SECOND SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 38633/97
by Milota VIRÁGOVÁ[Note1]
against Slovakia[Note2]
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section) sitting on 1 December 1998 as a Chamber composed of
MrC. Rozakis, President,
MrM. Fischbach,
MrG. Bonello,
MrsV. Strážnická,
MrP. Lorenzen,
MrA.B. Baka,
MrE. Levits, Judges,
withMrE. Fribergh, Section Registrar;
Having regard to Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 21 February 1997 by Milota VIRÁGOVÁ [Note3] against Slovakia and registered on 17 November 1997 under file No. 38633/97;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 49 of the Rules of Court;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a Slovak national born in 1966. She is unemployed and resides in Banská Bystrica. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
A.The particular circumstances of the case
The applicant and her husband agreed to transfer the tenancy of an apartment situated at Tatranská Street 46 in Banská Bystrica to an individual. The latter orally promised to the applicant that her family could move to a smaller apartment situated at Javornícka Street 22 in Banská Bystrica.
On 27 July 1994 the applicant and her husband signed a formal agreement according to which the right to use the apartment situated at Tatranská street 46 would be transferred to the aforesaid individual as from 1 September 1994. Section III § 3 of the agreement stated that the applicant and her husband were liable to pay the rent until the agreement became operative, and that after the transfer their address would be Javornícka street 22. The agreement was signed in the presence of a representative of the co-operative which owns the apartment situated at Tatranská street 46.
Subsequently the applicant found out that her family could not move into the apartment situated at Javornícka street 22 as it was occupied by another person. She therefore challenged the agreement of 27 July 1994 before the Banská Bystrica District Court (Okresný súd - “the District Court”) on the ground that the individual concerned had made her sign the agreement under false pretences.
On 14 June 1996 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s action. At the hearing a representative of the co-operative concerned stated that the applicant and her husband had signed the agreement of their own free will and without any reservations. Neither this witness nor the three other witnesses heard by the court were in a position to confirm the applicant’s allegation that she had been promised the right to live in the apartment situated at Javornícka street 22. Since there was no evidence which supported the applicant‘s allegation, the court concluded that the applicant had failed to show that she and her husband had concluded the agreement under circumstances which could affect its validity within the meaning of Sections 37 § 1 and 39 of the Civil Code (see “Relevant domestic law“ below).
The applicant appealed. She alleged that the individual who had offered them the deal had acted in a fraudulent way and invoked Sections 3, 37 § 2 and 39 of the Civil Code.
On 30 October 1996 the Banská Bystrica Regional Court (Krajský súd - “the Regional Court“) upheld the District Court’s judgment of 14 June 1996. The Regional Court found that the District Court had established all relevant facts of the applicant’s case with sufficient certainty, and that it had assessed them correctly from the legal point of view. In particular, the Regional Court noted that two witnesses had confirmed that the applicant and her husband had signed the agreement of their own free will. It found no evidence indicating that the agreement was void for any of the reasons set out in Sections 37 and 39 of the Civil Code.
In the Regional Court’s view, Section III § 3 of the agreement of 27 July 1994 referred to Javornícka street 22 as the applicant’s future address solely in the context of arrangements regarding the advance payments of the rent for the apartment situated at Tatranská street 46 until the applicant’s departure from that apartment. The Regional Court held it therefore for irrelevant that the applicant could not actually move into the apartment situated at Javornícka street 22.
On 23 March 1998 the District Court ordered the applicant to vacate the apartment situated at Tatranská street 46. On 30 July 1998 the Regional Court upheld this decision. Both courts established, with reference to the reasons set out in their judgments of 14 June and 30 October 1996 respectively, that the applicant and her husband had transferred the right to use the apartment in question to another individual and concluded that they lived in it without any legal ground.
B.Relevant domestic law
The following provisions of the Civil Code are relevant in the present case:
Section 3 § 1 provides that the exercise of civil rights and obligations must not, unless there is a relevant legal ground for it, interfere with justified rights and interests of others and that it must not be contrary to boni mores.
Under Section 3 § 2, public authorities shall ensure that civil rights and obligations are not infringed.
Pursuant to Section 37 § 1, for a legal act to be valid, it has to be carried out freely, with serious intention, certainly and clearly.
Under Section 37 § 2, any legal act the subject of which cannot be attained is to be considered as being void.
Section 39 provides that a legal act is void if, by its nature or contents, it is contrary to or circumvents the law, or if it is contrary to boni mores.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains that the courts dealing with her case failed to establish the facts correctly and decided arbitrarily in that they did not take into account that her contracting partner had made her sign the agreement in question under false pretences.
THE LAW
The applicant complains that the courts dealing with her case failed to establish the facts correctly and decided arbitrarily. The Court will examine this complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which provides, so far as relevant, as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by a[n] ... tribunal established by law.”
...
The Court first notes that the proceedings in question concerned respectively the validity of an agreement on transfer of tenancy and the applicant’s obligation to move out of an apartment. In the Court’s view, these proceedings determined the applicant’s “civil rights and obligations” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
The Court further recalls that, in accordance with Article 19 of the Convention, its only task is to ensure the observance of the obligations undertaken by the Parties in the Convention. In particular, it is not competent to deal with applications concerning errors of law or fact allegedly committed by the competent national authorities, to whom it falls, in the first place, to interpret and apply domestic law. The Court has no competence to examine allegations concerning such errors except where, and to the extent that, they seem likely to have entailed a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Schenk v. Switzerland judgment of 12 July 1988, Series A no. 140, p. 29, §§ 45, 46 ).
In the present case both the District Court and the Regional Court examined the applicant’s action but found, for reasons set out in their judgments, that the applicant had failed to show the existence of any circumstances which would be capable of rendering the agreement of 27 July 1994 void. In the subsequent set of proceedings the courts ordered the applicant to vacate the apartment in question after they had established, with reference to the arguments set out in their judgments of 14 June and 30 October 1996 respectively, that the applicant and her husband continued to live there without any legal ground.
The Court considers that the reasons on which the national courts based their above decisions are sufficient to exclude the assumption that the way in which they established and evaluated the evidence in the applicant's case was unfair or arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has before it no information which would indicate that the proceedings leading to the decisions complained of did not conform to the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Erik Fribergh Christos Rozakis
Registrar President
[Note1]Please check if public or not. If not, put initials only. Name and, in capital letters, surname ; corporative name in capital letters ; no translation of collective names.
[Note2]First letter in capital letters plus the article according to normal speech.
[Note3]In small letters.
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