FIRST SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 22487/21
Bojan ZUSTOVIĆ and Branko ZUSTOVIĆ
against Croatia
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 19 March 2026 as a Committee composed of:
Frédéric Krenc, President,
Davor Derenčinović,
Alain Chablais, judges,
and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 22487/21) against the Republic of Croatia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 21 April 2021 by two Croatian nationals, Mr Bojan Zustović and Mr Branko Zustović (“the applicants”), who were born in 1977 and 1954 respectively and live in Kršan, and were represented by Mr M. Matanović, a lawyer practising in Pazin;
the decision to give notice of the complaints concerning non-enforcement under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 thereto to the Croatian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms Š. Stažnik, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The application concerns non-enforcement of a judgment favourable to the applicants which had been obtained by a municipality against a private individual.
2. In civil proceedings concerning disturbance of possession, the Kršan municipality (“the municipality”) obtained a first-instance judgment ordering a private party, D., to liberate the unclassified road he had occupied. The first-instance judgment, adopted by the Labin Municipal Court on 27 October 2014, was upheld by the Pula County Court on 5 January 2015 and thus became final.
3. The municipality then applied for enforcement of that judgment. On 18 March 2015 the Labin Municipal Court issued a writ of execution, whereby it ordered D. to restore the road to its previous condition, failing which the municipality would be authorised to carry out the necessary works through third parties, at his expense.
4. The applicants participated in both the civil and the ensuing enforcement proceedings as interested third parties (umješač) on the side of the municipality because the road in question had enabled them to access their properties.
5. D. failed to restore the road to its previous condition. The enforcement court, therefore, on several occasions, invited the municipality to inform it whether it had selected a contractor to carry out the necessary works (see paragraph 3 above). In September 2019 the municipality informed the court that it had signed a contract with a contractor for the performance of the works in question. Accordingly, the enforcement was scheduled for 31 January 2020.
6. However, on 21 January 2020 the municipality withdrew its application for enforcement because it had established, on the basis of a traffic expert’s report, that an alternative access road leading to the applicants’ properties had been set up in the meantime. It considered that, in those circumstances, insisting on enforcement would impose an excessive individual burden on D., through whose land the unclassified road was passing.
7. The applicants opposed the municipality’s withdrawal. They argued that, pursuant to section 3(3) of the Civil Procedure Act, the enforcement court could not accept such disposition by the municipality because it had contravened the mandatory rules and public morals. In particular, they maintained that, unlike the road obstructed by D., the alternative road could not be considered an unclassified road within the meaning of the 2011 Roads Act because it had not existed on the day when that Act had entered into force. For a new unclassified road to be built, the necessary permits would first have to be obtained and it would have to be examined whether the necessary spatial planning conditions had been satisfied, none of which had been done in the present case. They also claimed that, in withdrawing the application, the municipality had breached its duty of safeguarding its property.
8. By a decision of 29 January 2020, the enforcement court discontinued the enforcement proceedings. It also declared the applicants’ submissions inadmissible on the grounds that, as interveners in those proceedings, they could only undertake those actions which benefited the party they had joined – that is, the municipality as the enforcement creditor – and were not contrary to the actions of the latter. Nevertheless, it explained that the withdrawal of the application for enforcement had not been contrary to section 3(3) of the Civil Procedure Act.
9. By a decision of 21 July 2020, the Pula County Court dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicants and on 16 December 2020 the Supreme Court declared a petition to appeal on points of law, filed by the applicants, inadmissible. Lastly, by a decision of 6 October 2020, served on the applicants’ representative on 21 October 2020, the Constitutional Court declared a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicants inadmissible.
10. Before the Court, the applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 thereto about the municipality’s withdrawal of its application for enforcement and the enforcement court’s decision to discontinue the enforcement. In particular, they argued that, in discontinuing the enforcement proceedings, the domestic courts had failed to account for their interests, notably, in being able to access their properties using the adequate unclassified road.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
11. The general principles concerning the non-enforcement of a final domestic judgment, where the debtor is a private individual, have been summarised in Orel v. Croatia ((dec.), no. 51506/13, §§ 69-70, 7 June 2016). In particular, in such cases the Court must examine whether measures taken by the domestic authorities with a view to enforcing the judgment in the applicant’s favour were adequate and sufficient for the respondent State to comply with its positive obligations under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The same applies to the positive obligation under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Nikoghosyan v. Armenia (dec.), no. 2193/05, § 63, 18 September 2012).
12. That said, the right of “access to court” does not impose an obligation on a State to execute every judgment of civil character without having regard to the particular circumstances of a case (see Kesyan v. Russia, no. 36496/02, § 64, 19 October 2006).
13. The specific feature of the present case is that the scope of the procedural actions that the applicants could undertake within the enforcement proceedings was somewhat limited, the applicants not being parties to the proceedings, but only interested third parties joining therein the enforcement creditor – the municipality (see paragraph 8 above). In view of their procedural role, the applicants could not prevent the discontinuation of the enforcement proceedings following the municipality’s decision to withdraw the enforcement application, a decision which prevented them from obtaining execution of a final judgment which was beneficial for them.
14. However, the State’s non-compliance with its positive obligation to enforce final judgments was justified in the present case by the need to protect the interests of the enforcement debtor, D., through whose land the unclassified road passed (see paragraph 6 above). In view of the fact that the applicants had the alternative road for accessing their properties, the State’s non-compliance with the obligation in question was also proportional. In that connection, the Court further notes that the applicants did not claim that the access to their properties had, at any time, been completely cut off. Rather, they stressed the inadequacy of the alternative road.
15. To the extent that the applicants challenged the municipality’s assessment and argued that the alternative road to their properties was inadequate, the Court observes that, with regard to any damage they may suffer on account of not being able to use the unclassified road, they can institute separate civil proceedings against the enforcement debtor.
16. In view of the circumstances above, the Court finds that in the present case the applicants’ complaints concerning the State’s positive obligations under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 thereto do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.
17. It follows that this application is inadmissible under Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention as manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 thereof.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 9 April 2026.
Liv Tigerstedt Frédéric Krenc
Deputy Registrar President