The Complainant is Caviar Petrossian of Paris, France represented by Areopage, France.
The Respondent is Domains By Proxy, LLC of Scottsdale, Arizona, United States of America / I S Internet Consulting Services Inc. of Cayman Islands, Overseas Territory of The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (“United Kingdom”). 2. The Domain Name and Registrar
The disputed domain name is registered with GoD, LLC (the “Registrar”). 3. Procedural History
The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the “Center”) on January 31, 2018. On February 1, 2018, the Center transmitted by email to the Registrar a request for registrar verification in connection with the disputed domain name. On February 2, 2018, the Registrar transmitted by email to the Center its verification response disclosing registrant and contact information for the disputed domain name which differed from the named Respondent and contact information in the Complaint. The Center sent an email communication to the Complainant on February 5, 2018 providing the registrant and contact information disclosed by the Registrar, and inviting the Complainant to submit an amendment to the Complaint. The Complainant filed an amended Complaint on February 7, 2018.
The Center verified that the Complaint together with the amended Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy” or “UDRP”), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Supplemental Rules”).
In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs 2 and 4, the Center formally notified the Respondent of the Complaint, and the proceedings commenced on February 8, 2018. In accordance with the Rules, paragraph 5, the due date for Response was February 28, 2018. The Respondent did not submit any response. Accordingly, the Center notified the Respondent’s default on March 1, 2018.
The Center appointed Benoit Van Asbroeck as the sole panelist in this matter on March 7, 2018. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. The Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph 7. 4. Factual Background
The Complainant, Caviar Petrossian, was incorporated on November 3, 1965. The original founders of the business were Melkoum and Mouchegh Petrossian, two Armenian brothers, who started importing caviar in France in 1920. In doing so, they founded the company that today is the premier buyer and importer of caviar worldwide. The Complainant received the “Entreprise du Patrimoine Vivant” label for its expertise in developing caviar. Armen Petrossian, the son of Mouchegh Petrossian, is still running the family business, as CEO of Caviar Petrossian and CEO of the American subsidiary, Petrossian Inc.
The Complainant is the owner of the trademark PETROSSIAN across many countries and, possesses a numerous trademark registrations, some of dating back to 1976. These registrations include:
- French trademark with registration No. 1358658 registered on June 11, 1986 in International Classes 8, 14, 18, 21, 22, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 40, 42, 43, 44 and 45;
- European Union trademark with registration No. 015876667 registered on February 1, 2017 in International Classes 3, 8, 14, 18, 21, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 39, 43 and 44;
- International trademark with registration No. 425498 registered on October 22, 1976 in International Classes 18, 22, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 and 42, designating Algeria, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Benelux, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Spain, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
- United Kingdom trademark with registration No. 1065452 registered on June 25, 1976 in International Class 29;
- Australian trademark with registration No. 1277416 registered on December 15, 2008 in International Classes 29, 30 and 33;
- New Zealand trademark with registration No. 800507 registered on June 18, 2009 in International Classes 29, 30 and 33;
- Indian trademark with registration No. 2724575 registered on April 24, 2014 in International Classes 29, 30, 33 and 43;
- Hong Kong trademark with registration No. 19810588 registered on March 30, 1981 in International Class 29;
- Argentinean trademark with registration No. 2.730.531 registered on March 29, 2015 in International Class 29;
- Brazilian trademark with registration No. 829622284 registered on August 10, 2010 in International Class 29;
The Complainant also has rights in the following trademark registrations:
- United States trademark with registration No. 1191779 registered on March 9, 1982 in International Class 29;
- Canadian trademark with registration No. TMA227545 registered on May 5, 1978 in International Classes 29 and 30;
The Complainant asserts that as a result of its long-lasting and intensive use, the trademark PETROSSIAN has acquired a great reputation and is widely known throughout the world.
Additionally, the Complainant is also the registrant of numerous domain names including PETROSSIAN such as , , , etc. Its American subsidiary, Petrossian Inc., is as well owner of the following domain names: and . The activities of the Petrossian group are promoted under the domain names and .
The disputed domain name was registered on December 11, 2017, well after the Complainant secured rights to the trademarks. The disputed domain name resolves to a pay-per-click website displaying links to the competitors of the Complainant. 5. Parties’ Contentions A. Complainant
The Complainant contends that each of the three elements specified in paragraph 4(a) of the Policy are satisfied in the present case, as follows:
(a) The disputed domain name is confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights.
The Complainant contends that the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to the registered trademarks in which the Complainant has rights. By reproducing eight letters on ten letters placed in the same order, the disputed domain name strongly imitates its trademark and company name, PETROSSIAN. The mere deletion of the letter “R” and of the second “S” only corresponds to an obvious misspelling of the PETROSSIAN trademark. According to the Complainant, this simple deletion of the letters does not significantly affect the appearance or pronunciation of the disputed domain name which is confusingly similar to the Complainant’s trademark.
(b) The Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name.
The Complainant asserts that it has rights in PETROSSIAN and that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name.
Prior the adoption and use of by the Complainant of the trademark PETROSSIAN, the Respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name. There is further no indication of any registration of the “petosian” trademark. Additionally, the Complainant has never authorized, licensed or any way permitted the Respondent to register and use the disputed domain name. Nor does the Respondent have an affiliation, association, sponsorship or connection with the Complainant.
(c) The disputed domain name was registered and is being used in bad faith.
The Complainant asserts that, at the time of registration of the disputed domain name, given the well-known character and reputation of the PETROSSIAN trademark, the Respondent knew the existence of the Complainant’s trademark and was therefore in bad faith when registering the disputed domain name (see Parfums Christian Dior v. Javier Garcia Quintas and C,WIPO Case No. D2000-0226 and Sony Kabushiki (also trading as Sony Corporation) v. Inja, Kil,WIPO Case No. D2000-1409).
Therefore, the Complainant is convinced that the Respondent has registered the disputed domain name seeking to take advantage of the confusion with the well-known PETROSSIAN trademark. The disputed domain name points towards a parking website on which there are hyperlinks related to caviar and fine food commercialized by direct competitors of the Complainant. In doing so, the Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name intentionally attracts and redirects Internet users looking for the Complainant to a competitive website for the Respondent’s commercial gain as these pay-per clicks are likely to generate revenues.
Additionally, the Complainant contends that bad faith can also be deducted from the fact that the disputed domain name is for sale and is only available at auctions. According to the Complainant, this is an indication that the Respondent registered the disputed domain name in the aim to negotiate its sale to generate profits.
Relying on Confédération Nationale du Crédit Mutuel v. Hardsoft, Inc. / Hilary Kneber,WIPO Case No. D2010-1352, the Complainant further argues that bad faith can be inferred from the fact that the disputed domain name was anonymously registered.
The Complainant moreover asserts that typosquatting itself may constitute bad faith (see B Inc. v. Cost Net Domain Manager,WIPO Case No. D2001-0970).
In sum, the Complainant submits there is no plausible good faith reason or logic for the Respondent to have registered the disputed domain name and can therefore only be taken as intending to cause confusion among Internet users as to the source of the disputed domain name for commercial gain. B. Respondent
The Respondent did not reply to the Complainant’s contentions. 6. Discussion and Findings A. Identical or Confusingly Similar
The Complainant is required to establish the two following elements: (1) that it has trademark rights, and, if so, (2) that the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to its trademark(s).
First of all, this Panel finds that the Complainant has clearly evidenced that it has registered trademark rights to PETROSSIAN.
Secondly, the disputed domain name differs from the Complainant’s trademark PETROSSIAN merely by the deletion of the letter “r” and the second “s”. In the view of the Panel, the deletion of two simple letters does not influence the similar overall impression of the disputed domain name and the trademark as there are only minor differences in the appearance and pronunciation. This conduct is commonly referred to as “typosquatting” and creates virtually identical and/or confusingly similar domain names to the trademarks of complainants (see E, Inc. v. Yingkun Guo, dba This domain name is 4 sale,WIPO Case No. D2006-0694). Ample authority exists to support that “essential” or “virtual” identity is sufficient for the purpose of satisfying the second element required above (see Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. John Zuccarini, Cupcake City and Cupcake Patrol,WIPO Case No. D2001-0489; United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Mr. John Zuccarini,WIPO Case No. D2000-1449).
On the basis of the foregoing findings, and according to paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy, this Panel finds and concludes that the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to the Complainant’s PETROSSSIAN trademarks. B. Rights or Legitimate Interests
Paragraph 4(c) of the Policy lists circumstances, in particular but without limitation, which, if found by the Panel to be proved, demonstrate the Respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name for the purposes of paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the Policy. Paragraph 4(c) of the Policy reads:
“When you receive a complaint, you should refer to paragraph 5 of the Rules of Procedure in determining how your response should be prepared. Any of the following circumstances, in particular but without limitation, if found by the Panel to be proved based on its evaluation of all evidence presented, shall demonstrate your rights or legitimate interests to the domain name for purposes of paragraph 4(a)(ii):
(i) before any notice to you of the dispute, your use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services; or
(ii) you (as an individual, business, or other organization) have been commonly known by the domain name, even if you have acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) you are making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.”
This Panel finds that there is no evidence that the Respondent has any rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.
It is a well-established view of the UDRP panels, with which this Panel agrees, that a prima facie case advanced by the complainant is generally sufficient for the complainant to satisfy the requirements under paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the Policy, provided that the respondent does not submit any evidence to the contrary (AGUAS DE CABREIROA, S.A.U. v. Hello Domain,WIPO Case No. D2014-2087; Spigen Korea Co., Ltd., Spigen Inc. v. Domain Admin, Whois Privacy Corp.,WIPO Case No. D2016-0145; HubSpot, Inc. v. WhoisGuard Protected, WhoisGuard, Inc. / Steve Johnson,WIPO Case No. D2016-1338).
In the present case, taking into consideration the default of the Respondent, this Panel finds that the Complainant has submitted a sufficient prima facie case that the Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name, in view of the circumstances of this case, including the following factors:
- there is no evidence that the Respondent has been authorized or licensed to use the disputed domain name by the Complainant;
- there is no evidence that the Respondent has commonly been known by the disputed domain name.
For all the foregoing reasons, this Panel finds that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name. C. Registered and Used in Bad Faith
Paragraph 4(b) of the Policy identifies, in particular but without limitation, four circumstances which, if found by this Panel to be present, shall be evidence of the registration and use of a domain name in bad faith. Paragraph 4(b) of the Policy reads:
“For the purposes of paragraph 4(a)(iii), the following circumstances, in particular but without limitation, if found by the Panel to be present, shall be evidence of the registration and use of a domain name in bad faith:
(i) circumstances indicating that you have registered or you have acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant who is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of your documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) you have registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that you have engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or
(iii) you have registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, you have intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to your website or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of your website or location or of a product or service on your website or location.”
Each of the four circumstances in paragraph 4(b) of the Policy, if found, would be an instance of “registration and use of a domain name in bad faith.”
The Complainant submits that it is well-settled that the practice of typosquatting, in and of itself, is evidence of the bad faith registration of a domain name (see Longs Drug Stores California, Inc.v. Shep Dog,WIPO Case No. D2004-1069; B Inc. v. Cost Domain Manager,WIPO Case No. D2001-0970). The Panel endorses that view. The Respondent has registered the disputed domain name that is virtually identical to the Complainant’s trademark, except for the deletion of the letter “r” and the second “s”. For the circumstance, this form of typosquatting is in itself evidence of bad faith.
Moreover, the indication that the disputed domain name is for sale indicates for the Panel that the disputed domain name has been registered by the Respondent for the purpose of selling it to the Complainant or one of its competitors for a valuable consideration. Paragraph 4(b)(i) of the Policy states that such practice is sufficient to demonstrate a registration and use of the disputed domain name in bad faith.
The allegation that the Respondent is using the disputed domain name to direct consumers to a parking website displaying commercial links related to caviar and fine food commercialized by direct competitors of the Complainant, is also indicative of bad faith conduct. The Panel further finds that the use to which the disputed domain name has been put constitutes bad faith registration and use pursuant to paragraph 4(b)(iv) of the Policy.
In light of the foregoing, this Panel finds that the disputed domain name was registered and is being used by the Respondent in bad faith under the Policy. 7. Decision
For the foregoing reasons, in accordance with paragraphs 4(i) of the Policy and 15 of the Rules, the Panel orders that the disputed domain name be transferred to the Complainant.
Benoit Van Asbroeck
Sole Panelist
Date: March 21, 2018
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