SECOND SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 60038/00
by Györgyné VEIZER
against Hungary
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 9 March 2004 as a Chamber composed of:
MrJ.-P. Costa, President,
MrA.B. Baka,
MrL. Loucaides,
MrC. Bîrsan,
MrK. Jungwiert,
MrM. Ugrekhelidze,
MrsA. Mularoni, judges,
and Mrs S. Dollé, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 4 June 2000,
Having regard to the Court's decision to apply the procedure under Article 29 § 3 of the Convention and examine the admissibility and merits of the case together.
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mrs Györgyné Veizer, is a Hungarian national who was born in 1944 and lives in Budapest.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
A. The circumstances of the case
The applicant produced machine components for an agricultural co-operative. Because of late payment, the applicant issued a prompt collection order, which was paid by the co-operative. However, in the meantime payment of the same amount was also transferred by a bank to the applicant's account. In 1990 the agricultural co-operative brought an action for unjust enrichment against the applicant before the Pest Central District Court. The first hearing was held on 16 February 1990.
On 26 February 1990 the applicant brought a counter-claim against the plaintiff for damages allegedly resulting from the late payment.
On 14 March 1990 the District Court heard the parties. On 22 March 1990 it heard the applicant.
At the hearing of 17 August 1990 the District Court appointed an expert. He submitted his opinion on 30 April 1991. On 12 July 1991 the court heard the expert.
On 18 September 1991 the District Court accepted the plaintiff's action and ordered the applicant to pay 238,015 Hungarian forints and interest to the co-operative. It also dismissed the applicant's counter-claim.
On appeal, on 16 December 1992 the Budapest Regional Court quashed the first-instance decision and transferred the case to its competent bench, holding that it had jurisdiction in the matter.
On 30 April 1993 the court held a hearing.
At the hearing of 2 February 1994 the plaintiff informed the court that proceedings had been instituted against him by the applicant.
On 13 May, 16 September 1994, 22 February and 31 May 1995 the court heard witnesses as well as the parties.
A hearing scheduled for 8 December 1995 was postponed by the court to 5 January 1996. On the latter date, the plaintiff requested the court to suspend the proceedings pending the final decision in another case.
On 20 April 1999 the applicant modified her counter-claim.
In the meantime, the applicant requested that a hearing be held. At the hearing of 21 April 1999 neither the plaintiff nor the applicant appeared despite having properly been summoned. Consequently, the proceedings were stayed (szünetelés) by force of law, pursuant to section 137 § 1 b) of the Code on Civil Procedure. None of the parties requested the continuation of the case for the next six months. Therefore, on 21 October 1999 the proceedings were discontinued (megszűnés szünetelés folytán) in application of § 3 of the same section.
In the case underlying the plaintiff's request for suspension, the final judgment was adopted on 14 November 2001 and served on the applicant on 4 February 2002. On 27 March 2002 the applicant requested that a hearing be held in the present case. She attached the Supreme Court's judgment.
In reply to the applicant's request, on 1 October 2002 the Budapest Regional Court informed her that the case had been discontinued on 21 October 1999 according to section 137 § 1 of the Code on Civil Procedure.
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
Section 137 of the Code on Civil Procedure reads as relevant:
“(1) The proceedings shall be stayed (szünetelés) [by force of law], if
a) ...
b) none of the parties appears at any of the hearings, ... and the plaintiff has not requested that the hearing be held despite his absence, ...
(2) ... The proceedings shall be continued at the request of either of the parties.
(3) If the proceedings were stayed for six months, the proceedings shall be discontinued (megszűnés) [by force of law] on the final date of that period. No request for reinstatement can be submitted in this respect.”
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention of the length of the proceedings.
THE LAW
The applicant complains that the proceedings lasted an unreasonably long time. She invokes Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which, in its relevant parts, provides:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time... by [a] ... tribunal...”
The Government argue that the application should be declared inadmissible as the applicant failed to introduce her application within the six-month period prescribed by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. In this connection they observe that the case ended on 21 October 1999, whereas the application was introduced only on 4 June 2000.
The applicant contests this. She claims that she was informed of the extinction of her case on 1 October 2002.
Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, provides:
“The Court may only deal with the matter ... within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken.”
The Court recalls that the six months' rule, in reflecting the wish of the Contracting Parties to prevent past decisions being called into question, after an indefinite lapse of time, serves the interests not only of the respondent Government but also of legal certainty as a value in itself. It marks out the temporal limits of supervision carried out by the organs of the Convention and signals to both individuals and State authorities the period beyond which such supervision is no longer possible (see, for example, Walker v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 34979/97, ECHR 2000-I).
The Court observes that at the hearing of 21 April 1999 neither the plaintiff nor the applicant appeared despite having properly been summoned. Consequently, the proceedings became statutorily stayed, pursuant to section 137 § 1 b) of the Code on Civil Procedure. Since none of the parties requested the resumption of the case for more than six months, on 21 October 1999 the case ceased to exist. When the applicant next contacted the Budapest Regional Court in March 2002, she was informed of this fact.
The Court is not convinced by the applicant's argument that she only became aware of the discontinuation of the case at a late state. It is to be observed that, under section 137 of the Code on Civil Procedure, both the stay and the discontinuation of a case takes effect by force of law, without it being necessary for the courts to take a decision. Consequently, the Regional Court was not obliged to inform ex officio the applicant of these events. Had the applicant displayed more diligence in her case, an enquiry in due time would have resulted in the resumption of the domestic proceedings or in her learning about their discontinuation before the expiry of the six-month time-limit under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.
In these circumstances, the Court considers that the proceedings terminated on 21 October 1999 and the six-month time-limit began to run from that date. However, the application was lodged only on 4 June 2000, i.e. more than six months later.
It follows that the application has been introduced outside the six-month time-limit prescribed by Article 35 § 1 and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
S. DolléJ.-P. Costa
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy