AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 27742/95
by Georg ZIEGLER
against Switzerland
The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting
in private on 3 December 1997, the following members being present:
Mrs J. LIDDY, President
MM S. TRECHSEL
M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
E. BUSUTTIL
A. WEITZEL
C.L. ROZAKIS
L. LOUCAIDES
B. MARXER
B. CONFORTI
N. BRATZA
I. BÉKÉS
G. RESS
A. PERENIC
C. BÎRSAN
K. HERNDL
M. VILA AMIGÓ
Mrs M. HION
Mr R. NICOLINI
Mrs M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 20 June 1995 by
Georg Ziegler against Switzerland and registered on 28 June 1995 under
file No. 27742/95;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, a Swiss citizen born in 1963, is a locksmith
(Metallbauschlosser) residing in Emmenbrücke in Switzerland. Before
the Commission he is represented by Mr B. Haefliger, a lawyer
practising in Lucerne.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be
summarised as follows.
The applicant was accused of having raped his then life
companion, Mrs H.-B., in 1991. The applicant, who disputed the
charges, was acquitted by the Criminal Court (Kriminalgericht) of the
Canton of Lucerne on 22 April 1994.
Against this decision the Public Prosecutor's Office
(Staatsanwaltschaft) filed an appeal (Berufung) with the Court of
Appeal (Obergericht) of the Canton of Lucerne.
Meanwhile, it appears that Mrs H.-B. (later: Mrs B.) and her
husband, Mr H., were involved in divorce proceedings, and that in this
respect an appeal was pending before the Court of Appeal of the Canton
of Lucerne. The bench consisted, inter alia, of Court of Appeal judges
W. and R.
A hearing in the applicant's case took place before the Court of
Appeal on 29 November 1994. The bench consisted of Court of Appeal
judges W., R. and H. At the hearing, the applicant requested the Court
to obtain the case-file of the divorce proceedings of Mrs H.-B.
After consulting the case-file, the applicant challenged judges
W., R. and H. He submitted that judge H., who was also a practising
lawyer, shared an office with the lawyer who was representing Mrs H.-B.
in the criminal proceedings. He further complained that judges W. and
R. were on the bench in the appeal proceedings concerning Mrs H.-B.'s
divorce for which reason these judges would have a preconceived opinion
as to Mrs H.-B.'s credibility. Also, it could not be excluded that,
after the appeal hearing on 29 November 1994, the judges had already
had a meeting where judge H. had influenced judges W. and R.
On 13 January 1995 the Court of Appeal upheld the applicant's
challenge insofar as it concerned judge H. Thus, even if it appeared
unlikely that judge H. had spoken with her office colleague about
Mrs H.-B.'s divorce case, it sufficed that the two persons shared an
office to raise doubts as to the impartiality of judge H.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeal dismissed the challenge
in respect of judges W. and R. In the Court's view, it could certainly
(ohne weiteres) consider any conclusions (Erkenntnisse) of the divorce
proceedings, and any deliberations between the three judges after the
appeal hearing could not call in question their impartiality.
The applicant's public law appeal (staatsrechtliche Beschwerde)
was dismissed by the Federal Court (Bundesgericht) on 19 May 1995.
In its decision, the Court considered that the proceedings
instituted against the applicant had no links with Mrs H.-B.'s divorce
proceedings, and it did not transpire how knowledge of one case could
be relevant for the other.
Insofar as the applicant complained that judge H. had already
discussed the case with judges W. and R., the Court found that the
outcome of the proceedings against the applicant was open, particularly
as a new judge would participate in the proceedings. The situation
resembled the case where judges of a lower court resumed proceedings
after an appeal against its decision had been upheld.
Meanwhile, on 2 February 1995 the Court of Appeal of the Canton
of Lucerne convicted the applicant of rape and sentenced him to
18 months' imprisonment, suspended on probation. The judgment was
given by judges W., R. and Z.
The applicant's public law appeal against this decision was
dismissed by the Federal Court on 4 December 1995.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention
of the possible lack of impartiality of judges W. and R. He fears that
they had a preconceived opinion as to the outcome of his criminal case.
The applicant points out that he contested the accusations of
rape, and that the outcome of the proceedings depended on the
credibility of his statements and those of Mrs H.-B. The two judges
W. and R. had had direct contact with Mrs H.-B.; they had therefore
gained a direct impression of Mrs H.-B. It was also possible that they
had information on her which the applicant did not have, as his lawyer
was only allowed to consult the case-file until 6 January 1995.
The applicant further points out that judges W., R. and H.
deliberated after the appeal hearing, and it was not excluded that
judge H., who had insider knowledge, had influenced judges W. and R.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complains of the possible lack of impartiality of
judges W. and R. He relies on Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention which states, insofar as relevant:
"In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an independent
and impartial tribunal."
The Commission recalls that the existence of impartiality must
be determined according to a subjective test, that is on the basis of
the personal conviction of a particular judge in a given case, and also
according to an objective test, that is by ascertaining whether the
judge offered guarantees sufficient to exclude any legitimate doubts
(see Eur. Court HR, De Cubber v. Belgium judgment of 26 October 1984,
Series A no. 86, pp. 13 et seq., para. 24).
As to the subjective test, the personal impartiality of a judge
must be presumed until there is proof to the contrary. In the present
case, the applicant does not contest the personal impartiality of the
various judges.
Under the objective test, it must be determined whether, apart
from the judge's personal conduct, there are ascertainable facts which
may raise doubts as to his impartiality. In this respect, even
appearances may be of a certain importance. What is at stake is the
confidence which the courts in a democratic society must inspire in the
public and above all in the parties to the proceedings. Accordingly,
any judge in respect of whom there is a legitimate reason to fear lack
of impartiality must withdraw (see the De Cubber v. Belgium judgment,
op. cit., p. 14, para. 26). This implies that in deciding whether in
a given case there is a legitimate reason to fear that a particular
judge lacks impartiality, the view of the complaining party is
important but not decisive. What is decisive is whether this fear can
be said to be objectively justified.
In the present case the applicant submits, first, that the fact
that judges W. and R. had sat in the appeal proceedings concerning
Mrs H.-B.'s divorce raised doubts as to their impartiality. Thus, they
had had direct contact with Mrs H.-B. and would therefore have formed
a direct impression of her.
The Commission observes that the civil proceedings concerning
Mrs H.-B.'s divorce were in no way related to the criminal proceedings
instituted against the applicant. Objectively seen, the judges were
in a position fully to form their opinion on the credibility of
Mrs H.-B.'s statements in the criminal proceedings against the
applicant. Indeed, the applicant has not referred to any particular
element in the divorce proceedings which could have affected the
judges' views in the proceedings concerning the applicant.
The applicant submits, secondly, that judge H. could have
influenced judges W. and R. following the appeal hearing.
In the Commission's opinion, there is no indication that such
deliberations took place after the appeal hearing or, if they did, that
judges W. and R. were influenced in such a manner. In any event, as
the Federal Court pointed out in its judgment of 19 May 1995, the
outcome of the appeal proceedings against the applicant was open,
particularly as judges W. and R. were eventually joined by a new third
judge Z., replacing judge H.
As a result, there are no indications that the impartiality of
judges W. and R. appeared open to doubt.
This part of the application is, therefore, manifestly ill-
founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
2. The applicant may be understood as complaining under Article 6
para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention of the unfairness of the
proceedings in that the judges might have had information on the case
which he did not.
However, the applicant has not shown that he obtained a decision
of the Federal Court on this complaint. He has not, therefore,
complied with the requirement as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies
within the meaning of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.
The remainder of the application must, therefore, be rejected
according to Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
M.F. BUQUICCHIO J. LIDDY
Secretary President
to the First Chamber of the First Chamber
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy