The Complainant is Solvay SA of Brussels, Belgium, represented internally.
The Respondent is Ye Li of Hangzhou, Zhejiang, China. 2. The Domain Name and Registrar
The disputed domain name (the “Disputed Domain Name”) is registered with PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainR (the “Registrar”). 3. Procedural History
The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the “Center”) on August 8, 2014. On August 8, 2014, the Center transmitted by email to the Registrar a request for registrar verification in connection with the Disputed Domain Name. On August 9, 2014, the Registrar transmitted by email to the Center its verification response confirming that the Respondent is listed as the registrant and providing the contact details.
The Center verified that the Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy” or “UDRP”), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Supplemental Rules”).
In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs 2(a) and 4(a), the Center formally notified the Respondent of the Complaint, and the proceedings commenced on August 14, 2014. In accordance with the Rules, paragraph 5(a), the due date for Response was September 3, 2014. The Respondent did not submit any response. Accordingly, the Center notified the Respondent’s default on September 5, 2014.
The Center appointed Nicholas Weston as the sole panelist in this matter on September 15, 2014. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. The Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph 7.
The language of this administrative proceeding is English, being the language of the registration agreement.
Finally, the Panel has reviewed the record and finds that the Center has adequately discharged its responsibility to contact the Respondent by reasonable means. 4. Factual Background
The Complainant operates a NYSE Euronext listed international chemical business established in 1863. It ranks among the top ten chemical companies in the world. Headquartered in Brussels, Belgium, it employs about 29,400 people in 56 countries, and generated EUR 9.94 billion in net sales in 2013.
The Complainant owns registrations for the mark SOLVAY and variations of it in almost 100 countries. It also owns numerous domain names containing or comprising the mark SOLVAY, including .
The Disputed Domain Name was registered on June 27, 2014, which resolves to a web page containing advertisements and sponsored links. 5. Parties’ Contentions A. Complainant
The Complainant cites its trademark registrations of the trademark SOLVAY in various countries as prima facie evidence of ownership.
The Complainant submits that the mark SOLVAY is well known and that its rights in that mark predate the registration of the Disputed Domain Name . It submits that the Disputed Domain Name is confusingly similar to its trademark, because the Disputed Domain Name incorporates in its entirety the SOLVAY trademark.
The Complainant contends that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the Disputed Domain Name because the Respondent has no trademark rights in or license to use the Complainant’s trademark. The Complainant also contends that the use by the Respondent of the Complainant’s mark intentionally trades on the fame of its SOLVAY trademark and that such use can not constitute a bona fide offering of goods or services.
Finally, the Complainant alleges that the registration and use of the Disputed Domain Name was, and currently is, in bad faith, contrary to paragraphs 4(a)(iii) and 4(b) of the Policy, using the Complainant’s SOLVAY mark in the Disputed Domain Name, and has intentionally attempted to attract for commercial gain Internet users to the Respondent’s web site or other online location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant’s trademarks as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the Respondent’s web site (presumably referring to Philip Morris Incorporated v. Alex Tsypkin,WIPO Case No. D2002-0946). The Complainant alleged that, in bad faith, the Respondent made a written offer by email dated August 1, 2014 to sell the Disputed Domain Name for USD 5,000. The Complainant also cites a number of decisions against the Respondent as evidence that the Respondent is a serial cybersquatter within the meaning of the Policy as further evidence of bad faith. B. Respondent
The Respondent did not reply to the Complainant’s contentions. 6. Discussion and Findings
Under paragraph 4(a) of the Policy, the complainant has the burden of proving the following:
(i) The disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and
(ii) The respondent has no rights or legitimate interests with respect to the disputed domain name; and
(iii) The disputed domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules requires the panel to:
“decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted and in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any Rules and principles of law that it deems applicable”. A. Identical or Confusingly Similar
The Panel finds that the Complainant has produced sufficient evidence to demonstrate that it has registered trademark rights in the mark SOLVAY in the United States and in many other countries throughout the world. The Panel finds that the Complainant has rights in the mark SOLVAY in Colombia, pursuant International Trademark Registration No. 1171614 - SOLVAY registered on February 28, 2013. The Panel also finds the Complainant has rights in International trademark registration No. 751647 registered on January 18, 2001 which also applies in the Respondent’s country, China. In any event, the propriety of a domain name registration may be questioned by comparing it to a trademark registered in any country (see Thaigem Global Marketing Limited v. Sanchai Aree,WIPO Case No. D2002-0358). The Panel finds that the Complainant has rights in the mark SOLVAY.
Turning to whether the Disputed Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to the SOLVAY trademark, the Panel observes that the Disputed Domain Name comprises: (a) an exact reproduction of the Complainant’s trademark; (b) followed by the country code Top-Level Domain (“ccTLD”) suffix “.co”. It is well established that the top-level designation used as part of a domain name should typically be disregarded when considering identity or confusing similarity: (see Magnum Piering, Inc. v. The Mudjackers and Garwood S. Wilson, Sr.,WIPO Case No. D2000-1525; Rollerblade, Inc. v. Chris McCrady,WIPO Case No. D2000-0429; and Phenomedia AG v. Meta Verzeichnis Com,WIPO Case No. D2001-0374). The relevant comparison to be made in these circumstances is therefore with the second level portion of the Disputed Domain Name, “solvay”, which is plainly identical to the trademark.
In Arthur Guinness Son & Co. (Dublin) Limited v. Dejan Macesic,WIPO Case No. D2000-1698, the panel held that “[t]he use to which the site is put has no bearing upon the issue whether the domain name is confusingly similar to the trademark, because by the time Internet users arrive at the Website, they have already been confused by the similarity between the domain name and the Complainant’s mark into thinking they are on their way to the Complainant’s Website”. The Panel finds that the Disputed Domain Name is therefore confusingly similar to the SOLVAY trademark.
Accordingly, the Panel finds that the Complainant has established the first element of paragraph 4(a) of the Policy. B. Rights or Legitimate Interests
Paragraph 4(c) of the Policy provides a nonexhaustive list of ways that the respondent may demonstrate rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name:
(i) before any notice of the dispute, the respondent’s use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the disputed domain name or a name corresponding to the disputed domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services; or
(ii) the respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the disputed domain name, even if it has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) the respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the disputed domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
The Policy places the burden on the complainant to establish the absence of the respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name. Because of the inherent difficulties in proving a negative, the consensus view is that the complainant need only put forward a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests. The evidential burden of production then shifts to the respondent to rebut that prima facie case (see World Wrestling Federation Entertainment, Inc. v. Ringside Collectibles,WIPO Case No. D2000-1306; and WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Second Edition, (“WIPO Overview 2.0”), paragraph 2.1)
It is well established that a respondent may have right to register and use a domain name to attract Internet traffic based solely on the appeal of a commonly used descriptive phrase, notwithstanding that the domain name is confusingly similar to a mark only if the domain name was registered because of its attraction as a descriptive phrase comprising dictionary words, and not because of its value as a trademark and that web site is then used to post links that are relevant only to the common meaning of the phrase comprising dictionary words. (See, National Trust for Historic Preservation v. Barry Preston,WIPO Case No. D2005-0424; Private Media Group, Inc., Cinecraft Ltd. v. DHL Virtual Networks Inc.,WIPO Case No. D2004-0843; T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc. v. J A Rich,WIPO Case No. D2001-1044; Sweeps Vacuum & Repair Center, Inc. v. Nett Corp.,WIPO Case No. D2001-0031; and EAuto, L.L.C. v. Triple S. Auto Parts d/b/a Kung Fu Yea Enterprises, Inc.,WIPO Case No. D2000-0047; National Trust for Historic Preservation v. Barry Preston, supra; The Knot, Inc. v. In Knot We Trust LTD,WIPO Case No. D2006-0340, WIPO Overview 2.0, paragraph 2.2)
However, the Complainant contends that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the Disputed Domain Name because the mark SOLVAY is not a dictionary word but rather a highly distinctive name. The Complainant also submits that the Respondent is misleadingly directing Internet users to a pay-per-click (“PPC”) landing web page containing sponsored links and advertisements. The Complainant also has not licensed, permitted or authorized the Respondent to use the Complainant’s trademark.
On any objective view, the Respondent is not a reseller with a legitimate interest in a domain name incorporating a manufacturer’s mark, such that it could meet the tests set out in Oki Data Americas, Inc. v. ASD, Inc.,WIPO Case No. D2001-0903. Nor, alternatively, is the Respondent commonly known by the Disputed Domain Name.
This Panel finds that the Respondent is making an illegitimate commercial use of the Disputed Domain Name. By misleadingly diverting Internet users, it can be inferred that the Respondent is opportunistically using the Complainant’s well-known mark in order to attract Internet users to its web site and has been using the Disputed Domain Name to divert Internet traffic to its PPC web page.
The Panel finds for the Complainant on the second element of the Policy. C. Registered and Used in Bad Faith
The third element of the Policy that the Complainant must also demonstrate is that the Disputed Domain Name has been registered and used in bad faith. Paragraph 4(b) of the Policy sets out certain circumstances to be construed as evidence of both.
“b. Evidence of Registration and Use in Bad Faith. For the purposes of Paragraph 4(a)(iii), the following circumstances, in particular but without limitation, if found by the Panel to be present, shall be evidence of the registration and use of a domain name in bad faith, (relevantly):
ii. you have registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that you have engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or
iii. you have registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
iv. by using the domain name, you have intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to your web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of your web site or location or of a product or service on your web site or location.”
The examples of bad faith registration and use in Policy, paragraph 4(b) are not exhaustive of all circumstances from which such bad faith may be found (see: Telstra Corporation Limited v. Nuclear Marshmallows,WIPO Case No. D2000-0003). The objective of the Policy is to curb the abusive registration of domain names in circumstances where the registrant is seeking to profit from and exploit the trademark of another. (See M, LP v. Bill Zag and NWLAWS.ORG,WIPO Case No. D2004-0230).
The evidence supports the Complainant’s contention that the Respondent registered and has used the Disputed Domain Name in bad faith. The onus is on the Respondent to make the appropriate enquiries. Paragraph 2 of the Policy clearly states: “It is your [domain-name holder’s] responsibility to determine whether your domain name registration infringes or violates someone else’s rights”. The apparent lack of any good faith attempt to ascertain whether or not the Respondent was registering and using someone else’s trademarks, such as by conducting trademarks searches or search engine searches, supports a finding of bad faith (see Mobile Communication Service Inc. v. WebReg, RN,WIPO Case No. D2005-1304; L’oreal v. Domain Park Limited,WIPO Case No. D2008-0072; BOUYGUES v. Chengzhang, Lu Ciagao,WIPO Case No. D2007-1325; Media General Communications, Inc. v. Rarenames, WebReg,WIPO Case No. D2006-0964; and mVisible Technologies, Inc. v. Navigation Catalyst Systems, Inc.,WIPO Case No. D2007-1141).
The Panel finds that the trademark SOLVAY is so well known internationally for chemicals that it is inconceivable that the Respondent might have registered a domain name similar to or incorporating the mark without knowing of it.
Further, a gap of ten years between registration of the Complainant’s trademark and the Respondent’s registration of the Disputed Domain Name (containing the trademark) can in certain circumstances be an indicator of bad faith. (See Asian World of Martial Arts Inc. v. Texas International Property Associates,WIPO Case No. D2007-1415). In this case, the Complainant held a Benelux registration for the trademark SOLVAY, Registration No. 577900 from December 23, 1971, predating its rights from the Respondent’s registration by approximately 43 years.
The diversion of Internet users is a common example of use in bad faith as referred to in paragraph 4(b)(iv) of the Policy and identified in many previous UDRP decisions. (See L’Oréal, Biotherm, Lancôme Parfums et Beauté & Cie v. Unasi, Inc,WIPO Case No. D2005-0623; Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin, Maison Fondée en 1772 v. The Polygenix Group Co.,WIPO Case No. D2000-0163; and Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Samuel Teodorek,WIPO Case No. D2007-1814).
The Respondent’s use of the Disputed Domain Name is apparently for domain monetization unconnected with any bona fide supply of goods or services by the Respondent. The Panel surmises that the business model in this case, is for the Respondent to passively collect click through revenue generated solely from the Complainant’s goodwill and Internet users’ inaccurate guessing of the correct domain name associated with the Complainant’s SOLVAY products. Exploitation of the reputation of a trademark to obtain click through commissions from the diversion of Internet users is a common example of use in bad faith as referred to in paragraph 4(b)(iv) of the Policy and identified in many previous UDRP decisions. (See Veuve Cliquot Ponsardin, Maison Fondée en 1772 v. The Polygenix Group Co., supra; Lilly ICOS LLC v. The Counsel Group, LLC,WIPO Case No. D2005-0042; and L’Oréal, Biotherm, Lancôme Parfums et Beauté & Cie v. Unasi, Inc, supra). The Respondent also offered the Disputed Domain Name for sale to the Complainant for USD 5,000 by email on August 1, 2014, a sum that in this Panel’s view, appears to exceed the reasonable costs associated with registration and further evidence of bad faith.
The Panel also notes that the Respondent exhibits a clear pattern of registering and using domain names to prevent legitimate trademark and/or service mark owners from reflecting their marks in corresponding domain names and has been joined as the Respondent to numerous prior UDRP decisions that involved transfer orders: (see: Lange Uhren GmbH v. Ye Li,WIPO Case No. D2013-1947; Giorgio Armani S.p.A. v. Ye Li,WIPO Case No. DNL2013-0030; Guccio Gucci S.p.A. v. Zhao Ke / Yeli / Corporate Domains, Inc / Li Ye,WIPO Case No. D2012-0357; L’Oréal v. Li Ye,WIPO Case No. DCO2012-0025; M/s Genpact Limited v. Li Ye,WIPO Case No. D2012-0304; Missoni S.p.A. v. Li Ye,WIPO Case No. D2011-1924; L’Oréal, Laboratoire Garnier et Compagnie, Lancôme Parfums et Beauté et Compagnie v. Zhao Ke, Zeng Wei, Zhu Tao, Yang Yong, Ma Yun, Ye Genrong, Ye Li, ChinaDNS Inc., DomainJet, Inc., Hao Domains Services,WIPO Case No. D2011-1608; Zino Davidoff SA v. Ye Li, Li Ye,WIPO Case No. D2010-1722. This Panel finds the Respondent to be a “serial cybersquatter” under the Policy, in further evidence of bad faith.
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, this Panel finds that the Respondent is a serial cybersquatter who has taken the Complainant’s trademark SOLVAY and incorporated it in the Disputed Domain Name without the Complainant’s consent or authorization, for the very purpose of capitalizing on the reputation of the trademark by diverting Internet users to a PPC parking web page or, alternatively, hoping to sell it to the Respondent for commercial gain at a price well in excess of the reasonable costs of registration.
Accordingly, the Panel finds that the Complainant has satisfied the requirements of paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy. 7. Decision
For the foregoing reasons, in accordance with paragraphs 4(i) of the Policy and 15 of the Rules, the Panel orders that the Disputed Domain Name be transferred to the Complainant.
Nicholas Weston
Sole Panelist
Date: September 30, 2014
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