Published on 12 October 2022
FIRST SECTION
Application no. 50849/21
Lech WAŁĘSA
against Poland
lodged on 5 October 2021
communicated on 30 September 2022
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The applicant, Mr Lech Wałęsa, is a Polish national, who was born in 1943 and lives in Gdańsk. He is represented before the Court by Ms K. Warecka, a lawyer practising in Gdańsk.
The circumstances of the case
2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
Background to the present case3. The applicant is the former leader of the “Solidarity” trade union, former President of Poland and laureate of the 1983 Nobel Peace Prize.
4. On an unspecified date the applicant made the so-called “lustration declaration” (oświadczenie lustracyjne) under the Act of 11 April 1997 on disclosing work for or service in the State’s security services or collaboration with them between 1944 and 1990 by persons exercising public functions (ustawa o ujawnieniu pracy lub służby w organach bezpieczeństwa państwa lub współpracy z nimi w latach 1944-1990 osób pełniących funkcje publiczne). In a judgment of 11 August 2000 the Warsaw Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) held that the applicant filed a true lustration declaration; his declaration stated that he had not collaborated with the communist security services.
5. On 16 November 2005 the Institute of National Remembrance (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej; the “IPN”) granted him the status of “injured party” under section 6 of the Act of 18 December 1998 on the Institute of National Remembrance – Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation (ustawa o Instytucie Pamięci Narodowej – Komisji Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu), thus confirming that he had not been
a collaborator of the communist state security bodies. This fact was widely reported by the media.
6. In the evening of the same day news programmes of two television stations, TVP II and TVN 24 reported this information. The journalists sought comments from Mr Krzysztof Wyszkowski, as a former friend and associate of the applicant. Mr Wyszkowski stated, among other things, that “... today the status of an ‘injured party’ does not mean that you were not an informant. Lech Wałęsa was a secret collaborator with alias Bolek, (he) reported on his colleagues, (he) received money for it ...”.
7. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Gdańsk Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) against Mr Wyszkowski for infringement of his personal rights. He claimed that the defendant had disseminated untrue information about him and damaged his reputation. The applicant demanded that the defendant publish an apology and sought an order requiring the defendant to make a payment to a charity. On 31 August 2010 the regional court gave judgment and dismissed the claim.
8. On 24 March 2011 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal reversed the first‑instance court’s judgment. The court ordered Mr Wyszkowski to publish an apology in the two above-mentioned television stations. It dismissed the remainder of the applicant’s appeal.
9. On 30 November 2011 the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) refused to entertain a cassation appeal lodged by Mr Wyszkowski. The proceedings in question were the object of an application (no. 34282/12) lodged by Mr Wyszkowski with the Court on 8 May 2012 and communicated on 11 March 2019 under Article 10 of the Convention[1]. The case, following the Government’s unilateral declaration was struck out of the Court’s list on 1 July 2021 [2].
10. On 21 March 2017 Mr Wyszkowski lodged a request with the Gdańsk Court of Appeal, seeking to have the terminated proceedings reopened on account of newly discovered evidence which had allegedly proven his allegations of the applicant’s collaboration with the communist security services (secret files kept by the last communist Prime Minister of Poland which were obtained by the IPN during the search of his house).
11. On 27 June 2017 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal rejected that request as lodged outside the relevant time-limit. On 30 November 2017 the Supreme Court dismissed Mr Wyszkowski’s interlocutory appeal against that ruling.
12. Mr Wyszkowski, who apparently shortly after the final judgment appealed to the public for financial support given the costs of publication of the apology, eventually refused to publish it as ordered. The applicant published the apology on his own, by means of substitute performance.
Introduction of extraordinary appeal under the 2017 Act on the Supreme Court13. On 8 December 2017 the Sejm enacted a new Act on the Supreme Court (ustawa z dnia 8 grudnia 2017 o Sądzie Najwyższym; “the 2017 Act on the Supreme Court”) creating two new Chambers: the Disciplinary Chamber (Izba Dyscyplinarna) and the Chamber of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs (Izba Kontroli Nadzwyczajnej i Spraw Publicznych). The latter Chamber became competent to examine extraordinary appeals (skarga nadzwyczajna) – a new type of an appeal, also introduced into the Polish legal system under the 2017 Act on the Supreme Court (see paragraph 33 below; see also Dolińska-Ficek and Ozimek v. Poland, nos. 49868/19 and 57511/19, §§ 23, 25, 89 and 91, 8 November 2021).
The Prosecutor General’s extraordinary appeal and proceedings before the Chamber of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court (case no. I NSNc 89/20)14. On 31 January 2020 the Prosecutor General, Mr Zbigniew Ziobro, lodged an extraordinary appeal against the judgment of the Gdańsk Court of Appeal of 24 March 2011.
15. Relying on section 89 (1) and (2) in conjunction with section 115 (1) and (1a) of the 2017 Act on the Supreme Court the Prosecutor General submitted that the lodging of the extraordinary appeal was necessary in order to ensure compliance with the principle of a democratic State governed by the rule of law and implementing the principles of social justice (Article 2 of the Constitution).
16. The Prosecutor General argued that the impugned judgment had breached principles, freedoms and rights of a human being and a citizen enshrined in Articles 31(3) and 54 of the Constitution of Poland by infringing the principle of proportionality in protecting the applicant’s reputation at the cost of Mr Wyszkowski’s freedom of expression. The Prosecutor General also submitted, relying on the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court (Trybunał Konstytucyjny), the Supreme Court and the Court, that the impugned judgment had breached the constitutional freedom of speech (wolność słowa) and flagrantly violated Article 10 of the Convention in conjunction with Articles 23 and 24 § 1 of the Civil Code by not concluding that Mr Wyszkowski’s statements were made within the boundaries of his freedom of expression. Finally, the Prosecutor General argued that the Gdańsk Court of Appeal had erred in making factual findings and evaluating evidence submitted by Mr Wyszkowski, which – according to him – had proven the truthfulness of statements concerning the applicant’s cooperation with the communist security services.
17. Pursuant to section 91 (1) of the 2017 Act on the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General requested the Supreme Court to quash the judgment of the Gdańsk Court of Appeal of 24 March 2011 in so far as it ordered Mr Wyszkowski to apologise to the applicant and rule on the merits of the case by dismissing the applicant’s claim and making award concerning the costs of proceedings.
18. The applicant submits that he was served with the Prosecutor General’s extraordinary appeal only on 23 June 2020 and was required to present his arguments in reply within two weeks. In his reply, he rebutted the Prosecutor General’s arguments by contesting the constitutionality of the extraordinary appeal which, he said, was in breach of the rule of law and arguing that reconsideration of the case ten years after it had been finally concluded would be a violation of fair trial and the principle of legal certainty. He stressed that the time-limit of two weeks for presenting his reply to the appeal was overly short and in breach of the principle of equality of arms. Furthermore, the new legal provisions for an extraordinary appeal had been introduced as part of political struggle and lacked any legal justification.
19. The applicant also pointed to the “logical impossibility” of granting the relief sought by the appeal: the Prosecutor General sought to have the final judgment quashed in part ordering the apology whereas, in his view, the effects of an apology already published could not be made null and void. He also argued that granting the extraordinary appeal would constitute an unlawful interference with his right to respect for private life.
20. On 19 April 2021 the applicant requested that seventeen judges of the Chamber of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court (including Judge Aleksander Stępkowski, assigned as rapporteur) be excluded from the examination of the Prosecutor General’s extraordinary appeal in his case. The applicant submitted that the appointment of these judges to the Supreme Court had taken place in breach of the domestic law. He further claimed that there were significant doubts regarding the independence and impartiality of Judge Stępkowski, in relation to whose status as judge proceedings were pending before the Court of Justice of the European Union (W.Ż., case no. C‑487/19; see Dolińska-Ficek and Ozimek, nos. 49868/19 and 57511/19, §§ 131-136, 8 November 2021). He also referred to that judge’s past activities, including co-founding and leading “Ordo Iuris”, non-governmental organisation which – according to the applicant – had been promoting extreme and fundamentalistic values. All this, in his submission, should disqualify Judge Stępkowski from dealing with his case.
21. On 21 April 2021 the applicant’s request for exclusion of the judges was dismissed in so far as it concerned Judge Stępkowski and its remainder was rejected. The ruling was issued by the Chamber of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court sitting in a single-judge formation of Judge Paweł Księżak. No written reasons were provided. The decision is available on the Supreme Court’s website.
22. On the same day the Supreme Court quashed the judgment of the Gdańsk Court of Appeal of 24 March 2011 and dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the first-instance judgment dismissing his claim. The Chamber of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court which examined the applicant’s case was composed of Judges Marcin Łochowski (president), Aleksander Stępkowski (rapporteur) and lay judge (ławnik) Marek Sławomir Molczyk. The full text of the judgment is available on the Supreme Court’s website.
23. The Supreme Court began its written statement of reasons by summarising the rationale behind the extraordinary appeal. Referring to its own jurisprudence and the Court’s case-law (in particular, Brumărescu v. Romania [GC], no. 28342/95, § 62, ECHR 1999-VII; Ryabykh v. Russia, no. 52854/99, § 52, ECHR 2003-IX and Sutyazhnik v. Russia, no. 8269/02, § 38, 23 July 2009), the Supreme Court explained that the basis for its extraordinary review was compatible with international standards of human rights protection and the mechanism was aimed at rectifying mistakes that could be considered of fundamental importance to the operation of justice. Furthermore, the distinct legal basis of the extraordinary appeal, the time‑limit for lodging it and additional safeguards laid down in section 89 (3) and (4) of the 2017 Act on the Supreme Court (see paragraph 33 below) ensured its compliance with the standards developed by the Court.
24. The Supreme Court then assessed the admissibility of the appeal, characterised the arguments raised by the Prosecutor General (some of which it considered as incorrectly formulated) and recapitulated the facts. Referring to the specifics of proceedings conducted before the lower-instance courts, it held that the Gdańsk Court of Appeal could have ordered Mr Wyszkowski, at most, to publish a statement on not having proven his allegations concerning the applicant’s past, whereas it ordered the former to state that they were false. As such, according to the Supreme Court, the judgment of the Gdańsk Court of Appeal had led to a flagrant disregard for the constitutional freedom of speech and a flagrant breach of Article 54 of the Constitution.
25. Referring extensively to the Court’s jurisprudence under Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention, the Supreme Court concluded that the latter provision had also been flagrantly violated. It explained that Mr Wyszkowski should have been considered a “public watchdog” and there had been no pressing social need to limit his freedom of expression considering that his statement concerned the applicant – a public figure. Furthermore, the sanction imposed on him had been disproportionate. The Supreme Court concluded that the severity of violation of Article 10 of the Convention had been more far-reaching than the breach of Article 54 of the Constitution.
26. The Supreme Court dismissed the Prosecutor’s General arguments regarding the allegedly incorrect assessment of evidence and errors in factual findings.
27. Finally, it considered that despite the lapse of more than five years since the judgment of the Gdańsk Court of Appeal had become final, in the light of importance of public debate for a democratic State governed by the rule of law, the quashing of the impugned judgment was desirable and nothing justified granting precedence to the principle of res judicata. Referring to the proceedings pending before the Court in the case of Mr Wyszkowski (see paragraphs 28-29 below) – the outcome of which it described as “rather easy to predict” – the Supreme Court held that quashing of the impugned judgment was a necessary measure to ensure compliance with the principle of a democratic State governed by the rule of law and implementing principles of social justice.
Related proceedings before the Court28. On 11 March 2019 the Court communicated the case of Wyszkowski v. Poland (no. 34282/12) concerning Mr Wyszkowski’s complaint that the judicial decisions in his case (see paragraph 8 above) violated Article 10 of the Convention.
29. On 1 July 2021 the Court struck the case of Wyszkowski v. Poland (no. 34282/12, [Committee decision]) out of its list of cases in accordance with Article 37 § 1 (c) of the Convention. It noted that the Government acknowledged a violation of Article 10 of the Convention regarding the interference with Mr Wyszkowski’s freedom of expression and offered to pay him 20,000 Polish zloty which would constitute the final resolution of the case.
Since none of the parties had informed the Court of the extraordinary appeal lodged by the Prosecutor General on Mr Wyszkowski’s behalf and the judgment given by the Chamber of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs on 21 April 2021, quashing the judgment of the Gdańsk Court of Appeal of 24 March 2011 which had given rise to his complaint under Article 10 of the Convention, that judgment was not referred to in the Court’s strike-out decision
After the Court’s strike-out decision30. On 16 September 2021 the Supreme Court published a press release[3], entitled “European Court of Human Rights confirms the ruling of the Supreme Court”, which stated that “the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, in is recently published decision of 1 July 2021 found a violation of Article 10 of the [Convention] on account of the interference with the freedom of expression and ordered payment of compensation to the applicant”. It said that “the judgment [sic!] was given in connection with the Republic of Poland’s unilateral declaration in which a violation of the [Convention] had been admitted”.
It was further added that “this violation was found, on 21 April 2021, by the Supreme Court sitting as the Chamber of the Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs which, after examining case no. I NSNc 89/20, allowed an extraordinary appeal lodged by the Prosecutor General against the judgment of the Gdańsk Court of Appeal of 24 March 2011, ordering the applicant to make apologies to the defendant for accusing him of cooperation with the [communist] Secret Service”.
RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE
31. The detailed rendition of the relevant legal framework and practice is set out in the Court’s judgment in Dolińska-Ficek and Ozimek v. Poland (cited above), §§ 82-155.
32. The relevant provisions of the Constitution read, in so far as relevant, as follows:
Article 2
“The Republic of Poland shall be a democratic State governed by the rule of law and implementing the principles of social justice.”
Article 31
“3. Any limitation upon the exercise of constitutional freedoms and rights may be imposed only by statute, and only when necessary in a democratic state for the protection of its security or public order, or to protect the natural environment, health or public morals, or the freedoms and rights of other persons. Such limitations shall not violate the essence of freedoms and rights.”
Article 47
“Everyone shall have the right to legal protection of his private and family life, of his honour and good reputation and to make decisions about his personal life.”
Article 54
“1. The freedom to express opinions, to acquire and to disseminate information shall be ensured to everyone.
...”
33. The 2017 Act on the Supreme Court as applicable at the material time, provided, in so far as relevant, as follows:
Section 89
“1. If it is necessary in order to ensure compliance with the principle of a democratic State governed by the rule of law and implementing the principles of social justice, an extraordinary appeal may be lodged against a final decision (orzeczenie) of an ordinary court or a military court terminating proceedings in a case if:
(1) the decision violates the principles or freedoms and rights of a human being and a citizen laid down in the Constitution, and/or
(2) the decision grossly violates the law through its misinterpretation or misapplication, and/or
(3) there is an obvious contradiction between significant findings of the court and the content of evidence collected in the case
– and the decision may not be reversed or amended under other extraordinary appeals.
2. An extraordinary appeal may be lodged by the Prosecutor General, the [Polish] Commissioner for Human Rights and, within the scope of his competence, the President of the Office of the General Counsel of the Republic of Poland, the Ombudsman for Children’s Rights, the Ombudsman for Patient’s Rights, the Chairman of the Financial Supervision Authority, the Financial Ombudsman, the Ombudsman for Small and Medium Enterprises and the President of the Office for Competition and Consumer Protection.
3. An extraordinary appeal shall be lodged within five years from the date on which the decision appealed against had become final and, if a cassation appeal has been lodged, within one year from the date of its examination. It shall be inadmissible to allow an extraordinary appeal to the detriment of the defendant lodged after one year from the date on which the ruling has become final and, if a cassation appeal or a cassation [appeal in criminal matters] has been lodged, after six months from the date of its examination.
4. If the prerequisites indicated in subsection 1 are met, and the contested ruling has had irreversible legal consequences, in particular if five years have elapsed since the date the contested decision has become final, and also if the reversal of the decision would violate the international obligations of the Republic of Poland, the Supreme Court shall confine itself to stating that the contested decision was issued in violation of the law and indicating the circumstances due to which it issued such a decision, unless the principles or freedoms and rights of a human being and a citizen specified in the Constitution speak in favour of issuing the decision referred to in section 91 (1).”
Section 90
“1. An extraordinary appeal may be brought only once against the same decision in the interest of the same party.
2. An extraordinary appeal may not be based on grounds which have been the subject of a cassation appeal or a cassation [appeal in criminal matters] accepted for examination by the Supreme Court.
3. An extraordinary appeal shall not be admissible against a judgment establishing the non-existence of marriage, declaring nullity of marriage or divorce judgment, if even one of the parties, after such a judgment has become final, has entered into marriage, and against a decision on adoption.
4. An extraordinary appeal shall not be admissible in cases of petty offences and petty fiscal offences.”
Section 91
“1. If an extraordinary appeal is allowed, the Supreme Court shall quash the decision appealed against in its entirety or in part and, depending on the outcome of the hearing, shall rule on the merits of the case or shall refer the case for re-examination to the competent court, if necessary also quashing the decision of the court of first instance, or shall discontinue the proceedings. The Supreme Court shall dismiss the extraordinary appeal if it finds that there are no grounds for quashing the decision appealed against.”
Section 94
“1. An extraordinary appeal shall be examined by the Supreme Court composed of two judges of the Supreme Court adjudicating in the Chamber of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs and one lay judge of the Supreme Court.
2. If an extraordinary appeal concerns a decision of the Supreme Court, the case shall be examined by the Supreme Court composed of five judges of the Supreme Court adjudicating in the Chamber of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs and two lay judges of the Supreme Court.”
Section 115
“1. Within 3 years from the date of entry into force of this Act, an extraordinary appeal may be lodged against final judgments terminating proceedings that have become final after 17 October 1997. The provision of section 89 (3), first sentence, shall not apply.
1a. An extraordinary appeal against a final decision terminating proceedings in a case which has become final before the entry into force of this Act may be lodged by the Prosecutor General or the [Polish] Commissioner for Human Rights. The provision of Section 89 (2) shall not apply.
2. If the preconditions listed in section 89 (1) are met and the contested decision has had irreversible legal consequences, in particular if five years have elapsed since the date the contested decision has become final, as well as if the reversal of the decision would violate the international obligations of the Republic of Poland, the Supreme Court shall confine itself to stating that the contested decision was issued in violation of the law and indicating the circumstances due to which it issued such a decision, unless the principles or freedoms and rights of human being and citizen set forth in the Constitution warrant the issuance of the decision referred to in Section 91 (1).”
34. Article 408 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as applicable at the material time, provided:
“After the expiry of five years from the date of the judgment becoming final, no reopening may be sought, except where the party was prevented from acting or was not duly represented.”
COMPLAINTS
35. The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that his case was examined by the Chamber of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court, a body that does not constitute an “independent and impartial tribunal established by law”.
36. Relying further on Article 6 § 1 he complains about the alleged lack of individual independence and impartiality on the part of Judge Stępkowski, maintaining that apart from being unlawfully appointed to the Supreme Court, he is well known right-wing activist and founder of the Ordo Iuris Foundation in Poland.
37. He also alleges a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in that the Prosecutor General’s extraordinary appeal was based on legal provisions violating the principle of legal certainty.
38. Invoking Article 8 of the Convention, the applicant complaints that the quashing of the final judgment in his case, which concerned his reputation and private life, constituted an unlawful interference with his private life. He claims that the legal basis for it lacked the necessary attributes of quality and foreseeability, also stressing that the provisions introducing an extraordinary appeal into the domestic legal system have a retroactive effect as in his case they were applied to the judgment given prior to their entry into force.
39. Lastly, the applicant complains under Article 18 of the Convention that the lodging of the extraordinary appeal by the Prosecutor General in his case was prompted by the “hidden agenda” and political retaliation of the Prosecutor General, as it has been a well-known fact that the applicant has openly opposed the current Polish government and holds it responsible for the current constitutional crisis and violations of the rule of law in Poland.
QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES
Article 6 § 1
As regards the requirement of an “independent and impartial tribunal established by law”
1. Did the proceedings before the Chamber of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court violate the applicant’s right to be heard by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law, as guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Dolińska-Ficek and Ozimek v. Poland, nos. 49868/19 and 57511/19, §§ 281-355, 8 November 2021)?
As regards the alleged lack of individual independence and impartiality on the part of Judge Stępkowski
2. In the light of the applicant’s allegation concerning the lack of individual independence and impartiality on the part of Judge Stępkowski, has there been a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on this account (see Micallef v. Malta [GC], no. 17056/06, §§ 93-99, ECHR 2009; and Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], no. 76639/11, §§ 60-65, 25 September 2018)?
As regards the principle of legal certainty
3. Was the judgment of the Chamber of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs quashing the final judgment of the Gdańsk Court of Appeal of 24 March 2011 upon an extraordinary appeal by the Prosecutor General in breach of the principle of legal certainty (see Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], no. 26374/18, § 238, 1 December 2020; Brumărescu v. Romania [GC], no. 28342/95, §§ 20-24, 32 and 61-62, ECHR 1999-VII; and Ryabykh v. Russia, no. 52854/99, § 13, 32-33 and 51-58, ECHR 2003‑IX)?
Article 8
1. Is Article 8 of the Convention applicable to the present case (see Denisov, cited above, § 112)?
2. If so, has there been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life, within the meaning of Article 8 § 1 of the Convention, on account of the quashing of the final judgment of the Gdańsk Court of Appeal of 24 March 2011, whereby that court granted the applicant’s claim for protection of his personal rights?
3. In the affirmative, was that interference in accordance with the law and necessary in terms of Article 8 § 2? In particular, was the impugned interference “in accordance with the law”, having regard to the following:
(a) the fact that the Chamber of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs lacks the attributes of a “tribunal” which is “lawful” for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 (see Dolińska-Ficek and Ozimek, cited above, §§ 353-354);
(b) the applicant’s allegations that the interference complained of was based on provisions of the Act of 8 December 2017 on the Supreme Court, which were incompatible with the rule of law and not foreseeable (see Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 58170/13 and 2 others, § 332, 25 May 2021)?
Article 18
1. Can it be said that the following actions of the Polish State, purportedly taken pursuant to Article 10 of the Convention:
(a) the Prosecutor General’s extraordinary appeal against the judgment of the Gdańsk Court of Appeal of 24 March 2011; and
(b) the subsequent quashing of that judgment by the Chamber of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs
constituted measures applied for purposes other than those envisaged by this provision, contrary to Article 18 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], nos. 29580/12 and 4 others, §§ 163 - 174, 15 November 2018)?
Article 46
Pilot-judgment procedure
1. Is the present case suitable for the pilot-judgment procedure, as defined in Rule 61 of the Rules of Court?
2. Having regard to the features of an extraordinary appeal and its potential impact on the operation of the rule of law in Poland, in particular in respect of the principles of legal certainty and res judicata, do the facts of the present case disclose the existence of a “systemic” or “structural” problem or other similar dysfunction which gives or may give rise to similar applications (cf. Rule 61 § 1)?
In their replies to the above questions, the parties are invited to make their comments in the light of the Courts case-law, in particular the judgments in the cases of Broniowski v. Poland [GC], no. 31443/96, §§ 189 et seq., ECHR 2004‑V; and Hutten-Czapska v. Poland [GC], no. 35014/97, §§ 231 et seq., ECHR 2006‑VIII.
Decision to ask the Government for information
The Government are also asked to produce information as to the number of extraordinary appeals that have been lodged by the Prosecutor General and other public bodies listed in section 89 of the 2017 Act on the Supreme Court since an extraordinary appeal was introduced into the Polish legal system, together with the list of cases, names (initials) of the parties, specific subject‑matter of the cases and the outcome of the proceedings before the Chamber of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court.
The list should include cases already terminated and still pending.
[1] A detailed description of the proceedings up to that stage can be found in the statement of facts in the case of Wyszkowski v. Poland (communication of 11 March 2019), no. 34282/12, §§ 2-33, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-192357.
[2] See Wyszkowski v. Poland (Committee decision), no. 34282/12, 1 July 2021, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-211514.
[3] https://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SitePages/Komunikaty_o_sprawach.aspx?ItemSID=466-b6b3e804-2752-4c7d-bcb4-7586782a1315&ListName=Komunikaty_o_sprawach