WINGRAVE v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

FOURTH SECTION

PARTIAL DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 40029/02
by Alberta WINGRAVE
against the United Kingdom

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 8 April 2003 as a Chamber composed of

MrM. Pellonpää, President,
SirNicolas Bratza,
MrsE. Palm,
MrM. Fischbach,
MrJ. Casadevall,
MrS. Pavlovschi,
MrJ. Borrego Borrego, judges,
and Mr M. O’Boyle, Section Registrar,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 28 October 2002,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, Mrs Alberta Pamela Wingrave, is a United Kingdom national, who was born in October 1936 and lives in Exeter.

A.  The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.

The applicant’s submissions concern two unrelated sets of legal proceedings: a claim for disability living allowance and a breach of contract claim against CGU Insurance Plc.

1.  Claim for Disability Living Allowance

(a)  The claim for disability living allowance

On 21 December 1995 the applicant submitted a claim to the Benefits Agency for disability living allowance (DLA) on the grounds that she suffered, inter alia, from a degenerated slipped disc, sciatica, irritable bowel syndrome, eczema, gastric ulcers and depression and anxiety. On 5 February 1996 the applicant was granted a lifetime award of DLA to begin from 21 December 1995. The DLA award included both a mobility component  at the higher rate and a care component at the middle rate.

(b)  The review of the decision of 5 February 1997 on the application of the Secretary of State

Following the award of DLA, the applicant completed two benefit integrity questionnaires on her condition received by the Benefits Agency on 14 July 1997 and 23 October 1997. On 20 October 1997 the applicant underwent a medical examination, the results of which suggested that the applicant’s medical problems were not as serious as previously thought. The doctor found, inter alia, that the applicant was capable of walking at a reasonable pace without severe discomfort, that the applicant did not require night care attention and that the applicant was able to deal with all her personal care needs safely and unaided. The Secretary of State consequently applied for a review of the award of DLA, after the time limit for such an application had expired, on the grounds that there had been a relevant change in circumstances. On 4 November 1997 the adjudication officer reviewed the award made on 5 February 1996 and found that the applicant was not entitled to either the mobility component or the care component of DLA from and including 20 October 1997, the date of the medical examination.

(c)  The first hearing before the Disability Appeal Tribunal

On 20 November 1997 the applicant applied for a review of the decision of 4 November 1997 to withdraw her entitlement to DLA. On 12 January 1998 the adjudication officer confirmed the decision of 4 November 1997 that the applicant did not satisfy the criteria for entitlement to either the mobility or the care component of DLA. The applicant appealed further to the Disability Appeal Tribunal (DAT) and submitted additional medical evidence but did not attend the tribunal hearing. On 3 August 1998 the DAT found that the applicant was entitled to the higher rate of the mobility component of DLA from 21 October 1997 until 20 October 2000 but was not entitled to any of the care component. The DAT accepted that the applicant was unable to walk without severe discomfort but time-limited the mobility component for three years on the grounds that the applicant’s lumbar spine injury might improve in that period. On the basis of the applicant’s statement to the medical practitioner, the DAT concluded that the applicant did not require attention in connection with bodily functions or supervision during the day or at night in order to prevent substantial danger to herself.

(d)  The appeal to the Social Security Commissioner

The applicant subsequently applied for leave to appeal against the decision of 3 August 1998 and the Social Security Commissioner granted leave on 23 July 1999. The Secretary of State supported the appeal, submitting, inter alia, that the DAT did not establish the existence of grounds for review, failed to make findings on all questions of fact, gave inadequate reasons for limiting the period of the award of the mobility component of DLA and did not adequately deal with the need for supervision due to the risk of falls. On 8 November 2000 the Social Security Commissioner set aside the decision of the DAT of 3 August 1998 on the basis that it was erroneous in law and referred the case back to a differently constituted DAT. Since both parties consented to the setting aside of the decision of 3 August 1998, the Commissioner was not required to give reasons for his decision according to the relevant regulations but stated that he agreed with the submission of the Secretary of State in its entirety.

(e)  The second hearing before the Disability Appeal Tribunal

The case came before a differently constituted DAT on 30 July 2001 and the applicant again did not attend the hearing and did not provide new submissions or full copies of the previous medical reports. She declined to undergo a new medical examination. On 29 August 2001, after reviewing the decision of 4 November 1997, the DAT decided that the applicant was not entitled to either the mobility or the care component of the DLA from and including 20 October 1997. The DAT considered that there were grounds for a review of the lifetime award due to a change in circumstances. The tribunal felt unable to rely on the medical evidence previously submitted by the applicant since portions of the report had been erased by the applicant. Relying principally on the report of the medical practitioner of 20 October 1997, the DAT found that the applicant was not entitled to the care component of DLA from that 20 October 1997. The tribunal stated that the applicant could carry out all necessary activities without help and considered that she did not need frequent attention during the day or night. On the applicant’s history of falls, the DAT concluded that on the balance of probabilities, the fact of three falls over a two year period did not indicate the need for continual supervision. The DAT also found that the applicant was not entitled to the mobility component of DLA. The DAT considered that she was not “virtually unable” to walk, again largely on the basis of the report of the medical practitioner of 20 October 1997.

(f)  The second appeal to the Social Security Commissioner

The applicant applied for leave to appeal against the decision of the DAT of 29 August 2001 and leave was granted by the Social Security Commissioner on 23 January 2002. In a statement of 18 January 2002, the Secretary of State again supported the appeal on the grounds that:

“... the statement of findings and reasons for decision is disorderly, extensive and, unfortunately it omits properly to consider the matters [brought to the DAT’s attention by the earlier decision of the Social Security Commissioner] ...”

but did not support the applicant’s allegations of unfairness. The Secretary of State considered that the DAT failed to give reasons for its conclusion that there had been a change of circumstances, that the tribunal had uncritically accepted the report of the examining medical officer without discussing the merits of the applicant’s contentions and that the tribunal did not make all the necessary findings of fact.

On 8 May 2002 the Social Security Commissioner set aside the DAT decision of 29 August 2001, again on the grounds that it was erroneous in law and referred the case back to a differently constituted DAT. The Commissioner considered that the appeal should be allowed for the reasons put forward by the Secretary of State. The Commissioner considered that the DAT had not explained what improvement had taken place in the applicant’s conditions since the award of DLA and had not reconciled the differences between the assertions in the benefit integrity questionnaires and the results of the medical examination. He also agreed with the Secretary of State that the DAT had not explained why they accepted the assessment of the examining medical officer and that it had failed to make sufficient findings of fact as to the distance which the applicant could walk before the onset of severe discomfort. In referring the case for rehearing by the DAT, the Commissioner noted that under the terms of the applicable legislation, the DAT would have to consider the applicant’s condition until the date of her latest claim for DLA, which was made on 11 September 2001.

(g)  Claim for Disability Living Allowance from 11 September 2001

On 11 September 2001 the applicant submitted a new claim for disability living allowance from that date onwards. The applicant would not have been able to submit a claim for DLA from 23 October 2001 onwards since, under the relevant legislation, there is no entitlement to DLA after the age of 65 unless an earlier award has been made. On 13 March 2002 an adjudication officer refused the application. The applicant applied for a review of the decision and on 13 May 2002, the decision was confirmed by the adjudication officer. The applicant was entitled to bring a further appeal before the DAT within one month of the date of notification but it is not clear from the documents provided whether she did indeed appeal against the decision of 13 May 2002. At the time of the third hearing before the DAT on 16 July 2002, the applicant had not appealed against the decision since she believed that this issue would be incorporated into the first appeal and the time limit for the appeal had already passed. Therefore, if the applicant did subsequently pursue an appeal against the decision of 13 May 2002, she would have had to seek leave to appeal out of time.

(h)  The third hearing before the Disability Appeal Tribunal

On 16 July 2002 the case relating to the original claim for DLA came before a differently constituted DAT and the applicant attended this hearing. On 17 July 2002, the tribunal decided that the applicant was entitled to the mobility component of DLA from 20 October 1997 until 10 September 2001 but was not entitled to the care component over the same period. The DAT found that in reviewing the lifetime award of DLA in light of the medical examination of 20 October 1997, the adjudication officer should have separately considered the entitlement to the mobility component and the entitlement to the care component in deciding whether the award could be reviewed. The DAT considered that there were no grounds to review the entitlement to the mobility component after 20 October 1997 since although the doctor doubted whether the applicant could not walk any distance without severe discomfort, he concluded that he was unable to make accurate assessments of her mobility. Therefore, the applicant was entitled to the mobility component of DLA from 20 October 1997 until 10 September 2001. In contrast, the DAT concluded that entitlement to the care component after 20 October 1997 was open to review since the original award had been made in ignorance of a material fact. The DAT went on to conclude that the applicant was not entitled to the care component of DLA from the date of the original award on 21 December 1995 on the grounds that the applicant did not, at any time, reasonably require assistance with bodily functions or supervision to keep her safe.

(i)  Events after the Disability Appeal Tribunal decision of 17 July 2002

The applicant was entitled to appeal against the decision of 17 July 2002 to the Social Security Commissioner within one month of the date of notification of the decision (30 July 2002) but from the documents provided, it appears that she did not pursue an appeal.

In a letter of 12 August 2002 to the Social Security Appeals Service, the applicant stated that she believed that the decision of 17 July 2002 was wrong and complained about the behaviour of members of the tribunal. In a letter of 12 September 2002, the Appeals Service advised the applicant that she was entitled to apply to the Social Security Commissioner for leave to appeal against the decision of 17 July 2002 and stated that the Appeals Service would inquire into her allegations of improper judicial behaviour if she wished to make an official complaint.

On 12 August 2002 the applicant also wrote to the Disability and Carers Service at the Department of Work and Pensions and complained about the decision of 17 July 2002 and the decision of 13 May 2002 in relation to her second claim for DLA. In a letter of 21 August 2002, the Disability and Carers Service advised the applicant that she could apply to the Social Security Commissioner for the decision of 17 July 2002 to be set aside. With respect to the decision of 13 May 2002, the applicant was informed that although she had not lodged an appeal with the DAT within the one-month time limit, she could request a late appeal if she provided reasons why the appeal was late.

It appears that the applicant did not appeal against either the decision of the DAT of 17 July 2002 or the decision of the adjudication officer of 13 May 2002.

2.  Breach of contract claim against CGU Insurance Plc.

The applicant entered into a contract of insurance with CGU Insurance Plc. (CGU) for buildings and home contents insurance and paid an additional premium for legal expenses insurance provided by another company on behalf of CGU. From February 1999 onwards, the applicant noticed an “oily” smell at her property which caused her to cough and complained to the local council. Council officers visited the property a number of times from March to July 1999 and concluded that they could not detect any smell aside from a fence treated with creosote and that the creosoted fence was not causing a statutory nuisance. However, the applicant believed that the smell was coming from the chimney of a nearby property. On 29 July 1999 the applicant moved out of her home.

On 31 July 1999 she returned to the property and took samples of the air at her property for analysis by a private laboratory. On the basis of the samples collected by the applicant, the laboratory found that there was a higher concentration of hydrocarbons present in the air at the applicant’s property than the normal background level but that there was no evidence of soot particles. On 1 September 1999 the local council carried out their own air tests, including for hydrocarbons, and all tests proved negative. The applicant sold the house on 15 October 1999.

The applicant submitted a claim under her insurance policy with CGU for the loss and damage suffered due to the air pollution at her property. General Exception 5 of the insurance policy provided that:

“This policy does not insure any destruction of or loss of or damage to any property or any consequential loss or any legal liability directly or indirectly caused by, or contributed to, by, or arising from:

5.  Pollution or contamination unless caused by:

(i)  A sudden and unforeseen and identifiable accident

(ii)  Leakage of oil from any fixed installation within your home.”

CGU refused the claim on the grounds that it did not come within the terms of the policy since there was no evidence that there had been any pollution or contamination and even if such pollution existed, it was not caused by a sudden, unforeseen and identifiable accident.

The applicant also contacted the company, Eastgate Assistance Ltd. (EA), which provided legal expenses insurance on behalf of CGU. The legal expenses insurance policy provided for the following cover:

(i)  A full telephone counselling service on any legal problem concerning the Insured.

(ii)  Legal costs and expenses of legal proceedings in order to pursue a civil claim directly arising from one or more of the following events occurring within the territorial limits during the period of insurance.

(a)  Your death or personal injury except when involving a motor vehicle owned by you or for which you are legally responsible.

...

(c)  An infringement of your legal rights arising from your ownership or occupation of your principal residence ...”

Under section (ii) of the policy the insured is obliged on the happening of any event likely to give rise to a claim to “inform us in writing as soon as reasonably possible ... and provide all information and assistance which we may reasonably require”. In guidance provided under the policy it is stated that “to make a claim use the Legal Helpline telephone number and request a claim form”. The policy goes on to provide that:

“If on receiving a claim or at any time thereafter we consider that:

(a)  your prospects of success in legal proceedings are insufficient;

(b)  your interests would be best served by another course of action;

(c)  we cannot agree to the claim;

We will write to you giving our reasons and we will not be liable to pay any further legal costs and expenses for the claim.”

The applicant telephoned CGU about the possibility of making a claim on her legal expenses insurance. On 18 August 1999 CGU wrote to the applicant advising her to contact the telephone helpline of EA and she would then be sent a claim form to complete. Rather than telephoning, the applicant sent a fax setting out her claims of air pollution. EA did not respond to the fax and did not send the applicant any other response to the claims made.

The applicant then issued proceedings against CGU in the County Court for breach of contract due to CGU’s failure to grant her claim made under her buildings and home contents insurance and the failure to respond to her communications regarding the legal expenses insurance. On 10 January 2001 the County Court gave default judgment in favour of the applicant but this was set aside on 19 April 2001.

The judge assigned to hear the case had, in the past, acted for CGU as a barrister. At the start of the hearing on 29 October 2001, the judge informed the applicant that he had worked for CGU in the past as a barrister and might work for them again in the future but stated that despite this, he would approach her claim impartially as a judge. The judge offered the applicant the opportunity to make submissions on this matter but she elected to proceed with the hearing in the knowledge of the judge’s connections with CGU.

On 4 November 2001 the County Court found that CGU’s refusal to grant the applicant’s claim under the buildings and home contents insurance did not constitute a breach of contract. After a careful review of the evidence provided by the applicant, the judge concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that there was any pollution or contamination of her property and therefore, no damage had occurred to the building or its contents. Further, even if there had been such pollution or contamination, it was not caused by a sudden, unforeseen and unidentifiable accident and therefore, was not covered by the insurance policy with CGU. The judge did, however, find that a breach of contract occurred with respect to the legal expenses insurance due to the failure to respond to the communications from the applicant. The court considered that there was an implied obligation in the contract of insurance to exercise reasonable skill and care in responding to communications from insured persons, which had not been met in this case. However, since the applicant could not point to any specific loss suffered as a result of this breach, the judge awarded nominal damages of 10 pounds sterling (GBP). The applicant applied for permission to appeal but her application was refused by the County Court on 27 November 2001.

On 14 December 2001 the applicant was ordered to pay a proportion of CGU’s costs in the case amounting to GBP 6,642.60 and permission to appeal against the order was refused. On 27 March 2002 the Court of Appeal refused permission to appeal against the costs order and an extension of time for this purpose. The applicant failed to comply with the costs order and on 30 April 2002 the County Court created a charge on the applicant’s property for the value of GBP 7,521.76 plus any further interest. The charge on the property was confirmed on 18 June 2002 and according to the applicant, the charge was due to be converted into a bill of sale on 19 December 2002.

B.  Relevant domestic law

1.  Law relating to Disability Living Allowance

(a)  Entitlement to Disability Living Allowance: Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992

Sections 71 to 73 of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992, as relevant, set out the conditions for entitlement to DLA:

“71.- (1)  Disability living allowance shall consist of a care component and a mobility component.

(2)  A person’s entitlement to a disability living allowance may be an entitlement to either component or to both of them.

(3)  A person may be awarded either component for a fixed period or for life, but if his award of a disability living allowance consists of both components, he may not be awarded the components for different fixed periods.

...

72.- (1)  Subject to the provisions of this Act, a person shall be entitled to the care component of a disability living allowance for any period throughout which-

(a)  he is so severely disabled physically or mentally that-

(i)  he requires in connection with his bodily functions attention from another person for a significant portion of the day (whether during a single period or a number of periods); or

(ii)  he cannot prepare a cooked main meal for himself if he has the ingredients; or

(b)  he is so severely disabled physically or mentally that, by day, he requires from another person-

(i)  frequent attention throughout the day in connection with his bodily functions; or

(ii)  continual supervision throughout the day in order to avoid substantial danger to himself or others; or

(c)  he is so severely disabled physically or mentally that, at night,-

(i)  he requires from another person prolonged or repeated attention in connection with his bodily functions; or

(ii)  in order to avoid substantial danger to himself or others he requires another person to be awake for a prolonged period or at frequent intervals for the purpose of watching over him.

...

73.-(1)  Subject to the provisions of this Act, a person shall be entitled to the mobility component of a disability living allowance for any period in which he is over the age of 5 and throughout which-

(a)  he is suffering from physical disablement such that he is either unable to walk or virtually unable to do so; or

...”

Section 75(1) provides that new claims for DLA may not be made after the age of 65:

 
“75.-(1)  Except to the extent to which regulations provide otherwise, no person shall be entitled to either component of a disability living allowance for any period after he attains the age of 65 otherwise than by virtue of an award made before he attains that age.”

(b)  Appeals against the decision of an adjudication officer on disability living allowance: Social Security Administration Act 1992

Sections 30 to 35 of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 set out the procedure for appeals against decisions on entitlement to disability living allowance on the application of the claimant or the Secretary of State. Section 30 establishes the grounds on which the decision of an adjudication officer may be reviewed, which differ depending on whether the application for review was made within or outside the relevant time limit:

“30.-(1)  On an application under this section made within the prescribed period, a decision of an adjudication officer  ... may be reviewed on any ground ...

(2)  On an application under this section made after the end of the prescribed period, a decision of an adjudication officer ... may be reviewed if-

(a)  the adjudication officer is satisfied that the decision was given in ignorance of, or was based on a mistake as to, some material fact; or

(b)  there has been any relevant change of circumstances since the decision was given; or

(c)  it is anticipated that a relevant change of circumstances will so occur; or

(d)  the decision was erroneous in point of law...”

Section 32(4) sets out the grounds for review of a lifetime award of DLA:

 
“(4)  Where a person has been awarded a component for life, on a review under section 30 above the adjudication officer shall not consider the question of his entitlement to that component or the rate of that component or the period for which it has been awarded unless-

(a)  the person awarded the component expressly applies for the consideration of that question; or

(b)  information is available to the adjudication officer which gives him reasonable grounds for believing that entitlement to the component, or entitlement to it at the rate awarded or for that period, ought not to continue”.

Section 33(1) provides that a claimant may appeal to the DAT against the decision on review of an adjudication officer:
 

33.-(1)  Where an adjudication officer has given a decision on a review under section 30(1) above, the claimant or such other person as may be prescribed may appeal-

(a)  in prescribed cases, to a disability appeal tribunal; ...”

Section 33(6) sets out the grounds for the review of a lifetime award of DLA by the DAT:

“(6)  The tribunal shall not consider-

(a)  a person’s entitlement to a component which has been awarded for life; or

(b)  the rate of a component so awarded; or

(c)  the period for which a component has been so awarded,

unless-

(i)  the appeal expressly raises that question; or

(ii)  information is available to the tribunal which gives it reasonable grounds for believing that entitlement to the component, or entitlement to it at the rate awarded or for that period, ought not to continue.”

Section 34 provides for an appeal to a Social Security Commissioner from the decision of the DAT:

“34.-(1)  Subject to the provisions of this section, an appeal lies to a Commissioner from any decision of a social security appeal tribunal or disability appeal tribunal under section 33 above on the ground that the decision of the tribunal was erroneous in point of law.”

2.  Law relating to charging orders on property for enforcement of court orders

Part 73 of the Civil Procedure Rules provides for the creation of a charging order on a judgment debtor’s property, on the application of the judgment creditor, in order to enforce an order of the court. Rule 73.4 allows for an interim charging order to be made:

“73.4 (1)  An application for a charging order will initially be dealt with by a judge without a hearing.

(2)  The judge may make an order (an ‘interim charging order’) –

(a)  imposing a charge over the judgment debtor’s interest in the asset to which the application relates; and

(b)  fixing a hearing to consider whether to make a final charging order as provided by rule 73.8(2)(a).”

Rule 73.8(2)(a) provides that at the second hearing, the court may “make a final charging order confirming that the charge imposed by the interim charging order shall continue, with or without modification”. Rule 73.10 provides that a charging order may be enforced by sale of the property subject to the order:

“73.10 (1)  Subject to the provisions of any enactment, the court may, upon a claim by a person who has obtained a charging order over an interest in property, order the sale of the property to enforce the charging order.”

COMPLAINTS

1.  Claim for disability living allowance

The applicant complains under Article 6 of the Convention about the delays in the appeal procedures, that she was forced to make a new application for DLA in September 2001 and that she was not provided with legal representation. The applicant further complains that at the hearing of 17 July 2002, the DAT could not also determine an appeal against the refusal of her second application for disability living allowance made on 11 September 2001. She claims that this resulted in the expiry of the time limit for her appeal.

2.  Breach of contract claim against CGU Insurance Plc.

The applicant complains under Article 6 of the Convention about the fairness of the trial on the grounds that the judge was biased since he represented CGU as a barrister, that the judge failed to consider all the evidence, that she was not provided with legal assistance and that the damages awarded were insufficient. The applicant further complains that costs were awarded against her and that the Court of Appeal failed to give reasons for its refusal to grant leave to appeal. Finally, the applicant also complains about the charge placed on her home and submits that she has been forced to sell her house despite a court judgment in her favour.

THE LAW

The applicant makes a number of complaints under Article 6 of the Convention with respect to two sets of legal proceedings. Article 6, as relevant, provides that:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... , everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law ...”

1.  Claim for Disability Living Allowance

(i)  The applicant complains about the length of time it took for her claim for DLA to be finally decided. The Court considers that issues arise under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which merit further consideration and therefore adjourns the examination of this complaint.

(ii)  The applicant complains that she had to make a new claim for DLA in September 2001 due to the age limit of 65 for submitting a claim. The Court considers that there is no appearance of a violation of any of the rights guaranteed in the Convention due to the fact that there is an age limit for the submission of claims for disability living allowance.

(iii)  The applicant complains that legal representation was not provided during the proceedings relating to her claim for DLA. The Court recalls that there is no right as such under the Convention to receive legal aid in cases concerning civil rights (for example, McVicar v. the United Kingdom, no. 46311/99, §§ 47 and 48, ECHR 2002-III). In this case, the lack of legal representation did not have the effect of depriving the applicant of effective access to a court, since the proceedings did not involve complex points of law but rather turned on questions of fact relating to the applicant’s condition.

(iv)  The applicant complains that the DAT was not able to deal with her appeal against the refusal of her second application for DLA at the same time as the appeal regarding her first application. She states that this resulted in her failure to comply with the time limit for her appeal against the refusal of her second application. The Court considers that there is no appearance of a violation of Article 6 due to the fact that the two applications for DLA were treated separately and the applicant was required to lodge separate appeals.

(v)  Consequently, the Court finds that the complaints outlined in points (ii) to (iv) are manifestly ill-founded and should be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

2.  Breach of contract claim against CGU Insurance Plc.

(i)  The applicant complains that the judge was biased due to his connections with CGU, that he did not properly consider the evidence before him and that the amount of damages was insufficient. The Court notes that the applicant did not apply to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal against the order of 4 November 2001. Therefore, the applicant failed to exhaust the domestic remedies available and these complaints should be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

(ii)  The applicant complains that she should not have been ordered to pay CGU’s costs relating to the case. The applicant further complains that the Court of Appeal did not give reasons for its refusal to grant leave to appeal. The Court notes that the final refusal of leave to appeal against the costs order was on 27 March 2002 and the first communication to the Court was dated 27 October 2002, outside the six-month time limit. Consequently, the Court finds that these complaints should be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

(iii)  Finally, the applicant complains about the charging order placed on her property on 30 April 2002 and that she has been forced to sell her house despite a court judgment in her favour. The Court considers that the placing of a charge on property is not an unfair or arbitrary method of enforcing a court order on costs. Further, the applicant was notified of the application for a charging order and was able to attend the court hearing and contest this application. In addition, she was able to subsequently apply to discharge the charging order. However, the applicant did not take either of these steps. The Court finds that this does not disclose any violation of a Convention right and that therefore, this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and should be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Decides to adjourn the examination of the applicant’s complaint concerning the length of the proceedings to determine her entitlement to disability living allowance;

Declares the remainder of the application inadmissible.

Michael O’BoyleMatti Pellonpää
RegistrarPresident

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