FIRST SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 48730/99
by Cinzia VOGLINO
against Italy
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 14 March 2002 as a Chamber composed of
MrC.L. Rozakis, President,
MrsF. Tulkens,
MrP. Lorenzen,
MrsN. Vajić,
MrE. Levits,
MrA. Kovler,
MrV. Zagrebelsky, judges,
and Mr E. Fribergh, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 16 March 1999,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is an Italian national, living in Grottaferrata (Rome). She is represented before the Court by Mr A. Barbàra, a lawyer practising in Rome.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Rome, which she had let to B.F.R.
In a writ served on the tenant on 4 February 1991, the applicant informed the tenant of her intention to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1991 and summoned her to appear before the Rome Magistrate.
By a decision of 29 May 1991, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 July 1992.
On 7 October 1992, 20 September 1995 and 10 February 2000, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises.
On 7 December 1992, she served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 15 February 1992.
Between 15 December 1992 and 25 February 1993, the bailiff made three attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.
On 13 October 1995, she served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 31 October 1995.
Between 31 October 1995 and 6 November 1996, the bailiff made six attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.
On 28 February 2000, she served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 24 March 2000.
Between 24 March 2000 and 13 July 2000, the bailiff made four attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.
On 24 July 2000, the applicant recovered possession of the apartment.
THE LAW
The applicant complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that her inability to recover possession of her apartment amounted to a violation of the right to property.
The applicant further complains under Article 6 of the Convention about the duration of the eviction proceedings.
The Government maintain that the measures in question amount to a control of the use of property which pursues the legitimate aim of avoiding the social tensions and troubles to public order that would occur if a considerable number of orders for possession were to be enforced simultaneously. In their opinion, the interference with the applicant’s property rights was not disproportionate; therefore, there is no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
As to the length of the enforcement proceedings, the Government submit that the delay in granting police assistance is justified on grounds of the order of priorities established according to public-safety requirements. In any event, the Government stress that following the entry into force of Law no. 431 of 9 December 1998, the Prefect is no longer competent to determine the order of priority for the enforcement of the evictions. The date of enforcement should now be set by the District Court.
The Court considers that the application raises complex and serious issues which require a determination on the merits. It follows that it cannot be considered manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring the application inadmissible has been established.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application admissible, without prejudging the merits of the case.
Erik FriberghChristos Rozakis
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy