AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 17279/90
by Walter ZUKRIGL
against Austria
The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on
13 May 1992, the following members being present:
MM. E. BUSUTTIL, Acting President of the First Chamber
F. ERMACORA
E. BUSUTTIL
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
Sir Basil HALL
Mr. C.L. ROZAKIS
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. M. PELLONPÄÄ
B. MARXER
Mr. M. de SALVIA, Secretary to the First Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 31 July 1990 by
Waler Zukrigl against Austria and registered on 10 October 1992 under
file No. 17279/90;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is an Austrian citizen born in 1933. He is
represented before the Commission by Mr. W. Dietrich, a lawyer
practising in Vienna.
The facts of the application, as submitted by the applicant, may
be summarised as follows.
The applicant is a homosexual, aware of his sexuality since his
youth.
In early 1986 the applicant met and became friends with a boy
who, at the time, was not yet 18 years old. The applicant's homosexual
feelings towards the boy were reciprocated. Because of the provisions
of Section 209 of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) the applicant was
not permitted to - and did not - have sexual relations with his friend.
The applicant introduced two constitutional complaints with the
Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof), one concerning the
wording of Article 209 up to 31 December 1988, and one concerning the
new wording which was in force from 1 January 1989.
The Constitutional Court rejected the first constitutional
complaint( concerning the old wording of Section 209) on the grounds
that the applicant no longer stood under any threat of being prosecuted
under that provision as it was no longer in force. As to the second
constitutional complaint, concerning the current wording of Section
209, the Constitutional Court, in its decision of 3 October 1989, found
that the applicant had locus standi to make the complaint as he was a
person who was actually affected by the provision. Only a
constitutional complaint could remedy the alleged interference with the
applicant's rights.
The Constitutional Court continued:
(Translation)
"The appellant especially sees a violation of equal rights
in the passage of the law he challenges in its allegedly
treating men and women differently, in a way that is not
justified on any relevant grounds, with respect to
homosexual activities with young people under 18. It is
claimed that if the legislature has in mind the protection
and the safeguarding of the undisturbed sexual development
of young people, there is no difference at all between the
development of male and female sexuality. It is also
asserted that if in order to justify exemption from
punishment for female homosexual acts involving under-age
partners a position is taken up which is based on whether
the effects of such acts are harmful, this standpoint
cannot be given up when it comes to judging homosexual
contacts with male under-age persons.
The Constitutional Court continues to hold the view it has
consistently expressed in previous cases that the scope
given to the ordinary legislature by the constitution with
respect to the passing of legislation applies both to the
aims it is seeking to achieve and to the choice of the
methods serving to achieve those aims. The ordinary
legislature is free to decide - while taking into account
either desired side-effects or those it is prepared to
accept - what instruments it considers suitable in order to
achieve its aims and then actually applies in a given
situation. In this connection it is only barred from
exceeding the limits imposed by the constitution, for
example by violating the requirement to be objective (which
results from the principle that everyone must be treated
equally) by choosing completely unsuitable means of
achieving an aim or by choosing means which, although
basically suitable, lead to a distinction being made for
which no valid reasons can be given. The development of
the criminal law in the last few decades has shown that the
legislature is striving to apply the system of criminal
justice in a significantly more restrictive way than before
- in pursuance of the efforts it is undertaking in
connection with its policy on the treatment of offenders,
which have become known under the general heading of
"decriminalisation". This means that it only leaves
offences on the statute book or creates new offences if
such punishment of behaviour harmful to society is still
found absolutely necessary and indispensable after the
strictest criteria have been applied. The criminal
provision which has been challenged is included in that
group of acts considered unlawful in order to protect - to
an extent thought to be unavoidable - a young, maturing
person from developing sexually in the wrong way
("Homosexual acts are only offences of relevance to the
criminal law inasmuch as a dangerous strain must not be
placed by homosexual experiences upon the sexual
development of young males ..."). Seen in this light, it
is the conviction of the Constitutional Court that from the
point of view of the principle of equality contained in
Article 7 para. 1 of the Federal Constitutional Law and
Article 2 of the Basic Constitutional Act those legislating
on the criminal law cannot reasonably be challenged for
taking the attitude, by reference to authoritative expert
opinions coupled with experience gained, that homosexual
influence endangers maturing males to a significantly
greater extent than girls of the same age, and conclude
that it is necessary to punish under the criminal law
homosexual acts committed with young males, as provided for
under s. 209 of the Penal Code. This conclusion was also
based on their views of morality, which they wanted to
impose while duly observing current policy on criminal
justice, which aims at moderation and at restricting the
punishment of offences (while carefully weighing up all the
manifold advantages and disadvantages). Taking everything
into account, we are dealing here with a distinction which
is based on factual differences and therefore
constitutionally admissible from the point of view of
Article 7 para. 1 of the Federal Constitutional Law, in
conjunction with Article 2 of the Basic Constitutional Act.
The Constitutional Court thus endorses the legal view held
by the Supreme Court, which did not raise any
constitutional doubts concerning the legal rule contained
in the earlier version of s. 209 of the Penal Code, the
basic conception of which was comparable with respect to
the different treatment of under-age males and females.
This has already been demonstrated in several judgments
(cf. OGH 15 September 1981, 9 Os 144/81 = EvBl. 1982 No.
35; 23 April 1986, 9 Os 38/86; see also OGH 10 September
1981, 13 Os 115/81 = EvBl 1982 No. 65m; 24 August 1982, 9
Os 114/82 = SSt. 53/50). The restriction contained in the
Juvenile Court Law 1988 (Federal Law Gazette 599) of the
group of offenders to (male) adults also raises no doubts
with respect to the constitutional law. The Constitutional
Court basically shares the view expressed by the Federal
Government, the gist of which is that this is only an
expression of the basic legal idea that the strict,
rigorous means of punishment available under the criminal
law must be handled sparingly and with proper restraint.
Contrary to the appellant's view, the criminal provision
which is challenged cannot violate Article 8 of the
European Convention on Human Rights simply because the
interference with private and family life, which it is
claimed has taken place, is quite obviously a legislative
measure for the protection of the rights of others which is
admissible under Article 8 para. 2 of the Convention,
namely the protection of the undisturbed development of
persons affected by criminal acts.
It therefore follows that the application to annul s. 209
of the Penal Code (Federal Law Gazette 60/1974, as amended:
Federal Law Gazette 599/1988) had to be dismissed as
ill-founded."
(Original)
"Die Gleichheitswidrigkeit der angegriffenen Gesetzesstelle
erblickt der Einschreiter insbesondere darin, daß sie
Männer und Frauen in bezug auf homosexuelle Handlungen mit
Jugendlichen in sachlich nicht gerechtfertigter Weise
unterschiedlich behandle. Habe der Gesetzgeber den Schutz
und die Sicherung der ungestörten sexuellen Entwicklung
junger Menschen vor Augen, so bestehe kein Unterschied in
der Entwicklung männlicher und weiblicher Sexualität
überhaupt. Werde zur Rechtfertigung der Straflosigkeit
weiblicher homosexueller Kontakte zu jüngeren Partnerinnen
eine Position bezogen, die sich an schädigenden Wirkungen
orientiere, könne dieser Standpunkt bei der Beurteilung
homosexueller Kontakte zu männlichen jüngeren Personen
nicht aufgegeben werden.
Der Verfassungsgerichtshof hält an seiner in ständiger
Rechtsprechung vertretenen Auffassung fest, daß die dem
einfachen Gesetzgeber verfassungsmäßig eingeräumte
rechtspolitische Gestaltungsfreiheit sowohl für die
angestrebten Ziele als auch für die Auswahl der zur
Zielerreichung dienlichen Mittel gilt: Der einfache
Gesetzgeber kann frei entscheiden, welche Instrumente er -
under Berücksichtigung erwünschter oder in Kauf genommener
Nebenwirkungen - in der jeweils gegebenen Situation zur
Verwirklichung seiner Zielsetzungen geeignet erachtet und
anwendet. Verwehrt ist ihm hiebei nur die Überschreitung
der von Verfasssungs wegen gezogenen Schranken, so die
Verletzung des aus dem Gleichheitssatz erfließenden
Sachlichkeitsgebots, indem beispielsweise zur
Zielerreichung völlig ungeeignete Mittel gewählt werden
oder die vorgesehenen, an sich geeigneten zu einer sachlich
unbegründbaren Differenzierung führen. Die Fortentwicklung
der Strafrechtsordnung in den letzten Jahrzehnten zeigt
nun, dass der Gesetzgeber das Justizstrafrecht - in
Verfolgung seiner unter dem Überbegriff
"Entkriminalisierung" bekannt gewordenen
kriminalpolitischen Bestrebungen - deutlich restriktiver
als zuvor einzusetzen trachtet, Straftatbestände also nur
dann bestehen läßt oder neu schafft, wenn eine derartige
Pönalisierung sozialschädlichen Verhaltens auch nach
strengsten Kriterien unbedingt geboten und unerläßlich ist.
Die angefochtene Strafnorm zählt zu jener Gruppe von
Unrechtstatbeständen, die dem Schutz des heranreifenden
jungen Menschen vor sexueller Fehlentwicklung - im
unumgänglich befundenen Umfang - dient ["Homosexuelle
Betätigung ist strafrechtlich nur insofern relevant, als
die sexuelle Entwicklung männlicher Jugendlicher nicht
durch homosexuelle Erlebnisse in gefährdender Weise
belastet werden soll..."). So betrachtet kann dem
Strafgesetzgeber aber nach Überzeugung des
Verfassungsgerichtshofs unter dem Aspekt des
Gleichbehandlungssatzes der Art. 7 Abs. 1 B-VG und 2 StGG
nicht mit Grund entgegengetreten werden, wenn er - unter
Berufung auf maßgebende Expertenmeinungen in Verbindung mit
Erfahrungstatsachen den Standpunkt einnehmend, daß eine
homosexuelle Einflußnahme männliche Heranreifende in
signifikant höherem Grad gefährde als gleichaltrige Mädchen
- auf dem Boden und in Durchsetzung seiner
Wertvorstellungen mit Beachtung der eingeschränkten,
maßhaltenden Ziele der vorherrschenden Strafrechtspolitik
(bei sorgsamer Abwägung aller vielfältigen Vor- und
Nachteile) ableitet, es sei mit einer strafrechtlichen
Ahndung homosexueller Handlungen an jungen Menschen
männlichen Geschlechts, wie in § 209 StGB festgelegt, das
Auslangen zu finden. Denn es handelt sich hier - alles in
allem genommen - um eine Differenzierung, die auf
Unterschieden im Tatsachenbereich beruht und deswegen aus
der Sicht des Art. 7 Abs. 1 B-VG iVm Art. 2 StGG
verfassungsrechtlich zulässig ist. Der
Verfassungsgerichtshof tritt damit im Ergebnis der
Rechtsmeinung des Obersten Gerichtshofs bei, der - wie
schon in mehreren Entscheidungen dargelegt (vgl. OGH
15.9.1981 9 Os 144/81 = EvBl. 1982 Nr. 35, 23.4.1986, 9 Os
38/86; s. auch OGH 10.9.1981 13 Os 115/81 = EvBl. 1982 Nr.
65m 24.84.1982 9 Os 114/82 = SSt. 53/50) - die in ihrer
Grundkonzeption vergleichbare Strafnorm des § 209 StGB
(frühere Fassung) aus dem Blickwinkel der unterschiedlichen
Behandlung von männlichen und weiblichen Minderjährigen
verfassungsrechtlich nicht in Zweifel zog. Doch auch die
hier relevierte, mit dem Jugendgerichtsgesetz 1988, BGBl.
599, verfügte Einschränkung des Täterkreises auf
(männliche) Volljährige begegnet keinen verfassungs-
rechtlichen Bedenken. Der Verfassungsgerichtshof teilt
dazu im wesentlichen die Auffassung der Bundesregierung,
die (sinngemäß) zutreffend darauf hinweist, daß hierin nur
der rechtspolitische Grundgedanke zum Ausdruck komme, die
einschneidenden strengen Mittel des Kriminalrechts in
sachgerechter Weise zurückhaltend und sparsam zu handhaben.
Gegen Art. 8 EMRK wieder kann die angefochtene Stafnorm
entgegen der Meinung des Antragstellers allein schon
deshalb nicht verstoßen, weil der behauptete Eingriff in
das Privat- und Familienleben ganz offenkundig eine nach
Art. 8 Abs. 2 EMRK zulässige gesetzgeberische Maßnahme
zum Schutz der Rechte anderer ist, nämlich zum Schutz der
ungestörten Entwicklung der von den Straftaten betroffenen
Personen.
Daraus folgt aber, daß der Antrag, § 209 StGB, BGBl.
60/1974 idF BGBl. 599/1988, als verfassungswidrig
aufzuheben, als unbegründet abzuweisen war."
Relevant provisions of domestic law
Up to 31 December 1988:
(Translation)
s. 209. A male person who after attaining the age of
eighteen fornicates with a youth of the same sex shall be
sentenced to detention of between six months and five
years.
(Original)
§ 209. Eine Person männlichen Geschlechtes, die nach
Vollendung des achtzehnten Lebensjahres mit einer
jugendlichen Person gleichgeschlechtliche Unzucht treibt,
ist mit Freiheitsstrafe von sechs Monaten bis zu fünf
Jahren zu bestrafen.
From 1 January 1989:
(Translation)
s. 209. A male person who after attaining the age of
nineteen years fornicates with a person of the same sex who
has attained the age of fourteen years but not the age of
nineteen years shall be sentenced to detention of between
six months and five years.
(Original)
§ 209. Eine Person männlichen Geschlechtes, die nach
vollendung des neunzehnten Lebensjahres mit einer Person,
die das vierzehnte, aber noch nicht das achtzehnte
Lebensjahr vollendet hat, gleichgeschlechtliche Unzucht
treibt, ist mit Freiheitsstrafe von sechs Monaten bis zu
fünf Jahren zu bestrafen.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant alleges that the continued existence of Article 209
of the Criminal Code constitutes an unjustified interference with his
right to respect for private life, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the
Convention. He also considers that the fact that Article 209 only
applies to relations between men, and not to relations between women,
violates Article 14 in connection with Article 8 of the Convention.
THE LAW
1. The applicant alleges violation of Article 8 (art. 8) of the
Convention by virtue of the existence of legislation which makes it a
criminal offence for a man over the age of 19 to have homosexual
relations with a boy between the ages of 14 and 18. Article 8
(Art. 8) of the Convention provides as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being
of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.
The applicant in the present case has not been prosecuted under
the new version of Section 209 of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch).
The Commission must accordingly consider whether he may claim to be
"the victim of a violation" of Article 8 (Art. 8) within the meaning
of Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention.
The Commission recalls that in its judgment in the Marckx case
the European Court of Human Rights held the following:
"Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention entitles
individuals to contend that a law violates their rights by
itself, in the absence of an individual measure of
implementation, if they run the risk of being directly
affected by it." (Eur. Court H.R., Marckx judgment of 13
June 1979, Series A no. 31, p. 13, para. 27).
The Commission has had regard to the jurisprudence of the Court
according to which the very existence of legislation may continuously
affect the exercise of a right under the Convention (cf. Eur. Court
H.R., Dudgeon judgment of 22 October 1981, Series A no. 45, p. 18,
para. 41) even in the absence of an individual measure of
implementation (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Johnston and Others judgment of
18 December 1986, Series A no. 112, p. 21, para. 42) and even where the
risk of such an implementation is minimal (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Norris
judgment of 26 October 1988, Series A no. 142, p. 16, para. 33).
Moreover, the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof)
found, for the purposes of Austrian law, that the current text of
Section 209 of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) affected the
applicant in the enjoyment of his rights. Having regard to the above
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, and to the finding
of the Constitutional Court, the Commission finds that the applicant
may claim to be a victim of a violation within the meaning of Article
25 (Art. 25) of the Convention.
To the extent that the applicant is required to exhaust domestic
remedies in connection with a complaint concerning the effect of a
provision on his right to respect for private life, the Commission
finds that, by putting his complaint to the Constitutional Court, the
applicant has exhausted domestic remedies according to the generally
recognised rules of international law.
Having regard to the above-mentioned Dudgeon and Norris judgments
of the Court, and to the Commission's Report in the case of Modinos v.
Cyprus (No. 15070/89, Report 3.12.91), the Commission finds that the
existence of Article 209 of the Criminal Code amounts to an
interference with the applicant's right to respect for his private life
as guaranteed by Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention, that
the interference is "in accordance with the law", and that the aim of
the interference is the "protection of the rights and freedoms of
others" and the "protection of morals".
As to the question of necessity, the Commission recalls that the
Convention organs have on three occasions considered the
criminalisation of homosexual activities between consenting male adults
as not "necessary in a democratic society" within the meaning of
Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention (Dudgeon and Norris
judgments and Modinos case, referred to above). The present case,
however, relates not to a prohibition on homosexual acts between
consenting male adults, but rather to legislation fixing an age of
consent to homosexual activities, with a separate age of criminal
responsibility for the relevant offences (cf. No. 7215/75, Comm. Report
12.10.78, D.R. 19 p. 66, paras. 139-158).
It is, in the first place, for the domestic authorities to assess
whether a pressing social need exists for an interference with the
rights set out in Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention, and
that in making this assessment, a margin of appreciation is left to the
States (cf. Norris judgment, referred to above, p. 20, para. 45 with
further references).
The Commission recalls that it has already considered that there
was a realistic basis (in 1978) for the conclusion that young men in
the age-bracket 18-21 who are involved in homosexual relationships
would be subject to substantial social pressures which could be harmful
to their psychological development (No. 7215/75, referred to above,
para. 154). In that case, the Commission found that the United Kingdom
Government had not gone beyond its obligations under the Convention in
attempting to strike a balance between the conflicting interests
involved.
In the present case, the age of "consent" is lower than in the
previous case concerning the United Kingdom, and the age at which
criminal responsibility will be imputed for breach of the respective
provisions is higher in Austria than in the United Kingdom. Although
it appears from the extensive documents submitted by the applicant that
attitudes in general may have evolved since 1978, the Commission finds
nothing in the present case to distinguish it from Application No.
7215/75, save that the Austrian legislation is less restrictive.
The interference with the applicant's right to respect for his
private life can therefore be considered "necessary in a democratic
society" within the meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the
Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-
founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
2. The applicant also alleges a violation of Article 14 of the
Convention in connection with Article 8 (Art. 14+8). He points out
that Section 209 of the Criminal Code relates only to male homosexual
behaviour, and considers that the fact that female homosexual behaviour
is not included amounts to an unjustified distinction in the enjoyment
of Article 8 (Art. 8) rights, contrary to Article 14 (Art. 14) of the
Convention. Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention provides as
follows:
"The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin,
association with a national minority, property, birth or
other status."
This issue is also canvassed in the Commission's Report in
Application No. 7215/75, (Comm. Report 12.10.78, D.R. 19 p. 66, paras.
166-170). In addition, in the present case, the Constitutional Court
has discussed, in the context of the principle of equality before the
law, whether a discrimination was involved. The Constitutional Court
noted that the reason why female homosexuality had been excluded from
the scope of Section 209 was because it was the policy of the
legislator only to impose criminal sanctions in cases where such
penalty was absolutely necessary, even using the strictest criteria.
It further noted that the legislator had considered that there was
considerably more danger of homosexual influence on adolescent males
than girls of the same age. Accordingly, although there was a
difference in treatment, the Constitutional Court found that the
existence of Section 209 did not raise constitutional problems.
Bearing in mind both its previous Report in Application No.
7215/75 (referred to above) and the reasons set out in the
Constitutional Court's decision of 3 October 1989, the Commission finds
that the application of Section 209 of the Criminal Code to males but
not to females does not constitute discrimination against the applicant
within the meaning of Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2
(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission by a majority
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Secretary to the First Chamber Acting President of the First Chamber
(M. De SALVIA) (E. BUSUTTIL)
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