ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION CENTER ADMINISTRATIVE PANEL DECISION Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP v. Eburg City Case No. D2025-2987 1. The Parties The Complainant is Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, United States of America (“United States”), internally represented. The Respondent is Eburg City, United States. 2. The Domain Name and Registrar The disputed domain name is registered with NameCheap, Inc. (the “Registrar”). 3. Procedural History The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the “Center”) on July 25, 2025. On July 28, 2025, the Center transmitted by email to the Registrar a request for registrar verification in connection with the disputed domain name. On July 28, 2025, the Registrar transmitted by email to the Center its verification response disclosing registrant and contact information for the disputed domain name which differed from the named Respondent (Redacted for Privacy, Withheld for Privacy ehf) and contact information in the Complaint. The Center sent an email communication to the Complainant on July 29, 2025, providing the registrant and contact information disclosed by the Registrar, and inviting the Complainant to submit an amendment to the Complaint. The Complainant filed an amended Complaint on August 3, 2025. The Center verified that the Complaint together with the amended Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy” or “UDRP”), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Supplemental Rules”). In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs 2 and 4, the Center formally notified the Respondent of the Complaint, and the proceedings commenced on August 6, 2025. In accordance with the Rules, paragraph 5, the due date for Response was August 26, 2025. The Respondent did not submit any formal response. The Respondent sent an email communication to the Center on August 30, 2025.
page 2 The Center appointed W. Scott Blackmer, Phillip V. Marano, and Jeffrey D. Steinhardt as panelists in this matter on September 16, 2025. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. Each member of the Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph 7. 4. Factual Background The Complainant is an international law firm headquartered in Los Angeles, California, United States, and organized as a limited liability partnership under California law. Founded in 1890, the Complainant has been known as GIBSON DUNN since at least 1911. It is well-known in the United States and throughout the world, among other things for its involvement in high-profile legal cases, as documented on its website at “www.gibsondunn.com”, which cites media publications and industry references such as “The Legal 500”, “Chambers Global”, “Global Competition Review”, and “Chambers Europe”. The firm has more than 2,000 attorneys in 21 offices in the United States, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. The Complainant has operated its website at the above address since 1997 and also uses other domain names and social media accounts incorporating the GIBSON DUNN service mark. The Complainant holds United States trademark registration number 2614712 (registered September 3, 2002) for the word mark GIBSON DUNN in International Class 45 for legal services. The disputed domain name was created on September 29, 2024, and is registered in the name of the Respondent “Eburg City”, listing no organization, a postal address in the State of Washington, United States, and a Gmail contact email address. The registrant’s name appears on its face to be the name of a city not an individual. The street address furnished in the registration also is likely fictitious. It does not include a street number and, according to Google Maps, the street does not exist in the city named in the registration.1 It does not appear that the Respondent has ever associated the disputed domain name with a website. The disputed domain name does not resolve to an active website at the time of this Decision, and the Panel notes that the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine does not have any archived screenshots of a website formerly associated with the disputed domain name. 5. Parties’ Contentions A. Complainant The Complainant contends that it has satisfied each of the elements required under the Policy for a transfer of the disputed domain name. Notably, the Complainant contends that the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to its registered service mark GIBSON DUNN, substituting the final double “n” with an “m” that is easily mistaken for the correct letters, in an instance of deliberate misspelling (“typosquatting”). The Complainant asserts that the Respondent has no association with the Complainant, no license to use its mark, and is not using the disputed domain name for a bona fide commercial offering or active website. The Complainant observes, however, that a DNS records search shows that the Respondent has configured an MX record for the disputed domain name, which suggests preparation to use the disputed domain name for phishing emails, which would not be a legitimate use. 1 Noting the general powers of a panel articulated in paragraphs 10 and 12 of the Rules, it is commonly accepted that a panel may undertake limited factual research into matters of public record, as the Panel has done in this proceeding. WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (WIPO Overview 3.0), section 4.8.
page 3 The Complainant points to the fame of its mark and the prominence of its own website in Internet search engine results (which tend to self-correct to its website when “gibsondum” is used as a search term) and argues that there is “no legitimate reason” for the Respondent to have selected the disputed domain name. The Complainant argues that the Respondent has deliberately obscured its identity and configured the disputed domain name for fraudulent email use, as the Respondent has done repeatedly in attacking other trademarks. B. Respondent The Respondent did not reply to the Complainant’s contentions. The Respondent sent an email communication regarding a separate UDRP proceeding to the Center on August 30, 2025. 6. Discussion and Findings A. Identical or Confusingly Similar It is well accepted that the first element functions primarily as a standing requirement. The standing (or threshold) test for confusing similarity involves a reasoned but relatively straightforward comparison between the Complainant’s trademark and the disputed domain name. WIPO Overview 3.0, section 1.7. The Complainant has shown rights in respect of a trademark or service mark (the registered GIBSON DUNN mark) for the purposes of the Policy. WIPO Overview 3.0, section 1.2.1. The Panel finds the mark is recognizable within the disputed domain name, which substitutes an easily confused “m” for the double “n” at the end of the Complainant’s mark. Accordingly, the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to the mark for the purposes of the Policy. WIPO Overview 3.0, section 1.7.1.9. The Panel finds the first element of the Policy has been established. B. Rights or Legitimate Interests Paragraph 4(c) of the Policy provides a list of circumstances in which the Respondent may demonstrate rights or legitimate interests in a disputed domain name. Although the overall burden of proof in UDRP proceedings is on the complainant, panels have recognized that proving a respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in a domain name may result in the difficult task of “proving a negative”, requiring information that is often primarily within the knowledge or control of the respondent. As such, where a complainant makes out a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests, the burden of production on this element shifts to the respondent to come forward with relevant evidence demonstrating rights or legitimate interests in the domain name (although the burden of proof always remains on the complainant). If the respondent fails to come forward with such relevant evidence, the complainant is deemed to have satisfied the second element. WIPO Overview 3.0, section 2.1. Having reviewed the available record, the Panel finds the Complainant has established a prima facie case that the Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name. The Respondent has not rebutted the Complainant’s prima facie showing and has not come forward with any relevant evidence demonstrating rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name such as those enumerated in the Policy or otherwise. The disputed domain name has not been associated with an active website, and the Respondent does not appear to have a corresponding name or an association with the Complainant. The disputed domain name is not comprised of dictionary words and appears on its face to represent an instance of typosquatting a distinctive and well-establish service mark. The Panel finds the second element of the Policy has been established.
page 4 C. Registered and Used in Bad Faith The Panel notes that, for the purposes of paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy, paragraph 4(b) of the Policy establishes circumstances, in particular, but without limitation, that, if found by the Panel to be present, shall be evidence of the registration and use of a domain name in bad faith. While Paragraph 4(b) of the Policy sets out a list of non-exhaustive circumstances that may indicate that a domain name was registered and used in bad faith, other circumstances may be relevant in assessing whether a respondent’s registration and use of a domain name is in bad faith. WIPO Overview 3.0, section 3.2.1. In the present case, the Respondent has not replied to the Complaint and appears to have furnished fictitious registration details. The disputed domain name is not composed of dictionary terms and does not appear to represent the name of an actual person or entity. Rather, it appears to be an instance of a typosquatting attack on a well-established service mark, using the character “m” that is easily mistaken for a double “n” (especially on a small screen), which lends itself to confusion. To date, the hidden Respondent has not associated the disputed domain name with a website or, so far as is known, used it for fraudulent emails. Panels have found that the non-use of a domain name would not prevent a finding of bad faith under the doctrine of passive holding. WIPO Overview 3.0, section 3.3. Having reviewed the available record, the Panel notes the distinctiveness or reputation of the Complainant’s trademark, and the composition of the disputed domain name, and finds that in the circumstances of this case the passive holding of the disputed domain name does not prevent a finding of bad faith under the Policy. Panels have held that the use of a domain name for illegitimate or illegal activity, here claimed to be suspicious configuration of the disputed domain name for an MX record for email use in a phishing scheme, constitutes bad faith. WIPO Overview 3.0, section 3.4. The Panel notes that MX configuration alone is not dispositive of bad faith, as this is often a routine feature provided for some period with domain name registration, and the Complainant presented no evidence of fraudulent emails in this case. However, the Panel also notes that this Registrar, according to its website, regularly furnishes only two months of free email service, while the record shows that the Respondent had MX configuration for the disputed domain name some ten months after registration, indicating a deliberate effort to maintain email capability. Thus, the Respondent’s maintenance of the disputed domain name targeting the Complainant’s mark, with no conceivable legitimate use and persistently readied for email use, is indicative of bad faith in the totality of these circumstances, bearing in mind the Respondent’s successful efforts to obscure its identity. The Panel’s finding of bad faith is reinforced by an apparent pattern of serial cybersquatting. Panels found that the Respondent engaged in typosquatting in four previous UDRP proceedings (one similarly involving a law firm and three involving documented email phishing): McDonald’s Corporation v. Eburg City, WIPO Case No. D2025-1502; McDonald’s Corporation v. Eburg City (Gene Camarata), WIPO Case No. D2023-1237; Clare Locke LLP v. Gene Camarata / Eburg City, WIPO Case No. D2021-2788; McDonald’s Corporation v. Eburg City (“Gene C.”), WIPO Case No. D2019-2164. Having reviewed the record, the Panel finds the Respondent’s registration and use of the disputed domain name constitutes bad faith under the Policy. The Panel finds that the Complainant has established the third element of the Policy.
page 5 7. Decision For the foregoing reasons, in accordance with paragraphs 4(i) of the Policy and 15 of the Rules, the Panel orders that the disputed domain name be transferred to the Complainant. /W. Scott Blackmer/ W. Scott Blackmer Presiding Panelist /Phillip V. Marano/ Phillip V. Marano Panelist /Jeffrey D. Steinhardt/ Jeffrey D. Steinhardt Panelist Date: September 25, 2025
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