ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION CENTER ADMINISTRATIVE PANEL DECISION Todos Santos Surf, Inc. v. Carrie Folse Case No. D2025-4080 1. The Parties The Complainant is Todos Santos Surf, Inc., United States of America (“United States”), represented by Stetina Garred Brucker & Newboles, United States. The Respondent is Carrie Folse, United States. 2. The Domain Name and Registrar The disputed domain name (the “Disputed Domain Name”) is registered with Spaceship, Inc. (the “Registrar”). 3. Procedural History The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the “Center”) on October 6, 2025. On October 7, 2025, the Center transmitted by email to the Registrar a request for registrar verification in connection with the Disputed Domain Name. On October 7, 2025, the Registrar transmitted by email to the Center its verification response disclosing registrant and contact information for the Disputed Domain Name which differed from the named Respondent (Redacted for Privacy Purposes, Privacy service provided by Withheld for Privacy ehf) and contact information in the Complaint. The Center sent an email communication to the Complainant on October 8, 2025, providing the registrant and contact information disclosed by the Registrar, and inviting the Complainant to submit an amendment to the Complaint. The Complainant filed amended Complaints on October 9 and 14, 2025. The Center verified that the Complaint together with the amended Complaints satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy” or “UDRP”), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Supplemental Rules”). In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs 2 and 4, the Center formally notified the Respondent of the Complaint, and the proceedings commenced on October 24, 2025. In accordance with the Rules, paragraph 5, the due date for Response was November 13, 2025. The Respondent did not submit any response. Accordingly, the Center notified the Respondent’s default on November 14, 2025.
page 2 The Center appointed Lynda M. Braun as the sole panelist in this matter on November 20, 2025. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. The Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph 7. 4. Factual Background The Complainant is a California, United States corporation that offers and sells a wide range of surf fins and accessories. The Complainant owns the following registered trademarks through the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”): FUTURES, United States Registration No. 3,254,933, registered on June 26, 2007, in International Class 28; FUTURES, United States Registration No. 6,768,311, registered on June 21, 2022, in International Class 25; FUTURES, United States Registration No. 5,944,851, registered on December 24, 2019, in International Class 18; F (design mark), United States Registration No. 4,778,045, registered on July 21, 2015, in International Classes 25 and 28; and F (design mark), United States Registration No. 6,053,800, registered on May 12, 2020, in International Class 18 (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “FUTURES Mark”). The Complainant owns the domain name , which it registered on June 22, 2000, and which resolves to its official website at “www.futuresfins.com”. The Complainant’s website prominently displays the FUTURES Mark in connection with its surf fins, paddle board fins, fin boxes, apparel and sports bags and luggage. The Respondent registered the Disputed Domain Name on June 10, 2025, which resolves to its website at “www.futures-fins.shop”, and which promotes and sells products bearing the Complainant’s FUTURES Mark that are purportedly counterfeit. The Respondent’s website was allegedly created to be identical to the Complainant’s website, even utilizing the Complainant’s business address and phone number, as well as its identical text and images. 5. Parties’ Contentions A. Complainant The Complainant contends that it has satisfied each of the elements required under the Policy for a transfer of the Disputed Domain Name. Notably, the Complainant contends that: - the Disputed Domain Name is confusingly similar to the Complainant’s FUTURES Mark because the Disputed Domain Name contains the FUTURES Mark in its entirety, joined by a hyphen to the term “fins”, followed by the term “shop”, and then followed by the generic Top-Level Domain (“gTLD”) “.shop”, which does not prevent a finding of confusing similarity; - the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the Disputed Domain Name because, among other things, the Complainant has not authorized the Respondent to register a domain name containing the FUTURES Mark, and the Respondent has never been commonly known by the Disputed Domain Name; and - the Disputed Domain Name was registered and is being used in bad faith because, among other things, the Respondent uses the Disputed Domain Name to feature alleged counterfeit goods, or at least identical goods to those sold by the Complainant on its official website, for the purpose of deceiving unsuspecting consumers, and the Respondent must have been aware of the FUTURES Mark when it registered the Disputed Domain Name.
page 3 The Complainant seeks the transfer of the Disputed Domain Name from the Respondent to the Complainant, and in the alternative, should the transfer be deemed inappropriate, cancellation of the Disputed Domain Name. B. Respondent The Respondent did not reply to the Complainant’s contentions. 6. Discussion and Findings In order for the Complainant to prevail and have the Disputed Domain Name transferred to the Complainant, the Complainant must prove the following (Policy, paragraph 4(a)): (i) the Disputed Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights; (ii) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the Disputed Domain Name; and (iii) the Disputed Domain Name was registered and is being used in bad faith. A. Identical or Confusingly Similar Paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy requires a two-fold inquiry: a threshold investigation into whether a complainant has rights in a trademark, followed by an assessment of whether the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to that trademark. The Panel concludes that in the present case, the Disputed Domain Name is confusingly similar to the FUTURES Mark as explained below. It is well accepted that the first element functions primarily as a standing requirement. The standing (or threshold) test for confusing similarity involves a reasoned but relatively straightforward comparison between the complainant’s trademark and the disputed domain name. See WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition, (“WIPO Overview 3.0”), section 1.7. It is uncontroverted that the Complainant has established rights in the FUTURES Mark based on its years of use as well as its registered trademark for the FUTURES Mark in the United States. The consensus view of panels is that “[w]here the complainant holds a nationally or regionally registered trademark or service mark, this prima facie satisfies the threshold requirement of having trademark rights for purposes of standing to file a UDRP case”. See WIPO Overview 3.0, section 1.2.1. Therefore, the Panel finds that the Complainant has rights in the FUTURES Mark. The Disputed Domain Name consists of the Complainant’s registered FUTURES Mark in its entirety, joined by a hyphen to the term “fins” and then followed by the gTLD “.shop”. The test for confusing similarity involves a side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the textual components of the relevant trademark to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the disputed domain name. Here, the FUTURES Mark is recognizable within the Disputed Domain Name. As stated in section 1.8 of WIPO Overview 3.0, “where the relevant trademark is recognizable within the disputed domain name, the addition of other terms (whether descriptive, geographical, pejorative, meaningless, or otherwise) would not prevent a finding of confusing similarity under the first element”. Thus, the addition of the term “fins” to the Complainant’s FUTURES Mark in the Disputed Domain Name does not prevent a finding of confusing similarity. See e.g., Allianz Global Investors of America, L.P. and Pacific Investment Management Company (PIMCO) v. Bingo-Bongo, WIPO Case No. D2011-0795; and Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Wei-Chun Hsia, WIPO Case No. D2008-0923. Finally, it is also well established that a disputed domain name that wholly incorporates a trademark will normally be considered confusingly similar to that trademark for purposes of the Policy despite the addition of a hyphen. The presence or absence of punctuation marks such as hyphens cannot on their own prevent a
page 4 finding of confusing similarity. See Six Continents Hotels, Inc. v. Helen Siew, WIPO Case No. D2004-0656. Further, the addition of a gTLD such as “.shop” in a domain name is a technical requirement. As such, it is well established that a gTLD may typically be disregarded when assessing whether a disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark. See Proactiva Medio Ambiente, S.A. v. Proactiva, WIPO Case No. D2012-0182, and WIPO Overview 3.0, section 1.11.1. Thus, the Panel finds that the Disputed Domain Name is confusingly similar to the Complainant’s FUTURES Mark. Based on the available record, the Panel finds that the first element of the Policy has been established. B. Rights or Legitimate Interests Paragraph 4(c) of the Policy provides a list of circumstances in which the Respondent may demonstrate rights or legitimate interests in a disputed domain name. Although the overall burden of proof in UDRP proceedings is on the complainant, panels have recognized that proving that a respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in a domain name may result in the difficult task of “proving a negative”, requiring information that is often primarily within the knowledge or control of the respondent. As such, where a complainant makes out a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests, the burden of production on this element shifts to the respondent to come forward with relevant evidence demonstrating rights or legitimate interests in the domain name (although the burden of proof always remains on the complainant). If the respondent fails to come forward with such relevant evidence, the complainant is deemed to have satisfied the second element. WIPO Overview 3.0, section 2.1. In this case, given the facts as set out above, the Panel finds that the Complainant has made out a prima facie case. The Respondent has not submitted any arguments or evidence to rebut the Complainant’s prima facie case. Furthermore, the Complainant has not authorized, licensed, or otherwise permitted the Respondent to use its FUTURES Mark. Nor does the Complainant have any type of business relationship with the Respondent. There is also no evidence that the Respondent is commonly known by the Disputed Domain Name or by any similar name, nor any evidence that the Respondent was using or making demonstrable preparations to use the Disputed Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services. See Policy, paragraph 4(c). The Disputed Domain Name resolves to a website displaying prominently the Complainant’s FUTURES Mark and purportedly selling unauthorized products bearing the FUTURES Mark, and thus, the Respondent does not have rights or legitimate interests in the Disputed Domain Name. When Internet users arrive at the Respondent’s website, they will find a site on which the Respondent attempts to pass off as the Complainant, purportedly offering counterfeit products to customers, which products compete with those offered by the Complainant on its official website. The Panel thus determines that the Respondent is not making a bona fide offering of goods nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the Disputed Domain Name but rather is using the Disputed Domain Name for commercial gain with the intent to mislead the Complainant’s customers into believing that they had arrived at the Complainant’s website. The Panel does not need to make any ultimate determination on the nature of the goods offered, as it determines that the use of the Disputed Domain Name to pass off as the Complainant to offer competing (or potentially counterfeit) goods does not confer rights or legitimate interests on the Respondent. See WIPO Overview 3.0, section 2.13.1 (“Panels have categorically held that the use of a domain name for illegal activity (e.g., the sale of counterfeit goods […] impersonation/passing off, or other types of fraud) can never confer rights or legitimate interests on a respondent.”). In sum, the Panel concludes that the Complainant has established an unrebutted prima facie case that the Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the Disputed Domain Name. Rather, the Panel finds that the Respondent is using the Disputed Domain Name for commercial gain with the intent to mislead by potentially defrauding the Complainant or Internet users. Such use cannot conceivably constitute a bona fide offering of a product or service within the meaning of paragraph 4(c)(i) of the Policy. Based on the available record, the Panel finds that the second element of the Policy has been established.
page 5 C. Registered and Used in Bad Faith The Panel notes that, for the purposes of paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy, paragraph 4(b) of the Policy establishes circumstances, in particular, but without limitation, that, if found by the Panel to be present, shall be evidence of the registration and use of a domain name in bad faith. The Panel finds that based on the record, the Complainant has demonstrated the existence of the Respondent’s bad faith registration and use of the Disputed Domain Name pursuant to paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy. Paragraph 4(b) of the Policy sets out a list of non-exhaustive circumstances that may indicate that a domain name was registered and used in bad faith, but other circumstances may be relevant in assessing whether a respondent’s registration and use of a domain name is in bad faith. WIPO Overview 3.0, section 3.2.1. Panels have held that the use of a domain name for illegitimate activity, here, at least passing off, constitutes bad faith. WIPO Overview 3.0, section 3.4. Having reviewed the record, the Panel finds the Respondent’s registration and use of the Disputed Domain Name constitutes bad faith under the Policy due to the Respondent’s passing off as the Complainant purportedly to offer competing or counterfeit goods to unwitting customers. The Respondent attempted to pass off as the Complainant by creating an identical website purportedly offering FUTURES-branded products, thus demonstrating bad faith. Therefore, it strains credulity to believe that the Respondent had not known of the Complainant or its FUTURES Mark when registering the Disputed Domain Name. See Myer Stores Limited v. Mr. David John Singh, WIPO Case No. D2001-0763 (“a finding of bad faith may be made where the respondent ‘knew or should have known’ of the registration and/or use of the trademark prior to registering the domain name”). In this regard, the fact that the Respondent featured goods bearing the FUTURES Mark on its website also indicates that the Respondent was aware of the Complainant and its branded goods. Rather, the Panel notes that the composition of the Disputed Domain Name, together with its use, affirms the Respondent’s intention to take unfair advantage of the likelihood of confusion between the Disputed Domain Name and the Complainant as to the origin or affiliation of the website at the resolving Disputed Domain Name. In sum, the Panel finds that the Respondent had the Complainant’s FUTURES Mark in mind when registering the Disputed Domain Name, another example of bad faith. The use of a domain name to intentionally attempt to attract Internet users to a respondent’s website or online location by creating a likelihood of confusion with a complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the registrant’s website or online location for commercial gain demonstrates registration and use in bad faith. Here, the Respondent’s registration and use of the Disputed Domain Name indicates that such registration and use had been done for the specific purpose of trading upon and targeting the reputation, name, mark, and goodwill of the Complainant. See Madonna Ciccone, p/k/a Madonna v. Dan Parisi and “Madonna.com”, WIPO Case No. D2000-0847 (“[t]he only plausible explanation for Respondent’s actions appears to be an intentional effort to trade upon the fame of Complainant’s name and mark for commercial gain.”). Moreover, the Panel concludes that the Respondent’s registration of the Disputed Domain Name was an attempt to disrupt the Complainant’s business. The Respondent’s use of the Disputed Domain Name was also likely to confuse Internet users into incorrectly believing that the Respondent was authorized by or affiliated with the Complainant. Based on the available record, the Panel finds that the third element of the Policy has been established
page 6 7. Decision For the foregoing reasons, in accordance with paragraphs 4(i) of the Policy and 15 of the Rules, the Panel orders that the Disputed Domain Name be transferred to the Complainant. /Lynda M. Braun/ Lynda M. Braun Sole Panelist Date: December 3, 2025
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy