Communicated on 6 September 2019
FIRST SECTION
Application no. 14692/18
Ivan VUGDELIJA
against Croatia
lodged on 22 March 2018
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
The application concerns civil proceedings the applicant instituted against an insurance company with a view to obtaining non-pecuniary damages for injuries sustained in a road traffic accident. In his civil action of 22 April 2005 he sought HRK 40,000. Following the insurance company’s reply of 23 May 2005 to his civil action, in his submission of 19 December 2005 the applicant indicated that he would adjust the amount sought after the court obtained opinions from medical experts. However, after having reviewed the medical documents provided by the applicant on 10 September 2007 the insurance company, shortly before the hearing held on 1 April 2008, acknowledged the applicant’s claim in the above amount. At that hearing the first-instance court adopted a partial judgment whereby it awarded the applicant HRK 40,000. Since at the same hearing the applicant raised his claim and sought HRK 400,000 the court immediately scheduled the next hearing to examine the remainder of the applicant’s claim in excess of HRK 40,000 already awarded by the partial judgment. In a judgment of 29 April 2009 the first-instance court, after obtaining opinions from three court appointed experts, awarded the applicant additional HRK 113,500. Following an appeal by the insurance company on 24 March 2011 the second-instance court quashed the first‑instance judgment and declared inadmissible the applicant’s claim in excess of HRK 40,000. It held that the partial judgment was actually a complete default judgment after the adoption of which the applicant could no longer raise the amount initially sought. The Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law and the Constitutional Court rejected his subsequent constitutional complaint.
QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES
1. Did the finding by the domestic courts that they were precluded from examining the applicant’s claim for damages in excess of HRK 40,000 constitute in the circumstances of the present case an unjustifiable restriction of his right of access to court, contrary to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention?
2. (a) Was the applicant’s claim for damages awarded to him by the first-instance judgment of 29 April 2009 sufficiently established to constitute a “possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention? Specifically, did that claim have a sufficient basis in national law having regard to the Supreme Court decision no. Rev‑2909/1998-2 and the Constitutional Court decision no. U‑III‑374/2008?
(b) If so, did the interference with the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions amount to a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1? In particular, was that interference lawful having regard to the above-mentioned case-law of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court?
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