WIPO Domain Name Decision D2004-0572 for bellsotuh.com, bellsou.net, bellsouht.net, bellsouthcolombia.com, bellsouthecuador.com, bellsouthguatemala.com, bellsouthperu.com, bellsouyh.net, belsout.net, wwbellsouth.net

WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center

ADMINISTRATIVE PANEL DECISION

Bellsouth Intellectual Property Corporation v. Alvaro Collazo

Case No. D2004-0572

1. The Parties

The Complainant is Bellsouth Intellectual Property Corporation of Wilmington, Delaware, United States of America (the “Complainant”), represented by Kilpatrick Stockton, LLP of Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America.

The Respondent is Alvaro Collazo of Tarariras, Colonia, Uruguay (the “Respondent”).

2. The Domain Names and Registrar

The disputed domain names are , , , , , , , , , , and are registered with iH Inc. d/b/a DotR (the “Registrar”).

3. Procedural History

This is a mandatory administrative proceeding submitted for decision in accordance with the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the�“Policy”), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the�“Rules”) adopted by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) on August�26,�1999, and the World Intellectual Property Organization, Arbitration and Mediation Center (the�“Center”) Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the�“Supplemental�Rules”).

By registering the disputed domain names with the Registrar, the Respondent agreed to the resolution of certain disputes pursuant to the Policy and Rules.

According to the information provided by the Center, the procedural history of this proceeding is as follows:

• The Complainant filed its Complaint with the Center on July 30, 2004.

• On August 2, 2004, the Center transmitted by email to the Registrar a request for registrar verification in connection with the disputed domain names.

• On August 3, 2004, the Registrar transmitted by email to the Center its verification response confirming that the Respondent is listed as the registrant of the disputed domain names and providing the contact details for the administrative, billing and technical contacts for each of the disputed domain names.

• The Center verified that the Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Policy, the Rules and the Supplemental Rules.

• In accordance with Rules paragraphs�2(a) and 4(a), on August 11, 2004, the Center formally notified the Respondent of the Complaint by both email and courier delivery of a hard copy of the Complaint. The notification was sent to the Respondent using 11 email addresses. After the Center sent the email notifications to the Respondent’s email addresses, the Center received messages indicating that the emails were rejected by each address as “undeliverable.” However, the couriered copy of the Complaint was apparently delivered to the Respondent without incident.

• In accordance with Rules paragraph�5(a), the due date for Response was August�31,�2004. The Respondent did not submit a Response within the prescribed time limit or at all, and on September 1, 2004, the Center delivered a Notification of Respondent Default to the Respondent by email. The email was apparently delivered to the Respondent without incident – no error message was received by the Center.

• The single Panel member, Bradley�J.�Freedman, agreed to act as Panelist in this proceeding and submitted the required Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, and on September 8, 2004, was duly appointed by the Center. The Center delivered a copy of the Notice of the Appointment of Administrative Panel to the Respondent by email. The email was apparently delivered to the Respondent without incident – no error message was received by the Center.

The Panel finds that it was properly constituted and appointed in accordance with the Rules and the Supplemental Rules.

Based upon the information provided by the Center, the Panel finds that all technical requirements for this proceeding have been met.

4. Factual Background

The following information is derived from the Complaint and supporting evidence submitted by the Complainant:

• The Complainant is the owner of the following trademarks: BELL, BELLSOUTH, BELLSOUTH.NET, BELLSOUTH PRODUCTS, BELLSOUTH#1 and 1-800-BELLSOUTH (collectively, the “BellSouth Marks”).

• The BellSouth Marks are registered in the United States of America (Registration Nos. 1,565,562; 2,718,321; 1,565,559; 2,244,189; 2,307,506; 2,341,098; 2,112,067; 2,244,864; 1,698,835; 2,234, 737 and 2,354,715) for use in association with a wide variety of telecommunications-related goods and services. Some of the BellSouth Marks are the subject of multiple registrations. The earliest registration dates for each of the BellSouth Marks are as follows:

BELL

November 14, 1989

BELLSOUTH

November 14, 1989

BELLSOUTH.NET

November 11, 1997

BELLSOUTH PRODUCTS

July 7, 1992

BELLSOUTH #1

March 23, 1999

1-800-BELLSOUTH

June 6, 2000

• In addition to the referenced trademark registrations in the United States of America, the BELLSOUTH trademark is registered in fifty other countries around the world, including Columbia, Peru, Guatemala and Ecuador, for use in association with telecommunications-related goods and services. The BELLSOUTH trademark is the subject of five registrations in Columbia, three registrations in Peru, six registrations in Guatemala; and eight registrations in Ecuador.

• The Complainant and its predecessors, affiliates, and licensees have adopted and used a number of marks incorporating the term “BELL” since the 1880’s.

• Prior to 1984, American Telephone & Telegraph Company operated the “Bell System,” consisting of 22 “Bell” operating telephone companies that provided local telecommunications services. Each Bell operating company used the BELL mark in connection with the sale and provision of various telephone and communications goods and services. As a result of the exclusive and extensive use by the Bell operating companies, the BELL mark acquired significant goodwill.

• On January 1, 1984, AT&T was divested of the Bell operating companies pursuant to orders of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in United States v. Western Electric Co., Inc., Civil Action No. 82-0192. AT&T assigned all of its right, title and interest in the BELL marks to seven regional “Bell” operating companies established in connection with the divestiture. Complainant’s affiliate, BellSouth Corporation, was one of those companies, and had exclusive rights to operate the “Bell” system in the southeastern part of the United States of America, subject only to the concurrent user rights of the other regional “Bell” operating companies to use the BELL marks in other regions of the United States of America.

• Since 1984, BellSouth Corporation has used the BellSouth Marks in connection with a wide variety of telecommunications-related goods and services.

• The Complainant is an affiliated BellSouth company that owns and manages BellSouth Corporation’s intellectual property assets, including the BellSouth Marks, which were assigned to the Complainant.

• Since 1990, the Complainant has spent substantial resources promoting and advertising the BELLSOUTH mark in Central and South America, including in newspaper advertisements and in the BellSouth Guia Export Directory (a popular resource in South and Central America).

• The Complainant and its affiliates have extensively promoted goods and services in connection with the BellSouth Marks on a global basis, through print, television and radio advertising, and online through websites using the domain names and .

• Since 1985, the Complainant and its affiliates have offered cellular and other telecommunications services and Internet access services in connection with the BellSouth Marks around the world. Currently, the Complainant and its affiliates serve more than 50 million customers in 13 countries worldwide. Accordingly, consumers throughout the world recognize the BellSouth Marks as indicating a product or service originating with a BellSouth company.

• The disputed domain names were registered on the following dates:

September 1, 2002

September 1, 2002

September 1, 2002

June 2, 2003

June 7, 2003

June 7, 2003

June 10, 2003

April 19, 2004

April 19, 2004

April 27, 2004

• Each of the disputed domain names is used for an English-language website that contains the following statement: “This domain is registered at DotR by a customer and parked temporarily. To contact the owner of the domain … please email: [Respondent’s email address].” Each of the websites provides a list of predetermined Internet search terms relating to telecommunications goods and services (for example, telephone services and long distance services) and general topics (travel, health and beauty, financial planning, business and finance and sports tickets) and an Internet search tool.

• On November 17, 2003, the Complainant sent a letter to the Respondent by airmail and email demanding that the Respondent cease using and transfer the disputed domain names to the Complainant. On November 18, 2003, the Respondent sent a brief email to the Complainant as follows:

“I am really sorry, I have not [sic] idea. The domain [sic] were free and that is why I registered them. I am willing to transfer the domains if you cover my out of pocket expenses of $70 each.”

The Respondent has not filed any response to the Complaint.

The Panel accessed the Respondent’s websites using the disputed domain names. When accessed, each website causes one or more pop-up advertisements to be displayed.

The Panel also accessed the website of the Registrar. That website indicates that domain names in the .com and .net domain may be registered for $15.99 (USD) for a single domain name, and substantially less if multiple domain names are registered at the same time.

Based upon searches of other decisions pursuant to the Policy, the Panel finds that the Respondent has been involved in other disputes regarding the registration of domain names that capitalize on variations and misspellings of well-known trademarks.1 In four of those proceedings, the panels held that the Respondent registered and used the impugned domain names in bad faith.

5. Parties’ Contentions

A Complainant

The Complainant contends as follows:

(i) The Complainant is the owner of the BellSouth Marks, and each of the disputed domain names is confusingly similar to the BellSouth Marks because it either combines the BELLSOUTH mark with a country name or is based upon a common misspelling or typographical error of the BELLSOUTH mark.

(ii) The Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain names because his registration and use of the disputed domain names is not bona fide and he has no legitimate rights in any of the disputed domain names.

(iii) The Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain names in bad faith because he is deliberately using the disputed domain names to redirect Internet users to commercial Internet search websites from which the Respondent derives a profit, he has a documented history of “typosquatting,” and in response to the Complainant’s demands to transfer the disputed domain names, the Respondent offered to sell the domain names to the Complainant for $70 each.

B Respondent

As previously indicated, the Respondent has not filed any response to the Complaint and has not answered the Complainant’s contentions in any manner other than the Respondent’s November 18, 2003 email mentioned above.

6. Discussion and Findings

The Policy is narrow in scope. It applies only to disputes involving alleged bad faith registration and use of domain names – conduct commonly known as “cybersquatting” or “cyberpiracy.” The Policy does not apply to other kinds of disputes between trademark owners and domain name registrants. The narrow scope of the Policy reflects its origins as a novel form of Internet dispute resolution designed to balance a wide range of perspectives regarding the regulation of Internet conduct.

The application of the Policy is limited to situations in which a complainant asserts and proves the following: (i) the registered domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; (ii) the registrant has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (iii) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith (Policy paragraph�4(a)).

The burden is on the Complainant to prove all three required elements set forth in Policy paragraph�4(a) in order to be entitled to relief under the Policy. It is not sufficient for the Complainant to make assertions without providing proof.

(a) The Respondent’s Default

Rules paragraph�10(a) requires that the Panel ensure that each party is given a fair opportunity to present its case. Rules paragraph 14 reads as follows:

Default

(a) In the event that a Party, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, does not comply with any of the time periods established by these Rules or the Panel, the Panel shall proceed to a decision on the complaint.

(b) If a Party, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, does not comply with any provision of, or requirement under, these Rules or any request from the Panel, the Panel shall draw such inferences therefrom as it considers appropriate.

The Respondent was given notice of this proceeding in accordance with the Rules. The Center discharged its responsibility under Rules paragraph�2(a) to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to the Respondent of the Complaint.

The Panel further notes that the Registrar’s Registration Agreement requires the Respondent to immediately notify the Registrar of any changes, errors and corrections to the Respondent’s contact information (including email address). The Respondent cannot hide behind the provision to the Registrar of either incorrect or out-of-date email addresses.

For those reasons, the Panel finds that the Respondent has been given a fair opportunity to answer the Complaint, and the Panel will proceed to a decision.

The Respondent’s default does not automatically result in a decision in favor of the Complainant. The Complainant must still prove each of the three elements required by Policy paragraph�4(a) for each of the disputed domain names. However, in accordance with Rules paragraph�14(b), the Panel may draw such inferences as are appropriate from the Respondent’s failure to reply to the Complainant’s assertions and evidence or to otherwise contest the Complaint. In the circumstances, the Panel’s decision is based upon the Complainant’s assertions and evidence and inferences drawn from the Respondent’s failure to reply.

(b) The Complainant’s Trademark Rights

The Complainant asserts that it is the owner of the BellSouth Marks, and that the BellSouth Marks are used by the Complainant and its affiliates and licensees in the United States and throughout the world, including in Central and South America, in connection with the provision and sale of telecommunications-related goods and services. The Complainant’s assertions in this regard are supported by documentary evidence, including evidence of the registrations of the BellSouth Marks in the United�States of America, Columbia, Peru, Guatemala and Ecuador. The Respondent has not filed any reply to the Complaint or contested the Complainant’s assertions. In the circumstances, the Panel finds that the Complainant has rights in the BellSouth Marks.

The Policy requires that the disputed domain names be “identical or confusingly similar” to the Complainant’s BellSouth Marks. Neither the Policy nor the Rules provide any guidance with respect to the test to be applied regarding the confusing similarity requirement of the Policy. Panels have applied different tests. Some panels have undertaken a literal comparison of the domain name and the trademark. Other panels have undertaken a source confusion analysis as required by conventional Anglo-American trademark law, which involves a consideration of all of the circumstances including the strength of the complainant’s mark, the sophistication of likely consumers, and the nature of the wares and services with which the domain name and conflicting mark are used.

A number of considerations support the view that the appropriate test for confusing similarity under the Policy is a literal comparison of the challenged domain name and conflicting mark:

(1) The language of Policy paragraph�4(a) should be interpreted in a purposive manner consistent with the Policy’s remedial nature and objective – to prevent the extortionate behavior known as “cybersquatting.”

(2) The language of Policy paragraph�4(a) does not invoke a likelihood of confusion test, as contrasted with Policy paragraph�4(b)(iv) which expressly refers to a “likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of [the registrant’s] website or location or of a product or service on [the registrant’s] website or location” as an indication of bad faith domain name registration and use.

(3) The Policy is international and, in the absence of express language, it is inappropriate to import into Policy paragraph�4(a) a test that may not exist under all national trademark laws.

(4) The procedure contemplated by the Policy is not well-suited to the kinds of factual issues presented by a conventional source confusion analysis. In particular, the Policy is intended to be a relatively quick and inexpensive process, panels must make factual determinations based upon written submissions and documentary evidence, complainants have no right of reply without the panel’s permission, and parties are often not represented by counsel.

For those reasons, the Panel considers the appropriate test for confusing similarity to be a literal comparison of the disputed domain name and the complainant’s mark.

The disputed domain names , , and each combine the Complainant’s BELLSOUTH mark with a country name. In light of the worldwide businesses operated by the Complainant and its affiliates, including in Central and South America, the addition of country names to the BELLSOUTH mark does not distinguish the resulting domain names from the BELLSOUTH mark or render the resulting domain names no longer confusingly similar to the BELLSOUTH mark. Other panels have held that the addition of modifiers to a trademark does not distinguish the resulting domain name from the trademark.2 Accordingly, the Panel finds that the disputed domain names , , and are confusingly similar to the Complainants’ BELLSOUTH mark.

The disputed domain names , , , , and are each variations of the Complainant’s BELLSOUTH and BELLSOUTH.NET marks reflecting misspellings or typographical errors. They are orally or visually similar to the Complainant’s BELLSOUTH and BELLSOUTH.NET marks. The practice of registering domain names based upon slight misspellings of well-known trademarks, known as “typosquatting,” exploits inadvertent mistakes by Internet users who fail to notice their error or distinguish between the intended domain name and the erroneous domain name actually used. Particularly where a registrant has engaged in a deliberate pattern of registering slight misspellings of well-known trademarks (as is the case here), the logical conclusion is that the registrant intended to take advantage of Internet users’ confusion.3 Accordingly, the Panel finds that the disputed domain names , , , , and are confusingly similar to one or both of the Complainant’s BELLSOUTH and BELLSOUTH.NET marks.

For those reasons, the Panel finds that each of the disputed domain names is confusingly similar to the Complainant’s BellSouth Marks. Accordingly, the Panel finds that the Complainant has satisfied the first element required by the Policy.

(c) The Respondent’s Rights and Legitimate Interests

The second element required by Policy paragraph�4(a) – the registrant has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name – requires the Complainant to prove a negative proposition, which can be particularly difficult.

A number of panels have held that the burden on a complainant regarding this element is necessarily light, because the nature of the registrant’s rights or interests, if any, in a domain name lies most directly within the registrant’s knowledge. Other panels have held that once the complainant makes a prima facie showing that the registrant does not have rights or legitimate interests in a domain name, the evidentiary burden shifts to the registrant to rebut the showing by providing evidence of its rights or interests in the domain name.

The Complainant contends that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain names because the Respondent is infringing the Complainant’s rights in the BellSouth Marks in bad faith and to confuse the public for financial gain. The Complainant has stated in the Complaint that Internet searches did not show any connection between the Respondent and “any of the terms used in the domain names at issue.” The Complainant did not provide any corroborating evidence of those Internet searches, or any evidence of trademark searches or other investigations to indicate that the Respondent does not have any interest in the terms “Bell South.” In some circumstances, the omission of such evidence might be fatal to a complaint under the Policy. Nevertheless, in the circumstances of this dispute – including the apparent lack of connection or relationship between the disputed domain names and the Respondent’s name; the nature and content of the websites for which the disputed domain names are used by the Respondent; the Respondent’s lack of rights granted by the Complainant; the Respondent’s email to the Complainant (in which the Respondent fails to assert any rights or interests in the disputed domain names); the disputed domain names themselves; and the Respondent’s pattern of similar bad faith domain name registrations – together with an adverse inference from the Respondent’s failure to reply to the Complaint or provide any credible justification for his registration and use of the disputed domain names, are sufficient to satisfy the Complainant’s evidentiary burden.

Even though the Respondent has not filed any reply to the Complaint and has not contested the Complainant’s assertions, it is incumbent upon the Panel to consider whether the Respondent’s use of the disputed domain names demonstrates rights or legitimate interests in the domain names. According to Policy paragraph 4(c), the following circumstances, if proved, demonstrate a registrant’s rights or legitimate interests in a domain name:

(i) the registrant used or demonstrably prepared to use the domain name or a corresponding name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services prior to notice of the dispute;

(ii) the registrant (as an individual, business, or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if it has not acquired trademark rights; or

(iii) the registrant is making a legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the complainant’s mark.

To satisfy the requirements of Policy paragraph�4(c)(i), the Respondent’s use of the disputed domain names must be in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services. In some circumstances, a website providing Internet search services and links to searches for specific goods and services might constitute a bona fide offering of goods or services. In the circumstances of this case, however, the Respondent’s use of the disputed domain names is not bona fide within the meaning of Policy paragraph�4(c)(i) because: (a) the disputed domain names are confusingly similar to the Complainant’s registered and well-known trademarks and domain names; (b)�there is no apparent connection or relationship between the disputed domain names and the Respondent’s name; (c)�there is no apparent connection or relationship between the disputed domain names and the Internet search services provided by the Respondent’s websites; and (d) the Respondent has engaged in a pattern of similar bad faith domain name registrations. In addition, the Panel draws an adverse inference from the Respondent’s failure to provide any credible explanation or rationale for his registration and use of the disputed domain names.

Policy paragraph�4(c)(ii) is not applicable. The Respondent does not contend, and there is no evidence, that the Respondent has been commonly known by the disputed domain names or that the disputed domain names are derived from one of Respondent’s trademarks or trade names.

Policy paragraph�4(c)(iii) is not applicable. The Respondent is using the disputed domain names for websites that provide Internet search services, links to searches for telecommunications goods and services, and pop-up advertisements –�which are not “noncommercial” uses.

For those reasons, the Panel finds that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names.

(d) Bad Faith Registration and Use

Policy paragraph�4(a)(iii) requires the Complainant to prove that the Respondent registered and has used the disputed domain names in bad faith. The language of Policy paragraph�4(b)(iii) is conjunctive, and requires that both bad faith registration and bad faith use be proved.

“Bad faith” within the meaning of the Policy is a term of art, and is not intended to apply to distasteful conduct that might constitute bad faith in the ordinary sense of the term. Policy paragraph�4(b) provides that the following circumstances are deemed to be evidence that a registrant has registered and used a domain name in bad faith:

(i) circumstances indicating that the registrant has registered or has acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant who is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of the complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of its documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or

(ii) the registrant has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that the registrant has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or

(iii) the registrant has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or

(iv) by using the domain name, the registrant has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to its website or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of its Website or location or of a product or service on its website or location.

The Policy expressly states that those circumstances are non-exclusive.

Policy paragraph�4(b)(iv) applies if the Complainant establishes that the Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in order to confuse and divert Internet traffic to its website for commercial gain. There is no direct evidence that the Respondent knew of the Complainant or its BellSouth Marks, or intended to use the disputed domain names to confuse and divert Internet users. Nevertheless, the Respondent’s knowledge and intention may be determined by common sense inferences from circumstantial evidence.

The only explanation offered by the Respondent may be found in his November�18,�2003 email, as follows:

“I am really sorry, I have not [sic] idea. The domain [sic] were free and that is why I registered them. I am willing to transfer the domains if you cover my out of pocket expenses of $70 each.”

The Respondent’s explanation for his registration of the disputed domain names is not credible for at least three reasons:

(i) The Respondent knew, as a result of his participation in other domain name disputes, that the registration of domain names comprised of well-known trademarks combined with country names and the use of those domain names for websites that advertise third party services and present pop-up advertisements are prohibited by the Policy.4

(ii) The broken English and poor grammar used by the Respondent in his email is wholly inconsistent with the Respondent’s well-written correspondence and submissions referenced in previous Policy decisions regarding other domain names registered by the Respondent.5

(iii) The payment for the domain names demanded by the Respondent is more than three times the highest domain name registration fee advertised on the Registrar’s website.

The Panel finds that the Respondent knew of the Complainant’s BellSouth Marks, and registered and is using the disputed domain names in order to confuse and divert Internet traffic to the Respondent’s websites, based upon the following circumstances: (a)�the Complainant’s BellSouth Marks are well-known and specific to the Complainant and its affiliates in connection with the sale and provision of telecommunications-related goods and services; (b) there is no apparent connection or relationship between the disputed domain names and the Respondent; (c)�there is no apparent connection or relationship between the disputed domain names and the Internet search services provided by the Respondent’s websites; (d)�there is no other apparent justification for the Respondent’s registration and use of the disputed domain names; (e)�the Respondent has not denied knowledge of the Complainant or its BellSouth Marks; (f)�the Respondent’s explanation for his registration of the domain names is not credible; and (g) the Respondent has registered other domain names that are identical or confusingly similar to well-known trademarks and popular website domain names in order to misdirect Internet users to mislabeled websites.

The Panel also finds that the Respondent’s websites result in commercial gain to the Respondent. It is well known that many websites generate substantial revenue by directing traffic to other websites and presenting pop-up advertisements. In the absence of any credible explanation or rationale by the Respondent, the Panel finds that the Respondent’s websites generate revenue for the Respondent in that manner.

Accordingly, the Panel finds that the Complainant has established that the Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain names in bad faith pursuant to Policy paragraph�4(b)(iv).

In the circumstances, the Panel need not consider whether Policy paragraphs�4(b)(i), (ii)�or (iii) are applicable, or whether there are other grounds for finding that the Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain names in bad faith.

7. Decision

The Complainant has established each of the three requirements set forth in Policy paragraph�4(a) for each of the disputed domain names – the disputed domain names are confusingly similar to the Complainant’s BellSouth Marks, the Respondent does not have any rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names, and the Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain names in bad faith.

For the reasons set forth in this proceeding, the Panel directs that the registration of each of the disputed domain names be transferred from the Respondent to the Complainant.

Bradley J. Freedman
Sole Panelist

Dated: September�22,�2004

1 See Soci�t� Air France v. Alvaro Collazo, WIPO Case No. D2003-0417 (July 22, 2003) (ordering the transfer of the domain name ); Expedia, Inc. v. Alvaro Collazo, WIPO Case No. D2003-0716 (October 30, 2003) (ordering the transfer of the domain name ); Hewlett-Packard Company v. Alvaro Collazo, National Arbitration Forum Case No. FA144628 (March 5, 2003) (ordering the transfer of the domain name ); and TV Globo Ltda. v. Alvaro Collazo, WIPO Case No. D2003-1013 (February 13, 2004) (ordering the transfer of the domain name ).

2 For example, see BellSouth Intellectual Property Corp. v. Melos aka Thomas Stergios, WIPO Case No. DTV2001-0013; Hewlett-Packard Company v. Alvaro Collazo, National Arbitration Forum Case No. FA144628 (March 5, 2003); BellSouth Intellectual Property Corporation v. AA-H, WIPO Case No. D2003-0732 (October 21, 2003); BellSouth Intellectual Property Corporation v. Craig Waltzer, WIPO Case No. D2000-1581 (January 23, 2001); and PRL USA Holdings, Inc. v. Alvaro Collazo, WIPO Case No. D2002-0108 (April 3, 2002).

3 AltaVista Company v. Geoffrey Fairbairn, WIPO Case No. D2000-0849 (October 13, 2000); Playboy Enterprises International Inc. v. SAND WebNames – For Sale, WIPO Case No. D2001-0094 (April�3,�2001); Altavista Company v. Grandtotal Finances Limited et. al., WIPO Case No. D2000-0848 (October 17, 2000); Yahoo! Inc. v. Eitan Zviely, et. al., WIPO Case No. D2000-0273 (June 14, 2000); V Inc. v. Knot Investments, WIPO Case No. D2001-0963 (September 12, 2001); BellSouth Intellectual Property Corporation v. Phayze Inc., WIPO Case No. D2003-0336 (June�26,�2003); BellSouth Intellectual Property Corporation v. Texas Internet, WIPO Case No. D2002-0559 (August 14, 2002); BellSouth Intellectual Property Corporation v. Andrey Michailov, WIPO Case No. D2003-0300 (June 13, 2003); BellSouth Intellectual Property Corporation v. Peter Carrington, Party Night Inc., WIPO Case No. D2003-0308 (June 3, 2003).

4 See Hewlett-Packard Company v. Alvaro Collazo, National Arbitration Forum Case No. FA144628 (March 5, 2003) and the other decisions referenced in note 1.

5 See Hewlett-Packard Company v. Alvaro Collazo, National Arbitration Forum Case No. FA144628 (March 5, 2003) and PRL USA Holdings, Inc. v. Alvaro Collazo, WIPO Case No. D2002-0108 (April�3,�2002).

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