SECOND SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 54893/18
Metka ZEVNIK and others
against Slovenia
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 12 November 2019 as a Committee composed of:
Julia Laffranque, President,
Ivana Jelić,
Arnfinn Bårdsen, judges,
and Hasan Bakırcı, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 16 November 2018,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicants are three Slovenian nationals, Ms Metka Zevnik, born in 1946 (“the first applicant”), Mr Aleš Primc, born in 1973 (“the second applicant”), and Mr Franc Kangler, born in 1965 (“the third applicant”), and two political parties registered under Slovenian law, Lista Franca Kanglerja – Nova ljudska stranka (Kangler’s New People’s Party - “the fourth applicant”) and Glas za otroke in družine (The Voice for Children and Families - “the fifth applicant”). They were represented before the Court by Mr S. Vesenjak, a lawyer practising in Maribor.The circumstances of the case
2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.
3. The first, second and third applicants were candidates on lists submitted by a coalition party formed for the early parliamentary elections of 3 June 2018 by the fourth and fifth applicants. The coalition party submitted its lists of candidates in all eight constituencies.Proceedings before the electoral commissions
4. On 4 and 7 May 2018, respectively, the electoral commissions (hereinafter “the ECs”) of the sixth and first constituencies rejected the lists of candidates submitted by the coalition party on 3 May 2018. The two rejected lists included the first and second applicants. The respective ECs established that the lists had been drawn up contrary to section 43(6) of the National Assembly Election Act (hereinafter “the Election Act”, see paragraph 15 below). In particular, the female candidates were found to represent less than 35% of the total actual number of candidates on each list: one included six male and two female candidates, while the other contained five male and two female candidates.Proceedings before the Supreme Court
5. On 6 and 9 May 2018, respectively, the representatives of the rejected lists of candidates appealed against the EC’s rejection decisions to the Supreme Court. They maintained that their lists should be accepted because the female candidates on both rejected lists represented more than 35% of the total number of candidates; the female candidates on the lists would run in more electoral districts in the respective constituencies. Alternatively, the ECs should have given them time to remedy the deficiencies of the lists under section 56(2) of the Election Act (see paragraph 15 below), eliminated male candidates from the lists themselves, or rejected the lists in part under section 56(3) of the Act (ibid.). Having regard to the deadlines of the election process, the appellants asked the court to eliminate as many male candidates as necessary for the lists to comply with the gender quota requirement under section 43(6) of the Act (ibid.) or to afford them three days to remedy the alleged deficiencies by themselves via a secret ballot.
6. On 7 and 10 May 2018, respectively, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the impugned decisions of the ECs. Referring to its case-law (see paragraph 17 below), the court held that the gender quota requirement was set out in clear terms in section 43(6) of the Election Act and that an accepted interpretation and the sanctions for non-compliance had been known for a considerable amount of time. It reiterated that the number of actual candidates (real people) was the only figure relevant, rejecting the argument that the ECs should have considered the number of electoral districts in which the same person stood for elections. Furthermore, the Supreme Court clarified that the deficiencies of the lists at issue were not formal but substantive, as they required electoral tasks of a substantive nature (the entire nomination process) to be carried out anew and could thus not be easily remedied. In this connection, it pointed out that a candidate who gave his or her consent in writing and was included in a list of candidates in accordance with the procedure provided by law could not be arbitrarily struck off that list, as suggested by the appellants. The Supreme Court further noted that the deficiencies – insufficient representation of each gender on the list – related to the lists in their entirety and could not be rejected only with respect to an individual candidate (ibid.). Lastly, the court emphasised that the rejection of the lists in the relevant constituencies had been solely due to a lack of diligence on the part of the proposer. Referring to the specificities of the electoral process and its short time-limits as a result of which possible errors could not be remedied at a later time, it reaffirmed that specifically strict rules applied to the candidatures and that the burden that all electoral tasks be performed in a timely manner and correctly lay with political parties.Proceedings before the Constitutional Court
7. Subsequently, the representatives of the rejected lists of candidates lodged constitutional complaints against the Supreme Court’s decisions, reiterating their previous arguments. They maintained that the electoral legislation was not sufficiently precise and foreseeable and that the rejection of the entire lists of candidates for an alleged failure to ensure gender‑balanced representation was a disproportionate sanction. The complainants also sought a constitutional review of sections 43, 54, and 56 of the Election Act (see paragraph 15 below).
8. On 17 May 2018, by seven votes to two, the Constitutional Court refused to accept the constitutional complaints for consideration. It held that the rule on the gender composition of the lists of candidates in section 43(6) of the Election Act was cogent and had a constitutional basis (see paragraph 21 below). The provision, which had been in force since 2006, was clear and comprehensible to everyone. A list of candidates not meeting the requirement was unlawful and the EC had to reject it on the basis of section 56 of the Election Act. All political parties would have had prior knowledge of the sanctions for disregarding the rule in question (see paragraph 17 below). The court acknowledged that some States had introduced other types of sanctions for non-observance of the gender quota requirement, but emphasised that the rejection of a list of candidates in its entirety was seen as the most effective way of ensuring that the above constitutional requirement was observed.
9. The Constitutional Court reiterated that elections were a process that had to take place and be completed within an uninterrupted period of time, and that therefore all tasks that had to be performed as part of that process were restricted by statutorily prescribed time-limits that were very short (see paragraph 19 below). The rules applied to all political parties competing for power in an election as required by the principle of equal suffrage. It was therefore vital that all proposers submit complete and lawful lists of candidates within the prescribed time-limit, to enable the timely conclusion of the electoral process and, above all, the realisation of the candidates’ passive right to vote (right to stand for election). In this connection, the court referred to its distinction between formal and substantive deficiencies (see paragraph 20 below), noting that the entire nomination process would have to be repeated in order to remedy the deficiencies at issue. The need for electoral tasks to be carried out (anew) was the reason for differentiating between substantively incomplete (unlawful) and formally incomplete lists of candidates.
10. The Constitutional Court noted that an EC could not interfere with a list of candidates without specific statutory authority and arbitrarily eliminate an individual candidate included on the list in accordance with the law, as suggested by the complainants. The gender representation requirement applied to the list of candidates in its entirety. Since the non‑compliance in the case at issue had been solely due to a lack of diligence on the part of the proposer, the rejection of the lists in their entirety was not inadmissible.
11. The Constitutional Court deferred its decision on the petition to a later date, holding that the statutory rules that governed the elections could not be amended during the electoral process.
12. Judge K. Jaklič of the Constitutional Court, who voted against that decision, wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by another dissenting judge. He opined that the rejection of an entire list contradicted the legitimate aim pursued, namely facilitating women’s access to parliament. He pointed to other less severe sanctions for non-compliance that would attain the aim with greater precision and in a proportionate manner.Decision regarding free airtime in the national broadcaster’s programmes
13. On 8 May 2018 Slovenia’s national television and radio broadcaster, Radio-Television Slovenia (hereinafter “RTV Slovenia”) informed the coalition party that it would not be allowed to participate in television or radio pre-election debates or receive free airtime due to the rejection of its list of candidates in a constituency (see paragraph 16 below).Relevant domestic law and practiceConstitution of the Republic of Slovenia
14. Under Article 43 of the Slovenian Constitution, the law shall provide measures to encourage equal opportunities for men and women standing for election to State authorities.Election Act
15. The relevant provisions of the Election Act (Official Gazette no. 109/06, with further relevant amendments) provide as follows:
Section 20
“(1) Eight constituencies shall be formed for the elections of deputies to the National Assembly...
...
(5) Each constituency shall be divided into eleven electoral districts... In each electoral district one deputy shall be elected.
...”
Section 43
“(1) A political party shall nominate candidates in accordance with the procedure determined by its regulations. The list of candidates shall be determined by secret ballot.
...
(6) On a list of candidates no gender may be represented by less than 35% of the total actual number of female and male candidates on the list.
...”
Section 54
“(1) Lists of candidates shall be submitted to the electoral commission of the constituency no later than thirty days prior to election day.
...”
Section 56
“(1) The electoral commission of the constituency shall reject a list of candidates if it ascertains that the list was not determined in accordance with this Act.
(2) If the electoral commission of the constituency ascertains formal shortcomings in a list of candidates, it shall immediately request that the proposer correct them within three days. If the formal shortcomings are not corrected in due time, the electoral commission shall reject the list of candidates.
(3) In the cases referred to in the preceding two paragraphs, the electoral commission shall reject a list of candidates entirely or with regard to individual candidates.”Relevant domestic law on election campaigns in RTV Slovenia programmes
16. Under the Radio-Television Slovenia Act (Official Gazette no. 96/05, with amendments), political propaganda on national television and other national media is only allowed during election campaigns, when free airtime must be provided for the presentation of candidates, political parties and their programmes (sections 10 and 12). Pursuant to the Rules for the use of broadcasting time for their presentations between 7 May and 1 June 2018, the competent authority of RTV Slovenia determined that free airtime would be offered to the political parties and lists of candidates with accepted lists in all constituencies (Rule 5).The Supreme Court’s case-law
17. In its decision of 15 November 2011 (Uv 12/2011), the Supreme Court held that non-compliance with the gender quota requirement under section 43(6) of the Election Act was a substantive deficiency of a list of candidates. It established that such lists were unlawful not only with regard to individual candidates but as a whole. It noted that a limitation to a particular candidate would be possible only if there were statutory grounds for partial rejection affecting individual candidature.
18. In its decision of 12 May 2018 (Uv 8/2018), the Supreme Court held that a situation where a proposer submitted a list of candidates not satisfying the required gender ratio from the outset had to be distinguished from a situation where a proposer submitted a list that had initially fulfilled this requirement but not later due to an individual candidate’s nomination being subsequently declared invalid solely as a result of his or her conduct (the candidate in question featured on two lists) and which could not have been known to the proposer at the time the list had been submitted. The Supreme Court considered that the fact that the proposer in the case in question could not influence the reason for the invalidity of that candidature significantly distinguished it from the applicants’ case. In those circumstances, the rejection of an entire list would represent a disproportionate interference with the rights protected under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.The Constitutional Court’s case-law
19. In its decision of 19 November 1998 (Up-304/98), the Constitutional Court held that due to the particular nature of elections, it was vital that all proposers of lists of candidates ensure that they submit complete and lawful lists of candidates within the prescribed time-limit.
20. In its decision of 9 September 2008 (Up-2385/08), the Constitutional Court adopted the position that a deficiency was only formal in nature (as opposed to substantive) when it could be remedied without carrying out any new electoral tasks in the nomination process.Relevant Council of Europe documents
21. At its 51st and 52nd sessions (5-6 July and 18-19 October 2002) the European Commission for Democracy Through Law (“the Venice Commission”) adopted a Code of Good Conduct in Electoral Matters (CDL‑AD (2002) 23 rev.), which comprises Guidelines and Explanatory Report. The relevant provision of the Guidelines reads as follows:
“I. Principles of Europe’s electoral heritage
The five principles underlying Europe’s electoral heritage are universal, equal, free, secret and direct suffrage. Furthermore, elections must be held at regular intervals.
2. Equal suffrage
2.5. Equality and parity of the sexes
Legal rules requiring a minimum percentage of persons of each gender among candidates should not be considered as contrary to the principle of equal suffrage if they have a constitutional basis.”
22. The relevant parts of Resolution 1706 (2010) on increasing women’s representation in politics through the electoral system adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly on 27 January 2010, read as follows:
“4. ... Changing the electoral system to one more favourable to women’s representation in politics, in particular by adopting gender quotas, can lead to more gender-balanced, and thus more legitimate, political and public decision making.
...
6. The Assembly considers that the lack of equal representation of women and men in political and public decision making is a threat to the legitimacy of democracies and a violation of the basic human right of gender equality, and thus recommends that member states rectify this situation as a priority by:
...
6.3. reforming their electoral system to one more favourable to women’s representation in parliament:
6.3.1. in countries with a proportional representation list system, consider introducing a legal quota which provides not only for a high proportion of female candidates (ideally at least 40%), but also for a strict rank-order rule ..., and effective sanctions (preferably not financial, but rather the non-acceptance of candidacies/candidate lists) for non-compliance...;”
23. The relevant parts of Resolution 2111 (2016) on assessing the impact of measures to improve women’s political representation, adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly on 21 April 2016, read as follows:
“2. Electoral quotas are the most effective means of achieving significant, rapid progress, provided that they are correctly designed and consistently implemented. Quotas should be adapted to the electoral system in force, set ambitious targets and be coupled with stringent sanctions for non-compliance.
15. In the light of these considerations, the Assembly calls on the Council of Europe member and observer States ... they should, in particular:
...
15.2.2. introduce applicable sanctions for non-compliance with positive measures, such as the rejection of lists of candidates...;”
24. The Preamble to Recommendation Rec (2003) 3 on balanced participation of women and men in political and public decision-making, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 12 March 2003, provides that:
“...balanced participation of women and men in political and public decision-making is a matter of the full enjoyment of human rights, of social justice and a necessary condition for the better functioning of a democratic society”Relevant international documents
25. With respect to media coverage, the Election Assessment Mission Final Report on the Early Parliamentary Elections of 3 June 2018, prepared by the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, noted that all electoral contestants had been provided with several opportunities to present their views in public and private media through debates, talk shows and special programmes dedicated to the elections.
COMPLAINTS
26. The applicants complained that the rejection of the lists of candidates in the respective constituencies on the basis of gender quota rules had unlawfully and disproportionately interfered with their rights under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
27. Furthermore, relying on Article 10 of the Convention and Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, they complained that they had been deprived of free airtime and access to television and radio debates at national level and had thus been eliminated from the political competition.
28. Under Article 6 of the Convention the applicants complained that they had not had a public hearing before the Supreme Court.
THE LAWComplaint under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 as regards the rejection of the lists of candidates
29. The applicants complained that the rejection of the lists of candidates had violated their rights under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which reads as follows:
“The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.”
30. The applicants argued that the 35% gender representation requirement and the term “formal shortcoming” were not clearly specified in law and allowed for ambiguous interpretation. Assuming the rejection of the lists of candidates had pursued the legitimate aim of promoting women in politics, they asserted that the sanction for non-compliance with the gender quota rule had been disproportionate. They referred to other less intrusive measures that could have been used in their case, without eliminating a considerable number of (female) candidates from the election, like the use of financial sanctions, subsequent rectification of the shortcomings and partial rejection of the lists.General principles
31. The Court refers to the relevant principles which guide its examination of complaints under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, as reiterated in the case of Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey [GC] (no. 10226/03, §§ 105-15, ECHR 2008). It finds it particularly important to note that Contracting States must be given a wide margin of appreciation in this sphere, seeing that there are numerous ways of organising and running electoral systems and a wealth of differences, inter alia, in historical development, cultural diversity and political thought within Europe, which it is for each Contracting State to mould into its own democratic vision (see Ždanoka v. Latvia [GC], no. 58278/00, § 103, ECHR 2006‑IV). The Court also reiterates that stricter requirements may be imposed on eligibility to stand for election to parliament, as distinguished from voting eligibility. However, it is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with. It has to satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate (see Yumak and Sadak, cited above, § 109).Application to the present case
32. Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that the applicants alleged a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 in view of the rejection of the coalition party’s lists of candidates in two constituencies pursuant to sections 46(6) and 56(1) of the Election Act (see paragraph 15 above). It further notes that the lists of candidates submitted by the coalition party of the fourth and fifth applicants were accepted by the ECs in six constituencies and rejected in two in which the first and second applicants also featured as candidates (see paragraph 4 above). The third applicant was a candidate on one of the accepted lists and was thus able to stand for election. Given that the decisions to reject the lists in the two constituencies might have had a negative impact on the election result of the coalition party at national level and the third applicant’s chances of being elected as deputy, the Court is willing to assume that the rejection of the lists of candidates interfered with the passive electoral rights guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention of all the applicants.
33. As regards the applicants’ first argument that the electoral laws were unclear and ambiguous, the Court notes that the ECs, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court based their decisions on the same legal provisions that are in question in the present case, namely sections 46 and 56 of the Election Act (see paragraphs 4, 6, 8 and 15 above). The two highest domestic courts, relying on a literal reading of the Act and their case-law, held that the provisions regarding the rules on gender representation and the sanctions for non-compliance were clear and should be well-known to all political parties (see paragraphs 6 and 8 above). The applicants, on the other hand, have not submitted any domestic court decision supporting their own interpretation of the relevant electoral rules or in any other way convincingly argued that the domestic law was vague, the consequences of non-compliance with the rules on gender representation unforeseeable and the application of domestic law in their case arbitrary (compare and contrast Yabloko Russian United Democratic Party and Others v. Russia, no. 18860/07, § 81, 8 November 2016). Having regard to the wording of the relevant provisions of the Election Act, their consistent application in domestic case-law and the reasoning of the domestic courts in the present case, the Court considers that the gender quota requirement was sufficiently clearly defined in domestic law and that the applicants were able to foresee that its non-compliance would result in the rejection of the entire lists of candidates (see Ekoglasnost v. Bulgaria, no. 30386/05, § 62, 6 November 2012; compare and contrast Krasnov and Skuratov v. Russia, nos. 17864/04 and 21396/04, § 60, 19 July 2007; Seyidzade v. Azerbaijan, no. 37700/05, §§ 36 and 37, 3 December 2009; and Ofensiva tinerilor v. Romania, no. 16732/05, § 59, 15 December 2015).
34. As to the aim pursued, the Court observes that a great variety of aims may be compatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, provided that the compatibility of any particular aim with the principle of the rule of law and the Convention’s general objectives is established in the specific circumstances of a given case (see, for example, Yumak and Sadak, cited above, § 119). In the present case, the lists of candidates were rejected because the female candidates represented less than 35% of the total number of candidates on the lists (section 46(6) of the Election Act). This provision is based on Article 43 of the Constitution, which provides for the adoption of measures aimed at providing equal opportunities for men and women standing for election (see paragraphs 8, 14 and 21 above). The Court reiterates that the advancement of the equality of the sexes is today a major goal in the member States of the Council of Europe (see Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 58369/10, § 72, 10 July 2012) and that its institutions consider the lack of gender balance in politics to be a threat to the legitimacy of democracy and a violation of the right of gender equality (see paragraphs 22-24 above). Consequently, the Court considers that the interference in question pursued the legitimate aim of strengthening the legitimacy of democracy by ensuring a more balanced participation of women and men in political decision-making.
35. It remains to be determined whether the rejection of the lists of candidates for non-compliance with the gender quota requirement was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Helpful guidance can be obtained from the relevant instruments adopted by the Council of Europe institutions, in which they not only allow but also encourage member States to adopt gender quotas into their electoral systems coupled with strict sanctions for non-compliance (see paragraphs 21-24 above). The Court also attaches weight to the view of the Constitutional Court that prior awareness of the fact that political parties would not be able to participate in elections unless they ensured gender-balanced representation on their lists of candidates provided the strongest impetus to satisfying gender quotas (see paragraph 8 above).
36. Furthermore, the Court finds that in accepting or rejecting lists of candidates the domestic courts took into account the reasons for non‑compliance (compare and contrast Sarukhanyan v. Armenia, no. 38978/03, § 49, 27 May 2008). The outcome of the balancing between the right to stand for election and ensuring observance of the gender quota depended on whether the list had been composed diligently and whether the proposer had knowingly composed it in breach of the gender quota (see paragraph 18 above). However, in the present case, as the domestic courts convincingly established, the proposer (coalition party) of the lists acted without due diligence. The proposer was the only one to blame for the breach of the gender ratio requirement and was sanctioned for conduct within its control (compare and contrast Russian Conservative Party of Entrepreneurs and Others v. Russia, nos. 55066/00 and 55638/00, §§ 65 and 66, 11 January 2007).
37. As regards the applicants’ argument that the lists of candidates should have been rejected only with respect to individual (male) candidates, the Court refers to the reasoning of the domestic courts (see paragraphs 6, 10 and 17 above) and notes, in particular, that the gender representation requirement applied to a list of candidates in its entirety and that the domestic authorities could not arbitrarily eliminate an individual candidate without any specific grounds.
38. Likewise, the Court rejects the applicants’ argument that they should have been given time to correct the alleged shortcomings of the lists. In that context, the Court takes note of the Supreme and the Constitutional Courts’ finding that, in order to remedy the deficiencies at issue, the electoral tasks would have to be carried out anew and the substance of the lists would change (see paragraphs 6 and 9 above). It observes in this connection that the lists of candidates at issue were submitted to the respective ECs a day before the expiry of the deadline (see paragraph 4 above and section 54(1) of the Election Act). Any changes to the lists at issue would therefore have needed to be done after the deadline that applied to all the parties competing in the elections. Having special regard to the Constitutional Court’s considerations regarding the nature of the election process (see paragraph 9 above), the Court accepts that the decision not to allow the proposer to make such corrections was based on the legislator’s legitimate concern to ensure timely completion of the electoral process and respect for the principle of equal suffrage.
39. In the light of the foregoing considerations and the wide margin of appreciation enjoyed by the Contracting States in organising and running electoral systems (see paragraph 31 above), the Court is of the view that the rejection of the lists of candidates in the present case cannot be considered disproportionate.
40. Accordingly, the applicants’ complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.Complaint under Article 10 of the Convention and Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 as regards free airtime and access to TV debates
41. The applicants further complained that they had been deprived of free airtime and access to television and radio debates at national level and had thus been eliminated from the political competition, in violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. They submitted that they had not brought any domestic proceedings in respect of this complaint, arguing that they had had no separate legal remedy available to them and that any complaint made before the domestic courts would have been rejected since the Constitutional Court had upheld the rejection of the lists at issue.
42. The Court refers to the general principles regarding the media coverage of elections under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, as summarised in the case of Communist Party of Russia and Others (cited above, §§ 107-110). It reiterates that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 does not guarantee, as such, any right for a political party to be granted airtime on radio or television during the pre-election campaign. The Court acknowledges that an issue may arise in exceptional circumstances, for example, if in the run-up to an election one party was denied any kind of party political broadcast whilst other parties were not (see Partija “Jaunie Demokrāti” and Partija “Mūsu Zeme” v. Latvia (dec.), nos. 10547/07 and 34049/07, 29 November 2007).
43. Turning to the present case, the Court does not find it necessary to determine whether the applicants exhausted domestic remedies (see paragraph 41 above), since this complaint is in any event inadmissible for the following reasons.
44. The Court observes that the applicants’ complaint specifically concerns the conduct of the national broadcasting corporation, RTV Slovenia. It notes that in the pre-election period the applicants were denied free airtime on RTV Slovenia channels on account of not having lists of candidates in all constituencies (see paragraphs 13 and 16 above). According to the relevant rules (see paragraph 16 above), airtime was afforded without distinction between different political forces, as long as the party participated with its lists of candidates in all eight constituencies; meaning that it was afforded to those who attempted to cover and address the electorate as a whole and not just the constituency in which they had their list (see, mutatis mutandis, Oran v. Turkey, nos. 28881/07 and 37920/07, §§ 73 and 76, 15 April 2014). In this context, the Court notes that the applicants did not argue that they could not be afforded paid airtime or that they had been prevented from conducting a campaign in the constituencies in which their lists had been accepted. Furthermore, there is nothing to suggest that they were prevented from using other available methods of electioneering (see Communist Party of Russia and Others, § 126, and Oran, § 76, both cited above). In this connection, the Court takes note of the report of the OSCE/ODIHR, according to which all electoral contestants were provided with several opportunities to present their views in public and private media (see paragraph 25 above).
45. Consequently, in the light of all these considerations, the Court takes the view that the measure criticised by the applicants was based on objective and reasonable justification. It does not discern any exceptional circumstances that would warrant a different conclusion (see paragraph 42 above). Accordingly, this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
46. Lastly, referring to the same facts and arguments, the applicants also raised their complaint concerning a loss of free airtime and access to political debate at national level under Article 10 of the Convention (see paragraph 27 above). Having regard to its above findings concerning the applicants’ complaint raised under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, the Court considers that their essentially identical complaint under Article 10 is also manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Communist Party of Russia and Others, cited above, § 57).Complaint under Article 6 of the Convention
47. The applicants also complained of a violation of Article 6 of the Convention (see paragraph 28 above). The Court reiterates, however, that Article 6 does not apply to proceedings concerning electoral disputes (see, for example, Pierre-Bloch v. France, 21 October 1997, § 50, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VI). It follows that this complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 5 December 2019.
Hasan BakırcıJulia Laffranque
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy