SECOND SECTION
DECISION
Applications nos. 23202/21 and 23223/21
Y against the United Kingdom
and X against the United Kingdom
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 2 June 2026 as a Committee composed of:
Jovan Ilievski, President,
Gediminas Sagatys,
Hugh Mercer, judges,
and Dorothee von Arnim, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the applications against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (“the UK”) lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by the applicants listed in the appended table (“the applicants”), on the date indicated therein;
the decision not to have the applicants’ names disclosed;
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The issue in the present case is whether the requirement under English law to register a transgender man who has given birth as the “mother” of the child on the child’s birth certificate (“the registration requirement”) breached the applicants’ rights under Article 8 of the Convention and/or Article 14 of the Convention read with Article 8.
2. The Gender Recognition Act 2004 (“the 2004 Act”) makes provision for and in connection with change of gender. Where a full gender recognition certificate (“GRC”) is issued to a person under the 2004 Act, the general consequence is that the person’s gender becomes for all purposes the acquired gender (so that, if the acquired gender is the male gender, the person’s sex becomes that of a man).
3. The Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953 (“the 1953 Act”) requires the birth of every child born in England and Wales to be registered, following which a birth certificate will be issued in respect of the child. There are two forms of birth certificate: the short version, which contains only the child’s details; and the full version, which also contains the parents’ details.
4. The first applicant, Y, was registered as female at birth. In April 2017, Y was issued with a GRC confirming his gender as male. Later that month, Y underwent fertility treatment during which donor sperm was placed inside his uterus. Y gave birth to the second applicant, X, the following year. Y was informed that he would be registered as the “mother” of X on the child’s birth certificate, although the registration could be in Y’s current (male) name.
5. In April 2018, Y brought a claim before the High Court arguing that his registration as X’s “mother” was unlawful. In August 2018, X was joined as a party to the proceedings. Y and X submitted (inter alia) that the registration requirement breached their rights under Article 8 and/or Article 14 of the Convention.
6. In September 2019, the High Court dismissed Y’s claim. It found that, as a matter of English law, Y was X’s “mother” for the purposes of registering X’s birth under the 1953 Act. The court also concluded that there had been no breach of Articles 8 or 14 of the Convention. Although the registration of Y as X’s mother interfered with the applicants’ Article 8 rights, the interference was in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim (namely, that of establishing a coherent registration system) and was otherwise necessary, proportionate and fair. The court noted in respect of X’s Article 8 rights and the best interests of the child that, although the registration of Y as X’s “mother” would likely be contrary to X’s psychosocial reality, it would enable X to know who gave birth to him and that he had a “mother”. The court observed in addition that the number of occasions when a full birth certificate may be produced was small. In relation to Article 14, the court did not consider that there had been any difference in treatment on the grounds of transgender status. Even if there had, any such difference would be justified for the reasons set out in relation to Article 8.
7. In October 2019, the High Court granted the applicants permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal.
8. In April 2020, the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants’ appeals. It found that, as a matter of English law, Y was correctly registered as the “mother” of X. The court also concluded that there had been no violation of Articles 8 or 14 of the Convention. It accepted that, even though the circumstances in which a full birth certificate was required were limited, the registration requirement interfered with Y’s sense of identity and X’s social reality. However, the interference was in accordance with the law and pursued the legitimate aims of protecting the rights of others (including any children born to transgender persons) and maintaining a clear and coherent scheme of birth registration. The court also found that the interference was proportionate. It observed (inter alia) that there were many interlinked pieces of legislation relating to children, in vitro fertilisation, surrogacy and adoption which may be affected if the word “mother” were no longer used to describe the person who gave birth to a child.
9. As part of its judgment the Court of Appeal had regard to Article 3.1 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, which provides that, in all actions concerning children, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. The court found that Parliament, in enacting a carefully crafted set of provisions balancing the rights of transgender people and others, including their children, took into account the best interests of children as a primary consideration. Parliament had taken the view that every child should have a mother and should be able to discover who their mother was, because that was in the child’s best interests.
10. The Court of Appeal noted that the applicants’ grounds of appeal did not raise Article 14 of the Convention, but was of the view that – in any event – Article 14 did not raise any separate issue in the circumstances of the case.
11. In November 2020, the Supreme Court refused the applicants permission to appeal on the basis that their applications did not raise an arguable point of law which ought to be considered at that time.
12. Invoking Article 8 of the Convention, the applicants complain that their right to respect for private and family life has been breached by the UK Government’s decision to register Y as the “mother” (rather than “father” or “parent”) of X in circumstances where X has never perceived Y to be his “mother”.
13. Invoking Article 14 of the Convention read with Article 8, the applicants complain of discrimination on the basis of Y’s status as a transgender man.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
Joinder of the applications14. As the applications concern substantially the same facts and complaints, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single decision.
Alleged violation of Article 8 of the Convention15. The general principles relevant to the registration issue raised by the present case have been set out in O.H. and G.H. v. Germany, nos. 53568/18 and 54741/18, §§ 81-82 and 109-17, 4 April 2023. That case concerned the German authorities’ refusal to register the first applicant as the “father” of his child on the birth register and the child’s birth certificate. Similarly to Y, the first applicant was a transgender man who had become pregnant after having been legally recognised as male. The Court found that the registration of the first applicant as “mother” did not give rise to a violation of Articles 8 or 14 of the Convention.
16. It follows from the above case that the registration requirement affected both of the present applicants’ “private life” under Article 8 (see O.H. and G.H. v. Germany, cited above, §§ 80-83) and that it is appropriate to assess the applications by reference to the State’s positive obligations under Article 8 (ibid., §§ 109-11). In doing so, regard must be had to the fair balance to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and the community, together with the applicable margin of appreciation (see Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], no. 37359/09, §§ 65-68, ECHR 2014). In the circumstances of the present case, the margin of appreciation to be afforded to the UK authorities is wide (see, mutatis mutandis, O.H. and G.H. v. Germany, cited above, §§ 112-17).
17. The domestic courts had due regard to the competing interests at stake when conducting their analysis of the applicants’ complaints under Article 8. The courts observed, in the first instance, that the registration requirement ran contrary to Y’s sense of identity and X’s lived reality (see paragraphs 6 and 8 above). The Court has recognised in this regard that the right to respect for private life entails the freedom to define one’s gender identity and the right to legal recognition of one’s gender identity (see O.H. and G.H. v. Germany, cited above, § 81). The right also encompasses the freedom to disclose or not disclose certain aspects of one’s private life (ibid.).
18. On the other hand, the domestic courts observed that the registration requirement did not run wholly contrary to X’s rights under Article 8 (see paragraphs 6 and 8-9 above). The right of a child to know their origins, including to establish details of their parentage, is also protected by the Convention (see O.H. and G.H. v. Germany, cited above, § 126). When hearing cases brought by a parent and/or their child, national courts cannot only take into account the interests invoked by the parent, but must take into account the best interests of the child as a primary consideration (ibid., § 124). The domestic courts did so explicitly in the present case, concluding that Parliament had taken into account the best interests of the child in devising the legislative scheme at issue (see paragraphs 6 and 9 above).
19. In addition, the domestic courts recognised that the registration requirement furthered the aim of maintaining a clear and coherent scheme of birth registration (see paragraphs 6 and 8 above). It is clear from the Court’s case-law that ensuring the reliability and consistency of civil-status records and, more broadly, ensuring legal certainty, are matters of public interest (see O.H. and G.H. v. Germany, cited above, § 122). Notable in this regard is the Court of Appeal’s observation that many related pieces of UK legislation could be affected if the word “mother” were no longer used to describe the person who gave birth to a child (see paragraph 8 above).
20. It is also of relevance that the domestic courts considered the extent to which the registration requirement would result in Y’s former gender being disclosed to third parties. The courts observed that the number of occasions when X would be required to produce a full birth certificate with details of parentage was limited, noting that a short form certificate would suffice for most purposes (see paragraphs 3, 6 and 8 above; see also, similarly, O.H. and G.H. v. Germany, cited above, §§ 131-32).
21. To the extent the applicants suggest that the competing interests in the present case should have been reconciled in a different manner, such as by registering Y as X’s “parent”, the Court notes that the choice of means calculated to ensure compliance with Article 8 in the sphere of relations between individuals is in principle a matter which falls within the Contracting States’ margin of appreciation (ibid., § 129). The Court also recalls that any such linguistic change may have consequences for other pieces of legislation in the UK (see paragraph 19 above).
22. The Court considers, in the circumstances, that the domestic authorities struck a fair balance between the competing interests of the individual and the community in the present case. The applicants’ complaints under Article 8 of the Convention are therefore manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected as inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
Alleged violation of Article 14 of the Convention, read with Article 823. The applicants did not raise Article 14 of the Convention in their grounds of appeal before the Court of Appeal. In any event, the Court is doubtful as to whether the registration requirement gives rise to a difference in treatment of persons in comparable situations on the grounds of transgender status (see O.H. and G.H. v. Germany, cited above, § 141). Even if it does, any such difference in treatment is objectively and reasonably justified for the reasons provided in relation to Article 8 above.
24. The applicants’ complaints under Article 14 of the Convention, read with Article 8, are therefore manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected as inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Decides to join the applications;
Declares the applications inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 25 June 2026.
Dorothee von Arnim Jovan Ilievski
Deputy Registrar President
APPENDIX
List of applications
No.
Application no.
Case name
Lodged on
Applicant
Year of Birth
Nationality
Represented by
1.
23202/21
Y v. the United Kingdom
30/04/2021
Y
1986
British
Laytons LLP
2.
23223/21
X v. the United Kingdom
30/04/2021
X
2018
British
Cambridge Family Law Practice