Information Note on the Court’s case-law 66
July 2004
Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy - 36681/97
Judgment 1.7.2004 [Section III]
Article 2 of Protocol No. 4
Article 2 para. 1 of Protocol No. 4
Freedom of movement
Unlawful prolongation of a police supervision order: violation
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1
Vote
Disenfranchisement following the imposition of a police supervision order: violation
Facts: The applicant, against whom a number of criminal complaints had been lodged in relation to his involvement in cases of stolen goods, was placed under police supervision for one year in March 1994. The order imposing this preventive measure was served on him in May 1994. However, it was not until over a year later, in July 1995, that the police drafted a document setting out the concrete obligations and movement restrictions which the applicant had to comply with during the preventive measure. As one year had already passed since the order had been served on him, the applicant requested the courts for a declaration that the preventive measure had expired. The District Court, and subsequently the Court of Appeal, considered that the order had not ceased to apply since its implementation had only started in July 1995 (when the police had drafted the document with specific obligations for the applicant). On the contrary, the Court of Cassation found that the period of special supervision had begun to run on the date when the order had been served on the applicant, and, consequently, that the special supervision had ceased to apply in May 1995. Moreover, as a result of the imposition of the special supervision order, the applicant had been taken off the electoral register in January 1995, which had prevented him from taking part in elections for the Regional Council and for the national Parliament.
Law: Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 – It was hard to understand why there had been a delay of more than one year in drafting the obligations which arose from an order which was immediately enforceable and concerned the applicant’s fundamental right of freedom of movement. Although the Court of Cassation had declared that the order had ceased to apply in May 1995, it had not provided the applicant with any redress for the damages he had suffered as a result of the unlawful prolongation of the special supervision order. In such circumstances, the interference with the applicant’s liberty of movement after May 1995 had not been “in accordance with law” or necessary.
Conclusion: violation (unanimously).
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 – As Regional Councils can enact laws and the powers vested on them by the Constitution are wide enough to make them a “constituent part of the legislature”, this provision was applicable to the applicant’s disenfranchisement in respect of these elections as well as those for the national Parliament. Given the delay of more than nine months between the date the order was imposed and the applicant’s actual disenfranchisement by the Electoral Committee, for which no explanation had been provided by the Government, the applicant had been adversely affected in his right to vote in both such elections. Had the disenfranchisement been applied in due time and for the statutory period of one year, the measure would have ceased before the holding of such elections.
Conclusion: violation (unanimously)
Article 41 – The Court awarded the applicant 2,000 euros in respect of non-pecuniary damage. It. also made an award in respect of costs.
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This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
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