FIRST SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 37309/10
Paweł WASIK
against Poland
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 18 December 2018 as a Committee composed of:
Ksenija Turković, President,
Krzysztof Wojtyczek,
Armen Harutyunyan, judges,
and Renata Degener, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 15 June 2010,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant, Mr Paweł Wasik, is a Polish national, who was born in 1982 and is currently detained in Wołów Prison.
2. The Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs J. Chrzanowska, who was later replaced by Mr J. Sobczak of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
A. The circumstances of the case
3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
1. Background to the case
4. On an unknown date the applicant was convicted of murder and uttering threats. At the time of the events in the present case he was serving a long-term sentence of imprisonment.
2. Application for compassionate leave
5. On 9 February 2010 the applicant asked the penitentiary judge of the Wrocław Regional Court to grant him compassionate leave from prison in order to conclude a civil marriage with his partner, M.M. The applicant attached a letter from the Wrocław Public Registry Office showing that the ceremony had been scheduled to take place on 3 March 2010.
6. On 25 February 2010 a hearing was held before the penitentiary judge of Wrocław Regional Court. The judge read out the applicant’s request, an opinion provided about the applicant and relevant passages from the applicant’s personal files.
7. On the same day the judge refused the request. The decision was announced orally; the written reasoning of the ruling reads as follows:
“None of the grounds specified by Article 141a § 2 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences are present.”
8. On 1 March 2010 the applicant submitted an appeal against that decision to the prison administration.
9. On 3 March 2010 the applicant married M.M. in a ceremony held in prison. The applicant was not allowed to take photographs of the ceremony owing to internal security rules.
10. Following the ceremony, he was allowed to spend three hours and thirty minutes with his wife. This included two visits without supervision and one unsupervised visit which lasted ninety minutes. Subsequently, he was granted three unsupervised visits with his wife on 6, 19 and 26 March 2010.
11. On 7 May 2010 the Wrocław Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of 25 February 2010. The relevant part of the decision read as follows:
“Under Article 7 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences [‘the Code’] a convicted person may challenge only the lawfulness of a decision given by an authority specified in Article 2 section 3-6 of the Code [a judge, a penitentiary judge, a director of a prison or detention centre, a regional director or the Director General of the Prison Service or a court probation officer].
Because the applicant in his complaint does not contest the lawfulness of the prison judge’s decision - and no unlawfulness has been observed by the [Regional] Court of its own motion – but only discusses the assessment of facts made by the prison judge, the requirements specified in Article 7 have not been met.”
3. Further developments
12. On 23 November 2010 the applicant was granted one year’s leave from serving his sentence. During that leave, on 1 December 2010, the applicant’s son K.W. was born. Subsequently, the applicant and his wife separated and on a later unknown date their marriage was dissolved.
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
13. The relevant domestic law concerning compassionate leave from prison, as applicable at the relevant time, is set out in the Court’s judgment in the case of Giszczak v. Poland (no. 40195/08, §§ 19‑21, 29 November 2011).
COMPLAINT
14. Without invoking any provisions of the Convention, the applicant complained about the refusal to grant him leave from prison in order to conclude a civil marriage.
THE LAW
A. Alleged violation of Article 8 of the Convention
15. The applicant’s complaint relates to the refusal to grant him compassionate leave from prison in order to conclude a marriage. However, the Court observes that the applicant was not prevented from contracting marriage (see, by contrast, Frasik v. Poland, no. 22933/02, ECHR 2010 (extracts), and Jaremowicz v. Poland, no. 24023/03, 5 January 2010). It thus finds that this complaint should be examined under Article 8 of the Convention alone, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life ...
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society ... for the prevention of disorder or crime ... or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
1. The parties’ observations
16. The Government submitted at the outset that the applicant could not claim to be the victim of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention since he had been allowed to contract the marriage with the person of his choice on a chosen date. In any event, even assuming that there had been an interference with his right to family life, the Government submitted that it had been in accordance with the law and had pursued a legitimate aim for the prevention of disorder or crime. They stressed that at the material time the applicant had been serving a prison sentence and had still had eight years of his sentence to serve. Consequently, in their view, the interference had been “necessary in a democratic society”.
17. The applicant contested those submissions. He argued that as a consequence of the refusal of compassionate leave the marriage ceremony had had to take place in prison with all the accompanying security restrictions.
2. The Court’s assessment
18. The Court notes that Article 8 of the Convention does not guarantee a detained person an unconditional right to be granted leave to attend any event of importance to him or her. It is up to the domestic authorities to assess each request on its merits. The Court’s scrutiny is limited to considering the impugned measures in the context of the applicant’s Convention rights, taking into account the margin of appreciation left to the Contracting States (see Płoski v. Poland, no. 26761/95, § 38, 12 November 2002).
19. In the present case the gist of the applicant’s complaint is that owing to the refusal of compassionate leave his marriage had to take place in prison and involved the necessary security restrictions associated with such an event.
20. However, as the Court has already held: “detention facilities are neither designed, nor freely and normally chosen for [the purpose of marriage]. What needs to be solved in a situation where a detained person wishes to get married [are] ... the practical aspects of timing and making the necessary arrangements, which ... might, and usually will, be subject to certain conditions set by the authorities” (see Frasik, cited above, § 95).
21. The Court observes that even though the events in the present case could have constituted an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private and family life, this interference was “in accordance with the law” and in the interests of “public safety” or “for the prevention of disorder or crime”. It thus remains to be decided whether it was “necessary in a democratic society”.
22. In this connection the Court notes that the applicant had been convicted of murder and uttering threats and that at the relevant time he was serving a long‑term prison sentence (see paragraph 4 above). Consequently, the Court accepts that in the circumstances of the present case it was reasonable to consider the risks associated with his release from prison to be high.
23. Given that the applicant was allowed to contract his marriage on a chosen date, and the only inconveniences suffered by him were security measures inextricably linked to the fact that the marriage took place behind the prison gates, the Court concludes that the authorities’ decision not to grant him compassionate leave did not exceed the margin of appreciation left to the respondent State and was “necessary in a democratic society”.
24. For the above reasons, this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
B. Other alleged violations
25. In a letter of 28 August 2017 the applicant submitted that the prison authorities had put pressure on him in connection with his complaint to the Court.
26. The Court will consider whether these alleged actions by the Polish authorities amounted to a hindrance of the applicant’s right of individual petition under Article 34 of the Convention.
27. The Government submitted in that respect that the applicant had failed to give any details as regards the alleged actions of the prison authorities. Therefore, it had been impossible to verify whether any such situation had indeed occurred.
28. The Court reiterates that it is of the utmost importance for the effective operation of the system of individual petition instituted by Article 34 that applicants or potential applicants should be able to communicate freely with the Court without being subjected to any form of pressure from the authorities to withdraw or modify their complaints (see, among other authorities, Fedotova v. Russia, no. 73225/01, §§ 49‑52, 13 April 2006).
29. In the present case, the Court observes that the applicant limited his submissions to vague and general statements. He failed to provide any details of his allegations. In particular he did not refer to any dates or names of persons who had allegedly approached him.
30. In view of the above, the Court is unable to establish the existence of any unacceptable practices amounting to a form of pressure on the applicant by the prison authorities concerning his application before the Court.
31. It follows that the applicant’s complaint is manifestly ill‑founded. It must therefore be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 24 January 2019.
Renata DegenerKsenija Turković
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy