ZOTOV AND TARANENKO v. RUSSIA and 2 other applications

Published on 26 February 2024

FOURTH SECTION

Application no. 79566/16
Anatoliy Nikolayevich ZOTOV and Sergey Yevgenyevich TARANENKO against Russia
and 2 other applications
(see list appended)
communicated on 6 February 2024

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

The applications originate from the conflict between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. They concern the property rights to the applicants’ cars (applications nos. 15381/17 and 18084/18) and a company (application no. 79566/16) in Crimea.

In 2006 the applicants in application no. 79566/16 became shareholders of a Ukrainian company, M., based in Yalta, holding 25% of its shares each. The remaining 50% had been held by a third shareholder, L., who was replaced in 2010 by a third-party company, M.S.

In 2011 the applicants in applications nos. 15381/17 and 18084/18 became owners of their cars, Mitsubishi Colt produced in 2006 and Suzuki Jimmy produced in 2004, respectively. The cars were registered in Sevastopol and Dnipro, respectively.

The Federal Constitutional Law of the Russian Federation No. 6-FKZ of 21 March 2014 (hereinafter referred as “6‑FKZ”), which formalised assertion of Russian jurisdiction over Crimea under Russian law, provided for transitional arrangements aimed at homogenising the regulation of, among other things, property and corporate relations in Crimea and Sevastopol with the legal regime established in the Russian Federation.

The new legal regime required all legal entities based in or managed from Crimea and Sevastopol to re-register under Russian law or establish their Russian branches within a deadline expiring on 1 March 2015. On 27 April 2015 the Government of the Russian Federation adopted the Resolution No. 399 which also required all residents of Crimea and Sevastopol to re‑register their means of transport under Russian law by 1 April 2016.

On 26 June 2014 a shareholders’ meeting of M. was allegedly convened and held in Yalta. The key issue on its agenda was the re-registration of M. under Russian law. The applicants in application no. 79566/16 challenged the minutes of the meeting claiming that it had been staged, that they had not been invited or participated in it and had not agreed to the re-registration. Their claim was rejected by final decisions of Russian courts which reasoned that the decisions of the meeting had not violated the applicants’ rights as shareholders of M. and that they had tacitly agreed to M.’s re-registration by not objecting against it in their correspondence with M.S.

On 6 January 2015 when the applicant in application no. 18084/18 entered Crimea from mainland Ukraine, Russian authorities registered her car with Ukrainian number plates (‘AE’ series of the Dnipropetrovsk region) as temporarily imported into the Russian Federation for three months. Then, on 28 September 2016, when she tried to leave Crimea, her car was seized by customs officers. On 28 November 2016 she was found guilty of a violation of customs rules (Article 16.18(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation (“the CAO”)) and fined 1,500 roubles; her car was ordered to remain seized until its customs clearance. The applicant’s appeal and cassation appeals on points of law were rejected.

On 7 July 2016 Russian traffic police officers stopped the applicant in application no. 15381/17 on the road between Simferopol and Sevastopol because of his car’s Ukrainian number plates (‘CH’ series of the city of Sevastopol). On 29 August 2016 he was found guilty of a failure to re-register his car (Article 12.1 of the CAO) and fined 500 roubles. His subsequent appeal was rejected.

Relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 the applicants complain that the requirements to have their property re-registered under Russian law and the respective actions of the Russian authorities against them constituted a control of the use of their property, which was not provided for by law, has been arbitrary and did not pursue a legitimate aim.

QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES

1.  Has there been an interference with the applicants’ peaceful enjoyment of possessions, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1?

2.  If so, did the alleged acts which gave rise to the applicants’ complaints had a basis in “law” within the meaning of this provision?

3.  Assuming that there had been an interference and that it was “lawful”, was that interference necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties?

APPENDIX

List of applications: