Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 121
July 2009
Wojtas-Kaleta v. Poland - 20436/02
Judgment 16.7.2009 [Section IV]
Article 10
Article 10-1
Freedom of expression
Disciplinary penalty imposed on public-television journalist for criticising the company’s programming policy: violation
Facts: The applicant was a journalist with a public television company and also the President of the Polish Public Television Journalists’ Union. She was reprimanded by the company after criticising – in comments to the press in her trade-union capacity and in an open letter – its decision to take two classical music programmes off the air. She applied to a district court for an order for the reprimand to be withdrawn, but her application was dismissed. On appeal, a higher regional court upheld that decision on the grounds that the applicant had been in breach of her duty of loyalty towards her employer.
Law: The applicant’s case raised the issue of how the limits of loyalty of journalists working for public broadcasters should be delineated and what restrictions could be imposed on them in public debate. It was not necessary to draw a distinction between the applicant’s roles as an employee of a public television company, a trade-union activist and a journalist and to make a separate analysis of the scope of her freedom of expression in each. However, her combined professional and trade-union roles were relevant to the question whether the reprimand had been “necessary in a democratic society”. The obligation of discretion and constraint did not apply with equal force to journalists as it was in the nature of their functions to impart information and ideas. A public broadcaster’s programming policy was an issue of public interest and concern allowing of little scope for restrictions on debate. The applicant’s employer had been entrusted with a special statutory mission which included assisting cultural development with special emphasis on national intellectual and artistic achievements. The applicant had argued that the changes in its programming policy were not consistent with that mission and had echoed widely shared concerns about the declining quality of music programmes. Although she claimed to have done so in her role as a journalist commenting on a matter of public interest, the company had taken the view that merely participating in the debate was sufficient to establish a breach of her obligations as an employee, without weighing those obligations against the company’s role as a public service. Similarly, the domestic courts had endorsed that conclusion without examining whether and how the subject matter and context of her comments could have affected the permissible scope of her freedom of expression. In the Court’s view, it was also relevant that the applicant’s comments had had a sufficient factual basis, while at the same time amounting to value judgments not susceptible of proof; that the tone had been measured; that no personal accusations had been made; and that her good faith was not in dispute. In sum, having weighed up the various competing interests, including the right to freedom of expression on matters of general interest, the applicant’s professional obligations and responsibilities as a journalist and the duties and responsibilities of employees towards their employers, the Court concluded that the interference had not been “necessary in a democratic society”.
Conclusion: violation (unanimously).
Article 41 – No claim made.
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
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