AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 22842/93
by Krzysztof WAYGART
against Poland
The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting
in private on 30 November 1994, the following members being present:
MM. S. TRECHSEL, President
H. DANELIUS
G. JÖRUNDSSON
J.-C. SOYER
H.G. SCHERMERS
Mrs. G.H. THUNE
MM. F. MARTINEZ
L. LOUCAIDES
J.-C. GEUS
M.A. NOWICKI
I. CABRAL BARRETO
J. MUCHA
D. SVÁBY
Mr. K. ROGGE, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 16 October 1992
by Mr. Krzysztof Waygart against Poland and registered on 29 October
1993 under file No. 22842/93;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be
summarised as follows:
The applicant, a Polish citizen born in 1956, is a lawyer
residing in Opole.
On 6 October 1987 the Katowice Regional Bar Council refused to
enrol the applicant as a trainee advocate on the ground that, although
he complied with the applicable requirements, other candidates were
better. The applicant appealed to the National Bar Council, to the
Minister of Justice, and also to the Supreme Administrative Court.
On 24 November 1988 the Supreme Administrative Court ordered the
Minister of Justice to reconsider the case on the ground that the
contested decision did not comply with the Code of Administrative
Procedure.
In its decision of 24 February 1989 the Minister of Justice
refused to allow the applicant's appeal as the employment quotas of the
trainee advocates in the Katowice Regional Bar Council were already
filled. The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision to the
Supreme Administrative Court.
On 18 January 1990 the Supreme Administrative Court again quashed
the contested decision.
On 3 March 1990 the Minister of Justice ordered the case to be
reconsidered by the Katowice Regional Bar Council. The applicant
lodged an appeal against this decision to the Supreme Administrative
Court. This appeal was declared inadmissible as the contested decision
was not final.
On 29 October 1990 the Katowice Regional Bar Council refused to
enrol the applicant, as the employment quotas in the region were
filled. The applicant lodged an appeal to the National Bar Council.
On 17 April 1991 the National Bar Council dismissed the appeal as the
argument of lack of available posts sufficed. The applicant appealed
to the Minister of Justice.
On 22 May 1991 the Minister of Justice decided to enrol the
applicant on the list of trainee advocates. However, the Katowice
Regional Bar Council appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court
against this decision and refused to allow the applicant to start
working as a trainee advocate.
On 13 June 1991 the applicant submitted a motion to the Minister
for an interpretation of his decision of 22 May 1991. The applicant
argued that as the decision admitted that he could have been enrolled
in 1987, he should be exempted from the requirement of taking the four
years' training as a trainee advocate as this period had expired. On
18 July 1991 the Minister refused to issue an interpretation as the
decision was sufficiently clear. The applicant appealed to the Supreme
Administrative Court, which in September 1991 rejected the appeal as
being out of time.
On 21 August 1991 the applicant brought a civil action to the
Katowice Regional Court against the Katowice Regional Bar Council and
the National Bar Council and against the State Treasury for
compensation for damages which he had suffered as a result of not
having been allowed to start working as a trainee advocate in
accordance with the decision of the Minister of Justice.
On 14 November 1991 the Katowice Regional Bar Council informed
the Supreme Administrative Court that in 1986 the applicant had been
arrested as he had committed the offence of insulting the police,
though no criminal proceedings had been instituted against him as he
enjoyed immunity as a judge.
On 6 January 1992 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the
applicant's enrolment. The Court pointed out that the decision of the
Minister was both in conformity with applicable laws and correct
("prawidlowa") while the decisions of the Katowice Regional Bar Council
were not in conformity with law as the Council had failed to make an
assessment of the applicant's suitability to become an advocate as
provided for by the Law on the Bar. However, the Court considered
that the Minister's decision should be quashed as circumstances unknown
both to the Bar and the Minister at the time when the decisions
concerned had been taken came to light, suggesting that the applicant
possibly did not fulfil the requirement of an irreproachable character.
On 30 January 1992 the Katowice Regional Court dismissed the
applicant's civil action for compensation.On 10 February 1992 the
Minister of Justice ordered the case to be reconsidered by the Katowice
Regional Bar Council.
On 31 March 1992 the Katowice Regional Bar Council refused to
enrol the applicant in the list of trainee advocates as he had
committed a crime in 1986. The applicant appealed unsuccessfully to
the National Bar Council, to the Minister of Justice and to the Supreme
Administrative Court.
On 18 June 1993 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the
applicant's appeal against the decision of the Minister of Justice. In
these proceedings the Court was called upon to examine the lawfulness
of the contested decision. In its decision the Court concluded that
the assessment of the applicant's suitability to become a trainee
advocate was in accordance with the law as the incident caused by the
applicant justified the conclusion that he did not comply with the
requirement of irreproachable character.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains under Article 3 of the Convention that
the authorities subjected him to inhuman and degrading treatment in
that he was not allowed to become a lawyer, was prevented from
exercising any legal profession and was humiliated by the proceedings
complained of.
The applicant further complains under Article 6 of the Convention
that the proceedings were unfair as a whole; that the authorities in
question, including the Bar, the Minister of Justice and the courts,
both civil and administrative, were neither independent nor impartial;
and that these authorities based their decisions on the assumption that
the applicant had committed a crime and had breached numerous
applicable provisions of domestic law.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complains under Article 3 (Art. 3) of the
Convention that he was subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment in
the proceedings complained of. He also complains under Article 6
(Art. 6) of the Convention of the unfairness and the outcome of the
proceedings.
2. Insofar as the applicant's complaints relate to a period prior
to 1 May 1993, the Commission recalls that Poland recognised the
competence of the Commission to receive individual applications "from
any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individual
claiming to be a victim of a violation by Poland of the rights
recognised in the Convention through any act, decision or event
occurring after 30 April 1993."
It follows that this part of the application is outside the
competence ratione temporis of the Commission and therefore
incompatible with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning
of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).
3. The applicant complains under Article 3 (Art. 3) of the
Convention of an inhuman and degrading treatment in that he was not
allowed to become a lawyer, was prevented from exercising any legal
profession and was humiliated by the proceedings complained of.
The Commission has examined this complaint in respect of the
proceedings taking place after 1 May 1993. It observes that the
treatment complained of does not attain the threshold of inhuman of
degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the
Convention as established in the case-law of the Convention (cf. Eur.
Court H.R., Ireland v. United Kingdom judgment of 18 January 1979,
Series A, no. 25, p. 56, para. 162). It follows that this complaint
is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2
(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
4. The applicant complains under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the
Convention of the unfairness of the proceedings and of their outcome.
The Commission considers that proceedings concerning admission
to a profession such as in the present case come within the ambit of
Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention (see Eur. Court H.R., the De Moor
v. Belgium judgment of 23 June 1994, Series A no. 292-A, para. 43).
The Commission has examined the applicant's complaints in respect
of the period after 1 May 1993. However, under Article 19 (Art. 19)
of the Convention its only task is to ensure the observance of the
obligations undertaken by the Parties to the Convention. In
particular, it is not competent to deal with an application alleging
that errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts,
except where it considers that such errors might have involved a
possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the
Convention. The Commission refers on this point to its established
case-law (see e.g. No. 458/59, Dec. 29.3.60, Yearbook 3 p. 222, 236;
No. 5258/71, Dec. 8.2.73, Collection 43 pp. 71, 77; No. 7987/77, Dec.
13.12.79, D.R. 18 p. 31, 45).
It is true that the appicant also complains under Article 6 para.
1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention about the unfairness of the proceedings
before the Supreme Administrative Court. The Commission notes that
this Court was only called upon to examine the lawfulness of the
contested decision of the Minister of Justice. In its decision of 18
June 1993 it found that the assessment of the applicant's suitability
to become an advocate was made in accordance with the Law on the Bar.
There is no indication that in these proceedings the applicant could
not duly put forward his own submissions or that the proceedings were
otherwise unfairly conducted.
The remainder of the application is therefore manifestly ill-
founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission unanimously
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Secretary to the Second Chamber President of the Second Chamber
(K. ROGGE) (S. TRECHSEL)
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy