FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 53653/07
by Mirosław WOLIŃSKI
against Poland
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 27 April 2010 as a Chamber composed of:
Nicolas Bratza, President,
Lech Garlicki,
Giovanni Bonello,
Ljiljana Mijović,
Päivi Hirvelä,
Ledi Bianku,
Nebojša Vučinić, judges,
and Lawrence Early, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 23 November 2007,
Having regard to the declaration submitted by the respondent Government on 6 November 2009 requesting the Court to strike the application out of the list of cases and the applicant's reply to that declaration,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Mirosław Woliński, is a Polish national who was born in 1959 and lives in Jelenia Góra. He was represented before the Court by Ms B. Słupska-Uczkiewicz, a lawyer practising in Wrocław. The Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant was born in 1959 and is currently detained in Jelenia Góra Prison Centre.
On 11 September 2006 the Jelenia Góra Regional Court convicted the applicant of murder and sentenced him to 12 years' imprisonment. On 7 December 2006 the Wrocław Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance judgment.
On 26 February 2007 the court assigned a legal‑aid lawyer to the case for the purposes of preparing a cassation appeal and lodging it with the Supreme Court.
By a letter dated 30 March 2007 the legal-aid lawyer informed the Wrocław Court of Appeal that she would not prepare and lodge a cassation appeal. She essentially referred to the cassation appeal prepared by the applicant himself and stated that his submissions were limited to contesting the findings of fact made by the first-instance court. In so far as the applicant had contested the judgment of the appellate court, his submissions focused on the allegations that the assessment of the evidence by that court had been erroneous. She concluded that there were therefore no grounds on which she could prepare a cassation appeal.
In a letter dated 12 April 2007, forwarded to the prison and served on the applicant on an unspecified later date, the Court of Appeal informed him about the legal-aid lawyer's refusal. It further summoned the applicant to submit a cassation appeal signed by a privately hired lawyer within a seven-day time‑limit.
The applicant did not submit a cassation appeal.
COMPLAINTSThe applicant complained that the proceedings in his case had been unfair in that he had been denied an effective access to the Supreme Court.The applicant complained about the outcome and unfairness of the proceedings, in particular that the courts dealing with his case had wrongly established the facts and evaluated the evidence.
THE LAW
By letter dated 6 November 2009 the Government informed the Court that they proposed to make a unilateral declaration with a view to resolving the issue raised by the applicant's first complaint. They further requested the Court to strike it out in accordance with Article 37 of the Convention.
The declaration provided as follows:
“(...) the Government hereby wish to express - by way of unilateral declaration — its acknowledgement of denial of access to a court in the determination of the applicant's criminal charges within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
Consequently, the Government are prepared to pay to the applicant PLN 4,500 which they consider to be reasonable in the light of the Court's case-law.
The sum referred to above, which is to cover any pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage as well as costs and expenses, will be free of any taxes that may be applicable. It will be payable within three months of the date of notification of the decision taken by the Court pursuant to Article 37 § 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In the event of failure to pay this sum within the said three-month period, the Government undertake to pay simple interest on it, from expiry of that period until settlement, at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points”.
In a letter of 12 January 2010 the applicant expressed the view that the sum mentioned in the Government's declaration was unacceptably low. He referred to just satisfaction awards made in the cases of Staroszczyk v. Poland, no. 59519/00, 22 March 2007; Siałkowska v. Poland, no. 8932/05, 22 March 2007, which amounted to EUR 4,000.
The Court recalls that Article 37 of the Convention provides that it may at any stage of the proceedings decide to strike an application out of its list of cases where the circumstances lead to one of the conclusions specified under (a), (b) or (c) of paragraph 1 of that Article. Article 37 § 1 (c) enables the Court in particular to strike a case out of its list if:
“for any other reason established by the Court, it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application”.
It also recalls that in certain circumstances, it may strike out an application or part thereof under Article 37 § 1(c) on the basis of a unilateral declaration by a respondent Government even if the applicant wishes the examination of the case to be continued.
To this end, the Court will examine carefully the declaration in the light of the principles emerging from its case-law, in particular the Tahsin Acar judgment (Tahsin Acar v. Turkey, [GC], no. 26307/95, §§ 75-77, ECHR 2003-VI); WAZA Spółka z o.o. v. Poland (dec.) no. 11602/02, 26 June 2007; and Sulwińska v. Poland (dec.) no. 28953/03).
The Court has established in a number of cases its practice concerning complaints about the violation of one's right of access to the Supreme Court in the context of criminal proceedings (see Kulikowski v. Poland, no. 18353/03, ECHR 2009‑... (extracts); Arciński v. Poland, no. 41373/04, 15 September 2009).
Having regard to the nature of the admissions contained in the Government's declaration, as well as the amount of compensation proposed – which cannot be said to be inconsistent with the amounts awarded in similar cases – the Court considers that it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application (Article 37 § 1(c).
Moreover, in light of the above considerations, and in particular given its case-law on the topic, the Court is satisfied that respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto does not require it to continue the examination of this part of the application (Article 37 § 1 in fine).
Accordingly, it should be struck out of the list.
The applicant further complained, invoking Article 6 of the Convention, that the proceedings had been unfair in that the courts had wrongly assessed evidence, erred in establishing the facts of the case and incorrectly applied applicable domestic law.
The Court has examined the remainder of the complaints as submitted by the applicant. However, having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that the complaints do not give rise to any appearance of breaches of the Article relied on. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court
Takes note of the terms of the respondent Government's declaration regarding the alleged denial of the applicant's access to the Supreme Court (Article 6 § 1 of the Convention) and of the modalities for ensuring compliance with the undertakings referred to therein;
Decides by a majority to strike the application out of its list of cases in accordance with Article 37 § 1 (c) of the Convention in so far as it relates to the above-mentioned complaint;
Declares unanimously the remainder of the application inadmissible.
Lawrence EarlyNicolas Bratza
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy