FIFTH SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 35328/17
Mihails VIŠŅEVSKIS against Latvia
and 2 other applications
(see list appended)
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 25 March 2021 as a Committee composed of:
Jovan Ilievski, President,
Mārtiņš Mits,
Ivana Jelić, judges,
and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above applications lodged on the various dates indicated in the appended table,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix. They were represented by Ms R. Matjušina, a lawyer practising in Riga.
2. The Latvian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms K. Līce.The circumstances of the case
3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.The applicants’ arrest and pre-trial detention
4. On 11 September 2015 the police stopped two cars with ten people. The first and second applicants were arrested on suspicion of kidnapping of two people. Shortly thereafter the first and second applicants were declared suspects in criminal proceedings. On 13 September 2015 an investigating judge ordered their pre-trial detention.
5. On 2 November 2015 the third applicant was arrested in connection with the same criminal proceedings. He was declared a suspect. On 4 November 2015 another investigating judge ordered his pre-trial detention.
6. In those initial detention orders the investigating judges found, on the basis of the available material, that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicants had taken part in the kidnapping, which was a particularly serious and violent crime punishable by imprisonment. The applicants were suspected of being members of a criminal group.
7. The judges established that there was a risk that the applicants might contact witnesses and people implicated in the events with a view to coordinating their testimony and obstructing the criminal investigation. Evidence was still being collected. It was in the interests of the investigation not to allow any contact with suspects, victims and witnesses.
8. The judges considered the applicants’ personal situation and links with the country. They established that (i) the first applicant was working; (ii) the second applicant, a German national, had a business in Germany (it was later established that he also had a family in Latvia); and (iii) the third applicant was unemployed and had a family in Latvia.
9. The judges examined the applicants’ criminal record. The first applicant’s last conviction had been for a drugs-related offence; he had been punished with a prison sentence of more than nine years. As regards the second applicant, the judge did not refer to his previous convictions in the initial detention order, but the material presented to her contained information that he had been under criminal investigation in Germany on suspicion of extortion and causing bodily injury.
10. The third applicant had had six previous convictions. His last conviction had been for theft; he had been punished with a prison sentence of two years. The third applicant had been under probation since his release in November 2014. However, he had breached the rules of probation on several occasions by not attending weekly appointments at a local police station. The third applicant had moved to another city after the events of 11 September 2015 and had avoided being brought before the investigating authority in the criminal proceedings at hand. The judge concluded that he might commit another offence, obstruct and avoid the criminal investigation.
11. The first and second applicants lodged appeals against their initial detention orders. On 1 October 2015 a court of appeal dismissed them. The third applicant did not lodge an appeal against his initial detention order.
12. On 24 and 26 November 2015 another investigating judge authorised further detention in respect of the second and first applicants. In addition to the reasons mentioned above, she noted that various investigating activities continued, and that evidence was being collected.
13. The judge noted further details. The first applicant had had two previous convictions, he had been released early in March 2015 and had been under probation since then. The second applicant had been previously convicted in Latvia (she referred to his last conviction for multiple serious crimes including kidnapping, extortion and causing bodily injury, he had been punished with a prison sentence of eight years). However, prior to serving his sentence the second applicant had fled abroad; international search warrant had been issued and he had been arrested several years later. The judge dismissed the second applicant’s allegations about medical assistance in prison. The judge concluded that the first and second applicants might commit another offence, obstruct and avoid the criminal investigation.
14. The judge took no further decision in relation to the third applicant as the statutory two-month time-limit since the last assessment (see paragraph 37 below) did not expire before the case was sent for trial.The applicants’ detention during their trial
15. The applicants lodged four requests for release in 2016. A first‑instance court judge dismissed those requests (decisions of 15 January, 9 May, 17 August and 10 November 2016).
16. On 10 November 2016 the judge reiterated the reasons indicated in the initial detention orders. She added that the court investigation was ongoing and witnesses were giving testimony before the trial court. She also relied on negative assessment reports by the State Probation Service that had been prepared at her request.
17. The applicants lodged four requests for release in 2017. The judge dismissed those requests (decisions of 25 January, 27 March, 29 May and 29 June 2017). A higher-level court judge made a further decision (see paragraph 23 below).
18. The judge reiterated the reasons indicated in the initial detention orders and provided further reasons.
19. On 25 January 2017 she added that the court investigation was ongoing and witnesses and victims (including those who had not previously appeared) were giving testimony before the trial court.
20. On 27 March 2017 the judge noted that the court investigation was ongoing and witnesses and victims continued to give testimony before the trial court (summonses had been sent abroad to ensure their participation). The applicants had submitted new evidence contesting credibility of written submissions made by one victim; it had to be examined by the trial court. The judge refused to release the second applicant on bail as there was no proof for his means to post bail.
21. On 29 May 2017 the judge reviewed the second applicant’s continued detention in view of his state of health. He was suffering from hypertension, but he could receive adequate medical care in detention. She also noted that the trial court continued to hear witness testimony, including from new witnesses for the defence. The court had postponed hearings as a result of absences or poor state of health of the defendants (including the applicants) or their lawyers.
22. On 29 June 2017 the judge noted that the court investigation had not been completed because of actions, absences or poor state of health of the defendants (including the applicants) or their lawyers. The defendants had continued to submit new requests, including requests to question new witnesses for the defence. Despite all reasonable efforts by the court to hear testimony from one victim and one witness, neither of them had been able to testify. The judge noted that four out of ten defendants continued to be detained taking into account their personal characteristics and role in the events under consideration.
23. On 6 September 2017 the higher-level court judge authorised the applicants’ detention for three more months (see paragraph 36 below). The judge established that the hearings had been scheduled on a regular basis and that there had been no unjustifiable delays attributable to the first-instance court. Faster completion of the proceedings had not been possible because of their particular complexity. With regard to the latter, he referred to the nature of the criminal offence (a particularly serious crime), the number of defendants (ten), all of whom exercised their rights in a manner which inhibited speedy proceedings.
24. On 27 October 2017 the applicants were released under assurances of personal guarantees and placed under police supervision. A newly appointed judge (see paragraph 30 below) found proof that they all had regular income, employment and a place to reside in Latvia.Conduct of the criminal proceedings against the applicants
25. On 30 November 2015 the police sent the case to the prosecution for bringing charges against the applicants and other defendants. One month later the case was referred for trial.
26. On 4 January 2016 the first-instance court received the case and scheduled hearings for January and February. At this stage the case related to several episodes of criminal acts, involved ten defendants (five were held in detention and five where at liberty at that time) and four victims.
27. Hearings were held at regular intervals (ranging from a few days to two months). Overall, fifty hearings were scheduled in the time period until the applicants’ release on 27 October 2017 (see paragraph 24 above). In setting the hearing dates, the court took into account availability of lawyers.
28. Sixteen hearings were scheduled in 2016. Hearings took place on a monthly or bi-monthly basis; two hearings were held via videoconference to ensure attendance of victims who were abroad. The court examined the applicants’ requests for release on four occasions (see paragraph 15 above). In the course of six hearings the court heard testimony given by nine witnesses and several (but not all) victims. The court ordered several forensic examinations, requested information from the State Probation Service, admitted new evidence, imposed fines on non-attending witnesses and examined recusal requests against the judge and a prosecutor. As the latter request was upheld, another prosecutor had to be assigned to the case (it resulted in a delay of approximately one month). One hearing was postponed because no transfer request had been sent to a prison. Three hearings were postponed because of a work-related absence and illness of the judge. In July 2016 the applicants appointed another lawyer.
29. Thirty-four hearings were scheduled in 2017. Hearings took place at least on a fortnightly basis (save for the month of July, when no hearings were held). The court examined the applicants’ requests for release on four occasions (see paragraph 17 above). In the course of two hearings the court heard further testimony given by four witnesses. From 20 April 2017 the court organised hearings via videoconference with the applicants in a prison to avoid transfer-related delays. The court ordered another forensic examination, requested information from the relevant authorities about the second applicant’s state of health and examined further recusal requests against the judge. One hearing was postponed because the judge had taken one‑day’s leave. Seven hearings were postponed because lawyers (including the applicants’ lawyer) were busy elsewhere. Three hearings were postponed as a result of lawyers’ illnesses. Thirteen hearings were postponed taking into account the applicants’ state of health. Three hearings were postponed taking into account state of health of other defendants. One hearing was postponed in order to allow the first applicant to take a State-language exam in a prison.
30. On 31 August 2017 the judge left on a long-term mission. Another judge was appointed (it resulted in a delay of approximately one and a half months).
31. On 27 October 2017 the applicants’ requests for release were granted (see paragraph 24 above).
32. On 24 January 2018 the prosecution and all defendants, including the applicants, concluded an agreement whereby the latter pleaded guilty of kidnapping of two persons (without the aggravating circumstance of being members of a criminal group).
33. On 31 January 2018 the first-instance court confirmed the conditions of that plea bargain. The applicants were sentenced to a term of imprisonment, which corresponded to the time they had already spent in detention (see paragraph 52 below).
34. That judgment became final on 13 February 2018.Relevant domestic law
35. Pursuant to section 272(1) of the Criminal Procedure Law (Kriminālprocesa likums), a person may be detained only if specific factual information obtained in the course of criminal proceedings creates a reasonable suspicion that the person in question has committed a criminal offence, for which the law provides for a custodial sentence, and if no other security measure can ensure that the person in question will not commit another criminal offence or obstruct or avoid the pre-trial proceedings, trial or execution of the sentence.
36. Pursuant to section 277(7), a person charged with particularly serious crimes (such as were the applicants) may not be held in detention for more than twenty-four months. A higher-level court judge may extend a term by three more months, if there have been no unjustifiable delays attributable to the person directing the proceedings, or if the person who provides defence has intentionally delayed the progress of proceedings, or if a faster completion of proceedings has not been possible due to their particular complexity.
37. Section 281 sets out a procedure of control over the application of detention. It provides that a detained person may at any time ask the investigation judge (during the pre-trial proceedings) or court (during the trial) to assess the necessity of further detention (section 281(2)). Such a request may be refused if less than two months have passed since the last assessment and no new arguments have been submitted (section 281(3)). Such an assessment is automatic if a detained person has not submitted a request within two months from the last assessment of the necessity of further detention. However, after the trial has started such an assessment must be made if the trial has been suspended (iztiesāšana atlikta) or postponed (pasludināts pārtraukums) for a period longer than two months (section 281(4)).
COMPLAINT
38. The applicants complained under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention about the length of their detention. They also alleged that the domestic courts had failed to justify their detention.
THE LAWJoinder of the applications
39. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single decision.Alleged violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention
40. The applicants submitted that the length of their detention had been excessive and alleged the lack of “relevant” and “sufficient” reasons. They argued that the trial had not been conducted with “special diligence”. The applicants relied on Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
41. The Government contested that argument.The parties’ submissions
42. The Government were of the view that the domestic courts had given “sufficient” and “relevant” reasons to justify the applicants’ detention. There had been a reasonable suspicion that the applicants had committed the crime they had been charged with. The applicants’ continued detention had been ordered on the grounds of the risk of flight and obstructing the course of justice. As the applicants had been implicated in violent crimes and had been suspected of being members of a criminal group, those risks were increased. The domestic authorities had examined specific facts, the applicants’ personal circumstances and provided individualised assessment.
43. As regards the risk of flight, the Government pointed to the fact that the second and third applicants were foreign nationals with no obvious links with Latvia. Both had previously fled – the second applicant had fled abroad in another set of criminal proceedings and the third applicant had avoided being arrested in the proceedings at issue. There had been no proof that the second applicant had financial means and a place of residence in Latvia to release him on bail.
44. The risk of obstructing the course of justice had not been assessed in abstract terms. It had been based on the specific stage of criminal proceedings – the court investigation – and the necessity to question witnesses and victims by the trial court. It had not been possible to question them rapidly and proceed to the next stage of adjudication because hearings were often adjourned (the applicants and other defendants relied on various health issues and their lawyers relied on overlapping schedules in relation to other cases to obtain adjournment).
45. The domestic authorities had displayed special diligence as they had completed the pre-trial investigation in three months. As regards the conduct of the proceedings before the trial court, the hearings had been scheduled at regular intervals, majority of them – on a weekly or fortnightly basis, save for those occasions when further procedural actions had to be taken (such as ordering forensic or medical examinations). Only a couple of hearings had been adjourned because the trial judge was absent, whereas more than thirty hearings had been adjourned for reasons imputable to the applicants or other defendants (health-related issues or unavailability of lawyers).
46. The applicants, for their part, argued that their continued detention had not been justified by “relevant” and “sufficient” grounds beyond the reasonable suspicion against them. In the application forms, to which they also referred in their observations, the applicants complained about their detention subsequent to 10 November 2016. They admitted that they had been charged as members of the criminal group at the start of the criminal proceedings. However, the prosecutor had excluded that circumstance from the plea bargain in 2018.
47. There was no risk of flight. They all had family and a place of residence in Latvia; they were eventually released on personal guarantees. There was no risk of obstructing the course of justice. Evidence had to be collected during the pre-trial proceedings. Their detention had not avoided the risk of collusion since they had been placed in the same cell.
48. As regards the conduct of the proceedings, the applicants alleged procedural irregularities owing to the change of the prosecutor in 2016. They also referred to the change of the trial judge in 2017. They alleged that those changes had led to significant delays in the proceedings.The Court’s assessment
(a) General principles
49. The persistence of a reasonable suspicion that the detainee has committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for the validity of his or her continued detention. But when the national judicial authorities first examine, “promptly” after the arrest, whether to place the arrestee in pre‑trial detention, that suspicion no longer suffices, and the authorities must also give other relevant and sufficient grounds to justify the detention. Those other grounds may be a risk of flight, a risk of pressure being brought to bear on witnesses or of evidence being tampered with, a risk of collusion, a risk of reoffending, or a risk of public disorder and the related need to protect the detainee (see Buzadji, v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], no. 23755/07, §§ 87‑88, 101‑02, 5 July 2016, with further references). Those risks must be duly substantiated, and the authorities’ reasoning on those points cannot be abstract, general or stereotyped (see Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], no. 72508/13, § 222, 28 November 2017, with further references).
50. The risk of flight cannot be gauged solely on the basis of the severity of the possible sentence; it must be assessed with reference to a number of other factors, such as the accused’s character, morals, assets, links with the jurisdiction, and international contacts. Moreover, the last sentence of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention shows that when the only remaining reason for detention is the fear that the accused will flee and thus avoid appearing for trial, he or she must be released pending trial if it is possible to obtain guarantees that will ensure that appearance (see Merabishvili, cited above, § 223, with further references).
51. Similarly, the risk of pressure being brought to bear on witnesses cannot be based only on the likelihood of a severe penalty, but must be linked to specific facts (see Merabishvili, cited above, § 224, with further references).
(b) Period to be taken into consideration
52. The period to be taken into consideration started when the applicants were arrested: on 11 September 2015 in relation to the first and second applicants (see paragraph 4 above) and on 2 November 2015 in relation to the third applicant (see paragraph 5 above). That period ended on 27 October 2017 when the applicants were released (see paragraph 24 above). Accordingly, the first and second applicants spent two years, one month and sixteen days in detention. The third applicant spent one year, eleven months and twenty days in detention.
(c) Previous case-law against Latvia
53. In a number of cases against Latvia, which concerned the corresponding period of time, the Court has found a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention because of the extremely basic and summary reasoning of court orders and decisions extending the applicants’ detention under the old Criminal Procedure Code (see Bannikov v. Latvia, no. 19279/03, § 65, 11 June 2013, with further references).
54. More recently, the Court has examined cases where the applicants had been detained under the new Criminal Procedure Law in the absence of a reasonable suspicion against them and in the absence of further reasons with the passage of time (see Urtāns v. Latvia, no. 16858/11,§ 38, 28 November 2014, in respect of Article 5 § 1 (c), and Vaščenkovs v. Latvia, no. 30795/12, §§ 51‑52, 15 December 2016, in respect of Article 5 § 3). In Davidovs v. Latvia ([Committee], no. 45559/06, 7 July 2015), the Court found a double violation: in respect of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention on account of the absence of any valid decision authorising detention (ibid., §§ 47 and 50) and in respect of Article 5 § 3 on account of the absence of any reasons in a belatedly issued detention order (ibid., §§ 54‑56).
(d) Reasonableness of the length of detention
55. The Court observes that the criminal proceedings in the present case concerned a particularly serious and violent crime against physical integrity of a person, namely, kidnapping of two people. While the applicants did not admit to being members of a criminal group (see paragraphs 32 and 46 above), the fact remains that from the start of the investigation there was a suspicion that they had committed the offence as members of such group (see paragraph 6 above).
56. The Court accepts, and the applicants do not argue otherwise, that the reasonable suspicion that they had committed the crime persisted throughout the trial leading to their conviction (compare and contrast with cases cited in paragraph 54 above).
57. At the same time, as noted in paragraph 49 above, the existence of reasonable suspicion cannot on its own justify continued detention and must be supported by additional grounds. Thus, the Court will examine whether other grounds provided by the domestic courts justified the applicants’ continued detention, and whether those grounds were “relevant” and “sufficient”.
58. The domestic courts in their decisions relied on two main grounds for the applicants’ continued detention: (i) the risk of obstruction of the proceedings and (ii) the risk of flight.
59. As concerns the risk of obstruction of the proceedings, the Court observes that the domestic courts relied not only on the general risk flowing from the organised and serious nature of the applicants’ alleged criminal activities. The main justification for the obstruction of the proceedings during the early stages of the investigation was the risk of collusion with other defendants, tampering with evidence and influencing witnesses (see paragraphs 7 and 12-13 above). Although the applicants were held in detention in the same cell, their detention during the early stages of the investigation was justified as it allowed to sever contact with those defendants who had remained at liberty. The Court has already accepted that cases related to organised crime present more difficulties for the investigating authorities, and later for the courts, in relation to determining the facts and the degree of responsibility of each member of the group. In cases of this kind, continuous control and limitation of the defendants’ contact with each other and with other persons may be essential to avoid their absconding, tampering with evidence and, most importantly, influencing or even threatening witnesses (compare Bąk v. Poland, no. 7870/04, § 56, 16 January 2007; Rażniak v. Poland, no. 6767/03, § 25, 7 October 2008; and, more recently, Štvrtecký v. Slovakia, no. 55844/12, § 58, 5 June 2018, with further references).
60. Subsequently, during the trial, the judge requested further information from the State Probation Service (see paragraph 16 above). The Court agrees with the Government that the domestic courts did not assess the risk of obstruction of the proceedings in abstract terms. In addition to the applicants’ personal situation and characteristics, which had already been established at the early stages of the investigation (see paragraphs 8-10, 13 above), the domestic courts further assessed the applicants’ role in the events of 11 September 2015 and considered that their detention was necessary (see paragraph 22 above).
61. From 10 November 2016 the main justification for the risk of obstruction of the proceedings was that the trial court had started court investigation and heard victims and witnesses. With the passage of time the domestic courts’ decisions reflected the stage of the ongoing court investigation. The trial court established that additional victims and witnesses, including additional defence witnesses, had yet to testify before it (see paragraphs 16, 19-20 and 22 above).
62. In view of the fact that the applicants had raised arguments pertaining to credibility of written submissions made by one victim and had requested additional defence witnesses to be called (see paragraphs 20 and 22 above), the Court considers that the applicants’ detention during their trial was justified to exclude any possible attempts to contact witnesses and victims with a view to influencing their testimony.
63. As concerns the risk of flight, the domestic courts justified that risk not only by referring to the gravity and violent nature of the criminal offence itself, but also to the applicants’ previous convictions, behaviour, character and links with Latvia and other countries (see paragraphs 8-10 and 13 above).
64. In particular, the domestic courts established that the first applicant had served a lengthy prison sentence for a drugs-related offence and had been released just six months prior to the events of 11 September 2015, at which time he was still under probation in relation to that conviction.
65. As regards the second applicant, the domestic courts held that he had previously avoided serving a sentence in Latvia. He had been convicted of multiple serious crimes (including such offenses as kidnapping, extortion and causing bodily injury), resulting in a lengthy prison sentence, but had fled abroad. Hence, he had avoided being brought to justice for several years. It is significant, in this regard, that he had established links with another country.
66. As regards the third applicant, the domestic courts noted that his last known conviction related to a less serious crime. However, his actions subsequent to the events of 11 September 2015 – moving to another city, breaching the rules of probation and not attending weekly appointments at the police station – indicated that he was at the risk of flight.
67. In view of the above, the Court considers that the assessment made by the domestic courts as to the risk of flight as regards all three applicants was duly substantiated and justified.
68. In conclusion, the Court considers that the Latvian courts thoroughly evaluated all the relevant factors and based their decisions on the particular circumstances of the applicants’ case, their personal situation, their most recent criminal convictions and their activities. The reasons relied upon by the domestic courts cannot be said to have been stated in abstracto, nor can it be said that they ordered or extended the applicants’ detention on identical or stereotypical grounds, using some pre-existing template or formalistic and abstract language (contrast with cases referred to in paragraph 53 above).
69. Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that the domestic courts gave “relevant” and “sufficient” reasons to justify the applicants’ continued detention for the entire period under examination.
(e) Conduct of the proceedings
70. It remains to be established whether the judicial authorities displayed “special diligence” in the conduct of the proceedings. In assessing whether this requirement has been met, the Court will have regard to, among others, the overall length of the pre-trial investigation and trial, the (legal and factual) complexity of the case, the number of defendants involved, and the conduct of the applicants and the authorities, including any periods of unjustified delay.
71. In the instant case, the Court accepts that the proceedings were of considerable complexity and involved the collection of extensive evidence, numerous hearings and taking of testimony from ten defendants, four victims and numerous witnesses. The proceedings required individual determination of the criminal responsibility of all defendants and – while the applicants were implicated only in the events of 11 September 2015 – the case related to several episodes of criminal activities (see paragraphs 26, 28, 29 above).
72. The Court considers that the pre-trial investigation was completed speedily – in less than three months from the start of the investigation (see paragraphs 4 and 25 above). The charges against the applicants were brought within one month and, thus, the case was referred for trial without any delay.
73. The applicants were held in detention during the trial for a further period of one year and nine months. At the trial stage, hearings where scheduled at regular intervals, taking into account the availability of lawyers (see paragraph 27 above).
74. As concerns the conduct of the proceedings in 2016, the trial court scheduled hearings on a monthly or bi-monthly basis. The trial court took a number of procedural steps, including requesting further information from the relevant authorities. The trial court also took steps to expedite the proceedings by imposing fines on non-attending witnesses (see paragraph 28 above). The applicants have pointed out only one circumstance allegedly causing unjustified delay in this period: the change of the prosecutor in 2016. However, the material submitted to the Court demonstrates that that delay was not significant (see paragraph 28 above). It did not take more than one month for the newly appointed prosecutor to take over the prosecution in the case. The Court considers that this period of time was reasonable in the circumstances of the present case.
75. As the trial advanced in 2017, the trial court scheduled hearings more often than in 2016 – at least on a fortnightly basis. The trial court took a number of procedural steps to expedite the proceedings, for example, by organising hearings via videoconference from the prison to avoid any transfer-related delays (see paragraph 29 above). The applicants have pointed out only one circumstance allegedly causing unjustified delay in this period: the change of the trial judge in 2017. However, the material submitted to the Court demonstrates that that delay was not significant (see paragraph 30 above). It did not take more than one and a half months for the newly appointed judge to take over the adjudication. The Court considers that this period of time was reasonable in the circumstances of the present case.
76. As to the conduct of the applicants, the Court notes that no hearings were adjourned because of them in 2016. However, towards the completion of the trial in 2017, it appears that the most significant delays in the proceedings occurred because the applicants’ state of health worsened. As a result, thirteen hearings were adjourned. The applicants cannot be blamed for delaying the proceedings because of their worsening state of health. However, in the present case the State cannot be held responsible for those delays either. In fact, the trial court took steps to find out the nature of the ailments which the applicants claimed to suffer from and to ensure their participation in the trial (see paragraph 29 above).
77. Taking into account the particular complexity of the case and the fact that the domestic authorities took precautions to avoid delays in the criminal proceedings, the Court does not find any delays or shortcomings in the proceedings which would indicate that the authorities did not proceed with “special diligence” as was required of them.
(f) Conclusion
78. Having regard to the above, the Court considers that the applicants’ complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Decides to join the applications;
Declares the applications inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 22 April 2021.
{signature_p_1} {signature_p_2}
Martina KellerJovan Ilievski
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Appendix
No.
Application no.
Case name
Lodged on
Applicant
Year of Birth
Place of Residence
Nationality
Name of court ordering the applicants’ detention on remand, date
Period of detention under consideration, length
1.
35328/17
Višņevskis v. Latvia
09/05/2017
M. VIŠŅEVSKIS
1975
Salaspils
Latvian
The Riga City Ziemeļu District Court,
13/09/2015
11/09/2015-27/10/2017
2 years, 1 month, 16 days
2.
35592/17
Wetzel v. Latvia
09/05/2017
I. WETZEL
1959
Rastatt
German
The Riga City Ziemeļu District Court,
13/09/2015
11/09/2015-27/10/2017
2 years, 1 month, 16 days
3.
35635/17
Askerov v. Latvia
09/05/2017
R. ASKEROV
1983
Riga
Russian
The Riga City Ziemeļu District Court,
04/11/2015
02/11/2015-27/10/2017
1 year, 11 months, 25 days
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