Information Note on the Court’s case-law 223
November 2018
Vicent Del Campo v. Spain - 25527/13
Judgment 6.11.2018 [Section III]
Article 8
Article 8-1
Respect for private life
Teacher found to have committed workplace harassment and identified by name in judgment following proceedings against his employer of which he had been unaware: violation
Facts – The applicant, a teacher and head of department in a public school, was accused of psychological harassment by a teacher colleague. After her complaint against him had been dismissed by the education authorities as unfounded, the applicant’s colleague instituted judicial proceedings against the regional administration, seeking compensation for its failure to prevent the harassment. In 2011 the High Court of Justice found that the alleged harassment in the workplace had been shown to exist and ordered the administration to pay compensation in the amount of EUR 14,500. The applicant was identified by name in the judgment. The applicant, who only knew about the proceedings through the publication of information in a local newspaper sometime after the judgment had been delivered, requested to become a party to the proceedings. The High Court of Justice rejected his request, on the grounds that he could not be considered an interested party in liability proceedings against the public administration.
Law – Article 8: While the applicant was not a party to the liability proceedings brought against the public administration, under domestic law, a declaration of liability of the public administration did not entail any automatic benefit or damage to his rights. Neither the reasoning nor the statement of facts set out in those proceedings had under any circumstances the force of res judicata with regard to subsequent proceedings judging the liability of the public official who had allegedly caused damage in the exercise of his or her duties.
Given that the judgment of the High Court of Justice had disclosed the applicant’s identity, finding that his conduct had amounted to psychological harassment and bullying, and that the publication of those findings had been capable of adversely affecting his enjoyment of private and family life, the complaint fell within the scope of Article 8.
Moreover, the disclosure of the applicant’s identity in the reasoning of the judgment of the High Court of Justice could not be considered to be a foreseeable consequence of the applicant’s own doing. On the one hand, he had been reportedly unaware of the proceedings. He had not been summoned to appear and was not a party to the proceedings, which in addition were solely aimed at determining the strict liability of the public administration concerned as a result of professional acts and omissions by public officials in the exercise of their duties. Furthermore, the complaint lodged against him personally by his colleague for psychological harassment in the workplace had been previously dismissed, and the colleague concerned had not taken further action against him. The applicant had never been charged with or proved to have committed any criminal offence.
Accordingly, the measures complained of had constituted an “interference” with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life and pursued the aim of “the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”, particularly those of the applicant’s colleague – as an alleged victim of harassment in the workplace – by acknowledging and publicly disclosing the facts as a way of reparation for the damage suffered and in the interests of the proper administration of justice.
While the liability proceedings against the public administration had specific features, the High Court of Justice had not confined its reasoning to simply finding that the situation suffered by the applicant’s colleague had amounted to workplace harassment and that the education authorities, despite being aware of the situation, had not taken effective measures to prevent it or bring it to an end. The High Court of Justice had conducted a thorough analysis of the facts and the evidence before it to conclude that the applicant’s conduct had amounted to repeated psychological harassment. The above portrayal of the applicant’s conduct in an authoritative judicial ruling was likely to have great significance by the way it stigmatised him and was capable of having a major impact on his personal and professional situation, as well as his honour and reputation.
The relevant domestic law made no mention of identifying the public official who had caused the damage, nor did it make the liability conditional upon establishing the public official’s negligence, fault or intent. It would hence have been sufficient to merely prove the damage and its link with the functioning of the public service. Furthermore, the High Court of Justice had the discretion to omit mentioning any names in the judgment, avoiding the identification of the applicant, or to restrict publication of the judicial proceedings for reasons of public policy or for the protection of rights and freedoms. Moreover, access to the text of a judgment or to certain matters therein could be restricted when a person’s right to private life was affected. Such measures would, to a great extent, have limited the impact of the judgment on the applicant’s right to reputation and private life and it was not apparent why the High Court of Justice had not taken any such measures to protect the applicant’s identity.
The applicant had not been informed, questioned, summoned or in any other way notified of his colleague’s complaint pending before the High Court of Justice. Accordingly, he had not had the opportunity to request the non-disclosure of his identity or personal information by the High Court of Justice before its judgment was passed. The interference with the applicant’s private life had thus not been accompanied by effective and adequate safeguards.
The case had had a significant impact and repercussions in media. Although it was unclear how the media had accessed information about the case, it was noted that, under domestic law, judicial proceedings were in principle public unless decided otherwise for reasons of public policy or for the protection of rights and freedoms. As a result, judgments were delivered in public and, once issued and signed by those who delivered them, published. Furthermore, once the judgment was delivered, the access to the judgment would be beyond the control of the High Court of Justice as it would be a court registrar, and not a judge, who would be in charge of authorising the disclosure of documents relating to judicial proceedings to third parties not involved in the proceedings. Taking this into consideration, and the State authorities’ obligation to protect individuals’ right to reputation, the High Court of Justice should have adopted appropriate measures to protect the applicant’s right to respect for private life in drafting the judgment.
The interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life occasioned by the High Court of Justice’s judgment had not been sufficiently justified in the particular circumstances of the case and, notwithstanding the national court’s margin of appreciation in such matters, had been disproportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.
Conclusion: violation (unanimously).
Article 41: EUR 12,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage; claim in respect of pecuniary damage dismissed.
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This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
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