FIRST SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 12981/21
Tatiana VOLÁROVÁ
against Slovakia
(see appended table)
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 10 November 2021 as a Committee composed of:
Erik Wennerström, President,
Lorraine Schembri Orland,
Ioannis Ktistakis, judges,
and Viktoriya Maradudina, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 26 February 2021,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
The applicant’s details are set out in the appended table.
The applicant, a Slovak national, was represented by Mr O. Urban, a lawyer practising in Bratislava.
The applicant’s complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention concerning the excessive length of civil proceedings before the first‑instance court were communicated to the Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”).
On 12 January 2017 the applicant sued her employer complaining of discrimination and seeking, among other things, payment of an outstanding amount of her salary. She filed six additional submissions with the first‑instance court up until May 2017. The first of eight hearings took place on 8 June 2018. On 21 June 2018 the applicant proposed to alter the summary of her action (petit), to which the court acceded after she had rectified her proposal as per the court’s instruction. At what was supposed to be the final hearing on 31 January 2020, the applicant was asked to amend again the summary of her action, after she had been paid a certain amount of salary by the defendant. Following the court’s repeated call to comply with that request in April 2020, the applicant withdrew a part of her action in May 2020. On 26 August 2020 the court dismissed the applicant’s action in part and discontinued the proceedings as for the remainder. The written judgment was sent off on 28 September 2020 and served on the applicant’s lawyer on 15 October 2020. On 29 October 2020 the applicant appealed. The proceedings before the court of appeal are currently pending.
The applicant complained twice to the Constitutional Court about the length of the proceedings before the first-instance court. Her first complaint was dismissed as manifestly ill-founded on 20 August 2020. The Constitutional Court found that the applicant, who had been represented by a renowned law firm throughout the entire proceedings, had considerably contributed to their length, including by filing six additional submissions to her action, altering the summary of her claim and rectifying it, and not complying in time with the first-instance court’s request following the hearing on 31 January 2020. While taking note of what was at stake for her, it dismissed the argument that the first-instance court’s conduct had been ineffective. The Constitutional Court observed, on the contrary, that steps had been taken to prevent delays, including by imposing a fine on the defendant’s lawyer and by addressing warnings to the applicant.
On 19 January 2021 the Constitutional Court dismissed as manifestly ill‑founded the applicant’s second complaint of 23 November 2020. Noting that it had been lodged only three months after its previous decision, the Constitutional Court held that the first-instance judgment had already been adopted on 26 August 2020 and had been served on 15 October 2020. The delay in serving had been explained by the applicant’s lawyer’s failure to collect the judgment within the set time-limit. The Constitutional Court observed that, following the judgment, the first-instance court had performed procedural tasks with regard to the applicant’s appeal (requesting her to pay the court fee and dealing with her complaint, and communicating the appeal to the defendant). Although the dispute required speedy resolution given the subject matter of the case, the first-instance court’s conduct did not disclose a violation of the “reasonable time” requirement. The Constitutional Court also noted that the proceedings were partially held on during the state of emergency in Slovakia in relation to the Covid-19 pandemic.
THE LAW
Complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (excessive length of civil proceedings before the first-instance court)
The Government viewed the applicant’s conduct in the domestic proceedings as decisive in so far as their length was concerned. They argued that she had considerably contributed to the delays and considered her complaints manifestly ill-founded.
The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
The impugned proceedings before the first-instance court started on 12 January 2017 and the judgment on the merits was served on the applicant’s lawyer on 15 October 2020. The period to be examined is thus slightly over three years and nine months before one level of jurisdiction.
In the Court’s view, the length of the impugned proceedings raises concerns. However, the Court cannot ignore that the Constitutional Court cautiously took into account the particular circumstances of the case and examined them in the light of the Court’s case-law, including by paying due regard to what was at stake for the applicant and to both her conduct and that of the first-instance court.
Nothing in the case file suggests, nor does it stem from the Constitutional Court’s decisions, that the case was particularly complex. The court held eight hearings over a period of approximately two years. It is true that the first hearing took place almost a year and a half after the action had been lodged, however, the applicant was partially responsible for that delay. She also contributed to further delays by altering and rectifying the summary of her action, not acting in time upon the court’s request and failing to collect the judgment within the set time-limit. As such, the applicant considerably contributed to the delays that occurred (see, by contrast, Perhács v. Slovakia [Committee], no. 59327/19, § 20, 24 September 2020). At the same time, the first-instance court took necessary procedural steps to prevent further delays, thus avoiding any extensive period of inaction (see, by contrast, Obluk v. Slovakia, no. 69484/01, § 71, 20 June 2006). In addition, the applicant was paid part of the amount claimed before the proceedings ended. In view of the above, the Court finds that in the impugned domestic proceedings the first-instance court acted in line with the “reasonable time” requirement.
Accordingly, these complaints are manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 2 December 2021.
{signature_p_2}
Viktoriya Maradudina Erik Wennerström
Acting Deputy Registrar President
APPENDIX
Application raising complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
(excessive length of civil proceedings)
Application no.
Date of introduction
Applicant’s name
Year of birth
Representative’s name and location
Start of proceedings
End of proceedings
Total length
Levels of jurisdiction
Domestic court
File number
Domestic award
(in euros)
12981/21
26/02/2021
Tatiana VOLÁROVÁ
1959
Ondrej Urban
Bratislava
12/01/2017
15/10/2020
3 years, 9 months and 4 days
1 level of jurisdiction
Constitutional Court
I. US 388/2020,
I. US 18/2021
0