FIRST SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 5730/03
by Ruslan Achilovich YELDASHEV
against Russia
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 4 December 2008 as a Chamber composed of:
Christos Rozakis, President,
Anatoly Kovler,
Elisabeth Steiner,
Dean Spielmann,
Sverre Erik Jebens,
Giorgio Malinverni,
George Nicolaou, judges,
and Søren Nielsen, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 16 January 2003,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Ruslan Achilovich Yeldashev, is a Russian national who was born in 1961 and lives in Noginsk, a town in the Moscow Region. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr P. Laptev, former Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant is a retired serviceman. He enlisted in 1980, and at the material time he was a captain of the Space Force, occupying the post of a deputy director of social and political education.
In 1998–2002 the applicant obtained three judgments against his command.
On 24 July 1998 the Noginsk Town Court ordered the command to grant the applicant an early discharge. On 4 August 1998 this judgment became binding but was not enforced immediately, and the applicant resubmitted his claim.
On 21 June 2002 the 94th Garrison Military Court ordered the command to discharge the applicant, to provide him with housing, and to pay 7,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in damages. On 24 July 2002 this judgment became binding in the part concerning the discharge and housing. The part concerning the damages was referred for a retrial.
On 3 September 2002 the 94th Garrison Military Court ordered the command to pay RUB 23,817.60 in pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. On 9 October 2002 this judgment became binding.
On 3 April 2003 the applicant was discharged from service.
On 9 June 2003 the applicant received the flat.
On 26 April 2004 the applicant submitted enforcement papers in respect of the damages, and on 22 December 2004 he received the sum due.
B. Relevant domestic law
Under section 9 of the Federal Law on Enforcement Proceedings of 21 July 1997, a bailiff must enforce a judgment within two months.
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the delayed enforcement of the judgments.
2. The applicant complained under Article 4 of the Convention that his delayed discharge amounted to compulsory labour.
3. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the military courts were partial given their organisational dependence on the army. He also complained under Article 14 of the Convention that he was persecuted for actively standing for his rights.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the delayed enforcement of the judgments. The Court will examine this complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Insofar as relevant, these Articles read as follows:
Article 6 § 1
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal...”
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
The Government argued that this complaint was inadmissible. The judgment of 24 July 1998 had been outside the scope of Article 6 because it concerned discharge from military service. The judgment of 21 June 2002 had been outside the scope of Article 6 in the part concerning the discharge. It had been enforced speedily in the part concerning the housing. The judgment of 3 September 2002 had been enforced shortly after the applicant had submitted the enforcement papers.
The applicant maintained his complaint. He should have been provided with the housing much earlier.
With regard to the applicability of Article 6, the Court recalls that this Article does apply to the proceedings in question (see Tetsen v. Russia, no. 11589/04, §§ 16–18, 3 April 2008).
The Court considers, in the light of the criteria established in its case-law on the question of non-enforcement of binding judgments, and having regard to all the information in its possession, that an examination of the merits of this complaint is required.
2. The applicant complained under Article 4 of the Convention that his delayed discharge amounted to compulsory labour. Insofar as relevant, Article 4 reads as follows:
“2. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.
3. For the purpose of this article the term ‘forced or compulsory labour’ shall not include:
...
(b) any service of a military character....”
The Government argued that this complaint was inadmissible. Article 4 had expressly excluded military service from the notion “forced labour” because this service had been crucial for public security. Besides, the applicant had himself chosen to stay on service awaiting the provision of the flat. During this period he had received pay and benefits.
The applicant maintained his complaint. His continued service had not been crucial for public security, because his unit had not been engaged in combat, and because his function of political instructor had been inessential to the army’s fighting capability.
The Court notes that Article 4 § 3 (b) excludes military service from the notion of “forced labour”. This rule covers also the obligation to continue a service entered into on a voluntary basis (see W, X, Y, and Z v. United Kingdom, nos 3435/67, 3436/67, 3437/67, and 3438/67, Commission decision of 19 July 1968, Collection 28, pp. 109–131).
It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
3. The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the military courts had been partial, and under Article 14 of the Convention that he had been persecuted.
However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares admissible, without prejudging the merits, the applicant’s complaint concerning non-enforcement of the judgments;
Declares inadmissible the remainder of the application.
Søren NielsenChristos Rozakis
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy