SECOND SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 34096/02
by Arvydas ŽIVULINSKAS
against Lithuania
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on
12 December 2006 as a Chamber composed of:
MrJ.-P. Costa, President,
MrA.B. Baka,
MrI. Cabral Barreto,
MsA. Mularoni,
MrsE. Fura-Sandström,
MsD. Jočienė,
MrD. Popović, judges,
and Mrs S. Dollé, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 2 September 2002,
Having regard to the decision to apply Article 29 § 3 of the Convention and examine the admissibility and merits of the case together.
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant is a Lithuanian national who was born in 1964 and lives in Kaunas.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
On 24 December 1996 the Kaunas Regional Court convicted the applicant of aggravated murder, sentencing him to 14 years’ imprisonment.
1. The search of 1 February 2002 and the disciplinary penalty of 7 February 2002
On 1 February 2002 a search of the applicant’s belongings was carried out at the Vilnius Sniego Prison. The applicant alleges that cash, in the amount of LTL 300 (about EUR 87), and a packet of washing powder were removed. The prison administration considered that the possession of these items was prohibited by the Prison Code and the Prison Interim Rules.
On 4 February 2002 the prison administration, having obtained a prosecutor’s approval, ordered that the confiscated money be transferred to the State’s account.
On 7 February 2002 a special disciplinary commission of the prison decided to impose on the applicant a disciplinary penalty, namely the deprivation of the right to receive or send a parcel on one occasion, and to purchase food in the prison shop for a month.
The applicant brought a court action, contesting the search and the penalty. In particular, he complained that the above decisions had been taken in his absence, in breach of his defence rights. The applicant also alleged that he had suffered double jeopardy by way of the confiscation of his money as well as the imposition of the disciplinary penalty on 7 February 2002. He requested that the money be returned to him.
In the context of the action, the applicant was granted free legal assistance for his representation before a court.
On 6 June 2002 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court examined the case in the presence of the applicant. The lawyer assigned to represent him failed to appear. The court rejected the applicant’s request to adjourn the examination of the case, having found that the applicant’s lawyer had been duly informed of the hearing.
The applicant’s action was dismissed. The court first held that the applicant’s money had been confiscated and transferred to the State’s account in accordance with Article 41 of the Prison Code. That measure was not deemed a “penalty” under domestic law since it was not included in the exhaustive list of disciplinary penalties (Article 69 of the Prison Code). The court dismissed the applicant’s allegation that he had been punished twice. It was furthermore established that, prior to the search, the prison inspectors had proposed that the applicant voluntarily show them any possibly illicit items. Had the applicant shown the cash, it would not have been confiscated but returned to him, in accordance with Article 83 of the Prison Interim Rules. However, the applicant had failed to do so. The court also noted that the law (providing for the confiscation of any cash held in the prison) was justified in the public interest.
It was also established that the penalty of 7 February 2002 was imposed in accordance with Article 61 of the Prison Code for a breach of prison discipline.
The court noted, however, that the disciplinary proceedings had been conducted in breach of Article 419 of the Prison Interim Rules, which guaranteed to the accused the right to be heard by a special disciplinary commission of the prison before the decision on a disciplinary penalty was taken. Nevertheless, the court considered that that irregularity had not rendered the proceedings as a whole unfair, since the applicant had been afforded the opportunity to submit his explanations to the commission in writing, in accordance with Article 356 of the Prison Interim Rules. There was no evidence that the applicant had intended to present any new arguments in addition to those indicated in his written explanations, as he had not submitted any new statements to the court.
The applicant appealed, complaining that the case had been examined in the absence of his lawyer. He was again granted free legal aid for his representation before the appellate court.
On 3 September 2002 the Supreme Administrative Court examined the case in the presence of the applicant and his lawyer, dismissing the applicant’s appeal. The appellate court upheld the reasoning of the lower court.
2. The alleged lack of space in the prison
The applicant brought another court action against the administration of the Vilnius Sniego Prison, complaining about the lack of space in dormitory no. 5, where he had been sleeping from 17 January 1997 until 10 October 2002. The applicant alleged that the overcrowding resulted in a lack of fresh air at night, causing him insomnia and headaches, and that it had had a very negative impact on his physical and mental health. The applicant claimed non-pecuniary damages in the amount of LTL 5,000 (about EUR 1,448).
On 20 December 2002 the Vilnius Regional Court essentially accepted the applicant’s claim, the applicant being present. The court held inter alia:
“It is undisputed that the official hygienic norms (HN 76:1999) guarantee the minimum space of 3 square metres for each inmate. The conditions in the [Sniego Prison] are not in compliance with the above norm, since the number of inmates exceeds that fixed by the order of 6 February 2001 by the Director of the Prison Department of the Ministry of Justice. While the order establishes 124 places in the [prison], as a matter of fact about 150 inmates are held there at any one time. ...
[T]he Civil Code foresees three conditions for civil liability: [a] the unlawful actions or inaction of the respondent [State institution] or its employees, [b] damage, and [c] the causal link between the actions (inaction) and the damage. It is for the applicant who seeks civil damages to demonstrate the existence of all these elements.”
The Court concluded that the applicant had not shown that he had suffered non-pecuniary damage as a result of the slight overcrowding.
The applicant appealed, stating that the prison administration had not submitted any evidence to show that it had requested additional finances from the Prison Department or the Government. The applicant also pointed out that the lack of space in the Sniego Prison had been acknowledged as a fact.
On 12 February 2003 the Supreme Administrative Court examined the case in the applicant’s presence, dismissing the appeal and upholding the reasoning of the lower court.
3. The applicant’s medical condition while in prison
From the medical reports submitted by the applicant, it appears that from 13 January 2000 to 1 August 2001 the applicant had consulted the prison doctor eight times. On several occasions he was diagnosed with a number of minor illnesses. The medical report of 30 September 2002 indicated that the applicant should be relieved from work and allowed to stay in bed, without specifying any reasons. Several medical reports dating from 2002 to 2005 also indicated that the applicant had sought consultations due to headaches, hypertension and certain psychological disorders.
4. Other proceedings
On 6 April and 4 November 2004, the Vilnius Regional Court upheld the decisions of the Vilnius City Third District Court to refuse the request of the prison administration for the applicant’s release on licence.
On 28 April 2005 the Vilnius City Third District Court granted the request of the prison administration, ordering the applicant’s conditional release.
The applicant was released on 4 May 2005.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
Article 21 of the Constitution prohibits inhuman and degrading treatment.
The Prisons Code (as then in force) provided:
Article 1 § 2:
“Punishment is not intended to cause physical suffering or degrade human dignity.”
Article 41 § 2
“Searches of inmates shall be carried out.”
Article 41 § 4
“Convicts are not permitted to keep money in cash ... Any cash found shall be seized and transferred to the State’s account by a reasoned decision of the head of the prison administration, upon approval by a prosecutor.”
Article 61 § 1
“Convicts breaching the prison regime shall be punished ... by the deprivation of the right to receive or send a parcel on one occasion, and to purchase food in a prison shop during one month.”
Article 70 § 9
“Convicts have the right to appeal against a disciplinary punishment.”
Until 1999, Article 77 § 1 of the Prison Code established the minimum floor-space per inmate at 2 square metres. From 1999 this norm was increased to 3 square metres, in accordance with Sanitary Standard HN:1999 (approved by the order of the Minister of Health on 22 October 1999).
Article 83 of the Prison Interim Rules provided that any items belonging to a detainee, which have been surrendered to the prison administration voluntarily, shall be put into storage and returned to the owner upon release.
Article 419 of the Prison Interim Rules provided a right for an inmate to be present before a special disciplinary commission of the prison.
Article 6.271 of the Civil Code (in force from 1 July 2001):
“1. Damage caused by the unlawful acts of public institutions shall be compensated by the State from the budget, irrespective of the fault of an actual civil servant ...
3. For the purposes of this Article, the term “action” shall be taken to mean any action (active action or failure to act) of a public institution or its employees, which directly affects the rights, liberties or interests of persons ... .
4. The civil liability of the State ... shall arise if employees of public institutions fail to act in accordance with the law.”
Article 6.273 of the Civil Code provides that, in cases where the State is liable to cover the damage, it shall be represented by the Government or an institution authorised by the Government.
COMPLAINTS
1. Under Article 6 of the Convention the applicant complained that the disciplinary proceedings against him had been unfair, given that the disciplinary penalty of 7 February 2002 was allegedly imposed by the prison administration in his absence, that it had been executed without awaiting the result of his court action, and that the court proceedings in the determination of his action had fallen short of the requirements of adversarial proceedings and respect for his defence rights.
2. Under Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention, the applicant also complained that he had been punished twice for the same offence in view of the confiscation of his cash and the imposition of a disciplinary penalty on 7 February 2002.
3. He alleged that the search of his belongings had been incompatible with Article 8 of the Convention.
4. The applicant further complained that the confiscation of his cash had breached Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
5. The applicant next complained that the lack of space in his prison cell had caused him suffering amounting to a breach of Article 3 of the Convention.
6. Under Article 6 of the Convention the applicant complained that the courts had been biased and had arbitrarily dismissed his action regarding his conditions of detention. He alleged that he had had no effective remedy in this respect.
7. Finally, under Article 6 of the Convention, the applicant complained about the outcome and fairness of the proceedings concerning his release on licence.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complained about the disciplinary proceedings against him at the Vilnius Sniego Prison. In particular, he alleged that he had not been heard before the imposition of the disciplinary penalty on 7 February 2002, which had been executed despite the fact that he had lodged a request for judicial review. The applicant also alleged that the court proceedings had not been adversarial, and that his defence rights had been breached. The applicant invoked Article 6 of the Convention, which provides, insofar as relevant, as follows:
“1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: ...
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; ...”
The first question to arise is whether Article 6 of the Convention was applicable to these disciplinary proceedings. Given their minor repercussions, the Court has serious doubts about this. However, it does not consider it necessary to resolve the issue because, even assuming that the proceedings involved a determination of a criminal charge against the applicant, the applicant’s related complaints are inadmissible for the following reasons.
The Court notes that, in the course of the judicial proceedings concerning the disciplinary penalty of 7 February 2002, the applicant did not raise any point about the alleged failure of the prison administration to afford suspensive effect for the penalty pending the determination of his action before the administrative courts. It follows that the applicant failed to exhaust domestic remedies as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention in respect of this matter.
It is true that the domestic courts found a procedural irregularity in the prison administration’s handling of the case, stipulating that they should have heard the applicant before imposing the penalty. However, the Court notes that the applicant subsequently benefited from judicial review at two levels of jurisdiction. Moreover, free legal assistance was granted to him for his action against the disciplinary penalty. Although the lawyer called upon to assist the applicant before the first-instance court failed to appear, the applicant himself was present at the hearing. In any event, the defects of the earlier procedure were duly remedied at the appellate instance, where both the applicant and his lawyer were able to present their legal and factual arguments. The applicant was thus afforded sufficient opportunity, both personally and through his counsel, to state his case and contest the evidence which he considered false. The Court is satisfied that the domestic administrative courts carefully examined the evidence before them and adopted reasoned decisions. In these circumstances, the Court cannot find that the essence of the applicant’s right to a fair hearing was impaired, or that the principle of adversarial proceedings or his defence rights were breached.
It follows that this part of the application is to be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
2. The applicant complained that he had been punished twice for the same offence, first by the confiscation of his cash and then by the disciplinary penalty of 7 February 2002. He relied on Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention, which provides in its relevant part as follows:
“No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which he has already been finally acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of that State.”
The Court recalls that the aim of this provision is to prohibit the repetition of criminal proceedings which have been concluded by a final decision (Gradinger v. Austria, judgment of 23 October 1995, Series A no. 328-C, p. 65, § 53). The Court reiterates its serious doubts as to whether the proceedings at issue could be deemed to be of a “criminal” nature. However, even assuming that Article 4 of Protocol
No. 7 to the Convention was applicable to the impugned administrative proceedings, the Court notes that both the confiscation of the cash and the subsequent disciplinary penalty of 7 February 2002, while arising from the same facts, amounted to different sanctions in relation to different breaches of the applicable prison regulations, the lawfulness of which was determined in the course of the same legal proceedings.
It follows that this part of the application is to be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
3. The applicant complained that the search of his belongings
on 1 February 2002 was incompatible with Article 8 of the Convention, which provides insofar as relevant as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private ... life, ... and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society ... for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
However, it does not appear that the applicant specifically contested the lawfulness of the search during the administrative proceedings concerning the penalty of 7 February 2002, nor did he bring a separate court action in this respect (Jankauskas v. Lithuania (dec.), no. 59304/00, 5 December 2003). He has therefore failed to exhaust domestic remedies, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4.
4. The applicant next complained that the removal and subsequent confiscation of his cash by the prison administration breached his property rights. He invoked Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which provides, insofar as relevant, as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.”
However, again, the applicant has submitted no convincing argument which might call into question the domestic courts’ finding that he was deprived of the LTL 300, as a result of the search of 1 February 2002, in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law. Moreover, the domestic courts established that the applicant had been offered the possibility of voluntarily disclosing any illicit items, such as cash. If he had accepted that opportunity, no confiscation would have taken place. The Court recognizes that the holding of personal cash by a prisoner in his or her cell could present a threat to good order in the prison. In these circumstances, the Court does not find that there has been any unjustified or disproportionate interference with the applicant’s property rights, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded, and must similarly be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
5. The applicant next complained that the conditions of his detention in Sniego Prison had been incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
The Government argued that the lack of space in the prison could not be regarded as having attained the severe level of ill-treatment proscribed by Article 3 of the Convention. They submitted that dormitory no. 5 measured 26.15 square metres, and that it had held around 10 inmates at any one time from 17 January 1997 until 10 October 2002. The applicant had thus been allocated about 2.6 square metres in the sleeping quarters. The Government further stated that a number of internal inspections had been carried out in the prison during the applicant’s stay there, establishing that there had been no inadequacies in the detention conditions other than this slight lack of space in the dormitory. In any event, inmates at Sniego had only been obliged to stay in the dormitories from 11 p.m. until 8 a.m. For the rest of the day, they could move around freely within the prison, including its outdoor facilities. There was a big yard, a park and a sports field at the prison. The inmates were not restricted by the prison regime from engaging in recreational activities, such as strolling, communicating, exercising, watching television, listening to music, playing games, etc. There were no restrictions on their visits to the prison chapel, library, canteen, laundries, attending various courses and lectures, or seeing a doctor. Some prisoners were also able to work. The employed prisoners were free to move within the industrial facility of the prison. Overall, the Government considered that, in view of the freedom of movement enjoyed by the prisoners, a slight insufficiency in sleeping space did not amount to inhuman or degrading treatment.
The applicant challenged the Government’s submissions as factually inaccurate. He indicated that the number of inmates per dormitory had been greater than that suggested by the Government. In particular, in 1999, 14 inmates had been sharing dormitory no. 5 and, therefore, the actual space per inmate had been as little as 1.87 square metres. The applicant reiterated that the overcrowding of the prison had resulted in a lack of fresh air at night, as a result of which he had suffered from insomnia, headaches and psychological disorders.
As the Court has held on many occasions, Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values in a democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim’s behaviour (Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 119, ECHR 2000-IV). However, to fall under Article 3 of the Convention, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity. The assessment of this minimum level of severity is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (Valašinas v. Lithuania, no. 44558/98, §§ 100-101, ECHR 2001-VIII).
The Court has also consistently stressed that the suffering and humiliation involved must in any event go beyond the inevitable element of suffering connected with a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment. Under this provision the State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject the prisoner to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, the individual’s health and well-being are adequately secured (Kudla v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 94, ECHR 2000-XI; Valašinas, cited above, § 102). When assessing conditions of detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative effects of those conditions and the duration of the detention. In particular, the Court must have regard to the state of health of the detainee (Iovchev v. Bulgaria, no. 41211/98, § 127, 2 February 2006).
The Court recalls that, in assessing evidence, it adopts the standard of proof “beyond a reasonable doubt”. Such proof may follow from the co-existence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see Labita, cited above, § 121).
As regards the facts of the present case, the Court notes that the applicant spent almost six years and nine months in the Vilnius Sniego Prison. It has not been alleged that the applicant was ever deprived of a separate bed in the dormitory. The Court observes the parties’ differences as to the number of inmates and the amount of space allocated to each person in dormitory no. 5 at certain times. The Government contended that an average of
2.6 square metres per person had been available during most of the applicant’s stay in the prison. The Court observes that this space either complied with (until 1999), or was below domestic standards.
In any event, the assessment of the compliance of prison conditions with the requirements of Article 3 must be made not only by reference to the sleeping space allowed for each prisoner. The relevant data must be viewed in the context of the applicable prison regime, daytime space being afforded more weight when a detainee enjoys wide freedom of movement on prison premises (see Karalevičius v. Lithuania, no. 53254/99, 7 April 2005, § 36; Valašinas, cited above, §§ 103-106). Against the background of the extensive freedom of movement enjoyed by the present applicant in Sniego Prison during the day, the Court does not consider that the lack of space in the sleeping quarters was a determining factor regarding compliance with Article 3.
Furthermore, it has not been shown that any other aspect of the applicant’s conditions of detention at Sniego Prison were inhuman or degrading. In particular, although the applicant was diagnosed with certain minor ailments, possibly caused by his stay there, there is nothing to suggest that his medical condition was not adequately treated or was such as to raise issues under Article 3.
In the light of these circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant’s conditions of detention did not cause him suffering or humiliation of such intensity as to constitute “inhuman or degrading treatment” within the meaning of Article 3 (see Valašinas cited above,
§ 106; also see, by contrast, Iovchev cited above, §137). It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded, and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
6. The applicant also complained that he had not been afforded a fair hearing or an effective right to claim damages for the lack of space in the prison. He invoked Article 6 § 1 to the Convention.
The Government submitted that, apart from the applicant’s action in which the prison administration was the respondent, he should also have brought an action citing the State as the respondent, in view of its alleged failure to ensure the adequate financing of the penitentiary system. Since the applicant did not avail himself of that additional judicial remedy, he failed to exhaust domestic remedies.
The Government further relied on the Court’s decision in the case of Jankauskas v. Lithuania (mentioned above), where an action before the administrative courts was considered an effective remedy capable of affording redress for inadequate detention conditions. In the present case, there had been no evidence of any procedural irregularity or arbitrariness in the courts’ assessment of the applicant’s claims.
The applicant maintained that the domestic courts had dealt with his action in an arbitrary manner.
The Court notes the Government’s objections regarding exhaustion of domestic remedies and the applicability of Article 6 to the impugned court procedure. However, the Court does not deem it necessary to determine these questions, because, even assuming that the applicant had exhausted domestic remedies and that Article 6 had been applicable to the proceedings at issue, this aspect of the case should in any event be rejected for the following reasons.
The Court observes that the subject of the applicant’s complaint in this part of the application does not concern any procedural irregularity in the proceedings before the administrative courts. Indeed, the applicant had ample opportunity to state his case and to challenge the evidence that he considered false before the courts at two levels of jurisdiction. There is no evidence of a lack of subjective or objective impartiality of the courts, nor an indication of any procedural disadvantage of the applicant vis-à-vis the other party to the proceedings (see the Court’s decision on admissibility of
6 June 2002 in the aforementioned Karalevičius case). The applicant essentially complains that, while he was successful in proving that the overcrowding in the prison was incompatible with the domestic law, he nonetheless was denied an effective right to claim damages in this respect.
The Court recalls that, as a general rule, the responsibility for the assessment of the facts and the interpretation of domestic law lie with the national courts. The Court will not substitute its own interpretation for theirs in the absence of arbitrariness. However, the effect of Article 6 § 1 is, inter alia, to require a “tribunal” to conduct a proper examination of the submissions, arguments and evidence, without prejudice to its assessment of whether they are relevant to its decision. Moreover this provision obliges courts to give reasons for their decisions, but cannot be understood as requiring a detailed answer to every argument. Nor is the Court called upon to examine whether arguments are adequately met (Van de Hurk v. the Netherlands, judgment of 19 April 1994, Series A no. 288, §§ 59-61). The question whether a court has failed to fulfil these obligations can only be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case as a whole (Ruiz Torija v. Spain, judgment of 9 December 1994, Series A no. 303-A, § 29).
In addition, the Court recalls that there can be no restrictions which impair the very essence of the right to a court under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, such as a disproportionate financial burden upon an individual to bring a claim for damages against the State (Kreuz v. Poland, no. 28249/95, §§ 52-67, ECHR 2001-VI), or the State’s reluctance to enforce a final court judgment in an individual’s favour (Burdov v. Russia, no. 59498/00, §§ 34-38, ECHR 2002-III). The Court’s case-law emphasises that Convention guarantees rights are to be practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory.
Whilst the principal form of redress in civil proceedings is normally compensation for pecuniary damage, an individual should also be able to claim compensation for non-pecuniary damage where the breach of the rights enshrined in domestic law has been recognised by the national courts (see, mutatis mutandis, Comingersoll SA v. Portugal [GC], no. 35382/97, § 35, 6 April 2000). It is however for the domestic courts to determine the person’s entitlement to and the amount of damages; the Court’s function in this respect is merely to oversee that this important question has not been dealt with in an arbitrary or wholly unreasonable manner.
Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court observes that the domestic courts accepted the essence of the applicant’s claim, finding a breach of the relevant domestic requirements in view of the overcrowding in the sleeping premises of the prison. At the same time, the courts dismissed the applicant’s claim for compensation since he had not shown that he had suffered sufficient damage, there being no evidence that the overcrowding in the sleeping premises had had serious repercussions on his mental and physical health (also see above for the Court’s conclusions in relation to the applicant’s complaints in this respect under Article 3). There is thus no indication that the domestic courts dealt with the matter of non-pecuniary damage in an arbitrary or wholly unreasonable manner.
In conclusion, the Court is satisfied that the proceedings, taken as a whole, met the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded, and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
7. Finally, the applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention that he had been unable to obtain his conditional release, alleging various procedural irregularities in the parole proceedings. The Court recalls, however, that the Convention does not guarantee, as such, the right to parole or release on licence. A sentence of imprisonment after conviction by a competent court is justified at the outset by the original trial and appeal proceedings. Moreover, Article 6 is not applicable to parole proceedings as they do not involve the determination of a criminal charge, or civil right or obligation (Ganusauskas v. Lithuania (dec.), no. 47922/99, 7 September 1999). It follows that this aspect of the case is incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4.
The Court concludes that the procedure under Article 29 § 3 of the Convention should be terminated, and the application rejected as a whole.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the application inadmissible.
S. DolléJ.-P. Costa
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy