Information Note on the Court’s case-law 189
October 2015
Zoltai v. Hungary and Ireland (dec.) - 61946/12
Decision 29.9.2015 [Section I]
Article 2
Extradition
Positive obligations
Alleged failure to secure extradition of Irish national to Hungary to serve prison sentence: inadmissible
Facts – The applicant was the father of two young children who were struck and killed by a car driven by an Irish national, T., in Hungary in 2000. Some months later T. was permitted to return to Ireland after his employment contract in Hungary ended. He deposited a sum with the Hungarian authorities as bail and appointed a lawyer to represent him at his trial, which was to take place in his absence. He was subsequently convicted by the Hungarian courts of negligent driving causing death and given a prison sentence.
Following Hungary’s accession to the European Union (EU), the Irish authorities received a European arrest warrant in June 2005 and T. was arrested. However, the Irish courts ruled that he could not be said to have “fled” Hungary and so did not come within the terms of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003, which transposed the EU Council Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant and surrender procedures into Irish law. In 2010 the 2003 Act was amended to remove the reference to “a person having fled” and the Hungarian authorities issued a fresh warrant for T.’s arrest. The Irish Supreme Court ruled, however, that T. could not be surrendered as either the amendment did not disturb his right derived from the earlier proceedings not to be surrendered or the renewed attempt to secure his surrender after so many years constituted an abuse of process. Ultimately T. travelled voluntarily to Hungary to commence his sentence before returning to Ireland to complete it there.
Law – Article 2 (procedural aspect)
(a) Complaint in respect of Hungary – The Hungarian authorities had prosecuted T. and the criminal proceedings had led to his conviction and sentence, which had been confirmed on appeal approximately two and a half years after the accident. The imperative of establishing the circumstances of the accident and the person responsible for the loss of life had thus been satisfied. Furthermore, in the light of the steps taken by the Hungarian authorities, the applicant had no basis on which to complain of the events subsequent to T.’s conviction. The Hungarian authorities had displayed persistence in seeking his return within the framework of EU law and, once the impediment to return had been removed by the Irish legislature in 2010, had promptly reiterated the request for his surrender to commence his sentence. In sum, there was no basis on which to find a breach of Hungary’s procedural obligations under Article 2.
Conclusion: inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded).
(b) Complaint in respect of Ireland – As regards the applicant’s complaint that he was not involved in the Irish proceedings, the Court considered that while Article 2 required States to ensure the participation of the next-of-kin in proceedings concerning the death of their loved ones, this had no application to the proceedings that took place before the Irish courts. The issues at stake in those proceedings did not concern the causes of the accident or T’s liability for the deaths, but the relevant provisions and principles of Irish law and the implementation of the Framework Decision in Ireland. Given the nature of those proceedings the applicant could not derive any right under Article 2 to be involved in that litigation.
As to the applicant’s complaint that Ireland had failed to transpose the Framework Decision correctly, the Court observed, first, that its competence as determined by Article 19 of the Convention did not extend to assessing whether a Contracting State had correctly implemented any other of its international legal obligations. Furthermore, the Irish authorities had genuinely and diligently sought to operate the European Arrest Warrant procedure by pursuing the matter to the Supreme Court in the first set of proceedings and subsequently making the necessary legislative amendments before promptly resuming the procedure and taking T. into custody. The second set of proceedings had involved complex questions of Irish law. Although, following the Supreme Court’s ruling, it had not been legally possible to compel T.’s return to Hungary, the Hungarian and Irish authorities had been able to arrange for him to serve out his sentence mainly in Ireland. Ultimately, accountability for loss of life had been enforced. It could not therefore be said that Ireland had failed in any procedural obligation that may have arisen out of the accident.
Conclusion: inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded).
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
Click here for the Case-Law Information Notes
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy