FIRST SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 19447/12
Jacek ZALEWSKI
against Poland
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 6 November 2018 as a Committee composed of:
Ksenija Turković, President,
Krzysztof Wojtyczek,
Armen Harutyunyan, judges,
and Abel Campos, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 27 March 2012,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant, Mr Jacek Zalewski, is a Polish national, who was born in 1977 and is detained in Koronowo.
2. The Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms J. Chrzanowska, and subsequently by Mr J. Sobczak, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
A. Criminal proceedings against the applicant
3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
4. On 6 March 2008 the applicant was arrested and detained on remand.
5. On 24 August 2009 the applicant was indicted before the Płock Regional Court. The bill of indictment was directed against twelve co‑accused charged with over ninety offences in total. The applicant was charged with fourteen counts of, inter alia, robberies, assaults, burglaries, and with drug dealing when acting in an organised criminal gang.
6. The Płock Regional Court held in total about 60 hearings during which it heard almost 200 witnesses. On 21 July 2011 the trial court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment. The reasoned judgment against the applicant and fifteen accused was almost 300 pages long.
7. The applicant appealed against the judgment.
8. On 20 November 2012 the Płock Court of Appeal partly upheld the judgment and partly amended it. The judgment is final.
B. Proceedings under the 2004 Act
9. The applicant lodged a complaint under the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaint about breach of the right to have a case examined in an investigation conducted or supervised by a prosecutor and in judicial proceedings without undue delay (ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu przygotowawczym prowadzonym lub nadzorowanym przez prokuratora i postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki - “the 2004 Act”).
10. On 14 March 2012 the Łódź Court of Appeal dismissed the complaint. The court, relying on the Convention principles, considered that taking into account the complexity of the case, the length of the proceedings had not been excessive. The court examined all actions that had been taken by the prosecutor and the courts and found no delay on the part of the authorities.
COMPLAINTS
11. The applicant complained under Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention about the unreasonable length of criminal proceedings and about a lack of redress for the excessive length of proceedings.
THE LAW
A. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
12. The applicant’s first complaint concerned unreasonable length of the criminal proceedings. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which in so far as relevant, provides:
“In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”
13. The Government lodged a preliminary objection of an abuse of a right of individual application under Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. They argued that the applicant had failed to inform the Court of important developments in his case, in particular, of the termination of the proceedings against him on 20 November 2012.
14. The Government further submitted that the case should in any event be considered manifestly ill-founded. The proceedings were particularly complex as they concerned twelve co-accused charged with in total some ninety offences. The case file constituted over 100 volumes. The courts dealing with the case were diligent and there were no periods of inactivity attributable to the domestic authorities.
15. The applicant argued that the proceedings had been lengthy.
16. The Court does not find it necessary to examine the Government’s objection of abuse of the right to petition, the present case being in any event manifestly ill-founded for the following reasons.
17. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities (see, among many other authorities, Pélissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999-II, and Kuśmierek v. Poland, no. 10675/02, § 62, 21 September 2004).
18. The Court firstly notes that the period to be taken into consideration began on 7 March 2008 and ended on 20 November 2012. They have thus lasted four years and nine months at two levels of jurisdiction.
19. The Court also notes that there is no appearance that the applicant significantly contributed to the prolongation of the proceedings.
20. Considering the nature of the case, the Court accepts the Government’s arguments that it was complex and that the domestic courts dealt with a vast amount of evidence (see paragraph 14 above). The allegations against the accused were very serious and included charges of acting within an organised criminal gang (see paragraph 5 above).
21. As to the conduct of the authorities, the Court observes that the bill of indictment was submitted to the Regional Court on 24 August 2009 and that the first hearing on the merits was held without excessive delay, on 4 January 2010. Once the trial started the domestic court held an impressive number of hearings without any apparent period of inactivity (see paragraph 6 above). The Court would thus agree with the conclusions of the Łódź Regional Court, which dismissed the applicant’s complaint under the 2004 Act finding that there had been no delays or periods of inactivity for which the domestic authorities had been responsible (see paragraph 10 above).
22. Having regard to the foregoing, the Court concludes that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
B. Article 13 of the Convention
23. The applicant also complained under Article 13 of the Convention, that he had no effective domestic remedy in respect of the protracted length of proceedings in his case. Article 13 reads:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
24. The Government contested a breach of this provision of the Convention.
25. The Court reiterates that Article 13 guarantees an effective remedy before a national authority for an alleged breach of the requirement under Article 6 § 1 to hear a case within a reasonable time. However, the “effectiveness” of a “remedy” within the meaning of that provision does not depend on the certainty of a favourable outcome for the applicant (see Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, §§ 154 et seq., ECHR 2000-XI).
26. While the subsidiarity principle underlying the Convention system requires the Contracting States to introduce a mechanism addressing complaints about the excessive length of proceedings within the national legal system, they are afforded – subject to compliance with the requirements of the Convention – some discretion as to the manner in which they provide individuals with the relief required by Article 13 and thus conform to their Convention obligations under that provision.
27. The Court further reiterates that the word “remedy” within the meaning of Article 13 does not mean a remedy which is bound to succeed, but simply an accessible remedy before an authority competent to examine the merits of a complaint (see, for example, Šidlová v. Slovakia, no. 50224/99, § 77, 26 September 2006, and Figiel v. Poland (no. 2), no. 38206/05, § 33, 16 September 2008).
28. Having regard to its finding in respect of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and the fact that the applicant had, and made use of a length complaint under the 2004 Act, the Court concludes that this part of the application is manifestly ill‑founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 29 November 2018.
Abel CamposKsenija Turković
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy