The Complainant is Brink's Network, Inc. of Richmond, Virginia, United States of America, represented by Thompson Coburn LLP, United States of America.
The Respondent is M. Rodriquez / PDVSA Petroleo S.A. of Caracas, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. 2. The Domain Name and Registrar
The disputed domain name is registered with GoD, LLC (the "Registrar"). 3. Procedural History
The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the "Center") on July 13, 2016. On July 14, 2016, the Center transmitted by email to the Registrar a request for registrar verification in connection with the disputed domain name. On the same date the Registrar transmitted by email to the Center its verification response confirming that the Respondent is listed as the registrant and providing the contact details.
The Center verified that the Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy" or "UDRP"), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules"), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Supplemental Rules").
In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs 2 and 4, the Center formally notified the Respondent of the Complaint, and the proceedings commenced on July 20, 2016. In accordance with the Rules, paragraph 5, the due date for Response was August 9, 2016. The Respondent did not submit any response. Accordingly, the Center notified the Respondent's default on August 10, 2016.
The Center appointed Mladen Vukmir as the sole panelist in this matter on August 26, 2016. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. The Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph 7. 4. Factual Background
The Panel has determined the following non-contested facts:
(i) the disputed domain name was created on May 4, 2016.
(ii) the Respondent is the registrant of the disputed domain name.
(iii) as listed and evidenced in the Complaint and Annex G to the Complaint, the Complainant is the holder of a number of BRINKS word and stylized trademarks registered before the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO"), including:
Trademark
Trademark Office
Registration No.
Registration Date
International Class
BRINKS
(typed drawing )
USPTO
2,582,146
June 18, 2002
6
BRINKS
(design + words)
USPTO
3,548,670
December 23, 2008
9
BRINKS
(design + words)
USPTO
2,585,259
June 25, 2002
6
(iv) the Complainant's affiliate Brinks Global Services is the registrant of the domain name which incorporates the Complainant's BRINKS trademark and was first created on September 20, 2000 (Annex I to the Complaint);
(v) on July, 6, 2016, the disputed domain name was being used in connection with a website offering security logistics and consulting services which are identical/competing to those offered on the website affiliated with the Complainant. Moreover, according to the Panel's findings, the content of the Respondent's website affiliated with the Complainant (Annexes E, F and Q to the Complaint). 5. Parties' Contentions A. Complainant
The Complainant, essentially, asserts that:
(i) it is using one of the oldest commercial brands in the world, and that the Complainant is a global leader in security services.
(ii) the Complainant's BRINKS trademark was first used in 1859 in connection with armored car delivery services, therefore, through its extensive use and prominent advertising for more than 150 years, the BRINKS trademark has become famous and it represents an extremely valuable asset of the Complainant.
(iii) the Complainant in the United States of America alone owns fourteen (14) trademark registrations for the BRINKS marks, thirteen (13) of which are incontestable.
(iv) the Complainant has established common law trademark rights in its BRINKS GLOBAL SERVICES mark. To support this claim, the Complainant asserts that the website "www." was first registered on September 20, 2000 in connection with the Complainant's affiliated company Brink's Global Services, which specializes in the secure transportation and handling of valuable goods throughout the logistics value chain. Since then, the BRINKS GLOBAL SERVICES mark has been continuously used in connection with Complainant's business and through the "www." website. The Complainant also asserts that a Google search for the phrase "Brink's global services" provides results only for the Complainant's business, and in connection to this cites the decision in S.N.C. Jesta Fountainebleau v. Po Ser,WIPO Case No. D2009-1394 and findings of the panel in that case that the complainant has established common law rights in the unregistered mark because Google search for the mark provided results only for complainant's business.
(v) the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the registered BRINKS trademarks of the Complainant and/or its common law trademark BRINKS GLOBAL SERVICES. In this regard, the Complainant claims that:
- the disputed domain name is identical in substance to the BRINKS GLOBAL SERVICES unregistered mark, thus, there is clearly confusing similarity;
- Even if the similarity analysis of the disputed domain would be limited in relation to the BRINKS registered trademarks of the Complainant, the disputed domain name is still confusingly similar, because it uses the entire mark and does nothing to distinguish itself from that mark. The addition of the descriptive phrase "global services" does not negate confusing similarity with a trademark. Thus, the Respondent's use of the Complainant's BRINKS trademark in connection with the descriptive phrase is likely to further confuse consumers. Moreover, the Respondent's website directly copies the website at "www.", which is controlled by the Complainant, and in addition, the Respondent claims to offer the same services as the Complainant.
(vi) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name, and in support of such assertion contends that:
- the disputed domain name was not registered until May 4, 2016, more than 150 years after the Complainant first used its BRINKS trademark in connection with armored transport services, over twenty (20) years since the Complainant registered its domain name, and more than fifteen years after the Complainant began using the BRINKS GLOBAL SERVICES mark and registered the accompanying domain name;
- the Respondent is not a licensee of the Complainant and has never been affiliated with, connected to, or sponsored by the Complainant. Thus, the Respondent has no actual or contemplated bona fide or legitimate use of the disputed domain name;
- the Respondent is incapable of presenting any evidence to support the claim that it has been commonly known by the disputed domain name. Additionally, the Complainant's search of the current USPTO records, as well as a search for active Venezuelan trademark records revealed no applications or registrations for marks incorporating the term "brinks" in the name of the Respondent or the Respondent's organization.
- the Complainant conducted a research into the name and address appearing on the WhoIs records for the disputed domain name and it appears that the organization does not exist;
- a Google search for "PDVSA Petroleo, S.A." does not direct the user to information regarding the Respondent, or his purported company, but instead directs the user to information regarding the Venezuelan state-owned oil and natural gas company which operates as a subsidiary of Petroleos de Venezuela S.A., focusing on the exploration, extractions, and refinery of crude oil and hydrocarbons – far removed from the services listed on the website used in connection with the disputed domain name;
- the Respondent changed the accurate Venezuelan postal code of 1060 to 33147 which is a code incompatible with the Caracas postal code system, but corresponding to a United States postal code from an area of Miami, Florida. According to the Complainant, earlier panels have held that because the respondent's contact information appears to be false, he could not be "commonly known" by the domain name, and in this respect invokes panel decision in Eli Lilly and Company v. Brian Turner,WIPO Case No. D2012-1349;
- a Google search for the phrase "Brinks global services" directs the user to the Complainant's website "www.". On the contrary, the Respondent's website fails to appear within the first five (5) pages of the search result list. In this regard, the Complainant states that the lack of such results has been used by prior UDRP panels to confirm that the respondent is not and has never been commonly known by the disputed domain name;
- the Respondent's lack of fair use is indicated by the fact that the phrase "brink's global services" is not used for its descriptive purpose but instead to deceptively divert unwary customers and potential customers of the Complainant to the Respondent's website. In that respect, the Complainant cites panel decisions in mVisible Tecnologies, Inc. v. Navigation Catalyst Systems, Inc.,WIPO Case No. D2007-1141, and Swarovski Asktiengesellschaft v. Joseph J. Gatlin,WIPO Case No. D2012-0901.
(vii) the Respondent has registered and used the disputed domain name in bad faith, and in this regard the Complainant claims that:
- the Respondent's registration of a domain name that uses a trademark as the dominant portion, with knowledge of a third party's rights in the mark and no license to use such mark, as well as the Respondent's copying of the legitimate Brink's Global Services website shows that the Respondent was clearly aware of the Complainant's rights in the BRINKS trademarks at the time the disputed domain name was registered;
- given the fame of the BRINKS marks in the security and logistics industry it is inconceivable that the Respondent registered the disputed domain name in good faith and without knowledge of the Complainant's exclusive rights in such marks;
- the Respondent included the Complainant's copyright notice as well as the complete history of the Complainant's organization and the development of the BRINKS marks on its own website, which is, according to earlier UDRP panels' decisions, a clear indication that the Respondent intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to his own website, by creating a likelihood of confusion. In this regard, the Complainant invokes panel decision in Syngenta Participations AG v. Maksim Ivanov, WIPO Case No. D2016-0310;
- the Respondent appears to be using the disputed domain name to defraud people and attempts to pass itself off as Brinks Global Services, a trusted entity. The Respondent also attempted to collect sensitive information (such as bank account wire transfer information) from prospective or real customers of Brinks Global Services, using the disputed domain name and an email "[…]@" which has been considered to be a phishing practice, i.e.,acquiring sensitive personal or company information, usually financial, by masquerading as a trustworthy entity, and panels in earlier UDRP cases have held that "phishing" practices will not be tolerated (e.g., The Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc v. kenneth ezenwa,WIPO Case No. D2012-1721). B. Respondent
The Respondent did not reply to the Complainant's contentions. 6. Discussion and Findings
The Panel now proceeds to consider this matter on the merits in light of the Complaint, the lack of the Response, the Policy, the Rules, the Supplemental Rules and other applicable legal authority pursuant to paragraph 15(a) of the Rules.
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy provides that Complainant must prove, with respect to the disputed domain name, each of the following:
(i) the domain name is confusingly similar to a trademark in which the Complainant has rights; and
(ii) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(iii) the disputed domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith. A. Identical or Confusingly Similar
Primarily, the Panel wishes to emphasise that, under general consensus view, the mere fact of ownership of a registered trademark by the complainant is generally sufficient to satisfy the threshold requirement of having trademark rights. The location of the trademark, its date of registration (or first use), and the goods and/or services for which it is registered, are all irrelevant for the purpose of finding rights in a trademark under the first element of the UDRP (see paragraph 1.1 of the WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDPR Questions, Second Edition ("WIPO Overview 2.0")).
The Complainant has presented sufficient evidence to establish that it is the owner of a number of BRINKS word and stylised trademarks, including afore-listed BRINKS trademarks registered before the USPTO. Furthermore, in this Panel's view, the Complainant has submitted adequate evidence to show that the Complainant's BRINKS trademark has been extensively used in relation to various security services, and therefore may be considered as well-known within a relevant market. At least one panel in earlier UDRP case has considered the Complainant's BRINKS trademark to be well-known (see Brink's Networks, Inc. v Jenny Ho, ,WIPO Case No. D2009-0530).
Moreover, it is well established that the threshold test for confusing similarity under the UDRP involves a comparison between the trademark and the disputed domain name. In order to satisfy this test, the relevant trademark would generally need to be recognisable as such within the disputed domain name, with the addition of common, dictionary, generic, descriptive, geographical or negative terms typically being disregarded as insufficient to prevent threshold confusing similarity. Application of the confusing similarity test under the UDRP typically involves a straightforward visual or aural comparison of the trademark with the alphanumeric string in the domain name (see paragraphs 1.2 and 1.9 of the WIPO Overview 2.0).
After performing the straightforward visual and aural comparison, it is evident to this Panel that the disputed domain name incorporates the Complainant's BRINKS trademark in its entirety, and that the same trademark is clearly recognisable as such within the disputed domain name.
The Panel must further answer the question, whether adding the words "global" and "services" to the Complainant's BRINKS trademark in the disputed domain name is sufficient to prevent the confusing similarity of the disputed domain name with the Complainant's BRINKS trademark.
With respect to the above, this Panel upholds the Complainant's contention that the addition of the words "global" and "services" is insufficient to prevent a finding of confusing similarity. Namely, the words "global" and "services" are clearly generic and/or descriptive and as such are not sufficient to overcome the confusing similarity with respect to the Complainant's BRINKS trademark which remains the dominant and only distinctive element in the disputed domain name.
Panels in earlier UDRP cases have found confusing similarity in a number of earlier cases based on the circumstances involving domain names comprised of a well-known trademark and a descriptive/generic term. Confusing similarity was found in those instances because the term added did nothing to overcome the strong mental association created by the trademark itself. See particularly, Ansell Healthcare Products Inc. v. Australian Therapeutics Supplies Pty, Ltd.,WIPO Case No. D2001-0110; Hachette Filipacchi Presse v. Vanilla Limited/Vanilla Inc/Domain Finance Ltd.,WIPO Case No. D2005-0587; eBay Inc. v. ebayMoving / Izik Apo,WIPO Case No. D2006-1307; Playboy Enterprises International, Inc. v. Zeynel Demirtas,WIPO Case No. D2007-0768; Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Wei-Chun Hsia,WIPO Case No. D2008-0923; BHP Billiton Innovation Pty Ltd, BMA Alliance Coal Operations Pty Ltd v. Cameron Jackson,WIPO Case No. D2008-1338; TPI Holdings, Inc. v. Carmen Armengol,WIPO Case No. D2009-0361; Nintendo of America Inc. v. Fernando Sascha Gutierrez,WIPO Case No. D2009-0434.
In relation to the applicable generic Top-Level Domain ("gTLD") ".com" suffix in the disputed domain name, it is a consensus view that it is usually disregarded under the confusing similarity test (see paragraph 1.2 of the WIPO Overview 2.0).
For all the foregoing reasons, the Panel finds that the Complainant has satisfied the requirement set forth in paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy, i.e., it has proven that the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to its BRINKS trademark.
For that reason, in this Panel's view it is not necessary for the Panel to decide whether the Complainant has common law rights in BRINKS GLOBAL SERVICES unregistered mark. Panels in prior UDRP cases have found that it is not necessary to decide on existence of common law rights in cases where the complainant has shown existence of rights in a registered trademark (e.g., D, Inc. v. Nurhul Chee / Robert Murry,WIPO Case No. D2008-0230). B. Rights or Legitimate Interests
Paragraph 4(c) of the Policy sets out a number of circumstances which, without limitation, may be effective for a respondent to demonstrate that it has rights to, or legitimate interests in, a disputed domain name, for the purposes of paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the Policy. Those circumstances are:
"(i) Before any notice to [the respondent] of the dispute, use by [the respondent] of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the disputed domain name or a name corresponding to the disputed domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services; or
(ii) Where [the respondent] (as an individual, business, or other organisation) [has] been commonly known by the disputed domain name, even if [the respondent has] acquired no trade mark or service mark rights; or
(iii) Where [the respondent is] making a legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the disputed domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trade mark or service mark at issue. "
The consensus view of UDRP panels on the onus of proof under paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the Policy, is summarised in paragraph 2.1 of the WIPO Overview 2.0, whereby: "[…] a complainant is required to make out a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests. Once such prima facie case is made, the burden of production shifts to the respondent to come forward with appropriate allegations or evidence demonstrating rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. If the respondent fails to come forward with such appropriate allegations or evidence, a complainant is generally deemed to have satisfied paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the UDRP. […]".
In the subject matter case, the Respondent is in default, hence, the Panel has evaluated the arguments and evidence submitted by the Complainant and finds that the the Complainant has made a prima facie case that the Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests to the disputed domain name.
Namely, the Complainant has established that it is the owner of a number of BRINKS trademarks, as well as that it has used the same trademarks on the market and the Internet, either directly or through its affiliates, including the website located at "www.".
The Panel observes that there is neither any relation, disclosed to the Panel nor otherwise apparent from the records, between the Respondent and the Complainant, nor does it arise that the Complainant has ever licensed or otherwise permitted the Respondent to use its BRINKS trademark, or to apply for or use any domain name incorporating the same trademarks.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the Respondent has been commonly known by the disputed domain name or has been using the disputed domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the disputed domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers.
Namely, from the evidence presented by the Complainant, it arises that a search of the current USPTO records and Venezuelan trademark office records revealed no applications or registrations for marks incorporating the term "brinks" in the name of the Respondent or his organisation. Furthermore, it appears from the Complainant's research into the name and address on the disputed domain name's WhoIs records that the Respondent's organisation does not exist. On the other hand, a Google search for "PDVSA Petroleo, S.A." directs the user to information regarding the Venezuelan state-owned oil and natural gas company. Finally, the Respondent's website fails to appear even within first five (5) pages of the Google search result list. Therefore, this Panel holds that the Complainant has made a prima facie case that the Respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name.
Furthermore, from the evidence submitted by the Complainant, it arises that the disputed domain name resolves to a website which reproduces the content of the website available at "www." (which is being used in connection to the Complainant's affiliate Brinks Global Services), and purportedly offers the identical security, logistics and consulting services as offered on the latter website. Having in mind the renown of the Complainant and its BRINKS trademarks, in this Panel's opinion it can be safely concluded that the Respondent deliberately chose to include the Complainant's trademark in the disputed domain name, in order to trade on the renown of the Complainant's trademarks and to achieve commercial gain by misleadingly diverting consumers. This conclusion of the Panel, is further supported by the fact (as evidenced by the Complainant), that the Respondent used the disputed domain name to approach the customers of the Complainant's affiliate Brinks Global Services by passing-off as Brinks Global Services and requesting the customers to provide bank-swift and other personal data. Such use cannot be considered as a legitimate noncommercial or fair use nor does it constitute a bona fide offering of goods and services. This is in line with views taken by panels in earlier UDRP cases – See, e.g., America Online, Inc. v. Xianfeng Fu,WIPO Case No. D2000-1374; Canadian Tire Corporation, Limited v. Texas International Property Associates NA NA,WIPO Case No. D2007-1407; Get Away Today.Com Inc. v. Warren Gilbert,WIPO Case No. DCO2010-0021; O, Inc. v. Metro Media,WIPO Case No. DME2009-0001and The Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc v. Domain eRegistration,WIPO Case No. D2012-2362.
Accordingly, the Panel finds that the requirements set forth in paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the Policy have been fulfilled by the Complainant's making the prima facie case that the Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name and by the Respondent's failing to produce any arguments or evidence to the contrary. C. Registered and Used in Bad Faith
For the purpose of paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy, the following circumstances, in particular, but without limitation, if found by the Panel to be present, shall be evidence of the registration and use of the disputed domain name in bad faith:
(i) circumstances indicating that the holder has registered or has acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant who is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the holder's documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) the holder has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that the holder has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or
(iii) the holder has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, the holder has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the holder's website or other online location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the holder's website or location or of a product or service on the holder's website or location.
Owing to a lack of the Response or any other evidence to the contrary, the Panel accepts the Complainant's arguments substantiated by evidence that at the time of registration of the disputed domain name, the Respondent knew or should have known about the Complainant and its trademarks because of a number of BRINKS trademark registrations and extensive use of the same trademarks on the market and Internet by the Complainant, either directly, or through its affiliates, including the Brinks Global Services. In addition, the fact that the Respondent chose to reproduce the name of one of the Complainant's affiliates (Brinks Global Services) within the disputed domain name, as well as to reproduce the content of the website available at "www." which is being used in connection by said affiliate of the Complainant, further demonstrates that the Respondent must have been aware of the Complainant, its trademarks and business at the time of registration of the disputed domain name. Especially since the Respondent has also reproduced on its website the complete history of the Complainant, its organisation and the history of the BRINKS trademark.
Panels in earlier UDRP cases have found bad faith registration based in part on proof that the respondent "knew or should have known" about the existence of the complainant's trademark and in particular in cases that involved trademarks widely used on the Internet (see paragraph 3.4 of the WIPO Overview 2.0).
Furthermore, and as already discussed above, the disputed domain name resolves to a website which reproduces the content of the website available at "www." (which is being used in connection to the Complainant's affiliate Brinks Global Services), and purportedly offers the identical security, logistics and consulting services as offered on the latter website. What is more, from the evidence submitted by the Complainant, it arises that the Respondent used the disputed domain name in email addresses used to send to approach the customers of the Complainant's affiliate Brinks Global Services by passing off as Brinks Global Services and requesting the customers to provide bank-swift and other personal data.
Therefore, from such comportment of the Respondent, it is obvious to this Panel that by using the disputed domain name, the Respondent has intentionally attempted to attract Internet users to the website to which the disputed domain name resolves, for commercial gain by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant's trademark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the same website, as well as to interfere/disrupt the business of the Complainant and/or its affiliates. The presence of the Complainant's BRINKS trademark as well as the reproduction of the name of the Complainant's affiliate in the disputed domain name certainly bears weight as a signal to the potential costumers and the disputed domain name clearly benefits from the same.
For that reason, the Panel finds the provision of paragraph 4(b)(iv) of the Policy to be applicable in this case, since that the Respondent's registration and use of the disputed domain name interferes with the Complainant's business and Internet users might be misled about the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the website to which the disputed domain name is redirected. See, e.g., the following decisions issued by panels in some of earlier UDRP proceedings:
(i) Sanofi v. PrivacyP / ICS Inc., WIPO Case No. D2012-1293: "previous UDRP decisions have found bad faith at the time of registration to exist where a domain name is so obviously connected with such a well-known trademark that its very use by someone with no connection with the trademark suggests opportunistic bad faith (LEGO Juris A/S v. Reiner Stotte,WIPO Case No. D2010-0494; and Sanofi-aventis v. Nevis Domains LLC,WIPO Case No. D2006-0303)";
(ii) Syngenta Participations AG v. Maksim Ivanov, supra: "Copying the content of Complainant's official US website to set up his own website under the disputed domain name , which is confusingly similar to Complainant's SYNGENTA trademark and domain name , without Complainant's permission to do so, is a clear indication that Respondent intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to his own website, by creating a likelihood of confusion with Complainant's SYNGENTA trademark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of Respondent's website. Such circumstances shall be evidence of registration and use of the disputed domain name in bad faith within the meaning of paragraph 4(b)(iv) of the Policy";
(iii) PepsiCo, Inc. v Ali Khan, WIPO Case No. D2004-0292: "The fact that the Respondent elected to register a domain name substantially comprising the 'PEPSI' trademark indicates that it was a deliberate act to mislead consumers into believing there was a connection with the Complainant";
(iv) The Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc v. Domain eRegistration, supra: "As to bad faith use, the Panel finds that the disputed domain name was used by the Respondent in an intentional attempt to benefit from the goodwill of the Complainant's trademark for financial gain by creating a website that included the Complainant's logo and pictures of credit cards issued by the Complainant with the likely purpose of collecting the data of people reaching such website (so-called 'phishing', cf. Hemmings Motor News Inc. v. Giacomo Pegorari,WIPO Case No. D2012-1807; Confédération Nationale du Crédit Mutuel v. Nicolas Pete,WIPO Case No. DBZ2009-0001; Banca Intesa S.p.A. v. Moshe Tal,WIPO Case No. D2006-0228; Grupo Financiero Inbursa, S.A. de C.V. v. inbuirsa,WIPO Case No. D2006-0614; Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited v. Bashar Ltd,WIPO Case No. D2007-0031; Confédération Nationale du Crédit Mutuel and Crédit Industriel et Commercial S.A. v. Trabaja Jayam, Zeb Fi Tarmatek,WIPO Case No. DLC2009-0002)".
Given the above, the Panel determines that the disputed domain name has been registered and is being used bad faith and that the Complainant fulfilled the third element under paragraph 4(a) of the Policy. 7. Decision
For the foregoing reasons, in accordance with paragraphs 4(i) of the Policy and 15 of the Rules, the Panel orders that the disputed domain name be transferred to the Complainant.
Mladen Vukmir
Sole Panelist
Date: September 9, 2016
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