ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION CENTER ADMINISTRATIVE PANEL DECISION Jennifer Silverness, MSEd, LPCC, LADC / Pioneer Recovery Center, LLC v. Dean Scaduto Case No. D2025-3476 1. The Parties The Complainants are Jennifer Silverness, MSEd, LPCC, LADC / Pioneer Recovery Center, LLC, United States of America (“United States”), internally represented. The Respondent is Dean Scaduto, United States, self-represented. 2. The Domain Name and Registrar The disputed domain name
is registered with NameCheap, Inc. (the “Registrar”). 3. Procedural History The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the “Center”) on August 27, 2025. On August 28, 2025, the Center transmitted by email to the Registrar a request for registrar verification in connection with the disputed domain name. On August 28, 2025, the Registrar transmitted by email to the Center its verification response confirming that the Respondent is listed as the registrant and providing the contact details. The Center verified that the Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy” or “UDRP”), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Supplemental Rules”). In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs 2 and 4, the Center formally notified the Respondent of the Complaint, and the proceedings commenced on September 1, 2025. In accordance with the Rules, paragraph 5, the due date for Response was September 21, 2025. The Response was filed with the Center on September 4, 2025. The Complainant submitted unsolicited supplemental filings on September 4, and 5, 2025.
page 2 The Center appointed W. Scott Blackmer as the sole panelist in this matter on September 9, 2025. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. The Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph 7. 4. Factual Background The Complainant Jennifer Silverness, a licensed alcohol and drug counselor in the State of Minnesota, United States, is the founder and CEO of the Complainant Pioneer Recovery Center, LLC (“Pioneer Recovery Center”). According to extracts from the Minnesota Secretary of State database furnished with the Complaint, Pioneer Recovery Center was organized as a limited liability company under Minnesota law on September 4, 2007, and Jennifer Silverness is listed as the manager. The Complaint also attaches documentation showing that Pioneer Recovery Center has been licensed by the Minnesota Department of Human Services since February 20, 2009, to operate a substance use disorder treatment facility. This residential treatment facility is located in Cloquet, Minnesota. Because of their commonality of ownership and interests, the Panel accepts the Complaint as filed on behalf of both Complainants and refers to them collectively hereafter as “the Complainant” except where otherwise indicated. See WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (“WIPO Overview 3.0”), section 4.11.1. Pioneer Recovery Center operates a website at “www.pioneerrecoverycenter.net”. The Panel notes that this domain name was registered on October 12, 2024.1 The Complainant does not claim a registered trademark but asserts common law trademark rights in the word mark PIONEER RECOVERY CENTER based on continuous use since 2009. The Complainant attaches copies of its licenses and business registrations and undated copies of its printed brochures. The Complainant also attaches copies of email exchanges with a marketing firm in 2013 showing that the Complainant was ordering brochures and planning a website to be used with the disputed domain name. However, there is no evidence that the Complainant acquired the disputed domain name or published a website at that time. There is evidence in the record, furnished by the Respondent, that by 2024 the Complainant had acquired the disputed domain name and used Squarespace, a website and social media design service, to develop a website advertising the Complainant’s services. The Respondent furnishes a screenshot from June 2024. The disputed domain name was created on April 27, 2008, and is currently registered to the Respondent Dean Scaduto, listing no organization, a postal address in the State of Georgia, United States, and a contact email address at “[xxx]@dinosdigital.com”. That domain name is associated with the website of Dino’s Digital, a “marketing and advisory firm” specializing in SEO (search engine optimization), artificial intelligence, and performance marketing online, based in New York City and displaying the logos of featured clients in the United States and Mexico. The disputed domain name resolves to a multipage website advertising the Complainant’s treatment facility, with contact information and descriptions of the Complainant’s services that seem to accord with those on the Complainant’s website at “www.pioneerrecoverycenter.net”. The social media links, however, resolve to the social media pages of Squarespace. Screenshots from the Wayback Machine show that the disputed domain name was used from 2011 to 2012 for the website of a drug treatment recovery center in “Northwoods”. Archived screenshots from 2013 onwards show a website adverting the Complainant’s services, displaying a figurative logo with the mark PIONEER RECOVERY CENTER similar to that which appears on the 2013 brochures provided with the Complaint. 1 Noting the general powers of a panel articulated in paragraphs 10 and 12 of the Rules, it is commonly accepted that a panel may undertake limited factual research into matters of public record, as the Panel has done in this proceeding. WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (WIPO Overview 3.0), section 4.8.
page 3 The Complaint does not explain the relationship between the Complainant and the Respondent but asserts that the Respondent “acquired and/or retained the disputed domain name” with knowledge of the Complainant’s common law mark. The Respondent, on the other hand, asserts that it invested in the Complainant’s struggling business with a view toward acquiring it. This included taking over the development and maintenance of the Complainant’s website and email contact list, which were at that time under development with Squarespace and associated with the disputed domain name. The Respondent provides copies of emails and texts between the Parties in September 2024, which read in part as follows: Jennifer Silverness (Complainant) to Dean Scaduto (Respondent), email dated September 18, 2024: “If you’re not using Squarespace for the PRC website, you may want to cancel that subscription. But I would copy the contacts list from there. I have used that email feature in the past to send out blast emails to referrals to let them know that we have bed availability. I don’t think we have that email list anywhere else [….]” Dean Scaduto to Jennifer Silverness, email dated September 18, 2024: “Thanks for the reminder. Actually, I need to transfer that domain. I’m going to do that now so I can cancel squarespace. I’m going to text you shortly for a verification code.” Subsequent text exchanges on September 18, 2024, show that the Squarespace account was changed to the Respondent’s email address and that Squarespace furnished the Respondent the “domain authorization code”, which can be used “to move your domain between providers”. In October, however, the Complainant had new website content prepared and requested the return of control over the disputed domain name. Jennifer Silverness (Complainant) to Dean Scaduto (Respondent), email dated October 5, 2024: “I’m sorry I missed your call yesterday. What are the steps to transfer the domain name back to me? I see that the website is my old Squarespace website. I am needing the domain name registered to my name and permissions, I think to get a new website up. […]” Dean Scaduto to Jennifer Silverness, email dated October 5, 2024: “All good. I will ring you again tomorrow no problem.” Jennifer Silverness to Dean Scaduto, email dated October 11, 2024: “The guy that redid our website is requesting the credentials to put up our new website. Can you please provide that?” In emails through December 2024, the Complainant repeatedly requested “return” of the disputed domain name and the authorization code required to initiate its transfer. An email between the Parties in October 2024 show that the Respondent charged the Complainant nearly USD 50,000 for website development, search engine optimization, training of the Complainant’s staff, and other expenses relating to “growing your business”, asking for a “plan for payment”. The email alludes to additional costs already incurred in connection with legal fees and an accounting valuation of the Complainant’s business. The Respondent furnishes screenshots demonstrating that the Respondent has maintained the website associated with the disputed domain name unchanged since the version as it appeared in June 2024, before the Respondent acquired control of the disputed domain name. As noted above, the Complainant registered
page 4 a new domain name in October 2024, , and the Complainant has since operated a website under its own control associated with that domain name. 5. Parties’ Contentions A. Complainant The Complainant contends that it has satisfied each of the elements required under the Policy for a transfer of the disputed domain name. Notably, the Complainant contends that the disputed domain name is identical to its common law mark PIONEER RECOVERY CENTER, which it has used continuously since 2009 in connection with licensed substance abuse disorder treatment services in Minnesota. The Complainant cites its state license, registrations, business filings, and brochures as evidence of use. The Complainant asserts that the Respondent is not affiliated with the Complainant and has never been authorized to use the mark and has “retained the disputed domain to block Complainant’s use of its own name online and to divert business”. The Complainant argues that the Respondent obtained the disputed domain name to prevent the Complainant from reflecting its name in a corresponding domain name and has engaged in a pattern of similar bad faith conduct. In its supplemental filing, the Complainant argues that it furnished the Respondent with “temporary cooperation” to control the disputed domain name “during acquisition discussions” but did not mean this to be a permanent transfer of ownership. B. Respondent The Respondent contends that the Complainant has not satisfied all three of the elements required under the Policy for a transfer of the disputed domain name. The Respondent does not contest that the disputed domain name is identical to the Complainant’s “business name”. The Respondent asserts a legitimate interest in the disputed domain name because the Complainant voluntarily transferred it to the Respondent for valuable consideration, who invested “significant funds” to help the Complainant cover payroll, vendor invoices, and other operating expenses, and the Respondent used the disputed domain name only to continue displaying the Complainant’s website in support of the Complainant’s business. The Respondent argues that this conduct demonstrates that there was no deception, disruption of the Complainant's business, or bad faith. The Respondent is holding the disputed domain name as security for repayment of its expenses, as the Complainant ultimately chose not to sell the business but acknowledged its repayment obligation. The Complainant argues that this is a contractual dispute outside the scope of the UDRP. 6. Discussion and Findings 6a. Preliminary Issue: Supplemental Filing The Rules provide for a Complaint and Response and do not contemplate repeated amendments and supplemental filings. Paragraph 10 of the Rules gives the Panel “the authority to determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of the evidence, and also to conduct the proceedings with due expedition”. Paragraph 12 provides that it is in the Panel’s sole discretion to request further statements or documents from the parties. Unsolicited filings are generally discouraged and tend to be permitted exceptionally where additional supporting evidence is required, a relevant claim has not been addressed, or fairness calls for an opportunity to respond to the opposing party. WIPO Overview 3.0, sections 4.6 and 4.7.
page 5 Here, the Complainant sent emails to the Center on September 4, and 5, 2025 in reply to the Response, rebutting the Respondent’s assertion that the disputed domain name was transferred as “collateral” in a business arrangement, and providing a further screen capture of the Parties’ email communications on October 2, 2024. The Complainant argues that providing the verification codes for the disputed domain name was not meant to be consent to a permanent ownership transfer but rather “temporary cooperation […] during acquisition discussions”. The Panel accepts this submitted explanation on a factual point raised by the Respondent, to be weighed with other relevant evidence. 6b. Substantive Matters A. Identical or Confusingly Similar It is well accepted that the first element functions primarily as a standing requirement. The standing (or threshold) test for confusing similarity involves a reasoned but relatively straightforward comparison between the Complainant’s trademark and the disputed domain name. WIPO Overview 3.0, section 1.7. The Panel finds the Complainant has established unregistered service mark rights for the purposes of the Policy. The term PIONEER RECOVERY CENTER is not merely descriptive or geographic, and the Complainant has been using it continuously for 18 years in association with well-defined, state-licensed, professional services that are apparently advertised locally and regionally largely through referrals from other professionals and social services agencies. The Complainant has operated a website since at least 2013, and the record includes photos of brochures and signage with a logo featuring PIONEER RECOVERY CENTER. The Panel notes that the record and the Complainant’s website and social media posts reproduce the Complainant’s brochure and refer to the Complainant’s appearances at community events in the region, indicating marketing and some level of community recognition. See WIPO Overview 3.0, section 1.3. The Complainant’s sales are not indicated in the record, although these might not be expected to be substantial for a ten-bed facility in a rural area. The Panel nevertheless finds sufficient evidence to establish acquired distinctiveness in a relevant (albeit narrow) geographic and service market. The entirety of the mark is reproduced within the disputed domain name. Accordingly, the disputed domain name is identical to the mark for the purposes of the Policy. WIPO Overview 3.0, section 1.7. The Panel finds the first element of the Policy has been established. B. Rights or Legitimate Interests Paragraph 4(c) of the Policy provides a list of circumstances in which the Respondent may demonstrate rights or legitimate interests in a disputed domain name. The Respondent claims use before notice of the dispute in connection with a bona fide offering of services, consistent with the Policy, paragraph 4(c)(i). WIPO Overview 3.0, section 2.2. In fact, the disputed domain name continues to be used only to advertise the Complainant’s services, not any offering of the Respondent’s.2 Thus, in the circumstances of this proceeding, the issue of the Respondent’s “bona fide” offering as a legitimate interest is intertwined with the question of the Respondent’s asserted bad faith in registering and using the disputed domain name, at least initially with the Complainant’s consent, and those facts are better addressed in the following section. 2 The Respondent also claims a legitimate interest in retaining the disputed domain name as “collateral” or “security” for repayment of its expenses on behalf of the Complainant’s business operations. However, the Panel finds insufficient evidence in the record of this proceeding to establish this claim to the Respondent’s interest in the disputed domain name itself, such as an adjudicated lien or an agreement between the parties granting the Respondent a legal interest in the disputed domain name.
page 6 C. Registered and Used in Bad Faith The Panel notes that, for the purposes of paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy, paragraph 4(b) of the Policy establishes circumstances, in particular but without limitation that, if found by the Panel to be present, shall be evidence of the registration and use of a domain name in bad faith. In the present case, the Panel notes that the Respondent was admittedly aware of the Complainant’s “name”, which the Panel has found to have acquired distinctiveness as a common law mark. The Parties do not dispute that the Respondent provided services to the Complainant, paid expenses of the Complainant, and entered into discussions concerning the Respondent’s possible investment in or “acquisition” of the Complainant’s business. It is undisputed that the Complainant freely gave the Respondent control of the disputed domain name, which was then being used for the Complainant’s website and emails, as the Respondent was then working to expand the Complainant’s digital marketing. The Complainant claims that it intended this transfer to be temporary, and the record shows that within days the Complainant asked for a return of the authorization codes. The Respondent acknowledges that the Complainant ultimately decided against selling the business but did not repay expenses advanced or incurred by the Respondent as agreed, asserting that the Respondent retained the disputed domain name (still displaying the Complainant’s website) as security against repayment. The question is whether this course of conduct constitutes bad faith as alleged by the Complainant or should be viewed as a commercial dispute outside the scope of the UDRP, as the Respondent contends. The facts do not comport with the illustrations of bad faith found in the Policy, paragraph 4(b) and cited by the Complainant. There is no evidence on this record that the Respondent has engaged in a pattern of cybersquatting with domain names, has attempted to divert Internet users to other sites for commercial gain, or is a competitor seeking to disrupt the Complainant’s business. Paragraph 4(b) of the Policy sets out a list of non-exhaustive circumstances that may indicate that a domain name was registered and used in bad faith, but other circumstances may be relevant in assessing whether a respondent’s registration and use of a domain name is in bad faith. WIPO Overview 3.0, section 3.2.1. Here, the Complainant voluntarily transferred the disputed domain name to the Respondent to perform development and marketing services while the Parties discussed the Respondent’s potential acquisition of the Complainant’s business. This was done apparently without any written agreement concerning the ownership and return of the disputed domain name in the event that (a) the Complainant did not sell its business to the Respondent or (b) the Complainant did not repay the Respondent for its expenses or investment. Under these circumstances, it is difficult for the Complainant to meet its burden of proving that the Respondent’s acquisition of the disputed domain name was in bad faith, and under the Policy both the registration and the subsequent use of the disputed domain name must be in bad faith to warrant the remedy of transfer or cancellation. Thus, the Complainant would have to prove that the Respondent, more likely than not, acquired the disputed domain name in bad faith from the outset, as part of a scheme to use a domain name corresponding with the Complainant’s common law mark as commercial leverage in negotiating a business transaction. There is insufficient evidence on this record to draw such a conclusion, bearing in mind that the Complainant has the burden of proof and that a UDRP proceeding does not involve evidentiary discovery and the opportunity to examine witnesses as in litigation and arbitration proceedings. The evidence in the available record as presented does not indicate that the Respondent’s aim in acquiring the disputed domain name was to improperly profit from or exploit the Complainant’s trademark. The Panel finds the third element of the Policy has not been established. It is, therefore, unnecessary to render a definitive finding on the second element of the Policy.
page 7 7. Decision For the foregoing reasons, the Complaint is denied. The Panel notes that the Decision is based on the available record, and that a panel may accept a refiled complaint in exceptional circumstances, such as legally relevant developments or new material evidence that was reasonably unavailable previously. /W. Scott Blackmer/ W. Scott Blackmer Sole Panelist Date: September 23, 2025
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