AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 15341/89
by Sandra WATTS
against the United Kingdom
The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private
on 6 September 1990, the following members being present:
MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President
J.A. FROWEIN
S. TRECHSEL
F. ERMACORA
G. SPERDUTI
E. BUSUTTIL
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
A. WEITZEL
J.-C. SOYER
H.G. SCHERMERS
H. DANELIUS
Mrs. G. H. THUNE
Sir Basil HALL
MM. F. MARTINEZ RUIZ
C.L. ROZAKIS
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. L. LOUCAIDES
J.-C. GEUS
A.V. ALMEIDA RIBEIRO
Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 29 November 1988
by Sandra WATTS against the United Kingdom and registered
on 2 August 1989 under file No. 15341/89;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the
Rules of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be
summarised as follows.
The applicant is a British citizen born in 1952 and resident
in Runcom. She is represented by George Albert Watts, her father.
The applicant's daughter S. (born on 13 November 1975) and son
D. (born on 25 February 1985) were taken into care in March and April
1987 by Knowsley Borough Council (the local authority) who were
investigating allegations of sexual abuse in respect of the children
and the children, M. and T., of the applicant's sister.
On 15 March 1988, both children were made wards of court.
Following a hearing before the High Court on 6 March 1989, at
which the applicant was represented by counsel and solicitor, the High
Court gave the local authority leave to place the children for
long-term foster-parents with a view to adoption. Access to D. was
terminated and further access to S. is to be at the discretion of the
local authority. In his judgment, the judge stated that having regard
to the interviews with the children of the applicant and those of the
applicant's sister, the revelations of M. to his foster mother and the
evidence of the social workers, he was convinced that S. and D. had been
involved in sexual abuse and that the applicant must have known of
and in all probability took part in that sexual abuse.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains of being deprived of justice and of the
custody of her children. She does not invoke any particular provision
of the Convention.
THE LAW
1. The applicant has complained of being deprived of the custody
of her children. The Commission has examined her complaint under
Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention which provides:
"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private
and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority
with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public safety
or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others."
The Commission finds that, in accordance with its established
case-law, the decision to take S. and D. into care and terminate the
applicant's custody constituted an interference with the applicant's
right to respect for her family life protected by Article 8 para. 1 of
the Convention (see e.g. Eur. Court H.R., W. v. the United Kingdom
judgment of 8 July 1987, Series A no. 121, p. 27, para. 59). The
Commission must therefore examine whether this interference is
justified under Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention, namely
whether it is "in accordance with the law", pursues one or more of
the legitimate aims enumerated in Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) and
whether it is "necessary in a democratic society" for one or more of
those aims.
The Commission recalls that S. and D. were taken into care
following suspicion of sexual abuse. The High Court ordered the
children to remain in the care of the local authority since it had
found the children had been victims of sexual abuse. The Commission
finds that these decisions were taken in accordance with the wardship
jurisdiction and made for the aim of protecting S.'s and D.'s health
and rights. Consequently, the decisions were "in accordance with the
law" and pursued a legitimate aim under Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2),
i.e. "the protection of health or morals" and "the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others".
The question remains whether the decisions were "necessary"
within the meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.
The case-law of the Commission and the Court establishes that the notion
of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing
social need and that it is proportionate to the aim pursued. Further,
in determining whether an interference is necessary the Commission and
the Court will take into account that a margin of appreciation is left
to the Contracting States, who are in principle in a better position
to make an initial assessment of the necessity of a given interference.
When determining whether or not the placing of S. and D. in
care and the refusal of custody to the applicant were necessary in the
interest of S. and D., the Commission observes that it is not its task
to take the place of the competent national courts and make a fresh
examination of all the facts and evidence in the case. The
Commission's task is to examine whether the reasons adduced to justify
the interference at issue are "relevant and sufficient" (Eur. Court
H.R., Olsson judgment of 24 March 1988, Series A no. 130, p. 32, para.
68).
The Commission recalls that the decisions to place S. and D.
in care and terminate the applicant's custody were taken in light of
the suspicion of sexual abuse, which was confirmed after a hearing by
the High Court which found that the applicant must have known of and in
all probability participated in the sexual abuse.
The Commission also recalls that the applicant was present
during the proceedings and was represented by solicitor and counsel.
The applicant therefore had the possibility of putting forward any
views which in her opinion would be decisive for the outcome of the
case. With regard to these facts, the Commission finds that the
procedural requirements implicit in Article 8 (Art. 8) were satisfied
since the applicant was involved in the decision-making process to a
degree sufficient to provide her with the requisite protection of
her interest (see e.g. Eur. Court H.R., W. v. the United Kingdom
judgment, loc. cit., pp. 28-29, paras. 63-65).
The Commission therefore finds that, bearing in mind the
margin of appreciation accorded to the domestic authorities, the
interference in the present case was justified under the terms of
Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention as being "necessary in
a democratic society" for the protection of the health and for the
protection of the rights of S. and D. Consequently, this part of the
application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27
para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
2. The applicant has also complained that she did not receive
justice in the proceedings. The Commision has examined this complaint
under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, which inter alia
guarantees to everyone a fair hearing before an independent and
inpartial tribunal in the determination of his civil rights and
obligations.
The Commission recalls that the applicant received legal aid and
was represented by counsel in the hearing before the High Court. The
Commission finds on the facts as presented by the applicant no
indication that the applicant did not receive a fair hearing within
the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.
It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission
(H.C. KRÜGER) (C.A. NØRGAARD)
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