WIPO Domain Name Decision D2000-0119 for ccom.com

WIPO Arbitrationand Mediation Center

ADMINISTRATIVE PANEL DECISION

Chernow Communications, Inc. v. Jonathan D. Kimball

Case No. D2000-0119

1. The Parties

1.1 The Complainant is Chernow Communications, Inc., a corporation organizedunder the laws of the State of Colorado, United States of America, having itsprincipal place of business at 900 20th Street, Boulder, Colorado,United States of America.

1.2 The Respondent is Jonathan D. Kimball, an individual having an addressat 167 East 77th Street 3, New York, New York, United States of America.

2. The Domain Name(s) and Registrar(s)

The domain name at issue is , which domain name is registeredwith Network Solutions, Inc., based in Herndon, Virginia.

3. Procedural History

3.1 A Complaint was submitted electronically to the World Intellectual PropertyOrganization Arbitration and Mediation Center (the "WIPO Center")on March 3, 2000, and the signed original together with four copieswas received on March 6, 2000. An Acknowledgment of Receipt was sent by theWIPO Center to the Complainant, dated March 6, 2000.

3.2 On March 5, 2000, a Request for Registrar Verification was transmittedto the registrar, Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI") requesting it to: (1) confirmthat the domain name at issue is registered with NSI; (2) confirm that the personidentified as the Respondent is the current registrant of the domain name; (3)provide the full contact details (i.e., postal address(es), telephone number(s),facsimile number(s), e-mail address(es)) available in the registrar�s Whoisdatabase for the registrant of the disputed domain name, the technical contact,the administrative contact and the billing contact; (4) confirm that theUniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy") is in effect; (5)indicate the current status of the domain name.

3.3 On March 6, 2000, NSI confirmed by reply e-mail that the domain name is registered with NSI, is currently in active status, and that the Respondent,Jonathan D. Kimball, is the current registrant of the name. The registrar alsoforwarded the requested Whois details, and confirmed that the Policy is in effect.

3.4 The WIPO Center determined that the Complaint satisfies the formal requirementsof the Policy, the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the"Uniform Rules") and the Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name DisputeResolution Policy (the "Supplemental Rules"). The Panel has independently determinedand agrees with the assessment of the WIPO Center that the Complaint is in formalcompliance with the requirements of the Policy, the Uniform Rules, and the SupplementalRules. The required fees for a three-member Panel were paid on time and in therequired amount by the Complainant.

3.5 No formal deficiencies having been recorded, on March 8, 2000, a Notificationof Complaint and Commencement of Administrative Proceeding (the "CommencementNotification") was transmitted to the Respondent (with copies to the Complainant,NSI and ICANN), setting a deadline of March 27, 2000, by which the Respondentcould file a Response to the Complaint. The Commencement Notification was transmittedto the Respondent by e-mail to the e-mail addresses indicated in the Complaintand specified in NSI�s confirmation. In addition, the complaint was sent byexpress courier to the postal address given. Having reviewed the communicationsrecords in the case file, the Administrative Panel finds that the WIPO Centerhas discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Uniform Rules"to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual noticeto Respondent." In any event, evidence of proper notice is provided bythe evidence in the record of the Respondent�s participation in these proceedings.

3.6 On April 10, 2000, in view of the Complainant�s designation of a three-personpanel, the WIPO Center appointed David E. Sorkin and John Terry to serve asPanelists in Case No. D2000-0119, having takeninto consideration the panelist nominations provided by the parties and havingreceived Statements of Acceptance and Declarations of Impartiality and Independencefrom each of them.

3.7 On April 10, 2000, the WIPO Center gave each party a list of five candidatesfor the Presiding Panelists to rank in order of preference. On April 20, 2000,the WIPO Center notified the parties that M. Scott Donahey had been appointedas Presiding Panelist and set the projected decision date as May 4, 2000. Thisdate was later extended to May 19, 2000.

4. Factual Background

4.1 Complainant registered the trade name "C-Com" in Colorado.

4.2 Complainant is in the business of communications services in connectionwith telephone calling and Internet access services. Complainant's customersare located throughout the United States. Complainant has expended money toadvertise its services in the telecommunications field and Complainant's markand name have acquired considerable good will and are assets of the business.Complainant has done business under these marks for some years.

4.3 Complainant registered the service mark with the United States Patent andTrademark Office and the registration issued on January 21, 1997, for "communicationservices, namely long distance telephone services." A copy of the registrationwas attached to the Complaint as Exhibit A.

4.4 Respondent registered the domain name on August 14, 1997.A copy of the Whois information concerning the domain name at issue is attachedto the Complaint as Exhibit B.

4.5 Respondent has alleged that "a search on the Internet yellow pagesdirectory, S yields [sic] 19 listings for companies with C COMor CCOM in their name, and a search on the popular web site AltaV yield[sic] 11,413 Internet web pages containing the word CCOM."

4.6 Respondent contends that his purpose in registering the domain name atissue was to "reserve for itself a generic domain name that combines the letter'c,' which is commonly known among Internet users as a short-hand descriptionfor 'relating to computers,' and the top level domain ('TLD') 'com,' as an abbreviationfor communication and commercial, and is the most popular TLD for commercialentities."

4.7 The domain name at issue resolves to a web site which states "[t]his websiteis currently under construction . . . for info about partnership opportunitiesor domain availability, send email to jon.kimball@. You are visitornumber:" followed by a counter which records the number of hits on the site.The majority determined these facts by entering "www." and reviewingthe web page to which it resolved.[1] Themajority believes that this is the equivalent in a domain name case to the practiceof taking judicial notice. See, e.g., the United States Federal Rulesof Evidence, Rule 201.

5. Parties� Contentions

5.1 Complainant

Complainant contends that Respondent has registered as a domain name a markwhich is identical to the service mark and trademark registered and used byComplainant, that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respectto the domain name at issue, and that Respondent has registered and is usingthe domain name at issue in bad faith.

5.2 Respondent

Respondent contends that the Second Level Domain ("SLD") name at issue is differentfrom Complainant's service mark in that the SLD "ccom" does not contain thehyphen in "c-com." Respondent contends that there is no likelihood of confusion,that there is no evidence of actual confusion, that Complainant has failed toprove that Respondent has no rights to or legitimate interests in respect ofthe domain name at issue, and that Complainant has failed to prove that Respondenthas registered and is using the domain name at issue in bad faith.

6. Discussion and Findings

6.1 Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs the Panel as to the principles thePanel is to use in determining the dispute: "A Panel shall decide a complainton the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with thePolicy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."Since both the Complainant and Respondent are domiciled in the United States,and since United States� courts have recent experience with similar disputes,to the extent that it would assist the Panel in determining whether the Complainanthas met its burden as established by Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy, the Panelshall look to rules and principles of law set out in decisions of the courtsof the United States.

6.2 Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy directs that the Complainant must prove eachof the following:

1) that the domain name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusinglysimilar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights;and,

2) that the Respondent has no legitimate interests in respect of the domain

name; and,

3) the domain name has been registered and used in bad faith.

6.3 The SDL "ccom" is not a generic name.

6.4 The majority of the Panel rejects the Respondent's contention that thedomain name at issue is not identical to the Complainant's service mark. Themajority of prior Panel decisions, which are consistent with United States Courtdecisions dealing with trademarks, have held that the use or absence of punctuationmarks, such as hyphens, does not alter the fact that a name is identical toa mark. The Channel Tunnel Group Ltd. v. Powell, ICANN CaseNo. D2000-0038; Seek America Networks, Inc. v. Tariq Masood and SolonSigns, ICANN Case No. D2000-0131; Hewlett-PackardCompany v. Cupcake City, ICANN Case No. FA0002000093562; InfoS,Inc. v. Tenenbaum Ofer, ICANN Case No. D2000-0075;EFG Bank European Financial Group SA v. Jacob Foundation, ICANN CaseNo. D2000-0036; Colgate-Palmolive Company v. Charles Kasinga, ICANNCase No. FA0002000094203; Marriott International, Inc. CafÈ au lait,ICANN Case No. FA0002000093670; Slep-Tone Entertainment Corporation d/b/aSound Choice Accompaniment Tracks v. Sound Choice Disc Jockeys, Inc., ICANNCase No. FA2002000093636; NFL Properties, Inc. v. Rusty Rahe, ICANN CaseNo. D2000-0128.

The majority believe that the discussion of the dissent and those cases itcites elevates form over substance [2]. Moreover,this disagreement over what is necessary for a second level domain name to beidentical to a trademark or service mark, rather than merely confusingly similar,is more than academic. If the dissent's reasoning were accepted it would bevery easy in the future for a prospective cybersquatter, by inserting or deletinga hyphen, to avoid the impact of the holding in Shirmax Retail Ltd./Detaillants/ShirmaxLTEE v. CES Marketing Group, Inc., Case No. AF0104 (sometimes referred toas the " case").

In the case, the Panel found that if it were determined that a domainname is identical to a mark, then such a determination would satisfy the firstof the three prong test for bad faith under the Policy, and there is no needto show a likelihood of confusion. If the dissent's reasoning were to be adopted,a would-be cybersquatter could simply eliminate the hyphen in "Hewlett-Packard"or insert a hyphen in "Microsoft" and thereby avoid an automatic finding ofbad faith under �4(a)(i) of the Policy. Such conduct should not be encouraged.

6.5 Indeed, decisions have held that such conduct is in and of itself evidenceof bad faith. "Bad faith on the part of the Respondents is to be inferredfrom using a hyphen as a device to obtain what is to all intents and purposesa domain name which is identical to Claimant�s service mark and earlier registereddomain name." SeekAmerica Networks Inc. v. Tariq Masood and Solo Signs,ICANN Case No. D2000-0131.

6.6 Rule 15(a) provides in pertinent part that the "Panel shall decide a complainton the basis of the statements . . . submitted . . . ." Complainant has statedin its certified Complaint that "[Respondent] has no rights or legitimate interestin the domain [] based on [Complainant's] continuous and longprior use of its mark ccom." Complaint, � 9, at 3.

6.7 Complainant's statement shifts the burden to Respondent to rebut this allegation.See, e.g., Policy, � 4(c).

6.8 Respondent failed to make any of the showings described in Paragraph 4(c)of the Policy.

6.9 Moreover, Complainant's registration of its service mark preceded Respondent'sregistration of the domain name at issue by some seven months. Thus, at thetime Respondent registered the domain at issue, it had constructive notice ofComplainant's service mark. Finter Bank Zurich v. Gianluca Olivier, ICANNCase No. D2000-0091; Barney's, Inc. v. BNYBulletin Board, ICANN Case No. D2000-0059.The Panel believes the reason for finding constructive notice is both realisticand practical. It is easy to do a trademark search online to determine whetherthe domain name which one intends to register is identical or confusingly similarto someone's registered mark. Indeed, Respondent performed similar searchesprior to filing his Response, and Respondent found 19 listings for companieswith "c-com" or "ccom" in their names and 11,413 Internet web pages containingthe word, "ccom." Had Respondent, prior to registration, performed a Trade Marksearch or searches similar to those he performed prior to filing the response,and had he been acting in good faith, Respondent might have registered a differentname entirely.

6.10 The failure of Respondent to produce evidence sufficient to rebut Complainant'sallegations entitles the Panel to conclude that Respondent has no such rightsor legitimate interests in respect of the domain name at issue. Ronson, Plcv. Unimetal Sanayal ve T.A.S., ICANN Case No.D2000-0011; Parfums Christian Dior v. QTR Corporation, ICANN CaseNo. D2000-0023.

6.11 The most difficult question facing the Panel is whether the Respondenthas registered and is using the domain name at issue in bad faith. Policy, � 4(a)(iii).

6.12 Respondent's conduct does not bring it within any of the illustrationsof bad faith registration and use set out in Paragraph 4(b) of the Policy. However,the majority believes that all of the facts, when taken together, are evidenceof bad faith registration and use. Telstra Corporation Limited v. NuclearMarshmallows, ICANN Case No. D2000-0003.

6.13 As set out, supra, at � 6.8, Respondent had constructive noticeof Complainant's registered service mark at the time that Respondent registeredthe domain name at issue. To the extent that Respondent has established thatothers have registered "ccom" as a mark in other commercial fields or geographicalareas, Respondent would have had constructive knowledge of any marks registeredprior to his registration of the domain name at issue.

6.14 The facts that the domain name at issue resolves to a web site at whichthe SLD name does not appear, that the site indicates it is "under construction,"that it is suggested that the Respondent be contacted regarding domain nameavailability, that a counter is prominently featured which registers the numberof visits to the site, and that the Respondent has failed to make a bona fideuse of the domain name at issue for almost three years, when taken togetherconstitute bad faith use.

6.15 It has been held that failure to make a bona fide use of a domain nameduring a two-year period following registration constitutes bad faith. Mondichand American Wine Biscuits, Inc. v. Brown, ICANN CaseNo. D2000-0004. The majority believes this reasoning is sound. A registrantshould be given sufficient time to make preparations to use the registered domainname, but the "parking" of a domain name is evidence of bad faith registrationand use. Beverages and More, Inc. v. Glenn Sober Mgmt., ICANN Case No.AF-0092.

6.16 It has also been held that the use of a counter at the web site to whichthe domain name resolves without other content is tantamount to an offer tosell the domain name. Home Interior & Gifts, Inc. v. Home Interiors,ICANN Case No. D2000-0010. In World WrestlingFederation v. Bosman, ICANN Case No. D1999-0001, the Panel held that under�4(b)(i) of the Policy, an offer to sell the domain name at issue for more thanthe costs incurred constituted evidence of bad faith registration and use.

6.17 Finally, the Panel refers to the decision in Ventura Foods LLC v. Pathi,ICANN Case No. AF-0136, in which the Panel held: "The Respondent must beshown to be using the domain name in bad faith. The Respondent has caused aweb page to appear announcing a future web site to internet [sic] users whoenter the domain name in their browsers. This is a use of the domain name, andfurther is a use which gives effect to the bad faith with which the name wasregistered."

6.18 Under all of the facts and circumstances present here, the majority findsthat Respondent has registered and is using the domain name at issue in badfaith.

7. Decision

For all of the foregoing reasons, the majority of the Panel decides that thedomain name at issue is identical to the service mark which had previously beenregistered by the Complainant, that the Respondent has no rights or legitimateinterests in respect of the domain name at issue, and that the domain name atissue has been registered and is being used in bad faith. Accordingly, the Panelrequires, pursuant to paragraph 4(i) of the Policy, that the domain name atissue be transferred to the Complainant.

M. Scott Donahey
Presiding Panelist

John Terry
Panelist

DISSENTING OPINION

Chernow Communications, Inc. v. Jonathan D. Kimball

Case No. D2000-0119

I respectfully dissent from the decision of the majority of this panel.

The domain name registered by Respondent, "," is plainly not identicalto Complainant's trademark for long distance telephone services, "C-COM," andunder the circumstances presented in this proceeding I would not find it confusinglysimilar to Complainant's trademark.

A domain name that incorporates an unhyphenated variant of a hyphenated trademarkis not identical to the trademark. Draw-Tite, Inc. v. Plattsburgh SpringInc., ICANN Case No. D2000-0017 (WIPO Mar.14, 2000) (holding that "" is confusingly similar but not identicalto trademarks "DRAW TITE" and "DRAW-TITE"); see also Pep Boys Manny, Moe& Jack of Cal. v. E-Commerce Today, Ltd., ICANN Case No. AF-0145 (DeCMay 3, 2000) (holding that "" is confusingly similar but not identicalto trademark "PEP BOYS"); Gateway, Inc. v. Pixelera, Inc., ICANN CaseNo. D2000-0109 (WIPO Apr. 6, 2000) (holding that "" is confusinglysimilar but not identical to trademarks "GATEWAY" and "GATEWAY.COM"); A.P.Møller v. Web Society, ICANN Case No. D2000-0135(WIPO Apr. 15, 2000) (holding that "" and ""are confusingly similar but not identical to trademarks "MAERSK" and "SEA-LAND");Durham Herald Co. v. Erwin S., ICANN Case No. FA94312 (NAF Apr. 14, 2000)(holding that "" is confusingly similar to trademark "The Herald-Sun,"without addressing issue of identicality); Creo Products Inc. v. Websitein Development, ICANN Case No. D2000-0160(WIPO May 1, 2000) (holding that "" is confusingly similar totrademark "CREOSCITEX," without addressing issue of identicality).

It is true that there have been UDRP decisions that reach a contrary result,including the decisions cited by the majority. In most of those cases, however,identicality has been at most an alternative basis for the panel's holding.The panels in five cases found both identicality and confusing similarity. SeeChannel Tunnel Group Ltd. v. Powell, ICANN CaseNo. D2000-0038 (WIPO Mar. 17, 2000); SeekAmerica Networks, Inc. v. Masood,ICANN Case No. D2000-0131 (WIPO Apr. 13, 2000);Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Kasinga, ICANN Case No. FA94203 (NAF Feb. 28,2000); Marriott International, Inc. v. Caf� au lait, ICANN Case No. FA93670(NAF Feb. 9, 2000); and NFL Properties, Inc. v. Rahe, ICANN CaseNo. D2000-0128 (WIPO Apr. 26, 2000). In Hewlett-Packard Co. v. CupcakeCity, ICANN Case No. FA93562 (NAF Mar. 31, 2000), the respondent's domainname was spelled differently than the complainant's trademark, and the panelfound it "phonetically identical to and confusingly similar to" the trademark.In Slep-Tone Entertainment Corp. v. Sound Choice Disk Jockeys, Inc.,ICANN Case No. FA93636 (NAF Mar. 13, 2000), the panel found the respondent'sdomain name "virtually identical" to the complainant's trademark based upona likelihood of confusion. In only two of the cases cited by the majority, InfoS,Inc. v. Ofer, ICANN Case No. D2000-0075 (WIPOApr. 4, 2000), and EFG Bank European Financial Group SA v. Jacob Foundation,ICANN Case No. D2000-0036 (WIPO Mar. 22, 2000),did the panels find identicality without also finding confusing similarity.

It seems obvious to me that there cannot be many different domain names thatare all identical to the same trademark. If Complainant's trademark is identicalto a domain name, that domain name is "c.com," or perhaps "" or "."But it is not simultaneously identical to all three of these, and it certainlycannot be identical to them and also to "," "," ",""," "," and numerous other permutations of these charactersand top-level domains.

Furthermore, I see no need to interpret the identicality requirement so liberally,since the UDRP applies to domain names that are confusingly similar as wellas those that are identical. As noted in Shirmax Retail Ltd. v. CES MarketingGroup Inc., ICANN Case No. AF-0104 (DeC Mar. 20, 2000), identicality merelyrelieves the trademark owner of the need to prove that confusion is likely.In particular, a domain name that merely adds or subtracts a hyphen from a trademarkis almost certain to be found confusingly similar to that trademark, but itclearly is not identical to the trademark.

The domain name and trademark at issue in this case are so similar that confusionseems almost inevitable. Yet Complainant has not even alleged that Respondent'sdomain name is confusingly similar to its trademark. Complainant's only allegationon the issue of identicality or confusing similarity is as follows: "Kimball'sdomain name, ',' is identical to Chernow's registered trademark CCOM."Of course, Complainant's trademark is "C-COM," not "CCOM," although the discrepancyappears more likely to be a typographical error than a deliberate attempt tomislead the panel. Nonetheless, the fact remains that Complainant has allegedidenticality but has not alleged confusing similarity.

Complainant may have elected not to pursue a claim of confusing similarityfor strategic reasons, or (perhaps more likely) due to oversight. Had Complainantchosen to raise the issue of confusing similarity, Respondent might well havebeen able to present a plausible counterargument. Identicality and confusingsimilarity are two distinct theories -- confusing similarity is not merely alesser included version of identicality, and alleging one of these does notautomatically allege the other. In any event, Complainant was represented inthis proceeding by capable legal counsel, and I see no need to supplement theallegations that Complainant actually made with others that Complainant chosenot to include, or to afford Complainant a second opportunity to allege whatfrankly is an obvious component of a prima facie case under the UDRP.

I would hold that Complainant failed to satisfy the first element of the UDRP,identicality or confusing similarity.

With regard to the second element, I agree with the majority's conclusion thatComplainant has met its burden of proving that Respondent has no rights or legitimateinterests in respect of the domain name at issue.

Finally, with regard to the third element, I would find that Complainant hasfailed to meet its burden of proving that Respondent has registered and is usingthe domain name in bad faith.

The majority finds bad faith registration and use based upon the totality ofcircumstances in this case, even though Respondent's conduct admittedly doesnot satisfy any of the illustrations set forth in Paragraph 4(b) of the Policy.This case bears so little resemblance to Telstra Corp. v. Nuclear Marshmallows,ICANN Case No. D2000-0003 (WIPO Feb. 18, 2000),cited by the majority to support this proposition, that a comparison of thetwo cases would be pointless. The only fact properly before this panel thatis even relevant to the question of bad faith registration (apart from Respondent'sstatement that he was unaware of Complainant's trademark when he registeredthe domain name) is that Respondent registered the domain name "" onAugust 14, 1997, nearly seven months after Complainant obtained its trademarkregistration for "C-COM." The majority notes that the domain name at issue hereresolves to a web site that suggests that the name may be for sale, and thatRespondent has failed to make a bona fide use of the domain name for almostthree years. However, neither of these facts is properly before the panel, andindeed neither fact has even been alleged by Complainant.

The existence of a prior trademark registration does not automatically rendera domain name registration in bad faith. In Finter Bank Zurich v. Olivieri,ICANN Case No. D2000-0091 (WIPO Mar. 23, 2000),cited by the majority, the respondent had offered two domain names for saleto the complainant only twelve days after he registered them. In Barney's,Inc. v. BNY Bulletin Board, ICANN Case No. D2000-0059(WIPO Apr. 2, 2000), the other decision cited by the majority on this point,the panel inferred bad faith registration of the respondent's domain name fromthe fame and presumably the distinctiveness of the complainant's mark, not merelyfrom the fact that the trademark registration predated the domain name registration.

To the extent that Mondich v. Brown, ICANN CaseNo. D2000-0004 (WIPO Feb. 16, 2000), holds that bad faith registration neednot be proved if a domain name owner fails to make "bona fide use" of the namefor two years, I believe the decision is contrary to the clear language of theUDRP, which requires that both registration and use be in bad faith. See, e.g.,World Wrestling Federation Entertainment, Inc. v. Bosman, ICANN CaseNo. D1999-0001 (WIPO Jan. 14, 2000) (inferring bad faith registration fromregistrant's attempt to sell domain name to complainant three days after registeringit). Passively holding or "parking" a domain name for an extended period maywell be relevant to bad faith use, but it does nothing to show that thename was originally registered in bad faith. In Beverages & More, Inc.v. Glenn Sobel Mgt., ICANN Case No. AF-0092 (DeC Mar. 9, 2000), the panelconsidered the respondent's "admissions, evasive tactics, gratuitously vituperativeand wholly unsupported allegations about the purported motives and actions ofopposing counsel, as well as the other facts and circumstances adduced by Claimant"in concluding that the respondent had registered its domain name in bad faith.Similarly, in Telstra Corp. v. Nuclear Marshmallows, the panel foundbad faith registration based in part upon the respondent's deliberate attemptsto conceal its identity and the fact that the respondent must have known atthe time that it registered the domain name that it could not possibly makelegitimate use of the name.

I do not believe there is a sufficient basis in this record to support a findingthat Respondent has registered or is using the domain name in bad faith.

Since I believe that Complainant has failed to meet the first and third requirementsset forth in the UDRP, I would deny its request for relief. I therefore respectfullydissent from the decision reached by my fellow panelists.

David E. Sorkin
Panelist

Dated: May 18, 2000

1. It is curious that, in the middle of panel deliberations,the Respondent (or his agent or assignee) changed the link to the web site,so that www. now resolves to a site offering computer products for salecopyrighted by . Such changes in conduct following the onset of proceedingscannot be allowed to affect their outcome. See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand v. FrankGully, d/b/a Advcomren, ICANN Case No. D2000-0021;Ventura Foods LLC v. Pathi, ICANN Case No. AF-0136.

2. For example, the first case cited by the dissent, Draw-Tite,Inc. v. Plattsburgh Spring Inc., ICANN Case No.D2000-0017 is cited for its holding "that �� is confusinglysimilar but not identical to trademarks �DRAW TITE� and �DRAW-TITE.�" Howeverit is instructive to read the Panel�s language on this point:
While the domain name DRAWTITE.COM is not identical to Complainant�s registeredtrademarks DRAW TITE and DRAW-TITE and Design, this Panel finds that the subjectdomain name is confusingly similar to the Complainant�s registered trademarks.Addition or deletion of a hyphen or space between the two words of the markmakes an insubstantial difference to the appearance, pronunciation and meaningof the terms.
Emphasis added.

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