FIFTH SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 25126/06
by Jiří VOJTA
against the Czech Republic
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 8 February 2011 as a Chamber composed of:
Dean Spielmann, President,
Elisabet Fura,
Karel Jungwiert,
Mark Villiger,
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre,
Ann Power,
Ganna Yudkivska, judges,
and Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 14 June 2006,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Jiří Vojta, is a Czech national who was born in 1950 and lives in Prague. The respondent Government are represented by Mr V.A. Schorm, from the Ministry of Justice.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
On 29 January 2000 the applicant accepted a summons for a hearing concerning a minor offence but informed the Prague 4 District Office that he could not attend.
On 2 May 2000 the Prague 4 District Office fined the applicant 2,000 Czech korunas (CZK) (55 euros (EUR)) for having committed the minor offence of public nuisance. According to the applicant, the administrative decision was never served on him. However, the Government provided the Court with the official return receipts showing that the decision was delivered to the applicant’s address on 18 and 19 May while he was not at home, and was later deposited at the relevant post office and the applicant was notified about it. Three days later the administrative decision was regarded as having been duly served. The decision became final on 7 June 2000.
On 2 October 2002 the Prague District Court ordered the execution of the administrative decision by the sale of the applicant’s movable property. According to the applicant, the execution order was served on him on 26 June 2003.
On 11 July 2003 the applicant applied for the reopening of the minor offence proceedings, arguing that he had learnt of the administrative decision only on 26 June 2003. At the same time, he appealed against the District Court’s order, claiming, inter alia, that on account of an “irregular official procedure” he had been unable to take part in the administrative proceedings.
On 24 September 2003 the District Office rejected the petition as having been filed outside the statutory period of three years which had run from 7 June 2000. The Prague Municipality upheld that decision on 11 January 2004.
On 30 March 2004 the applicant seems to have supplemented his appeal against the District Court order, maintaining that the administrative decision had not been served on him in compliance with the relevant provisions of the Code of Administrative Procedure.
On 30 April 2004 the Prague Municipal Court upheld the District Court’s execution order, holding that the proceedings had complied with the relevant laws. The court did not deal with the applicant’s argument that the District Office’s decision had not been properly served on him.
The applicant filed an appeal on points of law in which he complained that the administrative decision had not been served on him. On 26 April 2005 the Supreme Court rejected the appeal, considering that it did not appear from the case file that the applicant had raised this issue in his appeal against the execution order.
The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal alleging that the administrative decision had not been served on him. On 7 December 2005 the Constitutional Court rejected his appeal as manifestly ill-founded finding, inter alia, that the applicant had not raised this issue earlier. This decision was served on the applicant on 5 January 2006.
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the administrative decision had not been served on him in the due manner and that, therefore, he had not had the opportunity to challenge it.
2. The applicant further claimed that the service of the execution order had been delayed by eight months and that, as a result, he was denied the opportunity to apply for the reopening of the administrative proceedings in time.
3. Finally, relying on Article 6 of the Convention, the applicant alleged that in the proceedings concerning the execution order the domestic courts had not dealt with his argument that the District Office’s decision had not been served on him.
THE LAW
The applicant raised a number of complaints concerning the allegedly improper service of the administrative decision and the irregularities in the ensuing execution proceedings. He relied on Article 6 of the Convention which, so far as relevant, provides as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. ...”
1. With regard to the service of the administrative decision, the Government submitted that the applicant had neither exhausted all the domestic remedies nor complied with the six-month time-limit as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. Moreover, having regard to the relative insignificance of the issues under consideration, they further objected that the application was an abuse of the right of application within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. The Government presented the return receipts proving that the District Office had made two attempts to deliver the administrative decision to the applicant, who was, however, absent at the time. The decision had therefore been deposited at the post office and was regarded as having been duly served under the Code of Administrative Procedure.
The applicant did not respond to the Government’s observations.
The Court finds that it is not required to decide on the Government’s preliminary objections as the complaint is in any event inadmissible for the following reasons.
The Court observes that on 29 January 2000 the applicant was properly summoned, at his address, to a hearing. He was, therefore, aware of the administrative proceedings against him. Moreover, the return receipts clearly show that the administrative decision was sent to the applicant by registered letter at the same address on both 18 and 19 May. It could not be served on him because of his absence and was, therefore deposited at the relevant post office. As the applicant did not collect it there within the time-limit set, it was not delivered to him; however, pursuant to the Code of Administrative Procedure, the administrative decision was regarded as having been duly served (see, mutatis mutandis, Hennings v. Germany, 16 December 1992, § 26, Series A no. 251‑A).
The Court also notes that the applicant could have but did not challenge this legal presumption of delivery.
It follows that this complaint must be dismissed as manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 a) and 4 of the Convention.
2. Regarding the applicant’s complaint that he had missed the statutory time-limit to apply for the reopening of the proceedings, the Court reiterates that Article 6 § 1 does not guarantee a right to the reopening of proceedings and is not applicable to proceedings concerning an application for the reopening of proceedings which have been terminated by a final decision (e.g. Zawadzki v. Poland (dec.), no. 34158/96, 6 July 1999, and Sablon v. Belgium, no. 36445/97, § 86, 10 April 2001).
It follows that this complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.
3. Finally, with regard to the alleged failure of the domestic courts involved in the execution proceedings to deal with the applicant’s argument concerning the improper delivery of the administrative decision, the Government submitted that Article 6 of the Convention was not applicable to proceedings on the execution of punishment (e.g. Hormaechea Cazon v. Spain (dec.), nos. 55914/00 and 58071/00, 7 June 2001; Grava v. Italy (dec.), no. 43522/98, 5 December 2002; Pilla v. Italy (dec.), no. 64088/00, 23 September 2004; and Lazzari v. Italy (dec.), 9363/04, 24 March 2005).
The Government contended that the proceedings did not concern the lawfulness of the criminal charges against the applicant, which had already been decided. Nor did they involve the applicant’s civil rights and obligations; the fine was not a civil-law debt but a sanction for illegal acts, imposed in “criminal” proceedings. According to the Government the complaint is, therefore, incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention.
The applicant did not respond to the Government’s observations.
The Court notes that the minor offence proceedings must be regarded as “criminal” proceedings within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention (e.g. Lauko v. Slovakia, no. 26138/95, 2 September 1998, §§ 56-59, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑VI).
However, the present complaint concerns the fairness of the enforcement proceedings concerning the fine imposed on the applicant for a minor offence in the administrative proceedings.
The Court finds that Article 6 § 1 is not applicable under its civil head, given that the fine was intended as a punishment to deter reoffending and had a punitive character, which is the customary distinguishing feature of criminal penalties, and does not therefore constitute a civil obligation.
With regard to the applicability of this provision under its criminal head, the Court considers that it does not apply either, because the execution proceedings did not involve the determination of a new criminal charge against the applicant, nor were they akin to a sentencing procedure (see mutatis mutandis, Saccoccia v. Austria (dec.), no. 69917/01, ECHR 2007‑VIII (extracts)). In the Court’s view, the proceedings for the enforcement of the administrative decision imposing the fine on the applicant were thus tantamount to proceedings on the execution of punishment, which are not covered by Article 6 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Lazzari, cited above).
It follows that this complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Claudia WesterdiekDean Spielmann
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy