on 24 December 2004 (both “the Legalisation Acts 2004”).
33. According to the Legalisation Acts 2004 claimants were required to lodge an application for the regularisation of their unauthorised buildings within the time-limits prescribed by law. Upon the examination of the application, the competent authorities would issue a legalisation permit against the payment of a fee, recognising the applicants’ property rights over the unauthorised building and the appurtenant plot of land.
34. Both Legalisation Acts 2004 were subsequently repealed by the Legalisation Act 2006 (law no. 9482 of 3 March 2006, as amended).
COMPLAINTS
35. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the unfairness and unreasonable length of the proceedings. He further complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about a breach of his property rights on account of the unlawful construction of the side extension.
THE LAW
A. Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
36. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the proceedings were too long and unfair.
37. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, in its relevant parts, reads:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”
1. As regards the complaint about the alleged length of proceedings
38. The applicant complained about the length of the domestic proceedings under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
39. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, amongst others, Gazsó v. Hungary, no. 48322/12, § 15, 16 July 2015).
40. Having regard to the foregoing criteria, the Court notes that there was one set of proceedings which started on 27 January 1999 and finished on 18 February 2005. The proceedings lasted six years over four instances, three of which examined the case twice.
41. The Court considers that the domestic authorities acted with promptness from 27 January 1999 to 7 November 2001. While the remittal of the case for re-examination necessarily lengthened the proceedings, their overall conduct from 7 November 2001 to 18 February 2005, over four instances, does not disclose any delay or period of inactivity that would breach Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Nor does the Court consider that the overall length of the proceedings infringed the reasonableness requirement of the said provision.
42. The Court concludes that the applicant’s complaint about the length of the proceedings is manifestly ill-founded and should be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
2. As regards the complaint about the alleged unfairness of the proceedings
43. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the civil proceedings had been unfair, in that the domestic courts had unjustly dismissed his action, as a result of which they had failed to examine his arguments in full. He also complained that the higher courts’ decisions were not duly reasoned.
44. The Government submitted that the domestic decisions had been adequately reasoned, that the applicant had benefited from adversarial proceedings, which, as a whole, had been fair.
45. The Court reiterates that it is not its function to deal with alleged errors of law or fact committed by the national courts unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention (see, for example, García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999-I, and Perez v. France [GC], no. 47287/99, § 82, ECHR 2004‑I), for instance where they can be said to amount to “unfairness” in breach of Article 6 of the Convention. While Article 6 guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way in which evidence should be assessed, these being primarily matters for regulation by national law and the national courts. In principle, issues such as the weight attached by the national courts to particular items of evidence or to findings or assessments submitted to them for consideration are not for the Court to review. The Court should not act as a fourth-instance body and will therefore not question under Article 6 § 1 the national courts’ assessment, unless their findings can be regarded as arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable (see, for example, De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], no. 43395/09, § 170, 23 February 2017, and the references cited therein).
46. The effect of Article 6 § 1 is to place the domestic courts under a duty to conduct a proper examination of the submissions, arguments and evidence adduced by the parties, without prejudice to its assessment of whether they are relevant to its decision (see Carmel Saliba v. Malta, no. 24221/13, § 64, 29 November 2016). The Court’s sole task in connection with Article 6 of the Convention is to examine applications alleging that the domestic courts have failed to observe specific procedural safeguards laid down in that Article or that the conduct of the proceedings as a whole did not guarantee the applicant a fair hearing (see, for example, Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433/09, § 197, ECHR 2012, and Donadzé v. Georgia, no. 74644/01, §§ 30-31, 7 March 2006).
47. Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the applicant, relying on Articles 302 and 303 of the CC, instituted proceedings for interference with his property rights on account of the unauthorised building of the side extension.
48. The Court observes that the applicant consistently complained about the unauthorised building of the side extension, which was at the heart of his claim under Article 302 of the CC. In response, the District Court, in the rehearing proceedings, gave considerable weight to the applicant’s arguments and acknowledged the illegality of the construction of the side extension. However, having ordered a fresh expert report, which concluded that the applicant’s flat had not sustained any external damage, including damp, and that the extension had not obstructed the lighting and airing of, or access to, the applicant’s flat, the District Court, in the rehearing proceedings, dismissed his claim (see paragraph 16 above). In particular, the District Court found that Article 302 of the CC, which governs ongoing interference with the enjoyment of one’s possessions, was not applicable to the circumstances of the applicant’s case. The Court finds that the District Court gave reasons which cannot be considered manifestly unreasonable or arbitrary.
49. The Court further notes that the applicant was able to avail himself of the possibility to appeal against the District Court’s decision (see paragraph 17 above). He did not complain that he did not have the benefit of adversarial proceedings. At the various stages of those proceedings, whether personally or through his counsel, the applicant was able to submit the arguments he considered relevant to his case. On appeal, the Court of Appeal, referring to the expert’s reports’ findings, upheld the lower court’s decision, explaining that the applicant had not substantiated that there had been an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of his flat (see paragraph 18 above). The Court therefore does not consider that, in so far as the applicant’s claim under Article 302 of the CC is concerned, the domestic courts’ findings were arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable.
50. As regards the applicant’s claim under Article 303 of the CC, the domestic courts found that the building work had started on an unspecified date before March 1995, and the applicant purchased his flat on 5 December 1996 (see paragraphs 15 and 18 above), on which date he should at least have been aware of the construction. There is nothing in the case file to indicate that the applicant was not capable of envisaging the course of the building work. Neither can it be inferred that he was prevented from visiting the flat and the construction site, as a result of which he could have not noticed the building work.
51. However, the applicant lodged his civil action with the District Court on 27 January 1999, beyond the statutory one-year time-limit provided for under Article 303 of the CC. The Court considers that, regardless of the date the applicant moved to Austria or the date he purchased the flat, the domestic courts did not appear to err in their calculation of the one-year time-limit. Furthermore, the domestic courts’ assessment of evidence and interpretation of domestic law was not in disharmony with the Supreme Court’s case-law on the matter (see paragraphs 25 and 26 above). Consequently, the domestic courts’ decision declaring the applicant’s claim under Article 303 of the CC as time-barred was neither arbitrary nor manifestly unreasonable.
52. Lastly, the Court observes that the applicant’s cassation appeal to the Supreme Court was substantially the same as his appeal to the Court of Appeal, which had examined and addressed it. The Court considers that the limited reasons given by the Supreme Court in its inadmissibility formula implicitly indicated that the applicant had not raised one of the points of law provided for by Article 472 of the CCP. The Court observes that where a Supreme Court refuses to accept a case on the basis that it did not raise legal grounds of appeal, very limited reasoning may satisfy the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention (see Marini v. Albania, no. 3738/02, § 106, ECHR 2007 (extracts)). It was for the same reasons that the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional appeal in respect of a breach of the right to a fair hearing.
53. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court considers that the applicant’s complaint that the proceedings were unfair is manifestly ill-founded and should be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
B. Alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention
54. Under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention the applicant complained that his property rights had been infringed as a result of the construction of an unlawful building.
55. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention reads:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
56. The applicant submitted that the unlawfully constructed extension adjoining his flat had considerably hampered its lighting and airing. He had been unable either to sell or to rent out the flat.
57. The Government argued that the domestic courts had decided that the extension did not breach the applicant’s peaceful possession of his property. They relied on another expert report that they had commissioned, which determined that the extension did not interfere with the lighting and airing of or the passage to the applicant’s flat. They further stated that the annex had been constructed on a public plot of land which belonged to the State, following the collective consent of all other residents. As such, the legalisation of the extension was a matter to be resolved between the State and its residents.
58. The Government contended that the applicant’s inability to sell or rent the flat was because he had not maintained it or installed windows and window panes.
59. The Court notes that neither of the parties disputed the applicability of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It sees no reason to rule otherwise.
60. The Court has repeatedly held that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 also establishes some positive obligations. In cases involving litigation between private parties, the State is under a positive obligation to afford the parties to the dispute judicial procedures which offer the necessary procedural guarantees and therefore enable the domestic courts and tribunals to adjudicate effectively and fairly any disputes between private parties (see, for example, Kotov v. Russia [GC], no. 54522/00, § 114, 3 April 2012; Blumberga v. Latvia, no. 70930/01, § 67, 14 October 2008; and Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukraine, no. 48553/99, § 96, ECHR 2002‑VII).
61. Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the applicant complains mainly about the manner in which the national courts interpreted and applied domestic law in proceedings essentially between private parties.
62. As the Court has found in the examination of the applicant’s complaint concerning the alleged unfairness of the domestic proceedings under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention above, the domestic courts made an overall factual and legal examination of the various interests at stake and dismissed the applicant’s claims by giving reasons that cannot be considered manifestly unreasonable or arbitrary. It is noteworthy that the domestic courts acknowledged the unlawful construction of the extension. Furthermore, they found that the extension had not obstructed the lighting and airing of, or access to, the applicant’s flat, which had not sustained any external damage as a result of the unlawful construction.
63. The Court cannot find any basis on which to conclude that the domestic courts’ findings were affected by any element or arbitrariness or that they were otherwise manifestly unreasonable.
64. As regards the procedural protection of the applicant’s interests, the Court notes that the applicant, who was duly represented during the domestic proceedings, was provided with ample opportunity to advance all arguments which he regarded as pertinent for the outcome of the case, and benefitted from adversarial proceedings.
65. It follows that the applicant’s complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention is manifestly ill-founded and should be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 25 June 2020.
Stanley NaismithJon Fridrik Kjølbro
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy